The RNZAOC in South Vietnam, 1965–1972.

The Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps did not deploy a formed unit to South Vietnam. There was no RNZAOC depot, field park or company bearing the Corps’ badge. Instead, small numbers of RNZAOC officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers served throughout the New Zealand and Australian command and logistic systems.

They worked at Headquarters New Zealand V Force in Saigon, Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force at Nui Dat, the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau, and in the Logistic Support Element originally attached to 161 Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery. At any one time, the RNZAOC presence was usually only a handful of personnel—approximately two officers and four other ranks—but their responsibilities connected New Zealand units with an extensive multinational supply network.[1]

This was a corps without a unit, but not without a function. Its personnel helped manage the flow of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, technical stores, clothing, equipment and distinctly New Zealand items through a logistic system spanning New Zealand, Australia, South Vietnam and the vast American supply establishment.

Designing the support system

When 161 Battery was selected for service in South Vietnam in 1965, one option considered was to re-equip the battery completely from United States Army stocks. That would have simplified some aspects of supply, but it would also have required the battery to abandon much of its established equipment and procedures.[2]

The arrangements negotiated in Saigon during May and June 1965 instead produced a hybrid system. Colonel Leo Kermode and the Director of Equipment, Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Hassett, worked with Australian and American authorities to divide responsibility for supporting the New Zealand force.[3]

Broadly, the system operated as follows:

Supply source	Principal responsibilities
New Zealand	New Zealand-owned weapons and vehicles, national items, badges, shoulder titles, distinctive clothing and equipment not available from allied sources
United States	Most ammunition, petrol, oils and lubricants, rations, medical supplies, fire-control equipment and other commonly used operational stores
Australia	Clothing, vehicle spares, general stores, technical support, medical support and access to Australian supply and maintenance organisations[4]

A sixteen-man Logistic Support Element was formed under Lieutenant Piers Martin Reid. It contained personnel from several New Zealand corps and was intended to connect 161 Battery with the Australian logistic company supporting the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, at Bien Hoa.[5]

The arrangement gave the small New Zealand force access to a logistic establishment far beyond anything it could have deployed independently. It also created an enduring administrative challenge: responsibility for an item depended on who owned it, who normally supplied it, whether it was common to allied forces and which nation was expected to pay for it.

Bien Hoa: making the system work

The New Zealand Logistic Support Element was divided between Saigon and Bien Hoa. Some personnel served at Headquarters New Zealand V Force, while the remainder formed a battery section of the Light Aid Detachment and an augmented stores section supporting 161 Battery.

The original intention was to integrate the New Zealand element with the Australian Logistic Support Company. This did not happen immediately. The stores and workshop personnel initially moved into the Australian area but were subsequently accommodated with the battery, creating a small and comparatively independent New Zealand support organisation.

That arrangement was not entirely satisfactory. On 9 January 1966, the original policy was restored: the New Zealand element was placed under the Australian company’s operational and technical control, its personnel moved into the Australian area, and its stores were amalgamated with Australian holdings.[6]

The integration was important because 161 Battery arrived with several items that were not standard Australian or American equipment. Its Land Rovers, for example, were too small and underpowered for some of the tasks demanded of them, while replacement parts generally had to come from New Zealand. An American depot might hold thousands of vehicle components, but it could not supply a part for a vehicle that the United States Army did not use.

There were also substantial differences in scale. American depots operated in tons, pallet loads and large standard packs. New Zealand might require only a carton or a single component. The American system increasingly relied on computerised accounting, while New Zealand procedures remained largely manual. Requisitions therefore had to be translated not only between national organisations, but between fundamentally different concepts of scale and stock control.[7]

The L5 105-mm pack howitzer created further demands. It was light enough to be carried by helicopter, but tropical conditions reduced helicopter lifting capacity. Trials established that four sorties were required to move one gun, its detachment and twenty-five rounds. The weapon’s light construction also made it susceptible to damage when repeatedly fired at high charges. Maintaining the battery’s operational availability consequently depended upon an effective combination of engineering maintenance and ordnance supply.[8]

From Bien Hoa to Vung Tau and Nui Dat

The Australian commitment expanded from a battalion group into the brigade-sized 1st Australian Task Force during 1966. The task force established its operational base at Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province, while its main logistic base was built approximately thirty-five kilometres away at Vung Tau.

