Logistics for New Zealand’s Motorised Infantry Future

From 1845 to the present, New Zealand’s military logistics system has continually adapted under pressure. Across the history of the Defence Stores Department, the New Zealand Army Service Corps, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport and today’s Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment, the pattern is consistent. Each generation entered conflict organised for one set of assumptions, then adapted its structures, equipment, trades and methods as war exposed the limits of the old system.

That pattern is visible across the long history of New Zealand military logistics. Colonial forces moved from ad hoc local supply to centralised control of stores. The late nineteenth century saw the creation of a system capable of supporting breech-loading artillery, harbour defence, and increasingly complex imported weapons. The First and Second World Wars forced expeditionary supply, transport, ordnance, movement control, field catering, mobile repair and ammunition systems to mature at scale. Later reforms adjusted stores accounting, entitlement control, field-force logistics, ration packs, mechanical support, combat clothing, and digital supply systems to suit new technology and new structures.

The lesson is simple. New Zealand Army logistics has rarely succeeded because it possessed mass. It has succeeded when it adapted faster than its circumstances collapsed around it.

That lesson now matters again.

In December 2025, the New Zealand Army formally amalgamated 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment and Queen Alexandra’s Mounted Rifles at Linton Military Camp. The new unit retained the name 1 RNZIR and was organised as a Motorised Infantry Battalion, with one sub-unit retaining the QAMR name. NZDF described the change as enhancing the combat readiness of one of the Army’s key outputs, the Motorised Infantry Battle Group.[1]

This is more than a unit name change. It is a force design signal. If the combat arm is reorganising around a motorised infantry model, then the sustainment system must be examined with the same seriousness. A motorised infantry battalion can only be as agile, lethal and survivable as the logistics system that fuels it, arms it, repairs it, feeds it, moves it and replenishes it.

The danger is that the Army could create a modern combat structure sustained by an older, more predictable and increasingly vulnerable distribution model.

The Future Battlefield and the Logistic Problem

The Future Land Operating Concept 2035 anticipated many of the challenges now visible in Ukraine and other contemporary theatres. It described the future land environment as increasingly connected and monitored, crowded, partnered, lethal and complex. It also acknowledged that, by international standards, the New Zealand Army would remain a small army with limited firepower and protection compared with medium or heavy forces. To remain relevant, it would need a qualitative edge built around agility, precision, interoperability, information advantage and force-multiplier strategies.[2]

That description fits the logistics problem exactly.

The modern battlefield is becoming more transparent. Drones, commercial satellites, electronic surveillance, social media, signals intelligence and persistent sensors make movement easier to detect. Convoys, vehicle parks, fuel points, ammunition dumps, replenishment points and headquarters are no longer safely “behind” the front line. They are part of the target set.

At the same time, forces are becoming more dispersed. Lethality drives dispersion, and dispersion drives logistic complexity. Smaller groups need to operate further apart, for longer, with fewer opportunities for large-scale replenishment. This increases demand for batteries, water, medical stores, ammunition, repair parts, communications equipment, drone components, fuel and specialist technical support at the tactical edge.

For a large army, this problem may be partly solved by mass. For New Zealand, mass is not available. The answer must be a more intelligent, distributed and layered sustainment system.

Logistic drones should be part of that system.

But none of this is one-directional. A battlefield transparent enough to expose a fuel point is also transparent enough to reveal a drone charging station, an unmanned ground vehicle route, or a field 3D-printing node. Ukraine’s experience since 2022 shows how quickly forces adapt counter-drone measures, including layered air defence, electronic warfare, decoys and dedicated drone-hunting teams. Any New Zealand logistic drone system must therefore assume that the enemy will adapt to it, just as quickly as it seeks to outmanoeuvre the enemy.

Illya Sekirin makes the same point in Rise of the Machines. His central argument is not simply that drones are important, but that technology only becomes decisive when tactics, organisation, procurement, training and strategy are adapted around it. He compares the drone to the tank, noting that tanks existed in the First World War but did not become operationally decisive until armies learned how to organise and fight around them. The same warning applies to logistics. A drone purchased as equipment is not a capability. A drone integrated into sustainment, reconnaissance, protection, maintenance, counter-drone defence and command arrangements may become one.[3]

This is not theoretical. In March 2025, Reuters reported that the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces warned that NATO armies were not ready for the scale and character of modern drone warfare. His warning was not simply about owning enough drones. It was about the way drones had overturned established doctrine, created a new cost-exchange problem, and forced rapid adaptation in electronic warfare, counter-drone defence, automated targeting and battlefield logistics.[4]

That matters for New Zealand because the point is not the size of Ukraine’s drone programme, which New Zealand cannot and need not copy. The point is the speed of adaptation. Drone warfare is not developing at the pace of traditional platform acquisition. It is developing at the pace of software, commercial manufacturing, field improvisation and battlefield feedback.

A Historical Parallel: The Ordnance Field Park

The New Zealand Divisional Ordnance Field Park of the Second World War provides a useful historical comparison. Formed in July 1941 after the lessons of Greece and Crete, the NZ OFP was a mobile mini ordnance depot supporting the 2nd New Zealand Division. It held spares for the Divisional Workshops and moved forward when workshop elements deployed to support brigades. Its stockholding included motor transport spares, weapon spares and signal stores, carried on vehicles and scaled to support a highly motorised division.[5]

The OFP was not a rear-area warehouse. It was a forward, mobile stockholding system designed to place repair parts and critical stores close enough to the point of need to sustain tempo. When the Division became more mechanised and incorporated an armoured brigade, the OFP reorganised to include separate infantry and armoured sections, later adding reserve vehicle and mobile advanced ordnance depot functions.[6]

The parallel is not exact. The OFP moved spares within a Second World War divisional system. It did not operate through contested, observed airspace under the kind of persistent surveillance now assumed for the future battlefield. Drone logistics inherits the OFP’s logic of forward, mobile stockholding, but it must solve for exposure in a way the OFP never had to.

That principle remains relevant. The OFP solved a problem created by mechanisation, how to keep a mobile force supplied with the spares and controlled stores it needed without waiting for the base depot. Drone logistics solves a related problem created by dispersion and battlefield transparency, how to move small, urgent and high-value items across the last tactical mile without exposing larger vehicles, drivers and replenishment points.

In that sense, logistic drones are not a rejection of New Zealand Army logistics history. They are a modern expression of it.

Drones Are Not a Replacement for Trucks

The first point must be clear. Logistical drones will not replace trucks, containers, aircraft, ships, fuel tankers, forklifts, ammunition vehicles, recovery vehicles, or logistics specialists. Nor should they be presented as a miracle technology.

Their value lies elsewhere.

