Mackesy’s Warning

Modernisation, Mobilisation, and Early Integrated Logistics Thinking in the New Zealand Army

In May 1939, Major-General P. J. Mackesy, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., submitted his report on the Military Forces of New Zealand. Prepared after a short but intensive inspection, the report has not acquired the same place in New Zealand defence history as the earlier assessments associated with Scratchley, Jervois, Fox, Babington, or Kitchener. Those reports, and the reforms or controversies that followed them, are comparatively well recorded. Mackesy’s report, by contrast, remains less visible, despite being written only months before the outbreak of the Second World War and despite its clear relevance to New Zealand’s final pre-war military preparations.

Read in isolation, Mackesy’s report appears to belong to the pre-war world of Imperial defence planning, Territorial Force mobilisation, coast defence, ammunition reserves, mechanisation, and ordnance services. Yet when considered against the principles of modern capability management and Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), it reveals something more enduring. Mackesy did not create integrated logistics thinking in the New Zealand Army, nor did he use the terminology of modern ILS. Rather, his report provides an early and clear example of the same underlying logic, that equipment, ammunition, personnel, training, storage, mobilisation, reserves, finance, procurement lead times, accommodation, and technical support had to be treated as connected parts of one military capability system.

This distinction matters. Mackesy was not arriving to modernise an entirely dormant Army. By 1939, the New Zealand Army was already in the throes of modernisation. Modern equipment had been ordered, some had arrived, and the Army staff were attempting to keep pace with contemporary British doctrine, mechanisation, mobilisation planning, and the implications of modern weapons. The problem was not total inactivity, but incompleteness. Mackesy’s significance lay in reinforcing an existing direction of travel, exposing the remaining gaps, and turning modernisation from a matter of equipment acquisition into a whole-force capability problem.

The later expansion of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) demonstrates why that distinction matters. By 1942, the Ordnance Depot and Ordnance Workshops establishments had both been expanded and treated as Dominion establishments. In other words, manpower was managed nationally across New Zealand rather than permanently assigned to a single depot or workshop. The depot system provided the national machinery for receipt, accounting, storage, issue, and distribution, while the workshop system provided the technical capacity for inspection, repair, modification, maintenance, and specialist support. This wartime growth shows that the support problem Mackesy identified was not theoretical. Once modern equipment, ammunition, vehicles, and technical stores entered service, the Army had to build the support organisation beneath them. In modern ILS terms, the Mission System forced the Support System to expand.

The modern NZDF ILS Capability Management Handbook describes ILS as critical to cost-effective planning, integration, optimisation of through-life support, and the sustainment of safe capability. It links ILS to affordability, Whole-of-Life Cost awareness, preparedness, availability, and Defence resilience. Mackesy was not applying that formal framework in 1939, but his method, and the Army’s subsequent treatment of Recommendations 42 and 43, anticipated many of its principles.

This article, therefore, does not argue that Mackesy invented modern ILS, nor that his report can be used as a direct measure against contemporary logistics practice. Rather, it argues that Mackesy’s report provides a historically useful example of integrated logistics thinking before the term existed. It also offers contemporary logisticians a professional reminder, not a judgment, that military capability is only credible when the support system beneath it is understood, resourced, tested, and sustained.

Put simply, Mackesy was asking whether the Army’s equipment, people, stores, transport, workshops, training and facilities could work together as a real wartime system.

For readers unfamiliar with modern logistics terminology, the central idea is simple. A military capability is more than the equipment listed on an inventory. It also depends on the people trained to use it, the ammunition and spares held for it, the facilities that store and maintain it, the transport that moves it, and the systems that account for and sustain it. Modern ILS gives that idea a formal structure. Mackesy’s report shows that the same logic was already evident in the New Zealand Army’s planning in 1939.

Major-General P. J. Mackesy and the circumstances of the report

Major-General Pierse Joseph “Pat” Mackesy, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., was a senior British Army officer of the Royal Engineers and a decorated veteran of the First World War. He was commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1902, served in a range of operational and staff appointments, and by the late 1930s was an experienced Imperial officer with a professional background in command, training, mobilisation, and military organisation. His standing mattered because he was not a casual visitor or political commentator, but a senior officer able to assess New Zealand’s forces against contemporary British military practice.

Major-General Pierse Joseph “Pat” Mackesy, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., photographed in 1937, two years before he was asked to report on the Military Forces of New Zealand. Image: Walter Stoneman, National Portrait Gallery, London

His report on the Military Forces of New Zealand was prepared at the request of His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand after the Pacific Defence Conference. The United Kingdom authorities made his services available to the New Zealand Government for a few weeks, and he began his investigations in Auckland on Monday, 1 May 1939. By 22 May 1939, he had submitted his report to Army Headquarters, Wellington.[1]

Mackesy was careful to acknowledge the limits of his inquiry. He stated that it was impossible for one individual, in only three weeks, to investigate in detail all the activities and points of importance connected with the military forces of a country the size of New Zealand. Nevertheless, he had sought to obtain a fair and thorough general view of the problems involved. He also emphasised that his recommendations would require careful investigation before any action could be taken.[2]

He also made clear that the report was not an official British Government or War Office directive. The opinions, views, and recommendations were his own, and he alone was responsible for them. This gave the report a direct and candid tone. Mackesy told the Prime Minister that he understood plain and honest words were required, but he also stressed that where he criticised what he found, he did not intend criticism of individuals or groups. His purpose was to look at conditions as they existed and suggest how they could reasonably be improved.[3]

The timing was significant. The report was written only months before the outbreak of the Second World War, at a moment when the deteriorating international situation was testing New Zealand’s defence assumptions. Mackesy’s task was therefore not academic. He was examining whether the New Zealand Army, particularly its Territorial Force, mobilisation arrangements, equipment, ammunition reserves, training system, accommodation, and ordnance services, could meet the demands likely to be placed upon it in war.

Mackesy in the tradition of British defence inspection reports

Mackesy’s 1939 report also sits within a longer tradition of British officers inspecting, advising upon, and reporting on New Zealand’s defences. He was not the first senior Imperial or British officer to examine the country’s military arrangements, nor was his report an isolated event. From the late nineteenth century onward, New Zealand had repeatedly looked to British professional military expertise to assess its defence organisation, coastal protection, volunteer forces, mobilisation arrangements, and military efficiency.

Among the better-known examples were Major-General Sir Peter Henry Scratchley and Major-General Sir William Francis Drummond Jervois, whose work on colonial defence helped shape the port and coastal defence systems of Australia and New Zealand in the late nineteenth century.[4]

The pattern continued with Lieutenant-Colonel Francis John Fox, appointed Commandant of the New Zealand Permanent Militia in 1892. Fox inspected the Volunteer Force and produced a highly critical 1893 report, which caused a public and political stir for its uncompromising comments on the force’s condition and officers’ fitness for command.[5] Major-General Sir James Melville Babington, Commandant of the New Zealand Defence Forces from 1902, also produced formal reports on the Defence Forces of New Zealand.[6] Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener, later inspected New Zealand’s forces during his 1910 tour, contributing to the defence reform debate around compulsory military training and the wider reorganisation of Dominion defence.[7]

These earlier inspections and reports are reasonably well recorded in New Zealand defence history. Their recommendations, political reception, and subsequent reforms are traceable through parliamentary papers, newspapers, biographies, and later historical writing.

Mackesy’s report is different. Although it was prepared at a critical moment, only months before the outbreak of the Second World War, it appears to have attracted comparatively little sustained attention. The surviving archival record confirms that Mackesy submitted a formal report on the Military Forces of New Zealand on 22 May 1939, and that a later file addressed Recommendations 42 and 43, concerning modern equipment and ammunition reserves. Yet compared with Scratchley, Jervois, Fox, Babington, and Kitchener, there is a noticeable dearth of readily accessible secondary discussion on Mackesy’s findings and their subsequent influence. One possible reason is timing: war intervened almost immediately, shifting attention from broad reform to urgent mobilisation. Another may lie in Mackesy’s later wartime reputation. Within a year of advising New Zealand, Mackesy was associated with the controversial Norwegian campaign and was recalled after his handling of the Narvik operation enraged Prime Minister Winston Churchill. According to later accounts, Mackesy refused to commit his troops to what he considered “the sheer bloody murder” of an “arctic Gallipoli”, prompting Churchillian accusations of “feebleness and downright cowardice”. Although he avoided court-martial, Mackesy never again held field command.[8] While there is no clear evidence that New Zealand consciously suppressed or distanced itself from Mackesy’s report for that reason, his subsequent fall from favour may have made him a less convenient figure to acknowledge publicly.

That relative silence is significant. Mackesy’s report came at the hinge point between peacetime economy and wartime mobilisation. Unlike some earlier reports, it was not followed by a long period of public debate or gradual reform. The declaration of war rapidly overshadowed the broader recommendations, and attention appears to have narrowed to the most immediately actionable parts of the report, especially Recommendations 42 and 43 on modern equipment and ammunition reserves.[9] The follow-up papers show that these recommendations were implemented as a programme covering ammunition reserves, modern fighting and technical equipment, and the magazine, garage, and storage accommodation required to support them.[10]

For that reason, Mackesy’s report deserves to be recovered and re-examined. It belongs in the same broad tradition as Scratchley, Jervois, Fox, Babington, and Kitchener, but its significance lies in its timing. It was a final pre-war external assessment of the New Zealand Army before the demands of the Second World War forced theory into action. Its relative neglect has obscured the degree to which the Army’s wartime mobilisation priorities, especially modern equipment, ammunition reserves, mechanisation, and storage, were already being framed through a recognisably integrated logistics lens.

A report on the Army as a system

The structure of Mackesy’s report is revealing. Its table of contents moved beyond narrow questions of manpower or equipment and examined Regular Forces, the Territorial Force, the Special Reserve, Cadet Units, training, accommodation, mobilisation preparations, mechanisation, modern fighting equipment, ammunition, trained reserves, publicity, ordnance services, and financial administration.[11]

This breadth is important. In modern capability language, Mackesy was examining a range of inputs that would now be recognised across the PRICIE construct. The NZDF ILS Handbook describes PRICIE as the fundamental inputs to capability, covering Personnel, Research and development, Infrastructure and organisation, Concepts, doctrine and collective training, Information technology, and Equipment, logistics and resources.[12]

Mackesy did not use that vocabulary, but his report covered many of the same areas. He did not treat modern equipment as a stand-alone answer. He saw that equipment without trained personnel, ammunition, storage, transport, maintenance, and mobilisation arrangements did not constitute real military capability.

Mackesy’s central concern was that New Zealand’s military arrangements gave the appearance of a force without necessarily providing the substance of one. His analysis was rooted in a simple but enduring question:

Could the New Zealand Army actually perform the tasks expected of it in war?

He concluded that, under existing conditions, it could not do so with confidence.

Mission System and Support System

The modern NZDF ILS Handbook describes capability from an ILS perspective as the combination of a Mission System and a Support System. The Mission System is the part of the capability that directly performs the operational function, such as aircraft, ships, armour, communications, or, in Mackesy’s case, modern weapons and vehicles. The Support System is the totality of support infrastructure, resources, services, people, processes, and systems that enable the Mission System to be supported and operational objectives to be achieved.[13]

This distinction helps explain why Mackesy’s report remains relevant. His concern was not only that the New Zealand Army lacked sufficient modern Mission Systems, such as contemporary weapons, vehicles, and technical equipment, but also that the supporting system around them was incomplete. Ammunition reserves, trained personnel, mobilisation depth, magazines, garages, stores, training arrangements, and sources of supply all had to be provided if modernisation was to become a real capability.

In modern ILS terms, Mackesy was not simply asking, “What equipment does the Army need?” He was asking, “What system of support is required to make that equipment usable, sustainable, and available in war?”

The modern ILS view of capability as a Mission System supported by an integrated Support System. Although Mackesy did not use this terminology in 1939, his report considered many of the same elements, including personnel, training, equipment, ammunition, reserves, storage, transport, facilities, and supply.

Not modernisation from a standing start

It is important not to overstate Mackesy’s role as though he arrived in New Zealand to instruct an entirely dormant Army to modernise from scratch. By 1939, the New Zealand Army was already in the throes of modernisation. The process was slow, constrained by finance, dependent on British supply, and uneven in its results, but it was real. Since the mid-1930s, the Army had been placing orders for modern equipment, updating mobilisation planning, experimenting with mechanisation, and attempting to keep pace with contemporary British doctrine.

This is an important qualification to the common claim that New Zealand entered the Second World War wholly unprepared and equipped no better than it had been in 1918. The reality was more complex. Material deficiencies remained serious, but the Army was not intellectually or administratively stagnant. From 1934, the Director of Ordnance Services, Major Thomas Joseph King, worked to ensure that key ordnance positions were held by competent and experienced personnel. At the same time, New Zealand staff followed British doctrinal developments as closely as practicable, including changes in Field Service Regulations, mechanisation, training, mobilisation planning, and the implications of modern weapons.[14]

The same was true in the Army Service Corps. Although New Zealand’s transition from horse transport to motor transport was slow, it was already underway by the time Mackesy arrived. As late as the mid-1930s, each military district still retained one horse transport section and only one motor transport section, yet the direction of travel was clear. Major-General J. E. Duigan reported in 1937 that successful wartime transportation depended upon the efficient employment of civil resources and that the Army was now dependent on the motor industry for its mobility. Trials conducted in 1936 and 1937 had shown that motor transport could replace horse-drawn unit transport, and Duigan stated that this would be universally adopted in future. By 1938, despite the limited number of trucks and lorries held by the New Zealand Military Forces, Territorial Army Service Corps units were already conducting increasingly motorised convoy training.[15]

The archival record supports this more nuanced interpretation across both equipment and logistics. A 1938–39 Ordnance file shows a range of modern stores and equipment either on order, received, or being managed through requisition. These included Bren guns and components, Bren gun maintenance spares, 3-inch mortars, 2-pounder anti-tank guns and equipment, wireless sets No. 9 and No. 11, anti-gas equipment, Boys anti-tank rifles, portable cookers, tentage, medical equipment, signalling equipment, and large quantities of ammunition.[16]

The follow-up material to Mackesy’s report makes the same point. In relation to specialised vehicles, it noted that equipment requirements had to be considered as a whole and obtained from the most suitable source. It also recorded that the Army Department’s existing programme already provided for 39 Bren carriers, with six received and a further twelve on order, and eighteen six-wheeled field artillery tractors, with twelve previously ordered tractors already received.

Mackesy’s significance, therefore, was not that he invented the requirement for modernisation. Rather, he validated and sharpened it. He exposed the scale of the gap between partial modernisation and a force capable of mobilisation to the war establishment. The Army had begun to move beyond its First World War equipment base, and its staff were attempting to keep abreast of modern doctrine and equipment trends. Still, the process remained incomplete, under-resourced, and insufficient for the demands that war would impose.

A fair reading is that Mackesy reinforced an existing direction of travel and gave it strategic urgency. He turned modernisation from a series of equipment orders, doctrinal updates, and mobilisation preparations into a whole-force capability problem. The issue was no longer simply whether New Zealand had begun ordering modern equipment. It was a question of whether that equipment, together with trained personnel, ammunition reserves, storage, transport, maintenance, mobilisation depth, and supporting infrastructure, could be integrated into a force ready for war.

The iceberg effect

The modern ILS Handbook uses the “iceberg effect” to explain why ILS is necessary. It notes that capability planning and procurement have traditionally focused on equipment acquisition, while failing to account for Whole of Life Cost and Through Life Management. The visible acquisition cost is on the surface, while beneath it lie the larger, often less visible costs and requirements associated with operations, distribution, maintenance, training, technical data, supply support, test and support equipment, software, and disposal. The Handbook states that all these elements should now be considered early and planned across the life cycle, from policy and strategy to disposal.[17]

The ILS “iceberg effect”, showing how acquisition cost is only the visible portion of capability cost. Mackesy’s 1939 report anticipated this logic by linking modern weapons and vehicles to ammunition reserves, storage, magazines, garages, training, personnel, and procurement lead times.

Figure X: The ILS “iceberg effect”, showing how acquisition cost is only the visible portion of capability cost. Mackesy’s 1939 report anticipated this logic by linking modern weapons and vehicles to ammunition reserves, storage, magazines, garages, training, personnel, and procurement lead times.

Mackesy’s report and the follow-up work on Recommendations 42 and 43 show that the Army was already grappling with a similar problem in 1939. Modern weapons could not be considered in isolation. They required ammunition reserves, practice stocks, storage, magazines, garages, trained personnel, replacement depth, and a procurement plan that recognised lead times and sources of supply.

In other words, Mackesy saw beneath the surface of acquisition. He understood that the mere purchase of modern equipment would not solve the Army’s problem unless the less visible support system was also resourced.

The danger of paper capability

One of Mackesy’s most powerful themes was the difference between paper strength and usable strength. His examination of the Auckland defences showed this clearly. The 13th Heavy Battery required 338 all ranks for war manning of the fixed defences, but at the time of his visit, it had only a fraction of that number available. The Fortress Battalion had a war establishment of 773 all ranks, but a strength of only 320, of whom about sixty were considered physically unfit for war service.[18]

This was more than a manpower complaint. Mackesy was testing the force against its assigned task. A unit might exist on paper, but if it could not be manned, trained, equipped, and mobilised when required, it was not a real capability. This is directly comparable with modern capability assurance. Modern ILS and capability management similarly ask whether a capability is available, supportable, deployable, and sustainable, not merely whether it exists on an equipment register or establishment table.

Mackesy’s criticism was especially relevant because the Army’s mobilisation model relied heavily on the Territorial Force expanding rapidly in an emergency. He saw that this expansion would not be simple. Men might have little or no training. Units would need to be built up from inadequate peacetime strengths. Composite units would disintegrate on mobilisation into their component regiments. The gap between peacetime organisation and wartime effectiveness was therefore not administrative. It was operational.

Normalisation of deviance and the acceptance of military risk

A further way to read Mackesy’s report is as an early warning against what would now be called the normalisation of deviance.[19] The New Zealand Army had not suddenly become under-prepared in 1939. Rather, the condition Mackesy described had developed over time. Reduced establishments, obsolete equipment, inadequate reserves, limited training opportunities, insufficient accommodation, and reliance on rapid improvisation had gradually become accepted as normal peacetime conditions.

This was not necessarily the result of neglect by any one individual. Mackesy himself was careful not to criticise individuals or bodies of individuals, and he acknowledged that earlier decisions may have appeared necessary at the time. The problem was more systemic. Successive economies, assumptions, and deferrals had created a situation in which the Army’s deficiencies were visible but had not yet forced decisive correction.[20]

The extent to which these deficiencies had already become visible was demonstrated by the so-called “Four Colonels’ Revolt” of May 1938. Colonels Neil Lloyd Macky, C. R. Spragg, A. S. Wilder, and F. R. Gambrill publicly challenged official assurances about the state of the Territorial Force, arguing that New Zealand’s citizen army had been reduced below what was required for national defence, that recruiting and training were inadequate, and that morale had suffered. Their action breached military regulations and led to their posting to the retired list, but it also exposed the depth of professional unease within the senior Territorial leadership. Mackesy’s report should therefore be read against this background. He was not the first to identify the Army’s weaknesses.[21] Still, his external assessment gave formal shape to concerns that experienced New Zealand officers had already risked their careers to express.