161 Battery moved to Nui Dat on 16 May 1966. Its Logistic Support Element was detached and established within the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau.[9]

Vung Tau offered port facilities, an airfield and a comparatively secure location, but the logistic base had to be developed on sand hills and a former rubbish tip. From primitive beginnings it grew into a large complex containing more than 1,300 service personnel and approximately 500 locally employed civilians.

The sand was a constant adversary. Tent pegs worked loose, trenches collapsed, vehicles bogged down and furniture sank into the ground. Fine sand entered weapons, engines, typewriters, stores, food, clothing and bedding. Maintaining an accurate and serviceable stockholding in such conditions required continual preservation, inspection and housekeeping.

At Nui Dat, second-line ordnance support was provided by an Ordnance Field Park. The initial element became the 6th Ordnance Field Park Detachment and, on 1 February 1968, was redesignated as the 1st Ordnance Field Park.

At Vung Tau, third-line support was provided successively by the 1st Composite Ordnance Company, the 2nd Composite Ordnance Depot and, from 16 November 1967, the 2nd Advanced Ordnance Depot.[10]

The 2nd Advanced Ordnance Depot included supply-control, stores, ammunition, vehicle, laundry and bath elements. It held approximately 15,000 line items, generally based on ninety days of operating stock together with theatre reserves. New Zealand ordnance personnel posted to the Australian system could therefore find themselves working within an organisation of a scale not encountered at home.[11]

The supply chain

New Zealand’s supply system in Vietnam was not a single pipeline. It was a network.

Headquarters New Zealand V Force in Saigon managed national requirements, financial arrangements, local purchase and liaison with allied headquarters. New Zealand-specific stores were forwarded through national channels, while Australian and American organisations supplied most common operational requirements.

Urgent stores, mail and personnel could be moved by air. RNZAF and allied aircraft connected New Zealand, Singapore, Saigon and Vung Tau. Routine Australian flights also linked Saigon, Vung Tau and Nui Dat.

The principal daily connection between the logistic base and the task force was the road convoy from Vung Tau to Nui Dat. Priority demands, ice and perishables normally moved each day. Ammunition and petroleum products were carried forward three times a week, while ordnance and engineer stores generally moved twice weekly. Including the various classes of supply, 1st Australian Logistic Support Group could be tasked with approximately forty-six truckloads each day, seven days a week.

Each convoy was affected by road conditions, vehicle availability and enemy activity. Daily logistic conferences at Vung Tau considered demands, priorities, transport, road closures, intelligence and the back-loading of salvage. Operationally urgent items could be carried by special vehicle, aircraft, helicopter or watercraft when the normal system was too slow.[12]

Bulk resupply arrived by sea. HMAS Jeparit normally visited at intervals of about six weeks and was frequently loaded close to its 4,300-ton capacity. Ammunition, explosives and vehicles were discharged into barges before the ship came alongside to unload the remainder of its cargo. Other vessels, including HMAS Sydney, supplemented this service during unit rotations and major movements.

The system was vast compared with the number of New Zealanders it supported. Its size offered considerable advantages, but it also made New Zealand-owned equipment difficult to track. An item might pass through a New Zealand headquarters, an Australian depot, an American support unit and a forward Australian ordnance installation before reaching its user.[13]

Ammunition

Ammunition supply was one of the clearest examples of coalition dependence. Approximately ninety per cent of Australian and New Zealand ammunition requirements came from United States sources. The remainder came from Australia and included 105-mm artillery ammunition, 20-pounder ammunition for Centurion tanks and some small-arms ammunition.

Australian ammunition was initially held at a sub-depot at Vung Tau. It was later moved to the United States ammunition establishment at Long Binh, allowing both American- and Australian-supplied ammunition to be issued through one location. Australian and New Zealand ammunition technicians were attached at various times to undertake identification, safety, quality surveillance and disposal duties.

American road transport delivered ammunition for the task force directly to the Task Force Maintenance Area at Nui Dat. This reduced double handling, but it did not remove the need for ordnance oversight. Different manufacturers, markings, lots, fuzes and national accounting arrangements still had to be reconciled.[14]

Payment arrangements were equally complex. New Zealand initially paid a fixed monthly charge for American support. From 1967, artillery ammunition was charged according to recorded expenditure. A 105-mm round was priced at US$25.62, increasing to US$31.49 in March 1969.