Drones offer a way to move small, urgent and high-value loads across the “last tactical mile”, the dangerous and inefficient gap between a combat service support node and the soldier, crew, section, troop or detachment that needs something now. A drone does not need to carry everything. It only needs to carry the thing that prevents the task from failing.

That might be radio batteries, a replacement optic, a drone battery, a medical pack, blood products, morphine, water, rations, a weapon spare, a fuse, a small quantity of ammunition, a repair component, a cable, a cryptographic item or technical documentation.

Even here, the detail matters. Carrying medical items and ammunition as interchangeable small loads on the same platform class is not a purely logistical choice. Blood products and medical stores carried under recognised medical markings have a different legal status to ammunition. Any drone tasked across both roles will need clear rules on marking, tasking and interchangeability before it reaches the field.

Ukraine also shows that drone logistics is not theoretical. Sekirin notes that larger multirotor drones have been used to carry water, food and ammunition to encircled soldiers, while unmanned ground vehicles have been used to bring supplies forward, evacuate wounded, clear routes and reduce direct exposure of troops. These examples do not remove the need for conventional logistics, but they show how unmanned systems can fill dangerous gaps where trucks, soldiers or stretcher parties would otherwise be exposed.[7]

The scale of this shift should not be understated. General David Petraeus, drawing on repeated visits to Ukrainian units, has observed that armoured vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles are increasingly unable to survive if spotted by an observation drone, prompting some Ukrainian units to stop using human drivers on resupply routes altogether. Remotely driven vehicles instead carry ammunition, food, water and blood products forward and return with casualties.[8] This is not simply a refinement of last-mile delivery. It suggests that on the most exposed routes, the choice may shift from “driver plus drone support” to “no driver at all.”

In this sense, logistic drones are not bulk transport. They are precision distribution.

This has another historical echo. During the Second World War, New Zealand’s movement control system managed the complex movement of troops, stores and equipment by road, rail, sea and air. The 3rd Division’s Movement Control Unit in the Pacific handled 476 ships, averaging 20 vessels per week, with a staff that never exceeded 17 men. It operated in difficult conditions, often with limited port infrastructure, and adapted its methods to local circumstances.[9]

The modern equivalent is not simply moving more tonnage. It is using every available mode intelligently. Trucks, ships, aircraft, landing craft, forklifts, movement operators and drones all become part of a wider distribution network. The principle is not “drone instead of truck”. It is the right mode for the right load, at the right time, with the least exposure.

Logistic Drones as Multi-Role Systems

Logistic drones should not be thought of only as flying delivery vehicles. In many cases, the same platform that carries a small load can also provide information. A drone sent forward with batteries, medical stores or repair parts can confirm the condition of the route, identify damage to tracks or bridges, observe the proposed delivery point, check whether the receiving element has moved, and provide immediate feedback to the combat service support commander.

This gives logistic drones an ISTAR value. They can contribute to local intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance by observing the ground over which replenishment must occur. Before a vehicle convoy moves, a drone could check a route. Before a replenishment point is opened, a drone could confirm whether the area is clear, concealed and usable. During replenishment, a drone could provide overwatch, detect movement, and warn of threats to the supported force or the logistic element.

Sekirin identifies four characteristics that make drones militarily disruptive: omnipresence, accurate direct fires, discardability and mobility. For logistics, the most important of these is not necessarily direct fire, but omnipresence and mobility. A logistic drone can move a small load, but it can also observe, confirm, warn and report. That means its value lies not only in what it carries, but in what it sees and how quickly it can be repositioned.[10]

This does not mean that every logistic drone should become a strike platform. The more useful model is a family of systems with common components, training, batteries, software and payload standards, but different payload options. Some drones would be optimised for carriage. Some would be optimised for surveillance. Some might carry electronic-warfare or communications relay payloads. A smaller number, under clear command authority, could be armed or fitted for suppressive fire against targets of opportunity that threaten a replenishment operation.

That distinction matters. A drone carrying blood products, medical stores or marked medical supplies raises different legal and ethical issues from a drone carrying ammunition or a weapon payload. Mixing those roles without clear rules would create confusion and risk. If the Army adopts multi-role logistic drones, it will need clear procedures for tasking, marking, payload changeover, authority to arm, control of fires, recovery of unused munitions and post-mission accountability.

For a Motorised Infantry Battalion Group, the most immediate value is probably not in turning supply drones into routine attack drones. It is in using them to support replenishment by seeing first, warning early and reducing exposure. A resupply task could therefore be supported by three drone functions: a reconnaissance drone to check the route and delivery point, a logistic drone to move the load, and, where the threat justifies it, an overwatch or armed drone controlled through normal command and fire-control arrangements.

The Australian-designed SYPAQ Corvo Precision Payload Delivery System provides a useful example of this logic. Developed as a low-cost fixed-wing payload-delivery system, the Corvo PPDS has been supplied to Ukraine and reportedly adapted for reconnaissance and attack roles as well as delivery. Its significance is not that New Zealand should simply buy the same system, but that the design of logistics drones should preserve modularity. Airframes, payload bays, mission software, batteries, training systems, and repair arrangements should enable controlled adaptation rather than lock a platform into a single, narrow role.[11]

The broader lesson is that a drone designed only as a small flying box may quickly become obsolete. A drone family designed around carriage, observation, communications relay and controlled payload change may remain useful for longer.

This would fit the wider argument of this article. Drone logistics is not simply about moving small loads. It is about making sustainment less predictable, less exposed and better informed. A drone that delivers a battery is useful. A drone that delivers a battery and confirms the replenishment route is still usable is more useful. A drone system that can integrate carriage, reconnaissance, communications relay, and protective overwatch is even more useful, provided the roles are controlled rather than improvised.

Logistics in a Contested Drone Environment

Much is now said about operating in a contested environment, but the phrase needs to be understood in practical logistic terms. A contested environment is one in which friendly forces cannot assume that movement, communications, concealment, airspace, supply or evacuation will be uncontested. The enemy is not simply waiting to be engaged by combat troops. It is actively trying to find, disrupt and destroy the systems that allow those combat troops to keep fighting.

For logistics, this changes the problem. A replenishment point is no longer just a place where stores are issued. It is a potential target. A vehicle harbour is not just an administrative pause. It is a detectable pattern. A fuel point, ammunition transfer point, repair team, drone charging site, casualty collection point or field 3D-printing node may all become part of the enemy’s target list. The more predictable the logistic system becomes, the easier it is to find and attack.