In modern ILS terms, Mackesy was forcing decision-makers to confirm the impact of inaction. The ILS Handbook states that ILS principles include recognising constraints, focusing ILS effort where it will deliver the greatest benefit, and confirming the impact of any inaction.[22] Mackesy’s report did precisely that. He showed that what had become administratively familiar in peace would become dangerous on mobilisation.

The Army could still parade, train, administer, and maintain the outward form of a military system, but the underlying support structure was fragile. It lacked sufficient trained personnel, modern equipment, ammunition reserves, replacement weapons, accommodation, and mobilisation depth. Because those weaknesses had existed for some time without immediate disaster, they risked being accepted as the norm.

The declaration of war changed the calculation. What had been tolerable as a peacetime economy became a mobilisation risk. Mackesy’s report, therefore, demonstrates the danger of treating chronic under-resourcing as an acceptable condition. The absence of an immediate crisis had made shortages familiar, and that familiarity had made them appear manageable. Yet war removes the margin that peacetime under-resourcing depends upon.

Mackesy’s anti-improvisation principle

Mackesy’s report contains one of the clearest statements of the principle that underpins modern ILS. He warned that unless matters had been studied in peace, confusion and unnecessary loss of life and treasure would result when war forced unexpected action. He accepted that improvisation in war was possible but added that improvisation without previous thought and training was a costly expedient.[23]

This is, in essence, the logic of ILS. It exists to prevent an organisation from discovering too late that the ammunition reserve is inadequate, the spares are unavailable, the technical documentation is missing, the training pipeline is incomplete, the facilities are unsuitable, the supply chain lead time is too long, or the force cannot be sustained under operational conditions.

Mackesy’s language was that of 1939. The principle was timeless. A capability must be prepared before it is required. It cannot be wished into existence on mobilisation.

Recommendations 42 and 43, from report to action

The strongest evidence of ILS-like thinking appears in the follow-up work on Mackesy’s Recommendations 42 and 43, concerning the supply of modern equipment for the Army and the provision of ammunition reserves. The memorandum submitted by Major-General J. E. Duigan, Chief of the General Staff, in August 1939 divided the matter into three connected parts.

Part A dealt with the provision of reserve ammunition for weapons already in possession or already ordered. Part B dealt with the provision of modern fighting and technical equipment for the Territorial Force, together with the necessary ammunition reserves for new weapons. Part C addressed the magazine, garage, and storage accommodation required to house the equipment and ammunition covered by Parts A and B.

This structure is crucial. The Army was not simply proposing to buy modern weapons. It was linking weapons to ammunition, reserves, accommodation, garages, magazines, and storage. It also recommended that the projects be considered as a whole and that, if approved in principle, provision be made over a period of years, in line with the time required to obtain the various types of equipment and ammunition. Immediate local expenditure on accommodation was recommended, while enquiries were to be made into the most satisfactory sources of supply, taking account of both cost and delivery date.

This is ILS in all but name. Modern ILS would frame the same issue in terms of supportability, facilities, supply support, support equipment, training consumption, war reserves, procurement phasing, and whole-of-life cost. The 1939 language was different, but the logic was closely aligned.

The same logic is evident in the wartime expansion of the NZAOC. In 1937, the Ordnance establishment was still being framed around peacetime assumptions, limited mechanisation, and a relatively small depot and workshop structure. The Director of Ordnance Services had warned that if any great development of mechanisation occurred during the next five years, the Ordnance Workshop establishment would probably prove inadequate.

By 1942, that warning had become reality. The scale of mobilisation, equipment receipt, ammunition storage, inspection, accounting, repair, and issue had made the pre-war structure insufficient. War Cabinet approved an amended Ordnance Depot establishment of 30 officers and 1,019 other ranks, distributed across Trentham, Northern District, Central District, and Southern District. In parallel, it authorised a revised Ordnance Workshops establishment of 425 all ranks, comprising 15 officers and 410 other ranks, covering the workshops at Trentham, Devonport, and Burnham. Both the Ordnance Depot and Ordnance Workshops establishments were to be treated as Dominion establishments, rather than as separate fixed establishments for each depot or workshop.[24]

The scale of that support system is clearer when the pre-war and wartime establishments are placed side by side.

Ordnance functionPre-war establishment position, 1937–381942 wartime establishmentWhat changed
Ordnance DepotsSmall mixed military and civil establishment, framed around peacetime assumptions and the existing Territorial Force30 officers and 1,019 other ranks, a total of 1,049, across Trentham, Northern District, Central District, and Southern DistrictDepot support became a national supply, storage, accounting, receipt, issue, and distribution system
Ordnance WorkshopsThe limited workshop structure was considered vulnerable if mechanisation expanded. The 1938 Armament Section proposal included 3 officers, 9 WO1 artificers, and 25 other ranks across Trentham, Devonport, and Burnham15 officers and 410 other ranks, a total of 425, covering Trentham, Devonport, and BurnhamTechnical repair, inspection, modification, and maintenance became a national sustainment function
Establishment principleLocalised peacetime structureBoth depot and workshop establishments are treated as Dominion establishments. 

This was significant. It meant that NZAOC manpower was being managed as a national support capability, adaptable and transferable in response to the changing pressures of mobilisation, storage, repair, inspection, and distribution. The depots represented the system’s supply, accounting, storage, receipt, issue, and distribution functions. The workshops represented the technical sustainment arm, including armament artificers, instrument artificers, wireless artificers, carpenters and joiners, painters, plumbers and tinsmiths, blacksmiths and welders, electricians, clerks, storemen, and labourers.

Taken together, these two NZAOC establishments show that modernisation did not stop at acquisition. Modern equipment had to be received, inspected, accounted for, stored, issued, repaired, modified, maintained, and technically supported. In modern ILS terms, the Mission System had forced the expansion of the Support System beneath it.

Equipment, ammunition, reserves, and war wastage

The follow-up paper on Recommendations 42 and 43 showed that the Army was already thinking in terms of holdings, orders, war reserves, and annual practice expenditure. In Part A, the schedules showed ammunition held in the Dominion or on order, what was considered necessary as a war reserve, and what expenditure was required for annual practice.[25]

Part B extended this logic to modern weapons and technical equipment. It identified the nature and number of modern weapons and equipment required to replace or supplement obsolete or obsolescent equipment, to complete the Territorial Force war establishment, and to provide a 25 per cent reserve. It also calculated the ammunition required for those new weapons on a similar scale. [26]

This was not a narrow procurement. It was capability planning. It connected equipment to force structure, reserves, ammunition, training, and replacement needs. The inclusion of a 25 per cent reserve reflected an understanding that war consumes equipment as well as ammunition. Weapons break, vehicles wear out, losses occur, and reinforcements require training and equipping. The Army was therefore not planning merely for possession, but for endurance.

The scale of the problem is clearer when the weapon and ammunition returns are viewed across the period from 1939 to 1944. In August 1939, New Zealand’s modernisation remained uneven. Older weapons such as the 18-pounder, 4.5-inch howitzer, 60-pounder, and 6-inch howitzer still formed part of the artillery inventory, while modern weapons such as the 25-pounder, 2-pounder anti-tank gun, Bren gun, Bofors 40-mm anti-aircraft gun, and 3.7-inch anti-aircraft gun were either on order or still being discussed. By March 1944, the position had changed dramatically. Quartermaster General returns show 255 25-pounders, 219 2-pounder anti-tank guns, 226 6-pounder anti-tank guns, 10,991 Bren guns, and very large ammunition holdings, including 920,701 rounds for the 25-pounder, 423,259 rounds for the 2-pounder anti-tank gun, 428,023 rounds for the 3.7-inch anti-aircraft gun, and 608,984 rounds for the Bofors 40-mm. These figures show that Mackesy’s concern was not theoretical. Modernisation required not only weapons, but reserves, ammunition, storage, distribution, trained personnel, and a system capable of sustaining war consumption.

Weapon or ammunition type1939 positionLater wartime positionSignificance
25-pounder gunsRequirement identified255 by 1944Modern field artillery standard
2-pounder anti-tank guns16 On order against 90 required219 by 1944Early anti-tank modernisation
6-pounder anti-tank gunsAt the prototype stage226 by 1944Later response to armour threat
Bren guns40 available, 312 on order10,991 by 1944Expansion of modern infantry firepower
25-pounder ammunitionInitial Requirement of 58000 rounds identified920,701 rounds by 1944Shows ammunition burden of modernisation
Bofors 40-mm ammunitionInitial Requirement of 10000 rounds identified608,984 rounds by 1944Reflects growth of AA defence requirements

The problem of obsolete equipment

The need for this enlarged Ordnance support system was reinforced by the condition of the equipment itself. The follow-up material to Mackesy’s report made clear that the Territorial Force remained heavily dependent on old equipment. Apart from coastal defences and a few items of modern equipment already obtained or on order for the Field Force, much of the Territorial Force’s equipment remained of the pattern used in the previous war. Existing small arms were insufficient to equip the Territorial Force at war strength, and, except for rifles, there were no reserve weapons to replace war wastage or train reinforcements. [27]

This was a strikingly modern supportability problem. A force may possess equipment, but if that equipment is obsolete, insufficient, unsupported, or lacks reserves, the capability remains fragile. Mackesy and the Army Board understood that modernisation had to address both first-line equipment and depth. It was not enough to equip the first increment of a force. The system had to be capable of replacing losses, training reinforcements, and sustaining the force over time.

Lead time, source of supply, and industrial reality

The follow-up paper also recognised the hard limits imposed by procurement lead times and industrial capacity. It noted that new equipment could not be obtained from Great Britain until more than twelve months after the outbreak of war, and that even if ordered immediately under peace conditions, delivery would take place only over several years, depending on manufacturing time and the priority given to New Zealand’s orders. It also observed that ordering requirements in instalments were uneconomical and would not necessarily produce earlier or more uniform delivery.[28]

This is another point of strong alignment with modern ILS and capability management. Today, this would be described as supply chain risk, industrial capacity, source-of-supply analysis, procurement phasing, delivery risk assessment, and schedule dependency. In 1939, it was practical military administration. New Zealand could not assume that equipment would be available when war came. It had to consider where equipment could be sourced, how long it would take to arrive, what priority New Zealand would receive, and whether local expenditure could begin immediately on the supporting infrastructure.

Facilities as part of the capability

Part C of the follow-up paper addressed magazine, garage, and storage accommodation. It estimated the additional accommodation needed for ammunition already on order, ammunition under Part A, ammunition under Part B, vehicle garage accommodation, and general storage.

This is one of the clearest examples of the programme’s support logic. Modernisation was not treated as complete once weapons or vehicles had been ordered. The Army needed somewhere to store ammunition safely, somewhere to garage vehicles, and somewhere to hold equipment. The capability, therefore, depended on the estate as much as on the equipment itself.

This point is reinforced by the 1940 summary of estimated Army expenditure. Although prepared before Japan entered the war, the report is significant because it was already looking beyond immediate equipment purchases to the infrastructure required for mobilisation, home defence, training, storage, maintenance, and sustainment. In that sense, it anticipated many of the pressures that would later become urgent after the Pacific War began. Alongside weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and general equipment, the summary included provision for buildings, water supply, roads, hospital accommodation, officers’ quarters, ordnance stores, garages, and workshops.[29]

The range of facilities identified in the 1940 expenditure summary shows that infrastructure was being treated as a mobilisation requirement.

Facility or infrastructure itemEvidence from the 1940 expenditure summaryCapability significance
Buildings and camp infrastructureBuildings, water supply, roads, hospital accommodation, officers’ quarters, and other camp works were includedShows that mobilisation required a physical estate able to house, train, administer, and sustain an expanded force
Ordnance storesProvision was included for Ordnance storesEquipment and ammunition required controlled storage, accounting, preservation, and issue facilities
GaragesGarage provision was includedMechanisation required vehicle accommodation, protection, maintenance access, and controlled fleet management
WorkshopsWorkshop provision was includedWeapons, vehicles, instruments, and technical stores required repair, modification, maintenance, and inspection facilities
Magazine and ammunition accommodationThe wider Mackesy follow-up programme identified magazine, garage, and storage accommodation as part of the equipment and ammunition problemAmmunition reserves were only useful if they could be safely stored, managed, protected, and issued
Roads and water supplyRoads and water supply were included as expenditure itemsCamps, depots, magazines, and workshops required basic infrastructure before they could function as military facilities

The table illustrates that facilities were not an administrative afterthought. They were part of the support system that allowed weapons, ammunition, vehicles, stores, and personnel to become usable military capability. The timing sharpens the significance. In 1940, New Zealand was not yet at war with Japan, but the Army was already identifying the estate and infrastructure requirements that would underpin mobilisation and home defence. When the Pacific War later made the threat to New Zealand more immediate, many of these requirements were no longer theoretical.

Training and the human system

Mackesy also understood that trained people were central to capability. His report criticised the absence of regular units, the scattering of regular personnel across instructional and administrative duties, and the lack of a trained force available for mobilisation to protect while the Territorial Force prepared itself. He also noted that officers lacked opportunities to exercise tactical command in peace.[30]

Again, this reflects a whole-system view. Equipment required trained operators, trained commanders, trained instructors, and training areas. The Army’s problem was not merely material. It was institutional. Modern weapons, vehicles, ammunition, stores, workshops, garages, and magazines could not generate capability unless trained personnel existed to use, account for, maintain, repair, distribute, and command them.

The wartime expansion of the NZAOC reinforces this point. By 1942, the Ordnance Depot and Ordnance Workshops establishments had both become Dominion establishments, reflecting the need to manage trained manpower nationally rather than as a series of isolated local appointments. The depots required personnel able to handle receipt, accounting, storage, issue, and distribution, while the workshops required armament artificers, instrument artificers, wireless artificers, tradesmen, clerks, storemen, and labourers able to support increasingly technical equipment. The growth of the NZAOC was therefore not simply an increase in numbers. It was the creation of a trained human support system beneath modernisation.

The modern ILS Handbook identifies training support as one of the 10 ILS elements, involving the resources, skills, and competencies necessary to acquire, operate, support, and dispose of a capability system. It also identifies personnel as a separate ILS element, covering human resources and the prerequisite training, skills, and competencies required to acquire, install, test, train, operate, and support the capability system throughout its life cycle. Mackesy’s concern with Regular Forces, Territorial training, instructors, officers, cadets, and reserves fits closely with that logic.

Mapping Mackesy against the modern 10 ILS elements

The NZDF ILS Handbook lists 10 ILS elements: engineering support, maintenance support, supply support, packaging, handling, storage and transportation, training support, facilities, support and test equipment, personnel, technical data, and computer support.[31] Mackesy’s report and the follow-up work do not align with all these equally, but the comparison is revealing.

NZDF ILS elementThe Mackesy-era equivalent visible in the reportsAlignment
Engineering supportModern equipment selection, mechanisation, suitability of weapons and vehiclesPartial
Maintenance supportGarages, stores, vehicle support implications, mechanisationPartial
Supply supportAmmunition reserves, war reserve stocks, replacement weapons, source of supplyStrong
Packaging, handling, storage and transportationMagazines, garages, storage accommodation, specialised vehicles, delivery timelinesStrong
Training supportRegular, Territorial and Cadet training, instructors, annual camps, reinforcement trainingStrong
FacilitiesMagazine, garage, store accommodation, training areasStrong
Support and test equipmentLimited evidence in the reviewed materialWeak or implicit
PersonnelRegular Force, Territorial Force, reserves, instructors, officers, quartermastersStrong
Technical dataNot clearly visible in the reviewed documentsWeak
Computer supportNot applicable to 1939Not applicable

This mapping helps keep the argument balanced. Mackesy was not applying modern ILS in full. There is little visible evidence of what would now be called technical data management, configuration management, Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability analysis, Level of Repair Analysis, Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis, or computer support. But the strongest areas of alignment, supply support, training support, facilities, personnel, storage, transportation, and supportability planning, are precisely the areas most central to whether a mobilisation force could be made real in 1939.

Whole-of-life awareness, not modern Whole of Life Costing

The ILS Handbook states that Whole of Life Cost incorporates all costs attributable to a capability throughout its life cycle, and that many of these costs are incurred during the In-Service phase, even though key cost decisions are made much earlier.[32] Mackesy’s work should not be described as Whole of Life Costing in that modern technical sense. It did not model all costs across acquisition, operation, support, upgrade, and disposal.

However, it did move well beyond simple purchase cost. The follow-up work considered capital costs, ammunition reserves, annual practice expenditure, magazines, garages, storage accommodation, delivery times, sources of supply, and phased expenditure over several years.[33] That was not modern Whole-of-Life Costing, but it was a clear form of whole-of-support awareness.

This distinction matters. It avoids anachronism while preserving the core argument. Mackesy was not using a modern costing model, but he was applying the broader principle that capability costs do not end with equipment acquisition.

Was Mackesy’s report parked?

It would be fair to say that Mackesy’s report was initially parked, but that phrase needs careful handling. It was not simply ignored. Mackesy himself stated that his suggestions would require careful investigation before action could be taken. That gave the Government and the Army Department room to treat the report as a major advisory document rather than to implement it in full immediately.

In May 1939, New Zealand was still technically at peace. Mackesy’s broader recommendations, covering the Regular Force, Territorial Force, training, pay, prestige, reserves, cadets, accommodation, mobilisation, equipment, ammunition, ordnance services, and financial administration, represented a substantial reform agenda. It was unlikely that such a programme would be adopted in its entirety within weeks.

Once war was imminent, however, the position changed. The report appears to have been used selectively, with attention narrowing to those parts that could be translated most directly into urgent military preparedness. Recommendations 42 and 43, dealing with modern equipment and ammunition reserves, received particular attention. A memorandum of 22 September 1939 confirms this shift, noting that the original estimates had been prepared on a peacetime basis and that urgent orders had since been placed for 18-pounder gun ammunition, 4.5-inch howitzer ammunition, and 100 Marmon-Herrington adapters fitted to vehicles.[34]

Mackesy’s report, therefore, became less a comprehensive reform blueprint and more a menu of urgent war-preparedness measures. The deeper structural issues, such as the creation of regular units, institutional training reform, and the broader status of the Army, did not receive the same immediate attention. What moved first were the recommendations most directly connected to mobilisation, equipment, ammunition, mechanisation, storage, and mobility.

ILS as formalised old-fashioned military planning

The comparison with modern ILS should not be overstated. Mackesy was not applying a formal ILS framework. His report does not show modern logistics support analysis records, reliability and maintainability modelling, configuration management databases, digital technical data, performance-based support contracts, or through-life governance structures.

The ILS Handbook describes modern ILS as structured, iterative, life cycle-based, and linked to Through Life Support, Systems Engineering, Logistics Support Analysis, Whole of Life Costing, supportability testing, configuration management, RAM, and other technical disciplines. Mackesy’s 1939 work was not that.