Fuzes became the subject of separate negotiation. New Zealand was presented with a retrospective account of approximately $567,000, but the United States agreed not to charge for the fuzes fitted to more than 120,000 shells fired between 1965 and 1968. At approximately nine dollars per fuze, this represented a substantial saving. The episode nevertheless demonstrated that coalition logistics involved finance and accounting as well as the physical delivery of ammunition.[15]

The wider Australian ordnance framework

The Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps provided the organisational framework within which most New Zealand ordnance personnel worked. The system included the 2nd Advanced Ordnance Depot at Vung Tau, the Ordnance Field Park at Nui Dat and numerous specialist stores sections supporting workshops, engineer units, armoured units and communications organisations.

Ordnance soldiers did not remain permanently behind wire. Field Park personnel provided forward detachments during major operations, operated bath and water-point equipment, assisted with patrols and perimeter defence, guarded stores and accompanied convoys. At Fire Support Base Coral in May 1968, the forward Task Force Maintenance Area group operated in a position repeatedly attacked by rockets and mortars. Stores and records were damaged, and a complete stocktake was required after the detachment returned.

Even fixed installations remained within range of enemy action. The Ordnance Field Park area at Nui Dat came under mortar fire, while personnel at both Nui Dat and Vung Tau were required to maintain defensive positions and perform sentry and local-security duties. Logistic service in Vietnam could not be separated completely from the operational environment.[16]

New Zealanders in the wider system

Approximately five per cent of New Zealand V Force was employed in the supply chain. At the peak of the New Zealand commitment in November 1968, thirty of the 543 New Zealand personnel in South Vietnam were serving with the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group. Across the entire deployment, 137 New Zealanders from all corps and services served with the group.

These figures must not be mistaken for RNZAOC strength. New Zealanders in 1st Australian Logistic Support Group included personnel from many corps and services. The RNZAOC component was only one part of that wider national contribution.

Some RNZAOC personnel also served at American installations. Corporal Frankie Te Waru Hohepa, for example, worked at the United States Army depot at Long Binh. Such attachments provided direct access to the American supply system and gave New Zealand personnel experience with methods, stock levels and accounting procedures far larger than those normally encountered in New Zealand.[17]

A contemporary Corps newsletter provides a particularly clear picture of this dispersed presence. In 1970, Major Malcolm Ross was serving at Headquarters 1st Australian Logistic Support Group; Lieutenant Maxwell Newnham and Sergeants Rex Pennell and Terence Morrissey were attached to the 2nd Advanced Ordnance Depot at Vung Tau; Corporal Brian Moore was attached to 161 Battery at Nui Dat; and Corporals Ronald Henderson and Joseph Bolton were at Headquarters New Zealand V Force in Saigon. They did not constitute an RNZAOC unit, but collectively formed a small network of ordnance specialists distributed across the principal New Zealand and Australian logistic organisations.[18]

The surviving reports also reveal what these arrangements meant at the individual level. Corporal Joseph Bolton reported that he was attached to the Australians as a local-purchase clerk in the United States Supply Office in Saigon. The appointment placed him at the intersection of the New Zealand, Australian and American supply systems. He also hoped to gain an attachment to the United States Army ammunition sub-depot at Long Binh so that he could return to ammunition work.[19]

The New Zealand headquarters in Saigon underwent several changes of title:

•  Headquarters New Zealand Army Detachment, 29 June 1964–1 July 1965
•  Headquarters New Zealand V Force, 2 July 1965–5 March 1972
•  Headquarters New Zealand Army Training Group Vietnam, 6 March–21 December 1972

Published nominal rolls sometimes combine these headquarters under the general title ‘HQ V Force’. The distinction is nevertheless useful when establishing when and under what organisation an individual served.[20]

RNZAOC personnel in the ordnance and logistic system

The following register is confined to personnel who served in South Vietnam as members of the RNZAOC, in RNZAOC appointments or in direct ordnance-support roles.

It does not include soldiers who served in the New Zealand rifle companies or Army training teams as members of other corps and transferred to the RNZAOC after their Vietnam service. Those personnel are covered in the earlier V Force Ordnance article.