Drones intensify this problem because both sides can use them. If friendly forces are sending drones forward to check routes, confirm delivery points, carry stores, and provide overwatch, the opposing force is likely to do the same. Enemy drones may be searching for logistic vehicles, identifying resupply nodes, tracking movement between hides and distribution points, locating command posts, observing unloading activity or waiting for troops to concentrate during replenishment. The danger is not only that a logistic drone may be shot down. The greater danger is that enemy drones may exploit the replenishment process itself to locate and attack the logistics system.

Sekirin describes this as the emergence of battlefield transparency, an operational condition in which movement near the front can be observed and countered. Although his analysis is drawn from Ukraine, the implication for logistics is clear. Supply points, repair nodes, ammunition transfer points, casualty collection points and drone launch sites are all exposed by the same transparency that allows friendly drones to find enemy targets. In that setting, concealment, dispersion and deception are no longer optional fieldcraft. They are logistic survival measures.[12]

The problem is already visible in Ukraine. Reuters has described drone-dominated areas of the front as a “kill zone”, with drones complicating movement, evacuation and routine battlefield activity.[13] Surveillance drones, bomber drones, kamikaze drones and drone-killing drones are all part of the same ecosystem. Both sides use them to find targets, disrupt movement and make routine activity dangerous. For logistics, that means the most dangerous moment may not be the fighting itself, but the pause when vehicles, stores and soldiers concentrate long enough to be seen.

This is why counter-drone protection cannot be treated as someone else’s problem. If logistics units are using drones to find routes and delivery points, enemy drones will look for the same patterns in reverse.

This makes counter-drone protection a logistic requirement. It cannot be treated only as an air defence or combat arms problem. Logistic units will need the ability to detect, avoid, deceive and, where authorised, defeat enemy drones. This may include camouflage, concealment, dispersion, movement discipline, electronic emission control, decoy positions, rapid unloading drills, hardened or concealed charging points, alternate replenishment sites, passive warning systems, electronic countermeasures and short-range physical protection.

Ukraine’s efforts against Shahed-type drones also show the cost-exchange problem. Reuters reported on Ukraine’s layered counter-Shahed effort, highlighting the growing importance of interceptor drones, electronic warfare, and lower-cost countermeasures, as using expensive missiles against cheap drones is economically unsustainable over time.[14] The tactical lesson is clear. Logistic units cannot rely only on high-end air defence. They need low-cost options for warning, concealment, deception, dispersion, and defeat built into their routine.

Physical hardening of routes is another low-cost measure now in routine use. Petraeus has described the main supply routes in Ukraine, which are covered with mesh netting along their entire length to stop drones from striking resupply vehicles, though footage has already shown drones penetrating gaps beneath the mesh.[15] The lesson for New Zealand is not that mesh tunnels are the answer, but that even improvised physical countermeasures are being defeated within months, reinforcing the assumption that any logistic counter-drone measure adopted now must be treated as temporary rather than final.

The old habit of building a replenishment point around convenience will not survive on a monitored battlefield. Logistic sites will need to be selected as tactical positions rather than administrative locations. They will need overhead concealment, covered approaches, rapid entry and exit routes, emission control, and protection against observation from above. Replenishment drills will need to be fast, rehearsed and dispersed, with vehicles and troops spending as little time as possible in one place.

This also affects the design of logistic drone operations. A drone launch site, recovery point or charging location must not become a fixed signature. Batteries, controllers, antennas, maintenance benches, spare parts, and additive manufacturing equipment all create detectable patterns. If these are concentrated in one obvious place, the drone system intended to reduce exposure may instead create a new target.

For the Motorised Infantry Battalion Group, the implication is clear. Drone logistics and counter-drone measures must be developed together. A battalion that can send a drone forward with medical stores but cannot detect an enemy drone observing its replenishment point has only solved half the problem. Likewise, a logistic element that can move stores by drone but cannot conceal, protect or rapidly displace its launch and recovery points may become more vulnerable, not less.

The answer is not to avoid drones. It is to integrate them properly into a contested logistic system. Friendly drones should help logistics see first, move smarter and reduce exposure. Counter-drone measures should help logistics survive when the enemy is trying to do the same. In the future battlefield, every logistics drone sortie should be planned with two questions in mind: what can we see, and what can the enemy see of us?

A Three-Tier Model for New Zealand

The New Zealand Army does not need to copy the drone logistics model of a much larger ally. It needs a small-army model suited to limited people, limited equipment, dispersed operations and an Indo-Pacific operating environment.

In outline, that model runs across three tiers. At the company and combat-team levels, small tactical drones would carry radio batteries, medical supplies, repair parts, documents, small rations, and lightweight ammunition, and would confirm local routes and delivery points. At the Motorised Infantry Battalion Group level, medium-lift drones would move ammunition boxes, larger medical loads, tools, replacement sights, and drone batteries, while also providing route reconnaissance, replenishment overwatch, and communications relay. At brigade or joint level, larger cargo drones and unmanned ground vehicles would move stores between dispersed logistic nodes, reinforce isolated detachments, support forward arming and refuelling, and provide emergency movement when roads are blocked, mined, flooded, observed or under fire.

None of this needs to be built alone. New Zealand’s coalition-dependent posture is exactly the setting in which interoperability multiplies a small army’s reach. Where Australian, United States, British, or Indo-Pacific partners already field logistics drone systems, New Zealand should first look to adopt or adapt those platforms, payload standards, and data links, rather than developing a bespoke architecture from scratch. A small army’s advantage lies in plugging into someone else’s scale, not in reinventing it.

This tiered approach would enable drone logistics to support both warfighting and population-support missions. In the Indo-Pacific, the same systems could assist after cyclones, earthquakes, floods, or volcanic activity, particularly where roads, bridges, wharves, or landing sites are damaged. For New Zealand, this dual-use value matters.

An Indo-Pacific Intra-Theatre Layer

The three-tier model should not exclude larger fixed-wing logistics drones. For New Zealand, the Indo-Pacific operating environment makes them a serious consideration. Many likely tasks will occur across wide maritime distances, dispersed islands, limited ports, short or damaged airstrips, and communities isolated by cyclones, flooding, earthquakes or volcanic activity. In those conditions, a fixed-wing logistic drone may provide a useful bridge between strategic lift and local tactical distribution.

The same geographic logic appears in U.S. Army thinking on Indo-Pacific sustainment. The region’s distances, limited infrastructure, reliance on maritime access and exposure to anti-access/area denial systems mean that ports, airfields and supply depots can no longer be treated as secure or guaranteed. In such an environment, unmanned aerial and ground systems, supported by AI-enabled route planning and predictive logistics, become part of a wider answer to distance, disruption and denied access.[16]

Its value would not lie in replacing C-130s, NH90s, ships, landing craft, or truck movements. It would be in filling the gap between them. A larger fixed-wing drone could move urgent, lightweight, high-value stores between islands, from a main support base to a forward relief point, or from ship to shore, where landing sites are constrained. Loads such as medical stores, radio batteries, water testing kits, satellite communications equipment, repair parts, blood products, mapping equipment or small command-and-control stores are exactly the type of items where speed and reach may matter more than weight.