Yet the underlying method is unmistakably aligned. Mackesy and the subsequent Army Board work treated capability as an integrated system. They considered personnel, training, equipment, ammunition, reserves, accommodation, storage, mobilisation, source of supply, lead time, cost, and delivery. The later expansion of the NZAOC Depot and Workshops establishments as Dominion establishments, together with the 1940 expenditure planning for buildings, roads, water supply, ordnance stores, garages, and workshops, shows that this logic moved beyond paper analysis into practical mobilisation planning. The Army understood that a force could not be judged by its nominal existence, or by equipment on order, but by its ability to mobilise, train, store, issue, repair, move, reinforce, and sustain itself under wartime conditions.

This is the essential point. Modern ILS did not invent the idea that a military capability must be supportable. It formalised an older military truth.

Contemporary reflections for logisticians

Mackesy’s report should not be read as a simple checklist against which to judge contemporary logistics practice. The strategic setting, technology, force structure, governance, and scale of modern defence capability are vastly different from those of 1939. Nor should the report be used to imply that modern logisticians are repeating the failures of an earlier generation. Its value lies elsewhere. It provides a historical case study in how supportability, preparedness, and sustainment can determine whether military capability is real or merely assumed.

For contemporary logisticians, the first reflection is that capability must be understood as a system. Mackesy’s report did not treat weapons, vehicles, ammunition, personnel, training, storage, accommodation, and mobilisation as separate subjects. He examined them as interdependent parts of one military problem. The subsequent wartime expansion of NZAOC depots and workshops, and the inclusion of facilities such as stores, garages, workshops, roads, water supply, and accommodation in 1940 planning, reinforce the same point. A capability may be acquired through equipment, but it is delivered through the support system that allows it to be stored, issued, maintained, repaired, moved, supplied, trained, and sustained.

The second reflection is that gaps are easiest to tolerate when they have become familiar. Mackesy did not describe an Army that had suddenly become deficient. He described a force that had adapted over time to shortages, workarounds, obsolescence, limited reserves, inadequate establishments, and constrained training. In modern terms, this highlights the importance of identifying the impact of inaction. A shortage that has been managed for years may still be a real operational risk when circumstances change.

The third reflection is that mobilisation and sustainment cannot be improvised at the point of crisis. Mackesy’s warning about improvisation without previous thought and training remains relevant, not because the conditions of 1939 are directly comparable to today, but because the principle is enduring. Supply chains, storage, maintenance arrangements, trained personnel, technical data, contracts, transport, infrastructure, workshops, and reserves all require time, investment, facilities, and deliberate planning before they are needed.

The fourth reflection is that modernisation is not complete when equipment is ordered. New Zealand was already modernising before Mackesy arrived, with modern equipment received, further items on order, and staff attempting to remain current with British doctrine. Yet Mackesy’s report showed that partial modernisation was not enough. Equipment had to be connected to ammunition reserves, trained users, storage, transport, maintenance, repair, mobilisation depth, and supporting infrastructure. The 1942 Ordnance establishments and the 1940 facilities planning show the practical consequence of that principle: modernisation created a support burden that had to be manned, housed, equipped, and sustained.

Finally, Mackesy’s report demonstrates the value of honest external examination. His assessment was not perfect, nor was it a full implementation plan, but it forced attention onto the relationship between stated capability and actual readiness. For logisticians, that is perhaps the most useful enduring point. The purpose of logistics advice is not simply to support decisions already made, but to clarify what those decisions require if the capability is to be safe, available, supportable, repairable, and sustainable.

Read this way, Mackesy’s report is not a judgment on the present. It is a reminder that logistics has always been central to the credibility of military capability. The language has changed, and modern ILS has formalised the process, but the professional obligation remains familiar: to ensure that capability can be generated, supported, and sustained when required.

Conclusion

Major-General Mackesy’s 1939 report should be read not simply as a criticism of the New Zealand Army, but as a whole-force capability assessment. He arrived when the Army was already modernising, but that modernisation remained incomplete. His value lay in exposing the gap between equipment acquisition and usable military capability.

The follow-up work on Recommendations 42 and 43, together with the later expansion of Ordnance Depot and Ordnance Workshops establishments, demonstrates that this was not an abstract concern. Modern weapons, vehicles, ammunition, and technical stores required reserves, storage, magazines, garages, workshops, trained personnel, accounting systems, repair capacity, and distribution arrangements. The 1940 facilities planning reinforces the same point. Before the Pacific War made the threat to New Zealand more immediate, the Army was already identifying the estate and infrastructure needed to support mobilisation and home defence.

Measured against the modern NZDF ILS Handbook, Mackesy’s work was not ILS in the contemporary technical sense. It lacked the formal structures, terminology, analytical tools, and governance of modern capability management. Yet it clearly reflected the principles that ILS now formalises; early attention to supportability, recognition of whole-of-support requirements, integration of Mission System and Support System considerations, and the need to design capability that can actually be prepared, used, maintained, repaired, and sustained.

For contemporary logisticians, Mackesy’s report is best read as a historical reflection rather than a judgement. It reminds us that logistics is not a secondary activity performed after capability decisions have been made. It is part of the capability itself. Equipment without trained people, ammunition, spares, storage, transport, maintenance, infrastructure, workshops, repair capacity, and mobilisation depth is not a complete military capability.

The terminology has changed, the governance has become more formal, and the tools have become more sophisticated, but the underlying principle remains the same:

A capability is not real until it can be trained, equipped, supplied, stored, moved, maintained, repaired, reinforced, and sustained when required.

Notes

[1] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939),” Archives New Zealand No R18871665  (1939).

[2] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939).”

[3] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939).”

[4] Roderick MacIvor, Citizen Army: The New Zeland Wars Lost Official History (Wellington: Defence of New Zealand Study Group, 2025), 214-15.

[5] Paul William Gladstone Ian McGibbon, The Oxford companion to New Zealand Military History (Auckland; Melbourne; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 2000), , 180.

[6] J Babington, “Defence Forces of New Zealand (Report on the) by Major General J.M Babington, Commandant of the Forces,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1902 Session I, H-19  (1902), https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/parliamentary/AJHR1902-I.2.3.2.29.

[7] “Defence of the Dominion of New Zealand (Memorandum on the),” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1910 Session I, H-19a  (28 February 1910), https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/parliamentary/AJHR1910-I.2.3.2.30.

[8] N. Smart, Biographical Dictionary of British Generals of the Second World War (Pen & Sword Military, 2005).

[9] “Organisation for National Security, Chiefs of Staff Committee – Recommendations No 42 – 43 of Mackesy report – Supply of modern equipment for the army and the provision of reserves of ammunition, September 1939,” Archives New Zealand No R16640388  (1939).

[10] “Organisation for National Security, Chiefs of Staff Committee – Recommendations No 42 – 43 of Mackesy report – Supply of modern equipment for the army and the provision of reserves of ammunition, September 1939.”

[11] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939).”

[12] Defence Logistic Command – Integrated Logistics Support Centre of Expertise, Integrated Logistics Support in Capability Management Handbook Third Edition (New Zealand Defence Force, 2022).

[13] Defence Logistic Command – Integrated Logistics Support Centre of Expertise, Integrated Logistics Support in Capability Management Handbook Third Edition.

[14] “Debunking the Myth of New Zealand’s Military Unpreparedness During the Interwar Period,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zeland Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2025, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2020/12/21/ordnance-in-the-manawatu-1915-1996/.

[15] James Russell, “Brigadier Stanley Crump – An Underappreciated New Zealand Military Logistics Commander: a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand” (Massey University, 2022).

[16] “QMG (Quartermaster General) – Ordnance “, Archives New Zealand No R18527870  (9 January 1937 – 1939).

[17] Defence Logistic Command – Integrated Logistics Support Centre of Expertise, Integrated Logistics Support in Capability Management Handbook Third Edition.

[18] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939).”

[19] D. Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[20] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939).”

[21] Ian McGibbon, The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, 179-80.

[22] Defence Logistic Command – Integrated Logistics Support Centre of Expertise, Integrated Logistics Support in Capability Management Handbook Third Edition.

[23] Defence Logistic Command – Integrated Logistics Support Centre of Expertise, Integrated Logistics Support in Capability Management Handbook Third Edition.

[24] “Establishments – Ordnance corps,” Archives New Zealand No R22441743  (1937-1968).

[25] “Organisation for National Security, Chiefs of Staff Committee – Recommendations No 42 – 43 of Mackesy report – Supply of modern equipment for the army and the provision of reserves of ammunition, September 1939.”

[26] “Organisation for National Security, Chiefs of Staff Committee – Recommendations No 42 – 43 of Mackesy report – Supply of modern equipment for the army and the provision of reserves of ammunition, September 1939.”

[27] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939).”

[28] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939).”

[29] “Chief of the General Staff: Gun Ammunition, general army equipment and New Zealand Force numbers,” Archives New Zealand No R22849606  (1940).

[30] “NZ Forces – Army -Report on the military forces of NZ by Major-General Mackesy (22 May 1939).”

[31] Defence Logistic Command – Integrated Logistics Support Centre of Expertise, Integrated Logistics Support in Capability Management Handbook Third Edition.

[32] Defence Logistic Command – Integrated Logistics Support Centre of Expertise, Integrated Logistics Support in Capability Management Handbook Third Edition.

[33] “Organisation for National Security, Chiefs of Staff Committee – Recommendations No 42 – 43 of Mackesy report – Supply of modern equipment for the army and the provision of reserves of ammunition, September 1939.”

[34] The reference to “100 Marmon-Herrington adapters fitted to vehicles” appears to relate to four-wheel-drive conversion equipment supplied by the American firm Marmon-Herrington. These adapters were not simply minor spare parts, but conversion assemblies that allowed standard commercial vehicles, usually built as two-wheel-drive trucks, to be adapted for military use with improved cross-country mobility. Such kits typically involved the fitting of a driven front axle, transfer case, driveline modifications, and associated mounting components. Their inclusion alongside urgent ammunition orders shows that, by September 1939, New Zealand’s preparations were extending beyond stockpiling munitions to improving the field mobility of its vehicle fleet; “Trucks converted with Marmon-Herrington All-Wheel Drive Conversion Kits,” Marmon-Herrington military vehicles, 2002, 2026, https://www.mapleleafup.nl/marmonherrington/truck.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com.


Ad Hoc UBREs

NZAOD and New Zealand Army Bulk Refuelling in Malaysia, 1985–1989

The photographs accompanying this article show New Zealand Army Unit Bulk Refuelling Equipment (UBRE) in practical field use during exercises in Malaysia in the second half of the 1980s. The vehicles were operated by the New Zealand Advanced Ordnance Depot (NZAOD) in Singapore, supporting New Zealand forces training in the region during the final years of New Zealand Force Southeast Asia.

Evidence now places NZAOD’s truck-mounted bulk fuel support in Malaysia from at least Exercise Pemburu Rusa in 1985 through to Exercise Taiha Tombak XI in 1989, the final exercise for NZAOD. These images provide a rare visual record of how New Zealand’s tactical bulk refuelling capability appeared in service, not as a polished catalogue item or purpose-designed military refuelling module, but as a pragmatic, improvised system assembled from available tanks, pumps, hoses, fittings, and vehicle platforms.

The images are important because they show the reality behind later Army correspondence, which described the in-service New Zealand UBRE as an “ad hoc combination” of equipment. That description was not an exaggeration. By the late 1980s, the New Zealand UBRE was a field-engineered arrangement based around a 2000-litre rigid tank, a pallet-mounted dispensing pack, and an RL Bedford truck. The system worked, but it was never an ideal or fully purpose-designed solution. It was a practical answer to a practical problem, moving and issuing fuel forward in conditions where jerrycans alone were too slow, labour-intensive, and inefficient.

The ad hoc New Zealand UBRE

In its typical late-1980s form, the New Zealand UBRE consisted of a 2000-litre rigid fuel tank shackled or otherwise secured to the deck of an RL truck in NZAOD and a UNIMOG truck for NZ-based units. Nearby, a palletised dispensing pack was mounted, containing a pump, filter, meter, hoses, and fittings. Some pumps were self-contained, consisting of a pump, filter, and meter within a robust frame. Other pumps were made up of separate pump, filter, and meter components that were often grouped together on a pallet base and secured with steel banding tape.

The tank and dispensing pack were connected by two-inch hoses using camlock fittings. These fittings could be wired shut, but they required constant checking during movement, as vibration and road travel could work them loose. Fuel was dispensed to vehicles through a one-inch hose. In some cases, this could be fitted to a hose reel, but more often the hose was simply wound around the dispensing pack for stowage.

In New Zealand, a UBRE could be configured to dispense petrol, diesel, or Aviation Turbine Fuel. However, in Singapore, the NZAOD UBREs were configured specifically for petrol, then commonly referred to as MT Gas. Each issue was recorded on an MD638 Issue Sheet in litres, based on the meter reading. This detail is important. Although the equipment itself was improvised, the accounting and control of fuel remained formalised. The operator had to issue fuel, read the meter, record the quantity, and maintain a written record of consumption. In that sense, the UBRE was not merely a pump and tank on the back of a truck; it was part of a wider supply and accountability system.

The photographs show the dispensing pack either sitting exposed on the truck deck, with hoses visible around the tank and pump assembly or with the vehicle sideboards remaining fitted. The arrangement was functional, but it relied heavily on operator vigilance, routine checks, and practical experience.

Taiha Tombak X

Several photographs show the UBREs in convoy or road movement. These views make clear how exposed the equipment was. The dispensing pack, hose work, and tank fittings sat on the open deck, secured for movement but still vulnerable to vibration, weather, and rough roads. This was the kind of operating environment that made loose couplings, leaking fittings, and constant equipment checks an everyday concern.

Pemburu Rusa 88

Other images give a clearer side view of the RL-mounted UBRE. The large rectangular tank dominates the deck, with the dispensing pack positioned at the rear. The visible placarding, external hose work, and “No Smoking within 13M” markings highlight its role as a fuel-carrying and fuel-dispensing vehicle rather than a general cargo truck. The images also illustrate one of the central compromises of the system. The RL provided mobility and load-carrying capacity, but the refuelling equipment was not integrated into the vehicle as it would be in a purpose-built tanker or modern fuel module. It was mounted onto the truck, rather than designed as part of it.

Taiha Tombak IX

One of the most useful photographs shows three UBRE-equipped vehicles together in Malaysia. Rather than isolated refuellers, the image captures a small mobile fuel element, with each RL carrying a 2000-litre rigid tank and associated dispensing equipment. This gives a better sense of how the ad hoc UBRE capability could be grouped to support exercises, providing a dispersed yet practical bulk refuelling capacity. It also highlights the variation within the system. Although each vehicle performed the same broad role, the equipment was not a fully standardised, purpose-designed refuelling module. It was a collection of workable configurations assembled from available tanks, pumps, hoses, fittings, and vehicle platforms. That flexibility was useful in the field, but it also created challenges for maintenance, training, and safety.

Lunch stop Taiha Tombak XI

A mobile field fuel point

The wider photographic set adds further detail to how these improvised UBREs were actually operated. They were not simply trucks carrying fuel tanks. In the field, they could be established as temporary fuel issue points, with warning signs, no-smoking controls, drums used to mark or control the area, and fuel dispensed by hose directly into vehicles or into containers.

Pemburu Rusa 88

One image shows a controlled fuel point layout, with drums and signage forming a visible boundary around the dispensing area. Others show UBREs in harbour, in hides, on roads, and at exercise locations, demonstrating that the system was used as a mobile field fuel capability rather than as static depot equipment.

UBRE Hide Taiha Tombak XI

The photographs also show fuel being issued directly to vehicles and, in some cases, into jerrycans or other containers.

Taiha Tombak XI

This confirms that the UBREs were not limited to bulk vehicle refuelling alone. They could support vehicle replenishment, container filling, and local redistribution of MT Gas as required. The equipment was flexible, but that flexibility came from operator skill and improvisation rather than from a formally integrated design.

Kerbsiode convoy refuelling Taiha Tombak X

One photograph of field administration is particularly useful. It shows the paperwork side of the operation, reinforcing that the fuel issue remained formally controlled even when the equipment was improvised. Issues were measured with the meter and recorded in litres on the MD638 Issue and Receipt Sheet. At the end of each day, the MD638 issue and receipt sheets would be reconciled, and the balance would be entered on an AFNZ 28 Supplies and POL Ledger Card. This was then checked against the physical stock by dipping the tank. The result was a daily record of receipts, issues, book balance, and actual balance, with allowance made for normal tolerances, spillage, and calculated measurement variation. The UBRE may have been ad hoc in construction, but the discipline surrounding fuel accounting remained intact.

The activities shown in these photographs should be read as a snapshot rather than a complete record of NZAOD Petroleum Operator activity in Southeast Asia. They capture the principal known examples where UBREs were utilised in Malaysia between 1985 and 1989, but Petroleum Operators also supported New Zealand Transport Squadron activity and other exercises or depot requirements. They also supported helicopter refuelling for 141 Flight RNZAF. The UBREs were therefore only one visible part of a wider petroleum support function that linked vehicle movement, air support, depot supply, and field sustainment during New Zealand’s final years in Singapore and Malaysia.

Reconciling 638s Taiha Tombak X

The introduction of the UBRE idea

During this period, the term UBRE itself was not widely understood outside the Petroleum Operator community. It appears to have entered New Zealand Army usage through officers and soldiers who had been exposed to British petroleum doctrine and equipment, including Phil Green and H. J. Carson. Carson and Green were officers who had seen British UBRE mounted on Bedford or similar standard trucks during their time on the long petroleum course in the United Kingdom. They brought the concept back into New Zealand service, where it was discussed, adapted, and reinforced through Petroleum Operator courses.

British Army UBRE

In this sense, UBRE was not just a piece of equipment. It was a British idea filtered through New Zealand circumstances and given practical form by petroleum operators who understood that the Army needed something better than jerrycans alone, even if a fully engineered solution was not yet available.

Earlier New Zealand Petroleum Operators in Southeast Asia included Billy Vince, Stu McIntosh, Ian “Butch” Hay, Alan Barnes, Brian Calvey, John Weeds, and A. J. Weston. This list is not exclusive, and any omissions are regretted. Their service provides important continuity to the later NZAOD UBRE story. The ad hoc RL-mounted UBREs of the late 1980s did not appear in isolation. They developed from an established petroleum support presence in Southeast Asia, shaped by earlier operators, older equipment, field expedients, and the practical demands of supporting New Zealand forces in Malaysia and Singapore.

Earlier evidence, Exercise Pemburu Rusa, 1985

The use of NZAOD bulk fuel equipment in Malaysia can now be pushed back before the 1987–1989 photographic record. A contemporary recollection titled “Driving in Malaysia, An Experience” records that, after arriving in Singapore in late August 1985, Staff Sergeant Stu McKintosh recalls his first introduction to driving on the Malay Peninsula came during Exercise Pemburu Rusa, conducted between 2 and 31 October 1985. After initially driving the escort Land Rover for an RT-25 rough-terrain forklift, he soon found himself driving an RL fitted with a single 2000-litre tank on about four refuelling runs back to Singapore.[1]

Each trip took around two hours one way, despite the distance being only about sixty miles, with road conditions, traffic, and local driving habits contributing to the slow journey. This account is important because it confirms that NZAOD was operating truck-mounted bulk fuel arrangements in Malaysia before the later Taiha Tombak photographs. It does not prove that the exact UBRE configuration seen in the later images was already in routine use, but it does show that RL-mounted fuel carriage and refuelling support formed part of NZAOD’s exercise support system by late 1985.