Headquarters New Zealand V Force

•  Corporal Joseph Seymour Bolton
•  Sergeant John Walter ‘Boots’ Byrom
•  Corporal Ronald John Henderson
•  Warrant Officer Class Two John Edward Hancox
•  Corporal James Nelson Harvey
•  Corporal Frankie Te Waru Hohepa
•  Lance Corporal Kevin Gerard Moriarty
•  Lance Corporal Colin William Roulston
•  Lieutenant Mark David Stuart
•  Sergeant Bruce Raymond Swain
•  Corporal Barry James Taylor
•  Corporal William Douglas Waugh

Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force

•  Corporal Michael Maurice Barker
•  Private Colin Robert Von Richenbach

1st Australian Logistic Support Group

•  Corporal Brian William Calvey
•  Major Arthur John Campbell
•  Corporal Ernest Reichter Clegg
•  Captain Gary Malcolm Corkin
•  Lieutenant Ronald Leslie Cross
•  Staff Sergeant Alfred Stephenson Day
•  Captain Kevin John Dreyer
•  Lieutenant James Bernard Finnerty
•  Sergeant Dennis Leslie Goldfinch
•  Corporal Laurence Roy Hawkins
•  Staff Sergeant Tamamarakau Te Kingi Hiini
•  Sergeant Arthur James Keeler
•  Staff Sergeant Derek John Keen
•  Lieutenant Terence David McBeth
•  Corporal Phillip Ross Miller
•  Sergeant Terence Norman Morrissey
•  Lieutenant Maxwell Frederick Newnham
•  Staff Sergeant Rex Pennell
•  Lieutenant Piers Martin Reid
•  Major Malcolm John Ross
•  Staff Sergeant Roy Harold Staniford
•  Sergeant Barry Thomas Thompson
•  Sergeant Darrell Samuel Todd
•  Staff Sergeant James William Twist

161 Battery Logistic Support Element and attachments

•  Corporal Laurence Charles Collier
•  Staff Sergeant Ronald Albert Eveleigh
•  Lieutenant David Ralph Hughes
•  Sergeant Maurice John Lynch
•  Corporal Brian David Moore
•  Corporal Wilford Stuart Neshausen
•  Private Stephen Rex Shepherd

Private Stephen Shepherd was an RNZAOC storeman attached to 161 Battery. Although he has sometimes been recorded as a gunner because of that attachment, he remained a member of the RNZAOC throughout his service.

The register reflects the dispersed nature of RNZAOC service in South Vietnam. These personnel did not belong to a single corps unit. They occupied appointments across headquarters, depots, field installations and the logistic element supporting the New Zealand artillery battery.[21]

Withdrawal

The withdrawal of 161 Battery in May 1971 began another demanding phase for the logistic system. Weapons, vehicles, technical equipment and stores had to be identified as New Zealand-owned, Australian-supplied, American-supplied, leased, expendable or suitable for disposal in theatre.

The work could also extend an individual’s service in Vietnam. Sergeant John Byrom’s one-year tour was prolonged specifically so that he could assist with the withdrawal of stores from South Vietnam. His extended tour provides a personal example of the additional accounting, identification and disposal work generated as the New Zealand commitment contracted.[22]

The battery’s non-standard and borrowed holdings, including its M2A2 105-mm howitzers, had to be returned through the appropriate channels. Serviceable New Zealand equipment was prepared for shipment, while surplus and unserviceable stores were accounted for, transferred or disposed of.

The Australian withdrawal required ordnance personnel to maintain support while simultaneously reducing the organisation that provided it. During 1971, the 1st Ordnance Field Park moved most of its organisation from Nui Dat to Vung Tau, leaving a detachment to operate controlled stores, the self-service store, the monthly bulk break and the equipment wash point.

Quarantine regulations required vehicles and equipment returning to Australia to be thoroughly cleaned. Tanks, vehicles and stores exposed to Vietnamese soil had to pass inspection before loading. Other material, including deteriorated tentage, webbing and tarpaulins, could be written off, destroyed or transferred rather than shipped home.

On 15 September 1971, the 1st Ordnance Field Park at Vung Tau assumed responsibility for supporting the remaining Australian forces from the 2nd Advanced Ordnance Depot. Its personnel had to determine a final stock scaling that would meet every remaining operational demand without leaving a large surplus when the force closed.