For that reason, New Zealand should consider a fourth layer in the longer-term model: an intra-theatre fixed-wing logistics drone capability held at joint or operational level. This would sit above the Motorised Infantry Battalion Group model, but should be considered early so that payload standards, charging or fuel arrangements, data links, airspace control, maintenance and interoperability are not designed only around short-range tactical drones.

Tier	Echelon	Platform type	Example loads/roles
1	Company/combat team	Small tactical drones	Radio batteries, medical items, repair parts, documents, small rations, lightweight ammunition, local route checks and delivery-point confirmation
2	Motorised Infantry Battalion Group	Medium-lift drones	Ammunition boxes, larger medical loads, tools, replacement sights, drone batteries, ration modules, route reconnaissance, replenishment overwatch and communications relay
3	Brigade/joint	Larger cargo drones and unmanned ground vehicles	Movement between dispersed logistic nodes, reinforcement of isolated detachments, forward arming and refuelling support, emergency movement when roads are blocked, mined, flooded, observed or under fire
4	Joint/operational intra-theatre	Larger fixed-wing logistics drones	Inter-island movement of urgent medical stores, communications equipment, repair parts, water purification items, batteries, lightweight relief stores and wide-area route or landing-site reconnaissance

This does not change the starting point. The immediate trial should still focus on tier-one and tier-two systems capable of supporting the Motorised Infantry Battalion Group. However, the Indo-Pacific layer should shape the architecture from the beginning. If New Zealand starts with only short-range tactical drones in mind, it may later discover that its payload standards, batteries, data links, training systems and maintenance arrangements do not scale to the very environment in which New Zealand is most likely to operate.

Classes of Supply and the Distribution Network

Coalition logistics doctrine gives this model a sharper edge. The Australian Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Logistics, built on the NATO framework familiar to New Zealand logisticians, divides supply into ten classes, from subsistence through to ammunition, medical stores, repair parts and disaster-relief materiel.[17] That framework is a useful test of where drones add real value and where they do not.

Class	Description	Drone suitability	Comment
I	Subsistence, rations, water and welfare items	Good, limited	Useful for urgent top-ups to isolated posts, but not a substitute for bulk feeding
II	General stores, clothing, individual equipment, tools and maps	Good	Light items can be moved easily, although priority may be lower
III	Fuel and lubricants	Poor	Weight, volume and fire risk make this primarily a truck, tanker or pipeline task
IV	Construction and fortification materials	Poor	Usually too bulky or heavy, except for small tools or fixings
V	Ammunition and explosive ordnance	Good, controlled	Suitable for small urgent natures, not bulk ammunition resupply
VI	Personal demand items	Good, low priority	Light and low risk, but usually less urgent than medical, repair or ammunition loads
VII	Major end items, vehicles, weapons and major equipment	Not suitable	Beyond drone payload limits
VIII	Medical and dental stores	Strong	Often light, urgent and operationally critical
IX	Repair parts	Strong	Well suited to small, forecast-difficult, mission-critical items
X	Non-military programme materiel, including humanitarian and disaster relief stores	Good, selective	Useful in Indo-Pacific relief tasks where access is constrained

The pattern is clear. Drones earn their place where the load is light, time-critical and difficult to forecast. They have little to offer for loads that are heavy, bulky, or hazardous. That is not a weakness in the concept. It is the division of labour the model assumes: trucks and ships carry the mass, drones carry the urgent exception that would otherwise stop the mission.

Doctrine also describes the distribution network as a system of nodes and links, using both automatic “push” replenishment and demand-driven “pull” replenishment. Traditional delivery methods include direct delivery, unit collection, distribution or exchange points, and dumping. Drone delivery is best understood as an additional direct-delivery option layered onto that network. For predictable bulk flows, drones add little. For demand-driven requests for medical stores, repair parts or critical small stores, they may close the gap between the node and the soldier without committing a vehicle or establishing another exposed distribution point.

Aligning Drone Logistics with Doctrine

The case for drone logistics should not rest on novelty. It should be tested against the doctrinal architecture that already governs logistics, including the support dimensions, the functions of combat service support, the types of support, and the enduring principles of logistics.

Doctrine separates logistics into two dimensions. Capability support manages equipment and systems across their life cycle, including acquisition, in-service management, sustainment and disposal. Operations support, delivered as combat service support, provides the tailored resources a force requires to achieve a mission.[18]

Logistic drones sit across both dimensions. In operations, they are combat service support assets that move stores to soldiers. Before operations, they are capability systems that require proper acquisition, training, maintenance, configuration control, cyber protection, spares and disposal plans. A drone fleet that fails in capability support will eventually fail in operations support.

Within the functions of combat service support, drones do not contribute equally. Their strongest relevance is to supply support, maintenance support and health support. They can distribute selected classes of supplies, move urgent repair parts, and deliver time-sensitive medical supplies. They contribute to transport and movement as one mode among many, but they do not replace movement control. Their contribution to personnel services is limited, perhaps small urgent documents or low-volume welfare items. Their contribution to engineer sustainability is also limited, with drones able to move small tools or survey items but not bulk construction materials.

This unevenness is useful. It checks enthusiasm. Drone logistics is not a universal solution. It is a specific tool for supply, maintenance and health support at the tactical edge.

The three-tier model also maps onto doctrinal types of support. Company-level drones resemble integral support, held and operated within the sub-unit. Battalion-group drones provide close support, linking companies to the battalion’s combat service support system. Brigade or joint-level drones provide general support across a wider force. The proposed Indo-Pacific intra-theatre layer sits above this tactical model and belongs more naturally at joint or operational level. It would support movement between islands, bases, ships and forward relief points rather than provide immediate company-level resupply.

Drone logistics should also be judged against the enduring principles of logistics: responsiveness, simplicity, economy, flexibility, balance, foresight, sustainability, survivability and integration.[19]

Drones can improve responsiveness by closing the last tactical mile faster than a scheduled vehicle run. They support economy when they avoid committing a vehicle and crew to a very small load. They improve flexibility when a tiered model allows company, battalion and brigade options. They can improve survivability by reducing exposure of drivers and vehicles on dangerous routes.

But each advantage has a tension. A poorly standardised fleet adds complexity rather than simplicity. Battery, spares and training overheads may erode economy. Over-investment in drones at the expense of trucks and drivers would break balance. A drone charging site becomes a new target set. Integration with RNZALR structures, airspace control, allied data links, and maintenance systems must be deliberately designed.