It also reinforces a recurring theme in the photographic evidence, fuel support in Malaysia was never simply a technical matter. It required drivers and petroleum operators to move heavy, fuel-carrying vehicles over long distances and through demanding traffic conditions while maintaining the safety and accountability expected of military fuel operations.

The 1985 Pemburu Rusa experience helps explain the later Taiha Tombak arrangements. By the time larger exercises were being supported in the late 1980s, NZAOD already had practical experience moving fuel-carrying RLs between Singapore and Malaysian exercise areas. The later ad hoc UBREs therefore appear less as a sudden invention and more as the development of an existing pattern, using RL trucks, rigid tanks, pumps, filters, meters, hoses, local commercial support, and Petroleum Operator trade knowledge to create a mobile refuelling capability suited to New Zealand’s needs in Southeast Asia.

Exercise Taiha Tombak IX, 1987

The Taiha Tombak series provides a clearer sequence of NZAOD UBRE employment in the closing years of the New Zealand presence in Singapore. Two UBREs were sent on Exercise Taiha Tombak IX in 1987, conducted in Pahang State. Their use shows that, by 1987, the RL-mounted UBRE had moved beyond an occasional solution and had become part of the expected NZAOD support package for major exercises.

Taiha Tombak IX

With only a limited pool of NZAOD personnel available to support Exercise Taiha Tombak IX, soldiers were employed across multiple roles as required. At different stages of the exercise, Corporal Flo Tamehana and Lance Corporals Terry Read, Richard Tyler, and Rob McKie worked within the Petroleum Section. Their role was to operate the UBREs, handle fuel issues, maintain the dispensing equipment, and support kerbside or field refuelling as required by the exercise.

The exercise arrangement required repeated resupply runs to keep the UBREs filled. When operating in Johor State, this was normally achieved by returning to Singapore. However, when the exercises moved farther north up the Malay Peninsula, returning to Singapore was no longer practical. In those cases, fixed fuel sources were arranged through contracted commercial fuel companies, such as Mobil, using civilian service stations or commercial fuel points in or near the exercise area. In practical terms, the UBREs operated either as a shuttle-based bulk fuel link between Singapore and the deployed force, or as a mobile distribution system refilled from contracted civilian fuel infrastructure closer to the exercise.[2]

Exercise Pemburu Rusa, 1988

A further NZAOD detachment deployed on Exercise Pemburu Rusa in 1988 for approximately eight weeks, operating out of the Chaa Airfield area in Johor State. This confirms that UBRE use by NZAOD was not limited to the larger Taiha Tombak exercise series, but formed part of a wider pattern of field fuel support in Malaysia during the late 1980s.

The Petroleum Operators on Exercise Pemburu Rusa in 1988 were Lance Corporals Terry Read, Richard Tyler and Rob McKie. Their task was to keep the UBREs supplied and operational during the eight-week deployment, including repeated resupply runs from Chaa Airfield back to Singapore.

The exercise arrangement required repeated resupply runs from the exercise area back to Singapore to refill the UBREs. These were usually conducted as overnight trips. The fuel vehicles would leave the exercise area, complete the approximately two-hour road move back to Singapore, refuel overnight in barracks, and return to the exercise area the following morning. In practical terms, the UBREs were operating as a shuttle-based bulk fuel link between Singapore’s fixed support base and the deployed exercise area in Johor.

This routine again highlights the practical value of the RL-mounted UBRE, as well as the workload imposed on petroleum operators. They had to combine long-distance driving, refuelling, vehicle checks, field distribution, and ordinary detachment duties over an extended period. The UBRE was not just a piece of equipment, it was part of a daily sustainment rhythm connecting the depot base in Singapore with the deployed field force in Malaysia.

Exercise Taiha Tombak X, 1988

The operational value of these improvised UBREs is well illustrated by Exercise Taiha Tombak X, a brigade-size exercise conducted annually with the Malaysian Armed Forces in the states of Perak and Kedah. New Zealand involvement included 1 RNZIR, 141 Flight, the New Zealand Force Hospital, the New Zealand Military Police Unit, New Zealand Workshops, New Zealand Transport Squadron, and NZAOD. The NZAOD detachment was small, only fourteen personnel, but it carried a wide sustainment burden, including expendables, clothing, ammunition, water, POL, and rations.

The detachment’s Petroleum Section was central to the exercise. It consisted of Lance Corporals Terry Read, Rob McKie and “Monkey” Siemonek. Preparation began as early as March, with requirements being developed for the units to be supported during the exercise.

The move from Singapore to the exercise area took three days and covered approximately 800 kilometres. The Brigade Maintenance Area (BMA) moved first, followed by 1 RNZIR. At Tampin, the first overnight stop, the cooks established a kitchen while the petroleum operators refuelled the convoy. On that first night, two UBREs were emptied and then refuelled in the township of Tampin. The next day, as the BMA moved north towards Taiping, Terry Read and Monkey Siemonek remained behind to refuel 1 RNZIR, while Rob McKie left the convoy at Tapah and established a kerbside refuelling point just to top up vehicles so they could complete the move to Taiping.

Advance Partt Packet Taiha Tombak X

This detail is important because it shows the UBREs doing exactly what they were intended to do: extending the force’s reach by allowing fuel to be staged, issued, replenished, and repositioned during a long road move. The vehicles were not simply carrying reserve fuel. They enabled movement over distance, supported a staggered convoy, and allowed different elements to be topped up at key points along the route.

Once the exercise began, based at an airfield in Taiping, the petroleum operators’ workload was relentless. The account records that the detachment worked up to twenty hours a day. A typical Petroleum Operator’s day began with stand-to half an hour before first light, followed by washing, breakfast, first parade of vehicles, and morning briefing from 0700 to 0900. From 0900 to 1900, the petroleum operators could be driving to Butterworth to refuel, conduct taskings, and carry out unit duties. From 1900 to 0300, they could be setting up distribution points deep in the exercise area.

The exercise also demonstrates that petroleum support was not limited to operating the pump. The Petroleum Section had to move with the force, establish distribution points, carry out long refuelling runs, maintain its own vehicles and equipment, and continue with ordinary unit duties such as camouflage, sentry duties, mess fatigues, rubbish duties, and defensive tasks. The UBRE was therefore part of a wider field routine, not a standalone technical asset.

The comparison with Malaysian refuelling practice is also revealing. The account describes Malaysian soldiers refuelling from a 3-ton Mercedes-Benz truck loaded with 44-gallon drums. A vehicle would pull alongside, fuel would be pumped from a rotary pump into a jerrycan, then emptied into the vehicle, with a soldier recording each 20-litre increment. Much of this was done by the light of a kerosene lamp.

This comparison highlights the relative efficiency of the New Zealand UBRE, improvised though it was. The New Zealand system was still crude by later standards, but its tank, pump, meter, filter, and hose arrangement allowed measured fuel to be issued directly from the vehicle.

The circumstances surrounding Exercise Taiha Tombak X also demonstrate the improvisational culture behind the system. For this large exercise, held in the vicinity of Taiping, three UBREs were to be provided by NZAOD. There were sufficient trucks and 2000-litre rigid tanks available, but only one serviceable pumpset in NZAOD. Replacement pumps sent from New Zealand arrived only the day before deployment.

With an open TY125 purchase order in place, the Petroleum team approached Fredie from Hong Teck Hin Hardware, a trusted local supplier used by the New Zealand Forces, and sourced suitable meters and filters.

One unit was assembled the night before deployment, while the other was built on the road at a refuelling rendezvous as the team waited for the battalion’s main body to arrive. Once mounted on the pumps, these modifications created compact dispensing units that were less prone to leaks or loose connections while driving.

That episode says much about the character of New Zealand Army logistics in Singapore during the late 1980s. The capability existed, but it relied on local initiative, trade knowledge, and the ability to solve practical problems quickly. The additional UBREs were not completed because the system was neither elegant nor well-resourced. It was completed because the soldiers involved understood what was needed, found the missing components, and made the equipment work in time for the exercise.

That improvisation was also a by-product of the early Petroleum Operator courses. With scarce equipment, much of it purchased in the late 1960s and by the late 1980s approaching twenty years of age, course time was often spent taking the equipment apart, reassembling it, understanding how the pumps, filters, meters, hoses, and fittings worked, and learning how to produce a workable dispensing pack from whatever was available. The term UBRE itself was not yet common Army language, but within the Petroleum Operator community, it became shorthand for a capability learned from British practice, adapted through coursework, and made practical with New Zealand equipment. This created operators who understood the equipment at a practical level, not just as users, but as soldiers capable of maintaining, adapting, and making it function on a shoestring.

Taiping Airfield Taiha Tombak X

In Singapore, that training culture proved decisive. When the exercise requirement exceeded the available complete sets, the solution was not to wait for a formal procurement process, but to identify the shortfall, source suitable commercial components locally, and integrate them into the third UBRE overnight. The photographs of local civilian fuel infrastructure and support activity reinforce the wider reality of NZAOD operations in Singapore. Military capability often depended on a close working knowledge of local suppliers, workshops, hardware stores, and commercial fuel facilities. In this environment, sustainment was not a neat separation between military and civilian systems. It was a practical blend of Army need, local knowledge, commercial availability, and the initiative of experienced ordnance soldiers.

It was a classic example of small-army improvisation, where formal requirements, limited holdings, ageing equipment, and operational deadlines met the practical ingenuity of the depot floor.

Kerbside refuelling and the return move

The return move from Taiping further demonstrates how the UBREs were used as a mobile refuelling chain. After the exercise ended, the detachment moved back to Taiping to join 1 RNZIR for the move back to Singapore. The Petroleum Operators again set up a kerbside. Once Terry Read and “Monkey” Siemonek’s trucks were empty, they refuelled and moved down the route to establish a kerbside at Tampins. Rob McKie completed refuelling at 2000 hours and then departed to set up another kerbside at Tapah.

The scale of the work was considerable. The first vehicles left Taiping at 0600 hours and were due at Tapah by 0800. At Tampins, Terry Read and “Monkey” Siemonek were busy from the arrival of the first vehicles and refuelled 120 vehicles. By the end of the exercise, the Petroleum Section had issued 55,000 litres of MT Gas. The same detachment also issued 48,000 litres of water, while general stores achieved 100 per cent demand satisfaction.

These figures convert the photographs from interesting images into a measurable logistics story. The UBREs were not incidental vehicles in the background of an exercise. They were central to moving the force, and their operators were responsible for tens of thousands of litres of fuel during long road moves, at field distribution points, and on return-route kerbsides.[3]

Exercise Taiha Tombak XI, 1989

In 1989, three UBREs again participated in Exercise Taiha Tombak XI. As in the previous year, Taiha Tombak X required long road moves, route replenishment, field fuel points, and repeated coordination between the deployed force and available fuel sources. This exercise was significant because it would be the final major exercise for NZAOD before the end of New Zealand’s permanent presence in Singapore.

By this stage, the RL-mounted UBRE was a proven, if imperfect, solution. Across several years of Malaysian deployments, it had supported long-distance movement, kerbside refuelling, field distribution points, route replenishment, and wider exercise sustainment. Although the equipment remained improvised, the method was by then well understood. Petroleum Operators knew how to assemble, check, move, refill, operate, account for fuel, and keep the system working under field conditions.

The Petroleum Operators supporting Taiha Tombak XI were Corporals Heather Thomas and Richard Tyler, and Lance Corporal Rob McKie. Their participation marked the endpoint of the visible NZAOD UBRE story in Malaysia. Its value lay not only in the equipment itself, but in the trade knowledge, local initiative, field routine, and hard-won experience built around it.

Topping up in Butterworth Taiha Tombak XI

Taiha Tombak XI was the last Malaysian exercise of this type for the NZAOD. By the end of 1989, New Zealand’s permanent force presence in South East Asia had drawn to a close, and the remaining New Zealand elements had redeployed from Singapore back to New Zealand. With that redeployment, a distinctive chapter in New Zealand’s post-war military logistics ended. For the NZAOD Petroleum Operators, the Malaysian UBRE deployments represented a small but important example of practical field logistics, where limited equipment, local adaptation, and experienced soldiers combined to sustain operations over distance.

Later Army Review and the Wider UBRE Problem

The NZAOD photographs and exercise accounts help explain why the Army became increasingly concerned about UBRE by the early 1990s. They show a capability that worked, but which depended heavily on adaptation, operator judgement, and equipment that had never become a fully purpose-designed military refuelling system.

Official correspondence from 1991 confirmed the problem. Army records described the existing UBRE as an ad hoc combination of equipment, much of it using items that had been in service since before 1975. The same review noted that the equipment was in poor repair, was unsafe, and failed to meet hazardous-substances transport requirements, although temporary waivers had been arranged.

By late 1991, UBRE had therefore become more than a practical refuelling asset. It had become a safety, capability-definition, and interoperability problem. Papers considered by the Army Capital Acquisition Management Committee noted that the existing UBRE had undergone an Army Maintenance Area Technical Services engineering review, which found “extremely serious safety hazards” in the equipment. The issue was not simply one of age or maintenance. The Army also lacked a clearly defined user requirement, with AST 57.2 identifying a nominal requirement for 20 UBRE sets but providing insufficient detail on the required characteristics or performance.[4]

Following the Army restructuring, this figure was questioned. Army Maintenance Area Technical Services estimated that ten to twelve refurbished sets might be sufficient, using the existing 2000-litre rigid tanks as the basis for a modified system. The preferred interim solution was pragmatic rather than ambitious. Instead of immediate replacement, which was expected to cost more than $60,000 per set, AMA Technical Services proposed refurbishing the existing tanks and replacing the hoses, connections, and associated equipment with safer and more suitable components at an estimated cost of $10,000 to $20,000 per set.[5]

The role UBRE was meant to fulfil remained significant. It was required for first-line resupply to units needing immediate bulk fuel replenishment when other methods were impractical or cost-ineffective. It was also required to provide kerbside refuelling facilities at second line, mobile bulk refuelling facilities for RNZAF helicopters supporting ground forces, and mobile bulk refuelling facilities for civil aid or emergency tasks in New Zealand and overseas.

At the same time, New Zealand was closely watching developments in Australia. The Australian Army was moving towards different UBRE systems for armoured and general-purpose wheeled requirements. For New Zealand, this raised a choice between adopting the Australian solution, including a separate RNZAC refuelling capability, or developing a modular New Zealand UBRE system while maintaining interoperability through standardised pumping and distribution equipment.

This context is important because the system’s shortcomings did not make it irrelevant. On the contrary, UBRE was essential because it filled a real operational need. It allowed petroleum operators to move beyond purely manual fuel distribution and gave commanders a more efficient means of sustaining vehicles, aircraft support, and mobile formations in the field.

Towards safer Unimog-mounted UBREs

By 1991, safety and legislative concerns had begun to force a more formal approach to UBRE mounting and carriage. The earlier RL-mounted arrangements had demonstrated their value in Malaysia. Still, they also exposed the weaknesses of carrying fuel tanks and dispensing equipment on open vehicle decks using improvised restraints. As transport and dangerous goods compliance became harder to ignore, the Army moved towards a more secure mounting system based on two 2000-litre rigid tanks carried on the deck of a Unimog.

To enable this, the original rigid tanks were modified from their earlier design. Reinforced forklift lifting channels were added, pressure relief valves were fitted, and the original gate valves were replaced with more modern ball valves. The mounting system allowed each 2000-litre tank to be tied down to the platform by screw-tightened rods, four per tank, providing a much more positive restraint than chains or straps. The whole platform was then secured to the Unimog with twistlocks, providing a safer, more controlled method of carriage.

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Unimog UBRE, Ex Ivanhoe 1991

This represented an important step in the evolution of the New Zealand Army UBRE. The basic concept remained the same, a mobile bulk fuel system built around 2000-litre rigid tanks and a dispensing capability, but the method of securing the load had changed. The improvised logic of the RL-mounted UBRE was being replaced by a more engineered solution that better recognised the hazards of carrying flammable liquids over distance and across rough military routes.

This development did not immediately erase the earlier ad hoc systems. Instead, it marked the transition between the field expedients of the 1980s and the more regulated fuel-handling environment of the 1990s. The same small-army need remained, to move bulk fuel forward and issue it efficiently, but by 1991, the equipment was being reshaped by safety requirements, dangerous goods legislation, and the lessons learned from years of operating improvised UBREs in New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia.

The ad hoc UBRE would soldier on for another decade. Although safer mounting arrangements were introduced, the Army did not yet have a fully purpose-built replacement. As a result, the modified UBRE capability continued in service through the 1990s, bridging the gap between improvised field equipment and a formalised bulk refuelling system. That transition was finally completed in 2002, when the purpose-built Unit Bulk Refuelling Equipment Mk1 entered service, incorporating dedicated pumps, meters, and filters as part of a more deliberate and standardised capability.

For NZAOD in Singapore, this capability was particularly valuable. Exercises in Malaysia placed New Zealand vehicles and units into demanding tropical conditions, often operating away from fixed support facilities. Bulk fuel support had to be mobile, flexible, and responsive. The ad hoc UBREs shown in these photographs were therefore not curiosities. They were part of the everyday sustainment machinery that allowed New Zealand forces to train and operate in Southeast Asia during the final years of New Zealand’s long military presence in Singapore.

The images also speak to the professionalism of the Petroleum Operator trade. Operating this equipment was not simply a matter of turning on a pump. It required fuel-handling knowledge, an understanding of bonding and earthing, awareness of fire and environmental risks, pump operation, filter and meter management, hose discipline, vehicle-loading awareness, accounting discipline, and constant attention to leaks and loose fittings. In the absence of a purpose-designed system, safe operation depended heavily on the skill and judgement of the operators.

The options before the Army were therefore familiar small-army choices. Australian equipment offered a possible route to interoperability but raised questions about compatibility with New Zealand’s vehicle fleet and the need to support both A vehicles and B vehicles. Existing New Zealand equipment could be modified, but only at increasing cost and without fully resolving the underlying design limitations. The choice was whether to extend the life of an improvised but familiar capability, adopt an overseas design, or invest in a more suitable New Zealand solution.

These photographs capture the capability before that reassessment fully overtook it. They show UBRE in its late-1980s form, practical, rugged, improvised, and imperfect. They also show a period when New Zealand Army petroleum support was evolving from the older world of jerrycans, drums, and field expedients towards a more technical and regulated bulk fuel environment. In that sense, the ad hoc UBREs used by NZAOD in Singapore and Malaysia were transitional equipment. They belonged to an era when sustainment capability was often created through adaptation, local initiative, and trade knowledge.

Current NZ Army UBRE

Their importance lies in that very imperfection. They remind us that logistics history is not only about formal establishments, new equipment projects, or official doctrine. It is also about the equipment that soldiers actually used, the compromises they managed, and the practical systems that kept vehicles moving, exercises running, and commanders supported. Between 1985 and 1989, on Malaysian roads, in jungle hides, at temporary fuel points, and beside civilian fuel infrastructure, these ad hoc UBREs did exactly that. Their continued operation into the 1990s and eventual replacement by the Unit Bulk Refuelling Equipment Mk1 in 2002 confirm their place as an important bridge between improvisation and modern military fuel distribution.