This required continuous stocktaking, outscaling and reconciliation. The field park still received and issued stores, but its holdings had to decline in step with the force. It closed for business on 31 January 1972. Personnel and equipment then returned to Australia, where the final reconciliation of stock and records continued until June.[23]

New Zealand’s headquarters and training commitment continued until December 1972. Personnel who served with the training teams as members of other corps and subsequently transferred to the RNZAOC fall outside the scope of this article.

Conclusion

The RNZAOC contribution in South Vietnam cannot be measured by unit titles or the size of a formed deployment. There was no New Zealand ordnance depot and no RNZAOC field park. Instead, individual corps personnel were inserted into a multinational system and expected to make it work for a small national force.

They translated New Zealand requirements into Australian and American supply procedures, maintained national accountability, handled technical and general stores, supported ammunition supply, assisted with local purchase and helped sustain 161 Battery and the wider New Zealand contingent.

The arrangement offered New Zealand access to a supply chain of immense capacity, but it also exposed the difficulties of relying on allies whose equipment, accounting systems, stock scales and administrative practices differed from its own.

The achievement of the RNZAOC personnel in Vietnam was therefore one of professional adaptability. Dispersed across Saigon, Vung Tau, Nui Dat and allied installations, they ensured that New Zealand soldiers received the stores, weapons, ammunition and equipment they required. The Corps went to Vietnam without a unit of its own, yet its purpose—providing the warrior with the means to fight—remained unmistakable.

Notes

[1]J. S. Bolton, A History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (Trentham, New Zealand: Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 1992), 193; Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Unit Notes—Vietnam Veterans List,’ VietnamWar.govt.nz, accessed 1 September 2026, https://vietnamwar.govt.nz/unit-notes-vietnam-veterans-list.

[2]Ian McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War: A History of Combat, Commitment and Controversy (Auckland: Exisle Publishing, 2010), 80–81.

[3]McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, 80–81.

[4]Bolton, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 193–94; McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, 80–81.

[5]McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, 80–81.

[6]Ian R. Finlayson, Supporting the Commitment: Australian Army Logistics in South Vietnam, 1962–1973 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2026), 72–73; McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, 95–97.

[7]Bolton, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 194.

[8]McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, 95–97.

[9]Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Unit Notes—Vietnam Veterans List.’

[10]Robert McKie, ‘V Force Ordnance,’ To the Warriors Their Arms, 25 August 2017, https://rnzaoc.com/2017/08/25/vietnam-ordnance/; Ordnance Field Park Vietnam Association, ‘1st Ordnance Field Park 1968–72,’ accessed 1 September 2026, https://ofpvietnam.wordpress.com/1st-ordnance-field-park-1968-72/.

[11]Bolton, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 194–96.

[12]Bolton, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 196–98; Ordnance Field Park Vietnam Association, ‘About Us,’ accessed 1 September 2026, https://ofpvietnam.wordpress.com/about-us/.

[13]Bolton, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 196–98.

[14]Bolton, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 196.

[15]McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, 617.

[16]Ordnance Field Park Vietnam Association, ‘1st Ordnance Field Park 1968–72’; Ordnance Field Park Vietnam Association, ‘About Us.’

[17]McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, 460; McKie, ‘V Force Ordnance.’

[18] Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, ‘A Contribution from Vietnam,’ Pataka: RNZAOC Newsletter, no. 70/3 (1970), 2, https://rnzaoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/no-3-70.pdf.

[19] Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, ‘Overseas News,’ Pataka: RNZAOC Newsletter, no. 70/1 (1970), 2, https://rnzaoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/no-1-70.pdf.

[20]Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Unit Notes—Vietnam Veterans List’; McGibbon, New Zealand’s Vietnam War, 588–89.

[21]McKie, ‘V Force Ordnance’; Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Unit Notes—Vietnam Veterans List.’

[22] Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, ‘Overseas Tours Completed,’ Pataka: The Magazine of the RNZAOC, no. 2/72 (1972), 1, https://rnzaoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/no-2-72.pdf.

[23]Ordnance Field Park Vietnam Association, ‘1st Ordnance Field Park 1968–72.’