Read this way, drone logistics is not a departure from established logistic principles. It is a test of whether those principles can be applied to a new technology before the battlefield forces the issue.

Risks and Limits

The risks are real, and they deserve more than a token mention.

Drones can be jammed, hacked, intercepted, shot down, misrouted or grounded by weather. They may expose friendly locations through electronic signatures or predictable flight paths. Payloads are limited. Batteries create their own resupply burden. Maintenance, software updates, cyber protection and operator training all require discipline.

Airspace control is not a footnote. Logistic drones will need to be deconflicted with artillery, aviation, allied forces and, in Indo-Pacific contingencies, civil air traffic. That is an institutional problem as much as a technical one, and it needs to be solved before fleets grow, not after.

Multi-role systems also create command and legal complexity. A drone used for logistics, ISTAR, and strike cannot be treated as a simple store-delivery platform. The Army would need clear rules for payload configuration, authority to arm, control of fires, medical marking, target confirmation, airspace coordination and accountability after the mission. Without those controls, the flexibility of a multi-role drone could become a source of confusion rather than advantage.

Sekirin’s analysis also reinforces the need to develop drone and counter-drone systems together. He argues that UAS and counter-UAS activity must be coordinated so that friendly drones are not jammed or shot down by friendly systems, and that enemy drones are consistently detected and defeated. For logistics, that means counter-drone measures cannot be excluded from the sustainment plan. They must be integrated into replenishment points, repair nodes, drone launch sites, charging areas and movement routes from the beginning.[20]

The contested drone environment also means that logistic units must be given active counter-drone responsibilities. It will not be enough to rely on higher-level air defence or assume that combat units will always provide protection. Replenishment points, repair nodes, casualty collection points, drone launch sites and charging areas will all need organic or closely integrated counter-drone measures. These do not need to begin as complex systems. They may start with detection, warning, concealment, decoys, drills, emission control and simple defeat options. But they must be built into logistic structures from the start, because the enemy’s drones will be hunting the same logistic patterns that friendly drones are trying to exploit.

The Indo-Pacific layer adds further risks. Long-distance fixed-wing drones require navigation resilience, weather tolerance, recovery options, airspace permissions, communications coverage, maintenance depth and reliable launch and recovery procedures. These are not simple tactical systems. They would require joint-level oversight, but the need to solve those problems is precisely why they should be considered early.

But these are not arguments against drone logistics. They are arguments for starting early, deliberately and with realistic expectations of what the first systems will and will not do.

Scaling the Capability

History warns that equipment alone is not capability. Major-General Mackesy’s 1939 report made this point before the language of modern Integrated Logistics Support existed. He was not simply asking whether New Zealand had enough weapons. He was asking whether equipment, ammunition, people, storage, workshops, transport, training and mobilisation arrangements could function as a wartime system.[21]

The same test should be applied to drones.

A drone without trained operators, maintainers, batteries, charging systems, spares, airspace procedures, payload packaging, electronic protection, safety rules and logistic doctrine is not a capability. It is an item on charge.

To avoid this, drone logistics must be scaled properly. The Army should define standard drone loads, standard packaging, standard carriage methods and standard replenishment tasks.

Load type	Possible contents
Platoon emergency resupply	Batteries, water, medical stores and ammunition
Casualty support	Dressings, analgesia, blood products and evacuation aids
Ammunition support	Fuzes, tools, packaging material, labels and inspection equipment
Maintenance support	Belts, filters, cables, optics, lubricants and small assemblies
Signals support	Batteries, antennas, handsets, cables and replacement components
Disaster-relief support	Water purification items, medical stores, communications equipment and lightweight relief supplies
Indo-Pacific intra-theatre support	Medical stores, satellite communications equipment, water testing kits, mapping equipment, repair parts, batteries and small command-and-control stores

This would move drone logistics from novelty to system. It would allow the Army to plan, train, account for, package, prioritise and replenish using drones as part of the sustainment architecture.

Dispersed Logistics for a Transparent Battlefield

A motorised infantry force will require fuel, ammunition, spares, water and maintenance. These are heavy, visible and predictable demands. On a monitored battlefield, predictability is dangerous.

The answer is not to abandon conventional replenishment, but to reduce concentration and increase options. Stores should be held in smaller, dispersed nodes. Replenishment should be more frequent, more varied and less predictable. Some movement should still be by truck, some by protected vehicle, some by foot, some by air, some by water and some by drone.

Drone logistics supports this by enabling smaller quantities to be moved as needed without committing a vehicle column to every task. It can reduce the number of soldiers exposed on routine but dangerous runs. It can support units operating away from main routes. It can help sustain dispersed observation posts, sensor teams, anti-armour teams, engineers, medical teams, communications detachments and dismounted infantry.

It also supports the logic of a motorised infantry battalion. The battalion’s combat power will depend on the ability to shift between mounted and dismounted activity. Its logistics must be able to do the same. Trucks and protected mobility vehicles can move bulk forward. Drones can then move selected stores across the final exposed gap.

In the Indo-Pacific, the same logic applies across distance rather than across the battlefield. A community cut off by a cyclone, an airstrip damaged by flooding or a small island with limited landing options presents the same basic logistic problem: a gap between where stores are held and where they are urgently needed. Fixed-wing logistics drones may help close that gap for selected loads, while ships, aircraft and landing craft continue to move the mass.

Reverse Logistics and the Return Journey

Drone logistics should not be thought of only as forward delivery. It also has a reverse logistics role.

The withdrawal of the 3rd New Zealand Division from the Pacific between 1944 and 1945 showed the scale and complexity of bringing equipment, stores and vehicles home. More than 50,000 ordnance items, 3,274 vehicles, 25 tanks, tonnes of ammunition and large quantities of NZASC supplies had to be recovered, inspected, sorted, repaired, redistributed or disposed of. This was achieved without modern material-handling equipment or information technology, relying instead on infrastructure, discipline, labour, and determined logistical control.[22]

Modern forces must still recover, inspect and redistribute equipment. In a future conflict, drones could assist with the small but urgent reverse movement of repairable components, classified stores, medical samples, damaged optics, electronic modules, batteries, intelligence items and technical evidence. They could also assist ammunition technical staff by moving small components, samples or documentation from forward locations to specialist support nodes.

This reverse flow matters. A distribution system that only pushes stores forward, but cannot recover repairable or accountable items, soon becomes wasteful and blind.

Procurement, Experimentation and Environmental Fit

The Army should not wait for a perfect drone logistics programme.