Notes

[1] Stuart McIntosh, “Driving in Malaysia – An Experience,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine  (1986): 39-43.

[2] “A Suppliers Oddity – Exercise Taiaha Tombak IX 1987,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine  (June 1987): 33-34.

[3] “Exercise Taiaha Tombak X 1988,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine  (June 1989).

[4] “Equipment and Supplies – Overall Policy – Unit Bulk Refuelling Equipment (UBRE),” Archives New Zealand No R7934641  (1983 – 1991).

[5] “Equipment and Supplies – Overall Policy – Army Development Policy and Procedures,” Archives New Zealand No R7934660  (1983 – 1991).


The Unsung Force: Logistics, Star Wars, and the Wars of the Drone Age

Each year, 4 May provides an opportunity to indulge in one of the most enduring traditions of modern popular culture, International Star Wars Day. Built around the now familiar pun, “May the Fourth be with you,” the day has become a global celebration of George Lucas’s fictional galaxy, its Jedi and Sith, its starships and stormtroopers, its rebels, empires, smugglers, droids, and planetary struggles.

For those interested in military history, Star Wars is more than entertainment. Beneath the lightsabers, space battles, heroic duels, and sweeping political drama lies something less glamorous but far more decisive: logistics.

The Star Wars galaxy is a universe of war on an immense scale. Fleets cross star systems. Armies deploy across planets. Bases are built in deserts, forests, ice fields, moons, and asteroid belts. Blockades isolate worlds. Rebel cells survive on hidden stockpiles. Empires project force across vast distances. None of this is possible without supply, transport, maintenance, fuel, food, ammunition, communications, medical support, engineering, repair, and movement control.

The Force may bind the galaxy together, but logistics keep it operating.

The Real Force Behind the Fight

Star Wars invites us to focus on visible power. We remember Darth Vader’s presence, Luke Skywalker’s courage, Leia Organa’s leadership, Han Solo’s improvisation, the Millennium Falcon’s battered brilliance, and the terrifying scale of the Death Star. Yet every one of these depends on an unseen system of sustainment.

A Star Destroyer is not simply a weapon. It is a floating city, a warship, an airbase, a barracks, a repair facility, a command post, and a logistics node. It requires fuel, reactor components, coolant, atmosphere systems, food, water, uniforms, medical stores, spare parts, ordnance, trained technicians, docking facilities, and a constant flow of replacement equipment.

A stormtrooper legion may appear uniform and self-contained, but it also needs rations, armour, weapons, power cells, transport, accommodation, casualty evacuation, communications support, maintenance, and administration. A Rebel squadron does not fly because its pilots are brave. It flies because technicians have patched the fighters, astromech droids have diagnosed faults, fuel has been secured, missiles have been loaded, and someone has found enough spare parts to keep old ships in the air for one more mission.

This is the great hidden truth of Star Wars. The galaxy’s fate often turns on logistics while the story points our eyes elsewhere.

The Empire and the Burden of Scale

The Galactic Empire represents industrial military power at its most imposing. Its strength lies in scale, standardisation, centralisation, and reach. It has shipyards, depots, garrisons, military academies, command networks, weapons factories, and the ability to move forces across interstellar distances. Its Star Destroyers and stormtrooper legions are symbols of state power made visible.

But scale is also a burden.

The larger and more centralised a military system becomes, the more it depends on predictable flows. The Empire must sustain fleets, feed garrisons, maintain shipyards, repair fighters, move prisoners, transport fuel, administer occupied worlds, and replace losses. It must control space lanes, docking facilities, fuel sources, industrial planets, communications systems, and regional depots.

This makes the Empire powerful, but also vulnerable. Its very size creates patterns. Its movements can be watched. Its supply routes can be mapped. Its bases can be targeted. Its logistics become part of its signature.

The Death Star is the clearest example. It is usually remembered as a battle station, a superweapon, and a symbol of Imperial arrogance. But it is also a vast logistics gamble. It concentrates enormous quantities of labour, material, technical knowledge, command staff, weapons systems, maintenance capacity, and political prestige into a single platform. When it is destroyed, the Empire does not merely lose a weapon. It loses a major concentration of industrial and military investment.

The second Death Star repeats the same error. The Empire again concentrates power in a single visible node. It assumes that mass, secrecy, and intimidation will overcome vulnerability. It does not.

In modern military terms, the Death Star is not just a superweapon. It is a strategic supply chain failure waiting to happen.

The Rebellion and the Logistics of Survival

The Rebel Alliance survives because it cannot afford to fight like the Empire. It lacks industrial depth, secure territory, large bases, and mass. Its strength lies in dispersion, mobility, concealment, improvisation, local support, and the ability to move before it is fixed and destroyed.

Yavin IV, Hoth, and later Rebel bases are not permanent fortresses. They are temporary nodes in a moving network. The Rebellion stockpiles what it can, salvages what it finds, repairs what it must, and evacuates when discovery becomes inevitable. Its logistics are fragile, but they are also adaptive.

Hoth was not simply a battle, it was a sustainment and evacuation operation conducted under enemy pressure.

This is where Star Wars offers a surprisingly useful lesson for modern warfare. A smaller force does not survive by ignoring logistics. It survives by making logistics lighter, more mobile, more dispersed, more redundant, and harder to target.

The evacuation from Hoth is one of the finest logistics scenes in the series. The battle itself is dramatic, but the real question is whether the Rebellion can preserve enough people, equipment, data, leadership, and combat power to fight again. The shield generator, ion cannon, transports, escort fighters, loading crews, droids, medical staff, and hurriedly packed stores all matter. Hoth is not simply a defeat. It is a survival operation.

The Rebellion loses the base, but it preserves the movement. That is the point. A force that can move under pressure remains a force. A force that cannot move becomes a target.

Droids, Data, and the Modern Battlespace

Star Wars has always understood that machines are part of sustainment. Astromech droids repair starfighters in flight. Protocol droids manage communication. Medical droids support casualty care. Loader droids and maintenance systems keep ships, bases, and depots functioning. Even the smallest background droid often represents a logistic function.

In the modern world, those background systems have become more important, and more vulnerable. Contemporary logistics depends on data. Freight systems, inventory records, digital manifests, automated identification, satellite tracking, port systems, maintenance platforms, commercial contractors, and communications networks all help sustain military operations. But they also create signatures.

A convoy can be tracked. A port backlog can be observed. An unusual demand for fuel, tyres, batteries, medical stores, generators, ammunition packaging, engineering equipment, or spare parts can reveal intent. A digital freight pattern can disclose a build-up before the first shot is fired.

In Star Wars terms, the Rebellion’s problem is not only hiding Luke Skywalker or protecting the Death Star plans. It must also hide the pattern of activity that keeps the Rebellion alive. Fuel movements, spare parts, food supply, coded transmissions, medical evacuation, and repair activity all risk revealing the location and strength of the force.

The modern lesson is clear. A military force must protect not only its weapons and people, but also its logistic metadata. In an age of drones, satellites, cyber intrusion, commercial tracking systems, and open-source intelligence, the supply chain can betray the campaign plan.

Drones and the End of the Safe Rear Area

Star Wars is full of small systems with outsized effects: probe droids, seeker droids, remotes, buzz droids, surveillance systems, and automated sentries. They were once colourful science fiction details. Today they look more like warnings.

Drones have changed the relationship between distance and danger. They can search, loiter, strike, distract, overwhelm, and expose. They turn logistics into a visible and vulnerable activity. Fuel trucks, ammunition points, bridging equipment, repair vehicles, headquarters, generators, water points, field kitchens, and workshops all produce signatures. Heat, movement, noise, radio traffic, light, routine, and digital emissions can all attract attention.

In the drone age, convoys, fuel points, workshops, and supply nodes are no longer safely behind the front line.

The old assumption that logistics happens behind the fighting edge no longer holds. The rear area is now part of the battlespace. Ports, depots, airfields, fuel farms, warehouses, repair facilities, data centres, contractor hubs, and transport corridors can all be observed and struck.

This does not mean logistics should stop. It means logistics must fight differently.

Sustainment must be dispersed, mobile, protected, deceptive, redundant, and capable of quick recovery. Supplies cannot simply be piled into large, convenient depots. Repair cannot depend entirely on distant central workshops. Fuel cannot be concentrated in obvious farms. Communications cannot rely on a single network. Contractors cannot be assumed to operate safely in areas once considered secure.

In Star Wars terms, the Empire builds big, centralised, visible systems. The Rebellion survives through dispersion, deception, improvisation, and movement. The drone age suggests that even conventional forces may need to learn from the Rebel model.

The Iran, United States War and the Star Wars Question

Contemporary warfare has made the Star Wars comparison more relevant, not less. The Iran, United States war has shown how a weaker power can challenge a stronger one, not necessarily by defeating it platform for platform, but by attacking access, tempo, certainty, and sustainment.

This naturally raises the Star Wars question: is the United States the Empire, and Iran the Rebellion?

The comparison is tempting, but too simple.

The Strait of Hormuz illustrates how access, maritime movement, unmanned systems, and logistics can become strategic pressure points.

On the surface, the United States looks more like the Empire. It has carrier strike groups, global bases, satellite networks, alliances, advanced aircraft, precision weapons, logistics commands, airlift, sealift, contractors, and the ability to project power worldwide. Its military power depends on reach, technology, maritime access, forward support, munitions supply, fuel, data, and a global sustainment network.

Iran, by contrast, has relied heavily on asymmetric tools: drones, missiles, small craft, mines, proxies, geography, political pressure, and the ability to impose risk around maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. It does not need to defeat the United States ship for ship or aircraft for aircraft. It needs to delay, disrupt, impose cost, complicate access, and make sustainment more difficult.

But the analogy must not be pushed too far. The Rebel Alliance in Star Wars is morally framed as a resistance movement against tyranny. Iran is not that. Nor is the United States simply the Empire. Real war does not divide neatly into heroes and villains. States act through interest, fear, ideology, deterrence, coercion, domestic politics, alliance commitments, economic pressure, and military calculation.

The better comparison is structural, not moral.

If the United States resembles the Empire, it is because it carries the burden of imperial-scale logistics. Its strength rests on being able to project and sustain power across the globe. But that strength depends on ports, airfields, tankers, sealift, fuel, munitions, overflight access, host-nation support, contractors, communications, and political permission.

If Iran resembles the Rebellion, it is not because it is heroic. It is because it is fighting as a weaker power fights, by targeting the assumptions that allow a larger power to operate. Access, timing, predictability, shipping, fuel, data, and political will become the battleground.

The lesson is not that one side is good and the other evil. The lesson is that any force built on scale, technology, and reach becomes vulnerable when a smaller opponent can see, delay, strike, spoof, mine, jam, or politically disrupt the logistics that hold that power together.

That is the Star Wars lesson made real.

The Blockade of Naboo and the Weaponisation of Movement

The Phantom Menace is often remembered for its politics, Jedi, and spectacle, but at its centre is a logistics operation: the blockade of Naboo. The Trade Federation does not begin by destroying the planet. It isolates it. It controls access. It turns movement, trade, and supply into weapons.

That plot now feels uncomfortably modern.

A blockade does not need to destroy everything to be effective. It can delay shipping, raise insurance costs, create shortages, disrupt confidence, force rerouting, and generate political pressure. A port, strait, canal, air corridor, or freight network can become a battlefield without looking like one.

The blockade of Naboo is therefore not simply a fictional crisis. It is a reminder that logistics can be attacked without a conventional invasion. Control of movement can become coercion. Denial of access can become strategy. Supply can become leverage.

In Star Wars, the blockade is broken by daring action. In real life, blockades and maritime disruption require endurance, escort, clearance, diplomacy, insurance, industrial resilience, alternative routes, and political resolve. Courage matters, but it is not enough. Logistics must be fought for, protected, and restored.

The Clone Wars and the Cost of Mass Mobilisation

The Clone Wars show another side of sustainment: the logistics of mass mobilisation. The Grand Army of the Republic appears almost overnight, but behind it sits an immense support structure. Cloning facilities, training systems, armour production, weapons manufacture, troop transport, medical evacuation, ammunition supply, planetary staging areas, maintenance systems, and command networks all make the war possible.

The clone army is standardised, disciplined, and rapidly deployable. That standardisation is a logistic advantage. Common equipment, common training, common doctrine, and common medical requirements simplify sustainment. But the Clone Wars also show the danger of strategic dependency. The Republic relies heavily on specific production systems, centralised decisions, and a war economy shaped by hidden manipulation.

Strategic reach depends on the less visible machinery of airlift, sealift, depots, maintenance, and movement control.

This remains a modern lesson. Mobilisation is not just having equipment on a list. It requires people, repair depth, spare parts, consumables, ammunition, transport, data, training institutions, industrial capacity, and political will. Modern war consumes at a rate peacetime systems rarely anticipate.

Drones, missiles, air defence interceptors, batteries, electronic warfare equipment, tyres, engines, generators, medical stores, precision components, water purification systems, and communications equipment all become decisive. The mundane becomes strategic. The overlooked becomes essential.

In Star Wars, the army that appears suddenly still has to be sustained continuously. That is the hard part.

New Zealand and the Lesson Behind the Fiction

For New Zealand, the lesson is particularly relevant. As a maritime nation with long supply lines, limited strategic depth, and dependence on ports, shipping, air routes, commercial contractors, digital systems, and imported equipment, logistics is not a secondary military function. It is national resilience.

Star Wars helps because it strips the issue back to essentials. A force must be able to move, supply, repair, feed, fuel, communicate, protect, and regenerate. If it cannot do those things under pressure, it cannot fight for long. If its supply chain is visible, brittle, centralised, or dependent on assumptions of peace, it becomes vulnerable before the first engagement.

The contemporary environment points to several practical lessons.

  • First, stockholding matters again. Just-in-time logistics is efficient in peace but fragile in crisis. Critical consumables, including fuel, batteries, medical items, repair parts, water production consumables, tyres, communications equipment, selected engineering stores, and ammunition-related support items, must be treated as operational capabilities, not administrative burdens.
  • Second, movement control matters. Freight visibility, authorisation, tracking, and accountability are not clerical niceties. They are how commanders understand what is moving, where risk is building, what can be sustained, and what will fail first.
  • Third, repair depth matters. Equipment that cannot be repaired forward becomes a wasting asset. A force that depends entirely on distant contractors, long lead times, or fragile import chains will lose tempo.
  • Fourth, deception matters. In the age of drones and data, logistics must conceal intent. False signatures, dispersed nodes, protected information, disciplined movement patterns, controlled emissions, and redundant routes are no longer exotic ideas. They are part of survivability.
  • Fifth, people matter. Systems do not sustain forces by themselves. Drivers, suppliers, maintainers, ammunition specialists, movements staff, caterers, clerks, planners, and commanders turn stores and data into operational effect.

The lesson is not nostalgic. It is practical. The force that cannot sustain itself under pressure cannot endure.

The Unsung Force Remains the Decisive Force

Star Wars endures because it tells mythic stories in a recognisable military universe. It gives us heroes and villains, but also convoys, bases, depots, hangars, docking bays, repair crews, droids, evacuation drills, blockades, fuel problems, spare parts, and desperate movements under pressure.

The Millennium Falcon survives because it can be repaired. The Rebellion survives because it can evacuate. The Empire falters because it over-concentrates power. The Clone Wars expand because mass mobilisation becomes possible. Naboo suffers because movement and trade are weaponised. The Resistance survives only by moving before it is destroyed.

The “unsung force” is not behind the fight. It is part of the fight.

In the drone age, logistics is no longer safely hidden behind the front line. It is under observation, under attack, and increasingly decisive. Ports, depots, airfields, fuel systems, data networks, repair facilities, and supply chains are now central to how wars are fought, delayed, escalated, and sustained.

On International Star Wars Day, it is worth remembering that the galaxy’s fate was never decided by lightsabers alone. The Force may inspire the story, but logistics make the story possible.

Without fuel, food, parts, power, data, transport, maintenance, and people, no Jedi, fleet, army, empire, republic, rebellion, or resistance can endure.

The side that sustains the fight, survives the strike, moves before being fixed, repairs faster than it breaks, and protects its supply chain from both missiles and metadata, is the side that remains in the war.


“Carry On the Good Work”

It began, as many good stories do, with a small, almost forgotten act of kindness.

In 1941, in a munitions factory at Chorley in Lancashire, a young woman named Edith Edna Smith, born 7 December 1921, slipped a handwritten note into an ammunition box. At the time, she was living between Argyle Road, Leyland, Lancashire, and her family home at Providence Place, Gilesgate Moor, Durham. She was barely twenty years old.[1]

Edith was one of the thousands of women working at the vast Royal Ordnance Factory Chorley, one of Britain’s largest wartime filling factories, where artillery ammunition, including 3.7-inch anti-aircraft rounds and 25-pounder field gun ammunition, was prepared for shipment across the world, natures that would later be held in New Zealand depots such as Belmont.[2]

Aerial view of ROF Chorley, date unknown. https://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=28136

Like many of those workers, she added a simple message, “Carry on the good work”, and signed her name and address, never knowing if it would ever be read.[3]

At the time, Britain and its Empire were still fighting largely alone against Nazi Germany. The early years of the war had not gone well. There had been setbacks across Europe, the threat of invasion remained real, and the country had endured sustained bombing during the Blitz. Victory was far from assured.

In that context, such a message was more than a casual gesture. It was a quiet acknowledgement of the risks faced by those at the front, and a way for those working behind the lines to express solidarity. The women filling and packing ammunition were not distant from the war, they were part of it, contributing directly to the means by which it would be fought.

Her note reflected something characteristic of that period, a shared sense of purpose that extended beyond the individual. It was not written for recognition, nor with any expectation of reply, but as a small act of encouragement from one part of the war effort to another.

Seen from today, in a society that often emphasises the individual, the message carries a different weight. It speaks to a time when the collective mattered more than the personal, and when even the smallest contribution was understood as part of something larger.

That box entered the vast machinery of wartime logistics. It moved through the supply chain, sent first to New Zealand, then to Fiji and then returned to New Zealand, part of the expanding system that supported both Pacific operations and home defence.[4]  There it remained.

Explosive Storehouse at the Former Belmont Ammuntion Area in Wellington, now a regional Park.

As the war ended and urgency gave way to accumulation, New Zealand’s ammunition holdings grew into a vast and complex system of depots and magazines. Sites like Belmont, established during the wartime expansion from 1942, became long-term repositories for these stocks.[5] Over time, the problem shifted from shortage to surplus, from supply to storage, accounting, and eventual disposal.

It was into this environment that Joe Bolton, a 20-year-old Ammunition Technician of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC), stepped in the late 1960s.

By 1967, much of the wartime stock had long outlived its original purpose. Clean-ups of ageing ammunition were underway, and it was during one of these that Joe opened the box.

Inside, among the remnants of a war long finished, he found Edith’s note, still legible after twenty-six years. He later noted that several other messages from the Chorley girls had been found among the old ammunition stocks, but Edith’s was the only one that remained clearly legible after more than a quarter of a century.[6]

Rather than discard it, he did something simple, but remarkable.

He wrote back.