The history of New Zealand military logistics shows that wartime adaptation often compressed years of development into months. During the Second World War, New Zealand absorbed new vehicles, created workshop systems, expanded ammunition infrastructure, built depots, trained tradesmen, introduced ration systems and deployed new support organisations at a pace that would challenge modern peacetime procurement processes.

Nor was interwar New Zealand simply asleep before 1939. The Army had been updating doctrine, conducting training exercises, experimenting with motor vehicles and artillery modifications, ordering modern equipment and developing mobilisation scales. Its problem was not total ignorance, but the limits imposed by money, personnel and time.[23]

There is another lesson from New Zealand’s post-war history of clothing and equipment. The Army did not always get new equipment right the first time. Combat clothing, tropical uniforms and camouflage shelters were repeatedly trialled, modified, accepted, rejected or left to waste out as experience showed whether they suited New Zealand, Southeast Asia or operational conditions. The development of Drill Green uniforms, tropical combat clothing, DPM, and camouflaged lightweight shelters demonstrates that equipment had to be tested for climate, terrain, user acceptance, durability, camouflage value, local manufacture, and sustainment cost.[24]

That same principle applies to drones. A logistic drone that performs well on a manufacturer’s demonstration field may fail in the wind, rain, bush, dust, humidity, salt air, electromagnetic clutter or austere conditions in which New Zealand forces may operate. Payload claims may not survive rough handling. Battery endurance may collapse in cold weather. Noise and visual signature may expose supported units. A system that appears efficient in a trial may prove difficult to repair, recharge, transport, account for or integrate with existing logistic procedures.

The camouflage shelter trials of the 1960s offer a useful model. The Army did not simply select a pattern from a catalogue. Samples were tested in New Zealand and then by 1 RNZIR and 161 Battery in Southeast Asia under varying terrain, light and climate conditions. User feedback shaped the final direction of the project.[25]

The same method should be used for drone logistics. Soldiers and logisticians should test systems in the field, report what works, identify what fails and force the support system to adapt before procurement locks the Army into the wrong answer.

A better approach would be controlled risk. The Army should buy small numbers of different systems, test them hard, break them, discard weak options, adapt useful ones and scale what works. Trials should not be confined to demonstrations. They should be embedded in field exercises, live firing, logistic rehearsals, disaster relief training and Motorised Infantry Battalion Group development.

Ukraine’s procurement experience reinforces this point. In March 2025, Reuters reported that Ukraine planned to sharply increase purchases of domestically produced FPV drones in 2025, after purchasing more than 1.5 million the previous year. The important lesson for New Zealand is not mass for its own sake. It is the procurement rhythm: domestic adaptation, rapid production, battlefield feedback and the willingness to modify quickly when the enemy adapts.[26]

That procurement rhythm is now visible in Ukraine’s daily logistics and in its factories. Petraeus has described a Ministry of Defence–linked ordering platform, built with limited nonprofit funding rather than a major defence contract, through which units can order drones, components and optics from several hundred pages of listings and receive delivery within days.[27] Whatever New Zealand builds does not need to match this scale, but the underlying model, a fast, unit-facing ordering system tied directly to field feedback, is closer to the procurement rhythm this article is arguing for than a traditional annual bulk-buy cycle.

European militaries are drawing similar conclusions. Reuters reported in June 2026 that European defence leaders were calling for a shift toward mass-produced, lower-cost systems such as drones and interceptors, alongside electromagnetic warfare, air defence and faster procurement.[28] For a small army, that reinforces the need to buy small numbers early, test hard, avoid bespoke over-complexity and keep the learning cycle short.

Most importantly, logisticians and technical trades must be central to the process. New Zealand’s armourers evolved from civilian gunsmiths and part-time artificers into disciplined technical specialists because changing weapons technology demanded inspection, repair, maintenance and local expertise.[29] Drone logistics will require the same kind of technical foundation. Operators, maintainers, battery managers, electronic technicians, payload packers, software support personnel, ammunition specialists, movements staff and supply personnel must all be involved from the beginning.

Whether this becomes a distinct trade, an added skill set within the RNZALR, or a task shared across existing corps is a structural choice the Army will need to make early, before procurement, not after it. That choice will determine who trains whom, which units own the capability, and what current roles absorb the extra load.

Drone logistics is not just an aviation issue. It is a sustainment issue.

Maintenance, Additive Manufacturing and Repair Thresholds

Maintenance support must be integrated into RNZALR and unit support processes, including additive manufacturing where it is safe, economical, and tactically useful.

Drone fleets consume propellers, motors, bearings, arms, connectors, antennas, batteries, housings, landing skids, payload brackets and software updates at a tempo very different from traditional vehicle maintenance. Many of these items are light, fragile, frequently damaged and difficult to forecast accurately. A small stock of controlled spares will still be essential, but 3D printing could reduce downtime by allowing units to produce selected non-critical parts, such as protective housings, battery trays, cable clips, antenna mounts, payload adaptors, guards, brackets, training aids and repair jigs, without waiting for the normal supply chain.

This is not speculative. The United States Army has introduced drone training that includes 3D printing, printer maintenance, CAD and STL file handling, and building and repairing drones using printed components.[30] The United States Marine Corps has also demonstrated the potential of in-house drone production through its HANX project, a modular 3D-printed drone developed by 2nd Maintenance Battalion. Reporting on the project also notes that specialist infrastructure, assembly skills and calibration remain limiting factors.[31] More broadly, additive manufacturing is increasingly being treated as a way to shorten lead times, reduce dependence on long supply chains, and improve the availability of spare parts, particularly where the right digital files, materials, and quality controls are in place.[32]

For the New Zealand Army, the practical model should be controlled and tiered. At operator level, small systems should be maintained by trained users with controlled spares packs and simple replacement thresholds. At the battalion or brigade level, RNZALR-supported drone maintenance cells should carry field printers, approved print files, materials, inspection tools, and standard repair procedures. More complex parts, structural components, and any safety-critical items should remain under technical control, whether produced by an approved workshop, purchased through the supply system, or replaced as an assembly.

New Zealand should not attempt to maintain every cheap drone like a major fleet asset. Many smaller drones should be treated as semi-expendable, with rapid repair or replacement taking priority over prolonged workshop recovery.

Additive manufacturing also introduces risks that must be managed. A printed part is only as good as its material, file, printer settings, operator skill and inspection process. Research into additive manufacturing cyber risk has shown that compromised print files or printer firmware can weaken parts without obvious visual signs, including drone components.[33] For that reason, the Army would need an approved digital parts library, controlled printer settings, material traceability, basic inspection standards and clear rules on what may, and may not, be printed in the field.

Used properly, 3D printing would not be a shortcut around engineering discipline. It would be a way of pushing limited, controlled manufacturing closer to the tactical edge.

What This Would Take

None of this needs to wait for a perfect programme, but it does need a practical starting point.