By then, Edith had married and was now Edith Mortimer, living at 56 Coronation Avenue, Carville, County Durham, with her husband George William Mortimer. The address she had written in 1941 no longer existed, Providence Place had since been demolished, but the letter still found its way to her. A local postman, drawing on his knowledge of the community, successfully redirected it.

Against all odds, a message sent into the unknown during the Second World War had found its way home.

The story quickly captured attention. It made headlines in New Zealand and Britain, including coverage in the Daily Mirror.[7] What might have been a curiosity became something more enduring.

Joe and Edith began to write to each other.

Across the distance between New Zealand and England, and across the years between wartime youth and post-war adulthood, a genuine friendship developed.

From Ammunition to Innovation

Nearly a decade later, in 1977, the story gained its most human chapter and quietly intersected with a major technological shift in military ordnance.

Joe was in England on a course in Leamington Spa, learning about the then-new “Wheelbarrow” system, a remotely controlled bomb-disposal robot developed by the British Army in the early 1970s. Designed to allow operators to investigate and render safe explosive devices from a distance, it replaced the dangerous “long walk” approach with remote handling and marked a significant advance in explosive ordnance disposal practice.

Joe was among those exposed to this emerging capability at an early stage. His involvement placed him within the small group of practitioners who would go on to help introduce and embed this technology within the New Zealand Army.

56 Coronation Ave
Durham, England

A Journey Completed

His visit coincided with the Queen’s Jubilee, giving him a rare opportunity. He took the train north to Durham to visit Edith and her husband, Billy, at their home on Coronation Avenue for the weekend.

Edith, by then in her mid-fifties, was understandably nervous. She knew Joe was an Army officer, and her imagination had filled in the gaps. Would he arrive speaking in a clipped, formal accent, perhaps even dressed like a guardsman in a bearskin? She also knew he was Māori, and, shaped by distance and unfamiliarity, she wasn’t quite sure what to expect.

By Joe’s account, she had taken tranquillisers beforehand to steady her nerves.[8]

When he arrived, those concerns dissolved almost immediately.

They offered him a drink. Joe’s response, that he “could murder a beer”, cut straight through the tension. As he later recalled, the room visibly relaxed.

What followed was not ceremony or formality, but genuine warmth. Edith and Billy, though modest in means, extended generous hospitality and refused to let him pay for anything during his stay.[9]

Edith Mortimer passed away on 9 November 1993, but the note she placed in an ammunition box in 1941, and the connection it created, endured far beyond her lifetime.

The Man Behind the Story

Joe’s actions in replying to Edith’s note reflected something consistent throughout his career.

He served in South Vietnam, was later commissioned, and went on to serve in a range of logistics and ordnance roles within the New Zealand Army, both in New Zealand and overseas.

Major J.S Bolton ATO Conference Dinner, Hopu Hopu Camp, 10 September 1986

Joe Bolton passed away in 2020. He is survived by his wife, Marilyn, who has preserved his account of this story along with the original 1967 newspaper clippings.

The Human Trace in the System

What had begun as a pencilled note in 1941 became, decades later, a meeting between two people connected by chance, history, and simple human decency.

Behind every system, every depot, every stockpile, there are people, and sometimes, even in something as impersonal as an ammunition box, they leave behind a trace of themselves that endures.

Notes

[1] “Genealogical records, Edith Edna Smith (later Mortimer),” Ancestry.com family tree data, updated 2026, accessed  https://www.ancestry.com/family-tree/person/tree/164976759/person/312143787481/facts?_gl=1*7uvxqk*_up*MQ..*_ga*Njc4NjAyMzM5LjE3Nzc2MDA2Nzk.*_ga_4QT8FMEX30*czA3OTNhODM0LWQyYzUtNDBlOC1hMjA1LWRmOTM0MTQwMjYxNiRvMSRnMSR0MTc3NzYwMDY3OCRqNjAkbDAkaDA.

[2] “Royal Ordnance Factory Chorley,” WW2DB, updated 2018, accessed  https://ww2db.com/facility/ROF_Chorley.

[3] “Wartime Note is Answered,” Contemporary newspaper report, 1967.

[4] “Dear Edith . . 26 Years Later,” Contemporary newspaper report, 1967.

[5] “Opening the Belmont Magazines,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2026, accessed 1 May, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/wp-admin/post.php?post=26311&action=edit.

[6] “Wartime Echo,” Contemporary newspaper report, 1967.

[7] Rupert Morters, “After 26 Years . . A reply to her note,” Daily Mirror, Tuesday July 11, 1967.

[8] “Family Account,” Preserved by Marilyn Bolton, 2026.

[9] “Family Account.”


Amateurs Study War, Professionals Study Logistics

The 2026 U.S. experience in the Middle East reinforces a core doctrinal truth: logistics failure rarely manifests as sudden collapse. It emerges as friction across a system of systems.

NZDF doctrine defines logistics as the science of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of forces, encompassing supply, transport, maintenance, infrastructure, and services. More importantly, it frames logistics as a network of interdependent nodes and flows operating across strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These systems do not operate themselves. Their effectiveness depends on the people who plan, manage, adapt, and recover them under pressure.

The 2026 U.S. experience illustrates how sustainment failure actually appears. It does not begin with a dramatic ammunition blackout. It appears first as friction: delayed replenishment, reduced menus, suspended mail, and the quiet disappearance of “minor” items such as toiletries, clothing, and batteries.

Reporting in April 2026, drawing on service members’ accounts and imagery from deployed vessels such as USS Tripoli and USS Abraham Lincoln, described reduced food availability and the suspension of military mail services. Official responses rejected claims of outright shortages, but conceded a more important point: replenishment can be delayed by operations, weather, and access constraints, and consumption must then adjust accordingly.

This pattern was anticipated decades earlier. A 1994 Naval War College study identified U.S. logistics as a centre of gravity and outlined how attacks on ports, airfields, and pre-positioned depots could degrade operations without destroying the system.[1] More recent reporting confirms that key nodes such as Bahrain and Jebel Ali remain central to sustainment architecture.[2]

In 2026, Iranian strikes appear to have validated that model. Rather than destroying logistics outright, they disrupted and displaced it, translating operational pressure into day-to-day scarcity at the user end, precisely where morale and endurance reside.

The critical point is not collapse. It is adaptation under pressure. Friction is absorbed by people, planners, maintainers, and operators who compensate for delay, scarcity, and uncertainty.

Maritime Nations and the Wider Logistics Shock

The conflict also demonstrates that military logistics cannot be separated from the commercial systems that sustain it. Disruption in the Gulf affected shipping routes, fuel distribution, insurance costs, and port access.

For a maritime nation such as New Zealand, this has direct implications. Deployed forces rely on:

  • commercial shipping networks
  • fuel supply chains
  • host-nation infrastructure
  • coalition logistics hubs

The vulnerability sits not just within the force, but across the system sustaining it and four structural realities emerge:

First, geography is no longer protection.
Long-range strike and persistent ISR mean rear areas are targetable. Distance now creates fragility, not safety.

Second, forward deployments become liabilities.
Small, externally sustained forces are vulnerable not at the point of contact, but along the chain that supports them.

Third, maritime dependence amplifies risk.
Sea-based sustainment creates predictability, concentration, and exposure through dual-use infrastructure.

Fourth, host-nation dependence becomes critical.
Allied and commercial nodes do not need to be destroyed, only disrupted.

The problem therefore shifts. The question is no longer whether a force can deploy, but whether it can sustain operations under continuous pressure.

For New Zealand, endurance will fail before combat capability. The decisive factor becomes recovery and adaptation, not initial resilience.

The Historical Pattern: Forward Logistics

This is not new. New Zealand’s wartime logisticians understood it clearly. In the First World War, the New Zealand Ordnance Depot at Farringdon Road supported national requirements within the British system. In the Second World War, this expanded into a distributed network across Egypt, Italy, and the Pacific.

These systems were not just stockpiles. They were forward, semi-autonomous sustainment networks combining:

  • inventory depth
  • distribution capability
  • repair and maintenance
  • trained personnel

Each layer of autonomy required more people and more stock. That was the trade-off: resilience through forward capacity.

This pattern continued post-war through Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, and East Timor. Even within coalition systems, New Zealand maintained identifiable national logistics elements.

The conclusion was consistent: forward operations required forward sustainment.

The Contemporary Posture

Open-source evidence suggests a different balance today. The 2010 civilianisation programme shifted approximately 1,400 military roles, including logistics functions, into civilian positions. Procurement data shows heavy reliance on Defence Commercial Services, while major functions such as warehousing, maintenance, and catering are now intertwined with commercial providers.

This reflects a broader Western trend: efficiency in peacetime through outsourcing and centralisation. The issue is not efficiency itself. It is resilience under disruption.

Recent reporting indicates some rebalancing, including increased inventory holdings following global supply shocks. However, public data does not demonstrate the existence of deep, deployable reserve stocks on the historical model.

The key question is therefore practical, if commercial systems are disrupted, does the Army retain the uniformed depth and organisational capacity to assume and sustain those functions? 

While overall sustainment capacity remained intact, disruptions to supply chains and mail delivery illustrate how logistics friction emerges within even the most capable systems.

The 2026 American warning

The most useful way to read the 2026 U.S. reporting is not as a morality tale about poor catering, but as a case study in how contested logistics become visible to ordinary service members. The Independent reported that U.S. personnel in the Middle East were facing food shortages, that families were sending care packages containing food and other essentials, and that a suspended military mail service was delaying those packages. The article also noted that more than 50,000 U.S. service members were in the region and that some vessels had not made port since the war began.[3] NDTV’s account, likewise drawing on the same underlying reporting, highlighted nearly empty trays, complaints about the absence of fresh produce, and reliance on families for supplements.[4] Official United States Postal Service (USPS) alerts independently confirmed that, effective 7 April 2026, service to multiple military post office ZIP codes had been temporarily suspended; by late April, USPS still listed 26 military ZIP codes as suspended. That is a logistics fact, not a rumour.[5]

Reported meal served aboard a deployed U.S. vessel during the 2026 Iran conflict. Regardless of disputed claims, such images illustrate how logistics friction becomes visible at the user level, not through system collapse, but through reduced variety, substitution, and adaptation.

The U.S. Navy’s rebuttal matters too, because it clarifies the mechanism. Adm. Daryl Caudle said deployed ships had at least ten days of food, and most had more than thirty days, while the U.S. Navy and the Secretary of Defence rejected the “food shortage” framing. Yet Stars and Stripes and Navy Times both reported something equally important: culinary specialists acknowledged that orders can be pushed right when operations intervene, that replenishment can arrive weeks late, and that menus are modified until new deliveries come in. In other words, the official rebuttal did not eliminate sustainment friction; it narrowed the claim from “starvation” to “delay and adaptation.” That distinction is analytically crucial. In war, the logistics system need not implode to matter. It merely has to be hard enough to impose scarcity, uncertainty, and degraded morale.[6]

This was exactly the logic of Peter Scala’s Naval War College paper, U.S. Logistics Vulnerability: Major Regional Conflict with Iran. Scala argued that U.S. “logistics might” was one of America’s centres of gravity and built a scenario in which attacks on airfields, ports, and pre-positioned assets in Bahrain and Kuwait would distract, delay, and degrade U.S. operations.[7] The paper’s specifics belong to the early 1990s. Still, its core proposition has aged well: when long-distance power projection depends on predictable flows through a small number of hubs, the theatre logistic network itself becomes a prime target. Official Military Sealift Command reporting from 2025 reinforces this point by showing that combat logistics force vessels were loading ammunition in Bahrain, providing fuel support in the Gulf, and using Jebel Ali for readiness and repair tasks. That is the architecture an adversary studies.[8]

Joint doctrine states the broader principle in a less dramatic but equally important way. The Joint Staff still describes logistics as the keystone of joint logistics, while Army sustainment doctrine defines the sustainment warfighting function as enabling freedom of action, extending operational reach, and prolonging endurance.[9] The 2026 episode is therefore not a contradiction of doctrine. It is doctrine made concrete. Beans, mail, hygiene items, spare clothing, and batteries are not peripheral to combat endurance; they are its daily expression. 

Why New Zealand’s wartime logisticians built forward

New Zealand’s historical practice began from a hard truth: coalition integration did not remove national requirements. In the First World War, the NZEF could fit into the British imperial system, but the need for New Zealand-specific items was still recognised. That drove the establishment of the New Zealand Ordnance Depot at 30–32 Farringdon Road in London in late 1916, close to headquarters and rail access, so that NZ camps, hospitals, and establishments in Britain could be supported through a national node.[10] This was not a sign of mistrust in allies. It was an acknowledgement that national issue scales, accounting, clothing, and special stores always leave residual sovereign demand. 

The same logic expanded in the Second World War. The 2nd NZEF Base Ordnance Depot in Egypt, later split between base and advance functions into Italy, was the primary ordnance organisation sustaining New Zealand forces from 1940 to 1946.[11] In the Pacific,  NZAOC material shows a parallel depot logic: a Base Ordnance Depot in New Caledonia, an Advanced Ordnance Depot in Guadalcanal, and a forward depot at Vella Lavella. The 1943–44 reports are striking because they discuss not just locations, but the economics of depth. Each new sub-depot required more personnel and larger store holdings to create working margins. That is the classical logistics trade-off: autonomy buys resilience, but only by carrying inventory and people forward.[12] Crucially, these systems required not just stockholding, but trained personnel at scale, able to manage inventory, control distribution, conduct repairs, and adapt to disruption close to the point of use.

These systems were multi-corps mechanisms, not just warehouses. Historically, the service corps carried rations, POL, and movements; ordnance controlled stocks, accounting, and issue of clothing and camp equipment, and much of the materiel system; engineers provided electrical and mechanical support, repairing and recovering vehicles and equipment. Later examples make those roles explicit. The ANZUK Supply Platoon, for instance, existed to provide foodstuffs and POL to the force.[13] While NZDF’s own combat service support output descriptions continued to separate transport, supply, maintenance support, and movements as distinct support functions.

The post-1945 record matters because it shows that New Zealand did not abandon forward logistics once mass armies disappeared. In occupied Japan, New Zealand’s 4 Forward Ordnance Depot, later 4 New Zealand Advanced Ordnance Depot at Chofu, sat inside a broader British Commonwealth Occupation Force structure that also had a multinational base ordnance depot at Kure. This was an integrated Commonwealth system, but it still included dedicated New Zealand ordnance elements. In Vietnam, New Zealand’s Logistic Support Element was embedded in the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau from 1966; this was not full sovereign support, but it was still a recognised national logistic framework inside an allied base.

The more important shift came with the impending British withdrawal east of Suez. In 1970, New Zealand joined Australia in establishing 5 Advanced Ordnance Depots in Singapore. In 1971. That became the tri-national ANZUK Ordnance Depot, which by 1972 held roughly 45,000 line items. When ANZUK ended, New Zealand converted its share into the New Zealand Advanced Ordnance Depot, which remained in Singapore until 1989. In parallel, supply functions continued through an ANZUK Supply Platoon and then a New Zealand supply depot. This is the clearest postwar evidence that New Zealand’s logisticians concluded that a persistent forward presence required a real forward sustainment system, not merely rear-area faith in allied benevolence.

East Timor confirmed the enduring pattern. New Zealand’s initial deployment flowed through Darwin, with RNZAF Hercules flights shuttling personnel and stores between Darwin, Dili, and the NZ battalion operating base at Suai. The architecture was smaller than Singapore’s depot-era footprint. Still, the operational logic was the same: forward support, intermediate mounting, and theatre sustainment cannot be improvised from home stations alone.

LocationPeriodFunctionStockholding depthAutonomy
London, Farringdon Road1916–1919UK depot for NZEF camps, hospitals, and NZ-specific itemsModerateModerate
Egypt and Italy1940–1946Base and advance ordnance depots for 2nd NZEFDeepHigh
Fiji1940–1942Early Pacific base support and island defense sustainmentModerateModerate
Bourail / Nouméa, New Caledonia1943–1944Base ordnance depot for 3 NZ Division in PacificDeepHigh
Guadalcanal / Vella Lavella1943–1944Advanced and forward depots close to operationsLimited-to-moderateModerate
Chofu / Kure, Japan1946–1948NZ forward/advanced ordnance within Commonwealth occupation systemModerateModerate
Vung Tau / Nui Dat1965–1971Embedded NZ logistic support within Australian systemLimitedLow-to-moderate
Singapore1970–19895 AOD, ANZUK OD, then NZAOD and NZ supply depot for FPDA-era forceDeepHigh
Darwin / Dili / Suai1999–2002Mounting, airbridge, fuel and theater sustainment for East TimorModerateModerate
Current NZDF expeditionary model2010s–2020sMix of organic CSS, civilian staff, contractor support, and allied integrationPublicly unspecifiedPublicly unspecified

The table’s qualifiers are necessarily qualitative, because public New Zealand data do not disclose deployable stock levels or theatre reserve holdings. But the structural contrast is unmistakable: historical New Zealand practice repeatedly created forward depots with identifiable stocks and geography; the contemporary public record describes systems, contracts, facilities, and processes far more than it describes forward-positioned reserve depth.

The present New Zealand posture

The strongest open-source evidence for a thinner uniformed support base is the 2010 civilianisation program. The Office of the Auditor-General reported that NZDF committed to converting 1,400 military positions in the “middle” and “back” into civilian positions, explicitly including logistics and training. The stated aim was to move more military people to the deployable “front.” The Auditor-General also concluded that the project contributed to reduced capability and that NZDF then had to recover from the damage.[14] That does not prove the disappearance of second-line logistics. It does prove that, in the name of efficiency and force rebalancing, New Zealand deliberately reduced the military share of its support structure. 

Public procurement evidence points in the same direction. A Defence industry study noted that Defence Logistics Command managed roughly 85 percent of NZDF procurement and that around 60 percent of that was handled through Defence Commercial Services.[15] More recently, the Ministry of Defence publicly credited a 2022 review of Army logistics arrangements for warehousing, maintenance, repair, and overhaul—Project Alexander—as having been conducted collaboratively with the incumbent supplier, Lockheed Martin NZ, and Logistics Command Land.[16]  In other words, major elements of what earlier generations would have recognised as core second- and third-line military functions are now visibly entangled with commercial machinery, market contracts, and prime-contractor relationships. 

Current tendering reinforces the picture. NZDF’s 2025 “Future Hospitality Services” sought a strategic long-term catering and hospitality supplier. Its facilities-maintenance program sought outsourced prime FMS providers across nine camps and bases. Earlier tenders covered rations, industrial and engineering consumables, land transportation services, and other support categories through Defence Commercial Services and syndicated contracts.[17] None of this is unusual by contemporary Western standards. Indeed, it is precisely what many militaries did after the Cold War: capture the peace dividend by shifting routine support into civilian employment and commercial service markets. The problem is not peacetime efficiency. The problem is that efficiency-optimised support chains are often brittle under interruption, scarce lift, airspace closure, and hostile action.

The public record also shows why caution is necessary. NZDF’s 2024 annual report stated that inventories were above budget by NZ$26.6 million because global disruption led the force to hold more inventory as a buffer against uncertainty. That suggests some institutional re-learning after recent supply shocks. The same report also records completion of the Linton Maintenance Support Facility and ongoing work to modernise logistics information systems and clothing/personal-equipment systems.[18] So the fairest judgment is not that New Zealand has embraced a blind “just in time” ideology and owns no buffers. It is that open sources show a logistics system increasingly managed through commercial interfaces and civilianised structures, while offering too little public evidence to prove theatre-depth reserve stocks on the historical model. This raises a practical question. If commercial systems are disrupted and supply chains become contested, to what extent does the Army retain the uniformed personnel, experience, and organisational depth required to assume, manage, and sustain those functions at scale?

Consumables decide endurance

This matters across all classes of supply, but especially for high-turnover consumables. Historically, New Zealand learned the lesson through clothing and boots. A history of postwar combat boots records that wartime stocks delayed change at first, but by the mid-1950s leather-soled boots were proving inadequate in the Malayan jungle, which pushed the Army into research and trials with scientific and industrial partners.[19] The combat-clothing history makes the same point from another angle: older stocks could be mixed with newer garments for a while, but climate, terrain, and theatre requirements steadily forced change.[20] Clothing and footwear are therefore not cosmetic. In wet, abrasive, and tropical environments, they become wear items with replacement rates that differ markedly from those observed in temperate New Zealand conditions.

The modern equivalent is battery demand. U.S. Army reporting has repeatedly described soldiers carrying heavy battery loads for radios, GPS, night-vision devices, optics, and other worn systems; one official article described a 72-hour mission requiring seven battery types weighing 7.3 kg, while another cited a typical figure of more than 9.1 kg. More recent Army reporting indicates that energy demand continues to rise as high-tech soldier systems proliferate.[21] Batteries now sit where boot polish, webbing, Blanco, and extra socks once seemed mundane: they are daily-use items that decide whether a force can communicate, see at night, navigate, and operate sensors and drones. In any contested theatre, batteries become both a tactical enabler and a logistical burden.

The 2026 U.S. reporting underlines the linkage. Even if the Navy’s rebuttal is accepted at face value, family efforts to send food, socks, and similar comfort-or-necessity items tell the same story as New Zealand’s boot trials in Malaya: the “small” high-use things are often the first to become visible when a sustainment system is under strain. Managing these shortfalls is not purely a supply problem. It requires personnel capable of forecasting demand, reallocating scarce resources, and sustaining distribution under pressure.

Policy implications

The historical and contemporary evidence lead to a practical, not nostalgic, conclusion. New Zealand does not need to recreate a 1943 empire of depots. But it does need to ensure that both the systems and the personnel are in place to sustain operations when those systems are under stress.

  • First, it should identify a short list of mission-critical consumables for protected stockholding: clothing, boots, batteries, medical supplies, water-production consumables, and selected vehicle spares. The point is not to stock everything deeply; it is to protect the items whose absence rapidly degrades endurance and morale.
  • Second, it should rebuild the habit of forward positioning. Historically, that meant London, Maadi, Bourail, Guadalcanal, Singapore, or Darwin. In contemporary terms, it means access arrangements, pre-packed theatre sets, scalable forward storage in allied locations, and clear trigger points for activating them.
  • Third, commercial dependence should be made surge-capable rather than merely efficient. Rations, transport, facilities support, freight forwarding, and contractor maintenance can remain contracted, but contracts should include war clauses, regional alternates, rapid lift options, and standards for operating under degraded communications and closed airspace.
  • Fourth, organic maintenance and movements capacity should be protected as insurance, not treated as inefficiency. New Zealand’s historical advantage lay not only in holding stock, but in combining stock, movement, recovery, and repair close enough to the user to matter. A contracted peacetime base workshop is not the same thing as deployable maintenance depth.
  • Fifth, personnel depth itself should be treated as a capability. This does not necessarily mean large standing increases in force size, but it does require sufficient trained logisticians, across supply, transport, maintenance, and movements, who can expand, assume additional roles, and operate independently when systems degrade. The ability to absorb disruption is not a system property alone; it is a function of people.

Finally, allied integration should be pursued as a force multiplier, but never as a substitute for knowing one’s own requirements. New Zealand’s own history repeatedly shows the pattern: integrated systems in Britain, the Commonwealth occupation in Japan, the Australian base in Vietnam, and ANZUK in Singapore all still required national sub-systems or national accounting. Coalition logistics work best when each partner contributes coherent national support into the larger framework, not when a smaller force simply assumes that someone else will notice and solve its shortages.

Across all of these measures, the common requirement is not simply capability, but capacity, enough trained people to absorb disruption, adapt systems, and keep sustainment functioning when conditions are no longer permissive.

Open questions and limitations

Open-source evidence does not reveal the present deployable stock depth, reserve holdings, or second-line readiness of the New Zealand Army in a way that would support a definitive public assessment. Likewise, historical linkages between specific operational shortfalls and later structural decisions remain, in some cases, inferential rather than conclusive. The 2026 U.S. reporting also remains contested in detail, even as it consistently points to the same underlying reality: sustainment systems under pressure degrade through delay, adaptation, and accumulated friction.

What is clearer is the broader pattern.

The operating environment is shifting toward one in which logistics systems will be contested, disrupted, and forced to adapt under pressure. In such conditions, resilience cannot be measured solely in terms of stockholding, infrastructure, or contractual arrangements. It depends equally on the depth of personnel available to manage, reconfigure, and sustain those systems as conditions deteriorate.

New Zealand’s own history reflects this understanding. From Farringdon Road in 1916, through the base and advanced depots of the Second World War, to Singapore and the forward sustainment arrangements in East Timor, New Zealand repeatedly built systems that combined stock, infrastructure, and sufficient trained personnel to operate them forward, often at distance, and often under pressure.

The contemporary system reflects a different balance, shaped by efficiency, integration, and commercial support.

The question is not whether that system works in permissive conditions. It demonstrably does.

The question is whether it retains sufficient depth, in both structure and people, to adapt and endure when those conditions no longer apply.

If the historical record offers any guidance, it is that resilience has never rested on systems alone. It has depended on the ability to carry capability forward, in stock, in structure, and in people, and to sustain it when conditions are at their most difficult.

Ultimately, resilience in logistics is not only a matter of what is held, or where it is held, but of who is available, and in sufficient depth, to make the system function when it comes under sustained pressure.

Notes

[1] Peter A Scala, “U.S. Logistics Vulnerability: Major Regional Conflict with Iran,” Naval War College no. (1994).

[2] sections on Fifth Fleet combat logistics force support, Bahrain loading, and Jebel Ali repair and readiness activity. Military Sealift Command, “2025 in Review,” USNI News, 16 April 2025, https://news.usni.org/2026/01/21/u-s-navys-military-sealift-command-2025-in-review.

[3] Brendan Rascius, “Morale Is Going to Be at an All-Time Low’: Iran War Troops Living on Meager Rations as Postal Service Stops Delivering,” The Independent, 17 April 2026, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/iran-war-soldiers-food-shortages-mail-b2959960.html.

[4] NDTV World Desk, “US Troops Given Small Food Portions, Nearly Empty Trays on Warships Deployed in Iran Conflict,” NDTV, April 2026, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-iran-war-us-troops-given-small-food-portions-nearly-empty-trays-on-warships-deployed-in-iran-conflict-11369665.

[5] United States Postal Service, “Mail Service Alerts and Updates,”7 April 2026, https://about.usps.com/newsroom/service-alerts/.

[6] Riley Ceder, “CNO Denies Reports of Poor Food Service Aboard Navy Vessels,” Navy Times, 20 April 2026; Alison Bath, “Navy Having No Problems Feeding Sailors in Middle East, Admiral Says in Denying Reports,” Stars and Stripes, 21April 2026.

[7] Peter A Scala, “U.S. Logistics Vulnerability: Major Regional Conflict with Iran.”

[8] Military Sealift Command, “2025 in Review.”

[9] United States Government Army, Joint Publication JP 4-0 Joint Logistics February 2019 (2019); U.S.G.U. Army, Field Manual FM 4-0 Sustainment Operations July 2019 (Independently Published, 2019).

[10] “New Zealand Ordnance Depot, Farringdon Road, London,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2021, accessed 1 March, 2026.

[11] “New Zealand Base Ordnance Depot, Egypt and Italy 1940–46,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2018, accessed 1 March, 2026.

[12] “Reports on NZ Ordnance Depots in the Pacific,,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2020, accessed 1 March, 2026; Oliver A. Gillespie, The tanks : an unofficial history of the activities of the Third New Zealand Division Tank Squadron in the Pacific (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947).

[13] “ANZUK Supply Platoon,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2017, accessed 20 March, 2026.

[14] New Zealand. Office of the Auditor-General, New Zealand Defence Force: The Civilianisation Project (Office of the Auditor-General, 2013). https://oag.parliament.nz/2013/civilianisation.

[15] New Zealand. Ministry of Defence and New Zealand. Ministry of Defence. Evaluation Division, Defence Industry: Optimising New Zealand Industry Involvement in the New Zealand Defence Sector (Ministry of Defence, 2014). https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publications/evaluation-report-10-2014-optimising-nz-industry-involvement-in-the-nz-defence-sector.pdf.

[16] New Zealand Defence Force New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2022 Awards of Excellence to Industry (Ministry of Defence, 2022). https://www.defence.govt.nz/business-and-industry/industry-awards/2022-awards-of-excellence-to-industry/?stage=Live.

[17] New Zealand Government Electronic Tenders Service, NZDF Land Transportation Services, ( , 2022). ; New Zealand Government Electronic Tenders Service, Industrial and Engineering Consumables,” tender notice ( , 2015). ; New Zealand Government Electronic Tenders Service, Supply of Rations,” tender notice, ( , 2016). ; New Zealand Government Electronic Tenders Service, NZDF Future Hospitality Services,” advance notice for 2025 Request for Proposal ( , 2024). ; New Zealand Government Electronic Tenders Service, NZDF Future Facilities Maintenance,” tender notice ( , 2025). ; New Zealand Defence Force, Annual Report 2024 ( , 2024). .

[18] New Zealand Defence Force, Annual Report 2024.

[19] “New Zealand Army Combat Boots – 1945–1980,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2022, accessed 20 March, 2026.

[20] “Development of NZ Army Combat Clothing, 1955–1980,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2023, accessed 20 March, 2026.

[21] “Army R&D energizes battery charging for Soldiers,” U.S. Army, 2021, accessed 20 March, 2026, https://www.army.mil/article/251622/army_rd_energizes_battery_charging_for_soldiers; “Army partners with University of Maryland-led battery consortium,” U.S. Army, 2020, accessed 20 March, 2026, https://www.army.mil/article/240138/army_partners_with_university_of_maryland_led_battery_consortium; “CCDC’s Road Map to Modernizing the Army: Soldier lethality,” U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center, 2020, accessed 20 March, 2026, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/358111/ccdcs-road-map-modernizing-army-soldier-lethality.


From Shortage to Surplus

Weapons, Ammunition, and the Limits of Capacity in New Zealand, 1941–1944

One of the clearest ways to understand the scale of New Zealand’s 1939-1944 wartime transformation is not through unit establishments or organisational charts, but through the arithmetic of weapons and ammunition.

In 1941, the Army was small, lightly equipped, and operating within clear limits. By 1944, it had become something very different, a force holding thousands of weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition, supported by a nationwide network of depots and storage sites built at speed and under pressure.

At first glance, this appears to be a straightforward story of expansion. More guns, more ammunition, more infrastructure, a system growing to meet the demands of war.

But the detail tells a more complex story.

The Quartermaster-General’s report of 1944 provides a rare snapshot of that transformation. Using mid-1941 as a baseline and March 1944 as an endpoint, it shows not just what New Zealand held, but how rapidly it had to build the system to support it. Weapons were introduced faster than they could be standardised. Ammunition accumulated faster than it could be comfortably stored. Infrastructure expanded, but rarely kept pace.

Running through all of this was a constraint that was less visible but more decisive.

Not space.
Not supply.
Risk.

Even at the height of expansion, the system was not defined by how much it could hold, but by how safely it could manage what it contained.

Understanding Hazard: The Historical Foundations

The classification of ammunition by hazard category and group behaviour did not emerge fully formed during the Second World War. It was the product of decades of experience across the British and wider imperial ammunition system.

From the late nineteenth century onwards, a series of catastrophic explosions in magazines, depots, and aboard ships forced armies to confront a simple reality: ammunition did not merely burn, it behaved differently depending on its composition, confinement, and quantity. In some cases, a local incident could escalate rapidly through sympathetic detonation, producing catastrophic effects.

By the First World War, this understanding had become embedded in British ordnance practice.

From Experience to Principle

By the interwar period, British ammunition doctrine, which New Zealand inherited directly, had already established a set of hard-learned principles shaped by decades of accidents, battlefield experience, and industrial mishaps.

These included:

  • Separation of explosives by type, particularly detonators, propellants, and filled shells
  • Limitation of quantities per magazine, based not on space but on explosive effect
  • Dispersal of stocks, to prevent a single incident destroying an entire reserve
  • Recognition of sympathetic detonation, where one explosion could trigger another

Central to these principles was what would later be formalised as Net Explosive Content (NEC).

NEC represents the actual weight of explosive material, not the number of rounds. In practical terms, it provided a way to measure risk. A simple comparison illustrates this:

A single 3.7-inch anti-aircraft round contained a significant high explosive charge, meaning that thousands of such rounds could reach the safe explosive limit of a magazine. By contrast, millions of small arms rounds could be stored without approaching the same threshold.

This distinction mattered. Storage was not governed by how much could be stacked, but by how much explosive effect could be safely contained.

Although the term itself was not always used explicitly in this period, the concept was clearly understood. Magazine limits, spacing distances, and storage policies were already being determined by the total explosive effect that could be safely contained, rather than by available space.

Taken together, these principles map directly to what would later become:

  • Hazard categories (local versus mass explosion effects)
  • Compatibility groups (what can safely be stored together)
  • Net Explosive Content (NEC) limits (how much explosive risk can be safely held in one place)

The Emergence of Category and Group Thinking

By the 1940s, these ideas had been codified in practical terms. CAT X, Y, and Z were the standard hazard classifications used to categorise ammunition hazards:[1]

  • CAT X (local hazard)
  • CAT Y (intermediate hazard)
  • CAT Z (mass explosion hazard)

These categories reflected a long-standing recognition that:

  • Some ammunition would burn locally
  • Some would produce blast and fragmentation
  • Some could detonate in its entirety

Alongside this, British and Dominion forces employed a formal classification system set out in the Classified List of Government Explosives, which defined ammunition by composition, sensitivity, and function.[2]

Government Explosives Groups (Full Classification)

  • Group 1: Explosives bearing a fire and explosion risk, relatively sensitive to spark or friction, or requiring lead-free conditions, not containing a means of ignition.
  • Group 2: Explosives liable to decomposition, bearing an explosion risk and capable of functioning by spark or friction, but not containing a means of ignition.
  • Group 3: Explosives liable to decomposition, presenting primarily a fire risk, and not containing their own means of ignition.
  • Group 4: Stable explosives presenting a fire or explosion risk, but not containing their own means of ignition.
  • Group 5: Unboxed shell filled with high explosive, gunpowder, or similar compositions, plugged or fuzed.
  • Group 6: Boxed ammunition containing high explosive, gunpowder, or propellant, with or without its own means of ignition.
  • Group 7: Mines, bombs, and underwater ammunition filled with high explosive, plugged, with or without components.
  • Group 7A: Mines, bombs, and underwater ammunition filled with high explosive and containing their own means of ignition.
  • Group 8: Mortar and projector ammunition, grenades, and rockets, filled with high explosive or gunpowder, with or without propellant and components.
  • Group 9: Pyrotechnics, including signalling, illumination, and similar stores.
  • Group 10: Detonators and initiatory compositions, representing the most sensitive class of explosives.
  • Group 11: Incendiary and smoke ammunition not containing phosphides, white phosphorus, or flammable liquids.
  • Group 12: Ammunition containing phosphide or white phosphorus, presenting increased fire and chemical hazard.
  • Group 13: Chemical ammunition, including toxic or reactive fillings.
  • Group 14: Special group applicable to naval (H.M. ships) stowage conditions.
  • Group 15: Incendiary ammunition containing flammable liquids or gels, but not phosphorus.

This system defined what the explosive was. The CAT X/Y/Z system defined what it did in bulk.

From Composition to Behaviour

The interaction between these systems was central to wartime storage:

  • Group 5 and 7 natures typically aligned with CAT Z, driving magazine limits
  • Group 6 and 8 natures aligned with CAT Y, forming the bulk of operational stocks
  • Group 9 and some Group 11 natures aligned with CAT X, presenting mainly fire hazards
  • Group 10 detonators required strict segregation regardless of quantity

What emerges is a layered system:

A System Understood, but Defined by Limits

By the time of the Second World War, British and Dominion forces, including New Zealand, were operating within this framework in practice, even if the terminology had not yet been fully standardised.

What mattered was not the labels, but the underlying logic: Ammunition storage was governed not by how much space was available, but by how much explosive risk could be safely contained.

This distinction, already understood before the war, would become critical as New Zealand’s ammunition holdings expanded dramatically after 1942.

A Force Built on Scarcity

In mid-1941, New Zealand’s position was defined by limitation. Equipment existed, but in constrained quantities, and often of obsolescent types.[3]

At the end of 1941, New Zealand possessed just 164 artillery pieces of all classes.

Ammunition holdings reflected the same reality. Total gun ammunition stocks stood at 108,299 rounds, sufficient for training and limited contingencies, but not for sustained operations.

This was not a failure; it was a priority. New Zealand sat low in the imperial allocation system, and much of what it required existed on paper rather than in depots.

Yet even at this early stage, the nature of the ammunition held imposed constraints that were not immediately visible in the headline numbers.

Artillery Equipment and Ammunition Holdings, c. June–December 1941

TypeWeapon SystemQtyRounds HeldApprox Rds per Gun
FieldBL 60-pdr Mk I62,704451
FieldBL 6-inch 26-cwt How146,268448
FieldQF 4.5-inch Howitzer1914,074741
FieldQF 3.7-inch Howitzer92,589288
Field18-pdr QF Mk II6045,285755
Coast6-inch (Mk VII, XXI, XXIV)205,529276
CoastBL 6-inch Mk V (EOC)2310155
CoastBL 4-inch Mk VII144,531323
CoastQF 12-pdr Naval82,595324
Coast6-pdr Hotchkiss61,775296
AAQF 3-inch 20 cwt AA422,6395,660

At first glance, these figures reinforce the impression of scarcity, limited guns, modest ammunition stocks, and a force not yet configured for large-scale war. But read more closely, they reveal something more important.

The distribution of ammunition was uneven, and that unevenness mattered. Field artillery sat broadly within a band of 300 to 750 rounds per gun, reflecting a balance between capability and constraint. Coast artillery, while lower in rounds per gun, involved larger calibres and fixed locations, concentrating risk geographically. It is, however, the anti-aircraft line that stands apart with over 22,000 rounds held for just four guns. Taken together, these figures point to a subtle but important conclusion.

While the number of guns was small, the ammunition required to sustain them already imposed technical and safety constraints on the system. Storage was not simply a matter of space, but of how much explosive weight could be safely contained, how it was distributed, and how it could be managed.

In effect, even before the 1942 surge, the ammunition system was operating within the limits of explosive risk. This was not yet a crisis. But the conditions were already set, and the expansion that followed would not introduce complexity. It would multiply it.