A realistic first step would be a battalion-level trial of tier-one and tier-two systems within the next one to two years, run alongside Motorised Infantry Battalion Group training and Indo-Pacific disaster-relief exercises rather than as a standalone activity. It would need a small standing cell, likely single figures of trained operators and maintainers per battalion group initially, drawn from existing RNZALR and combat trades rather than a large new establishment. Numbers should be scaled only as trial results justify them.

It would also need a procurement approach that buys several competing systems in small numbers, rather than a single system in bulk, so the Army learns what breaks down before it commits to a fleet.

Australian experience is also relevant. The ADF’s recent investment in small uncrewed aerial systems indicates that regional partners are already moving toward broader adoption of tactical drones.[34] Australia is also investing in counter-drone systems, including low-cost interceptor drones and directed-energy options, in response to lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East.[35] New Zealand should use that momentum. The aim should be interoperability where possible, shared payload standards where practical, and sustainment arrangements that do not isolate New Zealand from the systems its closest partners are already adopting.

At the same time, the joint force should begin a parallel concept trial for larger fixed-wing logistics drones in Indo-Pacific-style scenarios. This does not need to be a major acquisition. It could begin as a proof-of-concept activity using a small number of systems to test inter-island payload movement, ship-to-shore delivery, airspace coordination, communication range, weather tolerance, and recovery procedures. The purpose would be to understand whether such systems can fill a genuine gap between strategic lift and local distribution, not to create another fleet before the requirement is proven.

Multi-role employment should also be included in the trial design. A replenishment serial should not only ask whether a drone can carry the load. It should ask whether the drone system can locate the delivery point, confirm the route, provide overwatch, relay communications, and, under controlled conditions, support the protection of the replenishment activity. The purpose would be to develop procedures before the pressure of operations forces improvisation.

Trial activity should also include enemy drone play. The trial should also include AI-enabled sustainment planning. The U.S. Army article notes that AI can assist logisticians by forecasting demand for fuel, ammunition, medical supplies and spare parts, integrating threat intelligence, terrain and weather data, optimising delivery routes, and helping planners model sustainment under contested conditions.[36]

This direction of travel matters specifically for logistics. Petraeus has argued that unmanned systems in Ukraine are moving from being remotely piloted to being algorithmically piloted, with the operator shifting from controlling each action to approving actions an AI system proposes under a given set of conditions.[37] For sustainment, that trajectory points toward logistics drones that increasingly plan their own routing and flag risks without a human directing every movement, which is a further reason for New Zealand to build its data links, payload standards, and command arrangements to accommodate more autonomy than today’s tactical drones require.

For New Zealand, the practical starting point need not be a large AI programme. It could begin with simple decision-support tools that help a battalion group compare replenishment routes, predict consumption, identify exposed nodes and test whether drone delivery, vehicle movement or pre-positioning is the better option.

Every replenishment serial should assume that opposing forces are using drones to locate, track and target the logistic system. This would force the trial to test concealment, dispersion, counter-drone warning, launch-site protection, rapid displacement and the discipline of operating without creating obvious patterns.

This is a modest first commitment, not a re-equipment programme. Its purpose is to generate the field evidence, on payload, endurance, maintainability, integration, trust, command arrangements, role separation and survivability in a contested drone environment, that the Army cannot get from a concept document alone.

Conclusion

There is a deeper continuity here. Colonial armourers, Defence Stores clerks, wartime ordnance parks, movement control teams and reverse logistics units all did more with less by adapting before failure became visible. Drone logistics is the next step in that same habit, not a break from it.

The creation of the Motorised Infantry Battalion at Linton gives the New Zealand Army an opportunity to rethink both sustainment and combat organisation.

If 1 RNZIR is to be more agile, adaptable, lethal and survivable, then its logistics must be more agile, adaptable, distributed and survivable as well. A motorised infantry force sustained only by predictable vehicle movement, centralised stockholding and traditional replenishment habits risks being organised for yesterday’s battlefield.

Drones will not solve every logistic problem. They will not replace the logistician, the combat driver, the storeman, the ammunition technician, the maintainer, the medic or the movement operator. But they can extend their reach. They can reduce exposure. They can increase responsiveness. They can help a small army make limited resources go further.

They can also make logistics better informed. A drone that delivers stores may also confirm the route, observe the delivery point, warn of threats and support the protection of the replenishment task. Under strict control, selected systems may also provide suppressive or defensive effect against threats of opportunity. That potential should be explored, but not confused with routine carriage. A medical drone, a supply drone and an armed overwatch drone are not the same thing simply because they may share airframes, batteries or software.

In the Indo-Pacific, larger fixed-wing logistics drones may also help close the gap between strategic lift and the final point of need. They should not distract from the immediate tactical requirement, but they should be considered early, as New Zealand’s most likely operating environment is maritime, dispersed, and infrastructure-limited.

But the most important point is that drones are not only a friendly advantage. If New Zealand can use drones to find routes, confirm delivery points and support replenishment, so can an adversary. Future logistic structures must therefore include counter-drone measures as part of their own survival. The logistician of the future will not only move stores. They will have to protect the movement, conceal the node, manage signatures, and understand what the enemy can see from above.

Sekirin’s argument that the drone is the new tank is a useful warning, but the New Zealand lesson is slightly different. The issue is not whether drones alone will decide wars. It is whether the Army can reorganise enough of its sustainment system to exploit them before an adversary exploits them against us. In that sense, the logistic drone is not merely a new delivery method. It is a test of whether a small army can adapt its doctrine, structures, trades, procurement and training quickly enough for the next battlefield.

The next adaptation should also be digital. Drones, counter-drone measures and AI-enabled sustainment should not be treated as separate projects. In a contested Pacific environment, they are connected parts of the same problem: how to move, protect, predict and prioritise sustainment when ports, airfields, roads, communications and supply chains are under pressure.

New Zealand’s logistic advantage has never been mass. It has been adaptation.

The next adaptation should begin now.

Notes

[1] “NZ Army Evolves with Creation of New Motorised Infantry Battalion at Linton Military Camp,” 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/nz-army-evolves-with-creation-of-new-motorised-infantry-battalion-at-linton-military-camp/.

[2] New Zealand Army, Future Land Operating Concept 2035: Integrated Land Missions (New Zealand Defence Force, 2026). https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/Future-Land-Operating-Concept-2035-1.pdf.

[3] I. Sekirin and A. Simms, Rise of the Machines: Drone Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War – Tactics, Operations, Strategy (Helion, 2026).

[4] “NATO armies unprepared for drone wars, Ukraine commander warns,” Reuters, 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-armies-unprepared-drone-wars-ukraine-commander-warns-2025-03-05/.

[5] “NZ Divisional Ordnance Field Park 1941–1945,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2018, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2018/12/10/nz-divisional-ordnance-field-park-1941-1945/.

[6] McKie, “NZ Divisional Ordnance Field Park 1941–1945.”

[7] Sekirin and Simms, Rise of the Machines: Drone Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War – Tactics, Operations, Strategy.

[8] “David Petraeus on What Taiwan Can Learn from Ukraine’s Battlefield Experience” (event transcript, Hudson Institute, July 28, 2025),” Hudson Institute, 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.hudson.org/events/david-petraeus-what-taiwan-can-learn-ukraines-battlefield-experience.

[9] “Unsung Enablers: A Snapshot of New Zealand’s Army Movements Control in World War II,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2024, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2024/11/17/unsung-enablers-a-snapshot-of-new-zealands-army-movements-control-in-world-war-ii/.

[10] Sekirin and Simms, Rise of the Machines: Drone Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War – Tactics, Operations, Strategy.

[11] “Sypaq Corvo Precision Payload Delivery System,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, updated 2026/07/06, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sypaq_Corvo_Precision_Payload_Delivery_System.

[12] Sekirin and Simms, Rise of the Machines: Drone Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War – Tactics, Operations, Strategy.

[13] “Enter the kill zone: Ukraine’s drone-infested front slows Russian advance,” Reuters, 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/enter-kill-zone-ukraines-drone-infested-front-slows-russian-advance-2025-07-17/.

[14] “Inside Ukraine’s drive to defeat the dreaded Shahed drone,” Reuters, 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/inside-ukraines-drive-defeat-dreaded-shahed-drone-2026-04-29/.

[15] David Petraeus, “David Petraeus on What Taiwan Can Learn from Ukraine’s Battlefield Experience” (event transcript, Hudson Institute, July 28, 2025).”

[16] “AI-Driven Sustainment in Contested Logistics — Preparing for LSCO in the Indo-Pacific,” Army Sustainment, 2026, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.army.mil/article/290024/?fbclid=IwY2xjawS317dleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFWNFJxTXRXemYzbXQ4V0JTc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHiPzttWAmnu0CoTnfavoODvZkI_UyYmc9gOH3uV14J4VOZazo9RZz8vQTLGP_aem_PbeTT4l-sv07R3nlkEtsKg.

[17] Australian Army, “Logistics,” Land Warfare Doctrine 4.0  (2018).

[18] Australian Army, “Logistics.”

[19] Australian Army, “Logistics.”

[20] Sekirin and Simms, Rise of the Machines: Drone Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War – Tactics, Operations, Strategy.

[21] “Mackesy’s Warning: Modernisation, Mobilisation, and Early Integrated Logistics Thinking in the New Zealand Army,” “To the Warrior his Arms” History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and its predecessors, 2026, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2026/05/10/mackesys-warning/.

[22] “Bringing the 3rd New Zealand Division Home: The Unheralded Triumph of New Zealand’s Greatest Military Reverse Logistics Operation,” “To the Warrior his Arms” History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and its predecessors, 2024, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2024/09/05/bringing-the-3rd-new-zealand-division-home-the-unheralded-triumph-of-new-zealands-greatest-military-reverse-logistics-operation/.

[23] “Debunking the Myth of New Zealand’s Military Unpreparedness During the Interwar Period,” “To the Warrior his Arms” History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and its predecessors, 2024, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2024/07/21/debunking-the-myth-of-new-zealands-military-unpreparedness-during-the-interwar-period/.

[24] “Development of NZ Army Combat Clothing, 1955–1980,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2023, accessed 20 March, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2023/02/11/development-of-nz-army-combat-clothing-1955-1980/.

[25] “NZ Army Camouflage 1949-1979,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2023, accessed 20 March, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2023/04/29/nz-army-camouflage-1949-1979/.

[26] “Ukraine to Sharply Raise Purchases of Home Produced FPV Drones in 2025,” Reuters, 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sharply-raise-purchases-home-produced-fpv-drones-2025-2025-03-10/.

[27] David Petraeus, “David Petraeus on What Taiwan Can Learn from Ukraine’s Battlefield Experience” (event transcript, Hudson Institute, July 28, 2025).”

[28] “Europe Rethinks How It Fights War as Russian Threat Looms,” Reuters, 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/europe-rethinks-how-it-fights-war-russian-threat-looms-2026-06-29/.

[29] “New Zealand Military Armourers, 1840–1900,” “To the Warrior his Arms” History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and its predecessors, 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2025/06/03/new-zealand-military-armourers-1840-1900/.

[30] “US Soldiers learn to 3D print and fly drones in new Army course — 3-week boot camp covers everything from printer maintenance to FPV operation,” Tom’s Hardware, 2026, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.tomshardware.com/3d-printing/u-s-soldiers-learn-to-3d-print-and-fly-drones-in-new-army-course-3-week-boot-camp-covers-everything-from-printer-maintenance-to-fpv-operation.

[31] “US Marine Corps develops first 3D printed drone with no China-sourced parts, dubbed HANX — modular design makes it quick to adapt from reconnaissance to one-way attack, and other duties,” Tom’s Hardware, 2026, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.tomshardware.com/3d-printing/us-marine-corps-develops-first-ndaa-compliant-3d-printed-drone-dubbed-hanx-modular-design-makes-it-quick-to-adapt-from-reconnaissance-to-one-way-attack-and-other-duties.

[32] F. Marinho de Brito et al., “Design Approach for Additive Manufacturing in Spare Part Supply Chains,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics 17, no. 2 (2021),https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2020.3029541.

[33] Hammond Pearce et al., “Flaw3d: A trojan-based cyber attack on the physical outcomes of additive manufacturing,” IEEE/ASME Transactions on Mechatronics 27, no. 6 (2022); Sofia Belikovetsky et al., “dr0wned–{Cyber-Physical} attack with additive manufacturing” (paper presented at the 11th USENIX workshop on offensive technologies (WOOT 17), 2017).

[34] “Australian government supports new drone radio production line,” Army Technology, 2025, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.army-technology.com/news/australian-drone-radio-line/?cf-view.

[35] “Albanese Government to invest up to $7 billion in counter drone defence,” Australian Government, 2026, accessed 1 July, 2026, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2026-04-21/albanese-government-invest-up-7-billion-counter-drone-defence.

[36] Lydia Aguirre, “AI-Driven Sustainment in Contested Logistics — Preparing for LSCO in the Indo-Pacific.”

[37] David Petraeus, “David Petraeus on What Taiwan Can Learn from Ukraine’s Battlefield Experience” (event transcript, Hudson Institute, July 28, 2025).”