The Shock of 1942: Demand Without Precedent

The entry of Japan into the war in December 1941 transformed the situation overnight.

Mobilisation surged. By mid-1942, New Zealand forces peaked at over 121,000 personnel, with roughly 200,000 troops in New Zealand when the Home Guard is included, all requiring equipment, weapons, and ammunition.[4]

The requirement was no longer incremental growth, it was exponential expansion, and the system responded.

Between July 1941 and March 1944, New Zealand received 2,507 artillery pieces. Modern field artillery supplemented rather than replaced obsolescent systems, resulting in a mixed and transitional inventory shaped as much by availability as by design.

At the outset in mid-1941, New Zealand’s field artillery reflected a largely First World War-era structure, including:

  • BL 60-pounder Mk I (6)
  • BL 6-inch 26-cwt howitzer (14)
  • 18-pounder QF Mk II field guns (60)
  • 3.7-inch howitzers (9)
  • 4.5-inch howitzers (19)

Between 1941 and 1944, new equipment was introduced in significant numbers, most notably:

  • Ordnance QF 25-pounder Mk II (255 received), which became the core field artillery system
  • 25-pounder (18/25-pdr conversions) (12)
  • 155mm M1917A1 guns (26 received, 12 retained)

At the same time, older systems were not immediately withdrawn. Instead, they were retained and, in some cases, augmented:

  • 18-pounders increased from 60 to 104
  • 6-inch 26-cwt howitzers increased from 14 to 18
  • 4.5-inch howitzers increased from 19 to 27

Additional equipment further complicated the inventory with Italian weapons captured in North Africa impressed into service for home defence:

  • Cannone da 77/28 Modello 05 (14 received, 10 held)
  • Cannone da 65/17 Modello 13 (17 received and retained)

Other systems, such as the 75mm pack howitzer (37 received), appear not to have been retained in New Zealand holdings, reflecting redistribution or operational allocation elsewhere.

This was not a clean transition from old to new. It was an accumulation driven by urgency, resulting in a heterogeneous mix of legacy, modern, and foreign-pattern equipment.

Alongside this, large numbers of anti-tank weapons were introduced, reflecting the growing importance of anti-armour defence across both home defence and expeditionary roles. This included the Ordnance QF 2-pounder and QF 6-pounder anti-tank guns, which formed the backbone of towed capability, supported by infantry-operated systems such as the Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank (PIAT) and the Rifle, Anti-Tank, .55-inch Boys. These were further reinforced by a wide range of munitions, including rifle grenades and substantial stocks of anti-tank mines.

At the same time, there was a dramatic expansion in anti-aircraft capability, from just 4 guns in 1941 to 770 received within 12 months. This comprised a mix of heavy and light systems, including approximately 300 3.7-inch heavy anti-aircraft guns, forming the backbone of high-altitude defence, and around 470 40mm Bofors systems designed to counter low-level and fast-moving aircraft.

What makes this expansion particularly striking is not simply the increase in numbers, but the scale and diversity of the system that accompanied it. Anti-aircraft defence required not just guns, but:

  • Large quantities of high explosive, time-fuzed, and specialised ammunition
  • Fire control equipment, including predictors and, later, radar integration
  • Trained crews capable of sustained high-rate firing

Unlike field artillery, anti-aircraft weapons consumed ammunition at significantly higher rates. Even a single engagement could see a battery expend thousands of rounds. Scaled across hundreds of guns, this created an immediate and substantial demand on ammunition stocks, storage capacity, and distribution systems.

The increase from 4 to 770 guns was not simply numerical; it introduced one of the most ammunition-intensive and explosive-heavy systems within the New Zealand logistical structure.

By March 1944, holdings stood at 2,279 pieces of equipment, even after disposals and transfers. This was not simply growth. It was the rapid modernisation of an entire force.[5]

Ammunition: The True Weight of War

If weapons represent capability, ammunition represents sustainability.

From a baseline of 108,299 rounds, New Zealand received 4,614,189 rounds of artillery ammunition between July 1941 and March 1944. By March 1944, total artillery holdings had reached 4,722,488 rounds, spanning:

  • 28 calibres
  • 47 distinct types, including high explosive, armour-piercing, semi-armour piercing, smoke, chemical, and other specialised natures

This expansion was closely tied to the rapid growth in weapon systems, particularly anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery.

The increase from just four anti-aircraft guns in 1941 to 770 within 12 months was matched by a corresponding surge in ammunition holdings. By March 1944, anti-aircraft ammunition alone had reached substantial levels, including:

  • 428,023 rounds of 3.7-inch heavy anti-aircraft ammunition
  • 608,984 rounds of 40 mm ammunition
  • 22,639 rounds of 3-inch 20-cwt ammunition
  • 26,400 rounds of 37 mm ammunition

Taken together, this represents more than 1 million rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition, a scale that far exceeded the holdings of many individual field artillery natures.

But anti-aircraft ammunition was only one part of the picture. New Zealand had also accumulated very substantial holdings of anti-tank ammunition. By March 1944, stocks included:

  • 650,997 rounds of Ordnance QF 6-pounder ammunition
  • 423,259 rounds of Ordnance QF 2-pounder ammunition
  • 791,043 rounds of 37 mm anti-tank ammunition

Together, these amounted to 1,865,299 rounds of dedicated anti-tank gun ammunition. This was a remarkable figure, reflecting the central place anti-tank defence had assumed in modern war. Unlike older artillery systems, anti-tank weapons were expected to be held ready for sudden, intense action, often at short notice and in dispersed positions. Their ammunition, therefore, imposed not merely a storage burden, but a readiness burden across the whole logistics system.

Tank-related ammunition added a further layer of scale. Armoured fighting vehicles and associated weapons drew upon large quantities of machine-gun ammunition, particularly for Besa 7.92 mm guns, of which holdings reached:

  • 215,500 rounds of Besa 7.92 mm Ball
  • 3,690,000 rounds of Besa 7.92 mm Ball and Tracer
  • 2,336,000 rounds of Besa 7.92 mm Ball, Tracer, and AP

This gave a combined total of 6,241,500 rounds of Besa ammunition alone. To this can be added 521,000 rounds of Boys .55-inch armour-piercing ammunition, showing that anti-armour defence still extended beyond gun systems into older infantry anti-tank weapons.

At the infantry level, anti-tank holdings were also substantial. Stocks included:

  • 58,000 Grenade No. 68 rifle-launched anti-tank grenades
  • 33,000 No. 74 Sticky Bombs
  • 98,000 No. 75 Hawkins anti-tank grenades
  • 6,700 PIAT HEAT bombs
  • Significant holdings of anti-tank mines, including 55,000 Mark II, 39,000 Mark V, 19,000 Local Pattern, and 7,200 M1A1 mines

These figures show that anti-tank capability was not confined to specialist guns. It was distributed across the force, from artillery and armoured units to infantry and field defences. In practical terms, this meant that anti-tank ammunition had to be stored, handled, moved, and issued across a much wider range of locations and unit types than many conventional artillery natures.

What makes this particularly significant is not just the quantity, but the nature of the ammunition itself. Anti-aircraft and anti-tank rounds were predominantly high-explosive, armour-piercing, or fused, designed for rapid, sustained fire under combat conditions. Much of this ammunition possessed what would now be recognised as high-hazard or mass-explosion characteristics. Unlike field artillery, where expenditure could be episodic, anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems were designed for immediate response to fast-moving threats. Even limited operational activity could consume large quantities of ammunition. Scaled across hundreds of guns, armoured vehicles, and infantry anti-tank weapons, this created an immediate and sustained demand on:

  • ammunition production and supply
  • storage capacity and magazine limits
  • handling, transport, and distribution systems

The expansion of anti-aircraft, tank, and anti-tank capability did not simply add to the total volume of ammunition. It introduced some of the most explosive-intensive, logistically demanding, and operationally sensitive natures within the entire system.

This helps explain why, despite the overall scale of artillery ammunition holdings, the distribution and behaviour of specific natures, particularly anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and other high explosive stocks, mattered far more than the total number of rounds.

This was not passive stock. New Zealand actively sustained operations, issuing over 839,000 rounds to Pacific forces. The scale is striking. But even this does not fully capture the weight of the system.

Beyond Artillery: The Full Ammunition Burden

Artillery ammunition formed only one part of a much larger inventory. By 1944, New Zealand was holding:

  • Hundreds of millions of rounds of small arms ammunition, including .303, .300, 7.92 9mm, and .45
  • Millions of mortar bombs and grenades, across multiple calibres and natures
  • Large stocks of anti-tank mines and infantry munitions
  • Substantial quantities of bulk explosives, including gelignite, ammonal, and monobel
  • Hundreds of thousands of detonators, fuzes, and explosive accessories

Taken together, this represented not just an increase in scale, but a transformation in the structure of the ammunition system.

Quantity Versus Risk

At first glance, the system appears dominated by sheer volume, particularly small arms ammunition, which alone ran into the hundreds of millions of rounds. Yet this volume was deceptive.

Small arms ammunition, despite its quantity, sat largely within what would now be understood as low-hazard categories, contributing relatively little to overall explosive risk.

By contrast, a much smaller proportion of holdings, particularly:

  • Artillery high-explosive ammunition
  • Anti-aircraft ammunition
  • Mortar bombs and grenades
  • Bulk explosives and demolition stores

carried significantly greater explosive weight and hazard.

These natures, which broadly align with mass-explosion characteristics, were the true drivers of risk within the system. What emerges is a clear distinction between:

  • The largest part of the system by quantity was small arms ammunition
  • The most significant part of the system by risk, high explosive and sensitive stores

In practical terms, this meant:

  • Storage capacity was not defined by how much could be physically held
  • It was defined by how much explosive hazard could be safely contained

A relatively small proportion of ammunition types effectively dictated the limits of the entire system, shaping:

  • Magazine design and spacing
  • Storage allocation
  • Handling and transport procedures

By 1944, New Zealand’s ammunition system had expanded to a scale that would have been unimaginable in 1941. Yet it remained constrained, not by shortage, but by the characteristics of the ammunition itself.

The true weight of war was not measured in the number of rounds held, but in the explosive risk carried by a small proportion of them.

Ammunition Infrastructure: Building a System to Carry the Weight

The rapid expansion in ammunition holdings between 1941 and 1944 did not occur in isolation. It drove a parallel transformation of New Zealand’s ammunition infrastructure, shifting it from a small, centralised network into a dispersed, nationwide system designed to manage both scale and risk.

Before the war, ammunition storage in New Zealand was limited in capacity and geographically concentrated. Facilities at Fort Balance, Ōhakea, and Hopuhopu reflected peacetime requirements, designed to store, inspect, and maintain relatively modest stocks. They were not intended to support a rapidly expanding force preparing for sustained operations at home and overseas.

From 1939, and particularly after 1941, this system came under immediate and sustained pressure. As new weapons and ammunition arrived in increasing quantities, existing magazine capacity was quickly exceeded. At the same time, responsibility for ammunition shifted toward a more specialised ordnance system, requiring a corresponding expansion in personnel, facilities, and technical oversight.

This pressure was not only physical. It was organisational.

A minute by the Quartermaster General, dated 12 October 1941, provides a clear snapshot of the ammunition organisation at the point when expansion was beginning to accelerate. At that time, the entire ammunition system was supported by a remarkably small workforce.[6]

Military personnel consisted of:

  • 1 Captain
  • 1 Lieutenant
  • 1 Staff Sergeant
  • 2 Corporals

These were supported by 12 civilian staff, comprising:

  • 10 civilians at Fort Ballance
  • 2 civilians at the Waikato magazines

In total, the national ammunition organisation was being sustained by just 17 personnel.

This was, in effect, a peacetime structure attempting to absorb a wartime influx. The system’s operational level remained heavily dependent on civilian labour, while military oversight was limited to a small supervisory cadre.

The implications were immediate. Ammunition was arriving in increasing quantities, magazine construction was expanding, and responsibilities were growing to include inspection, repair, preservation, accounting, and safe custody across multiple locations. Yet the manpower to manage this system remained minimal.

The response, as reflected in the same documentation, was an urgent move to expand and militarise the ammunition organisation. Civilian staff were to be replaced, and a dedicated military establishment was to be created to operate within camps, fortress areas, and dispersed magazine sites.

This moment marks a critical transition. By late 1941, the constraint on New Zealand’s ammunition system was no longer simply one of supply or storage. It was organisational. The system had reached the limits of what a small, peacetime manpower structure could sustain.

A Distributed National System

By the height of the war, New Zealand’s ammunition system had evolved into a layered structure:

  • Primary depots holding bulk reserves
  • Sub-depots and forward storage sites supporting regional forces
  • Inspection and repair facilities ensuring serviceability
  • Transport systems linking depots to operational units

This network extended across both islands. In the north, Ardmore, Hopuhopu, and Kelm’s Road formed key nodes. In the central districts, Waiouru and Makomako supported training and mobilisation. Around Wellington, Trentham and Belmont provided access to major ports. In the south, Glentunnel, Mount Somers, Fairlie, and Alexandra formed a dispersed magazine system supporting both storage and distribution.

Alongside Army facilities, RNZAF and naval ammunition depots were significantly expanded, developing into large, specialised sites with multiple magazines and dedicated handling infrastructure.

What emerged was not simply a collection of storage locations, but an integrated national system designed for distribution, dispersal, and continuity under pressure.

From Storage to Risk Management

This expansion marked a fundamental shift in approach. Pre-war ammunition storage had relied on centralisation, limited magazine numbers, and relatively small holdings. Wartime conditions made that model untenable.

In its place, a new system was implemented based on established ordnance principles:

  • Dispersal of stocks across multiple locations
  • Separation of hazardous natures
  • Increased spacing between magazines
  • Strict limits on explosive quantities per site

These measures were not new in theory, but the scale at which they were applied in New Zealand during the war was unprecedented. Storage was no longer simply about capacity; it was about controlling the effects of failure. Distance, separation, and containment became the primary tools for managing the risk of fire and sympathetic detonation.

Built Under Pressure, Proven Under Load

The expansion of ammunition infrastructure from 1941 onward was the result of a deliberate construction programme directed by Army Headquarters following War Cabinet approval. It reflected both the scale of wartime demand and a clear understanding that ammunition posed a distinct and enduring hazard.[7]

New magazine areas were established in locations selected for their ability to balance access with safety, often remote, dispersed, and deliberately concealed. Sites such as Ardmore, Waiouru, Makomako, Belmont, and Glentunnel were developed with these principles in mind.

Construction was carried out under persistent constraints. Difficult terrain, poor weather, and manpower shortages slowed progress, and in some cases ammunition stocks accumulated faster than permanent facilities could be completed, requiring temporary storage in the open. Despite these pressures, the underlying design principles were consistently applied:

  • magazines separated by distance
  • explosive quantities strictly controlled
  • traverses constructed to contain blast
  • depots dispersed to prevent catastrophic loss

This was not a system designed to eliminate risk, that was never possible. It was a system designed to manage it, absorb it, and prevent local incidents from becoming national disasters.

Its effectiveness would ultimately be demonstrated under operational conditions on 26 February 1945.

Glentunnel Ammunition Area 1943

At Glentunnel, one of the South Island magazine areas constructed as part of this expansion, an accidental explosion destroyed Storehouse No. 10 and its contents. The detonation was complete, reducing the building to debris.[8]

Yet despite the scale of the explosion, there were no casualties, and, more importantly, no propagation beyond the single magazine.[9] Adjacent storehouses remained intact, and no sympathetic detonation occurred.[10]

As later recorded in official accounts, this was the only storehouse lost to an accidental explosion during the period, and it demonstrated the effectiveness of traversing.

This outcome was not incidental. It was the direct result of the system described above.

Glentunnel Depot 1956, arrow indicating ESH 10

Magazines at Glentunnel had been excavated into the hillsides, arranged in sequence, and separated by earth traverses designed to absorb and deflect blast effects. The loss of one storehouse, while total at the local level, was contained at the system level.

Set against the wider wartime experience, where ammunition accidents could destroy entire depots, the distinction is clear. Where other systems failed through sympathetic detonation, Glentunnel did not.

What this demonstrates is fundamental. The constraint governing ammunition storage was not space, but risk.

The infrastructure built between 1941 and 1944 was not simply an expansion of capacity. It was a system engineered to ensure that when failure occurred, it remained localised.

Glentunnel provides a rare and definitive example that this system worked.

A System Built for Scale, But Constrained by Hazard

Despite the rapid expansion of infrastructure, capacity never fully aligned with demand.

The planning behind this expansion was itself a significant ordnance achievement. The allocation of space, calculation of permissible explosive limits, and matching of ammunition types to suitable storage were all undertaken without the benefit of modern ERP systems, digital inventory tools, or automated hazard-management software. Instead, this work fell to the small Inspecting Ordnance Officer staff, operating under the Chief Inspector of Munitions and Chief Inspecting Ordnance Officer, Lieutenant Colonel I. R. Withell. Their calculations relied on manual returns, local storage data, and technical information drawn from the latest Ammunition Bulletins issued by the Chief Inspector of Armaments in the United Kingdom and dispatched to New Zealand. In practical terms, the wartime ammunition storage system was built not only with concrete, timber, earthworks, and labour, but also through painstaking clerical discipline, technical judgement, and professional ordnance expertise.

By 1944, the manpower required to sustain this system reflected the scale of the transformation that had taken place since 1941.

As at 31 March 1944, the Ammunition Section and associated repair elements comprised an establishment of 159 personnel, with an actual strength of 150. The organisation was now distributed across Army Headquarters and the Northern, Central, and Southern Districts, with a dedicated Ammunition Repair Section responsible for inspection and maintenance.

In total, the system was supported by 10 officers and 140 other ranks.

This stood in stark contrast to October 1941, when the entire ammunition system had been sustained by just a handful of military personnel supported by civilian labour. What had emerged by 1944 was a fully militarised and professionalised organisation capable of managing both the scale and the risk inherent in modern warfare.

At the outset of the war, New Zealand possessed just 13-gun ammunition magazines, largely concentrated in a small number of established sites.[11] These were sufficient for pre-war holdings, but wholly inadequate for the scale of expansion that followed.

By March 1944, this had grown to:

  • 351 ammunition magazines distributed across the country
  • A total storage capacity of approximately 2¾ million cubic feet

This represents not just growth, but a transformation from a centralised, peacetime system into a dispersed, national network of ammunition storage and handling facilities.

Yet even this expansion did not resolve the underlying constraint.

As large volumes of ammunition, particularly high explosive and anti-aircraft stocks, entered the system:

  • Magazine capacity was limited by Net Explosive Content (NEC) thresholds, not physical space
  • High-risk natures required segregation, reducing usable capacity
  • Safety distances between magazines imposed hard limits on how much could be held at any one site

In practical terms, a depot could appear only partially full yet already be at its safe operating limit. At peak inflow, this tension was evident:

  • Ammunition was temporarily stored in the open and would remain a feature or many depots well into the post-war years
  • Stocks were frequently redistributed between sites
  • New magazine construction struggled to keep pace with arrivals

Even by the end of the war, the system remained under pressure. The return of ammunition from overseas, combined with retained reserves and the steady recovery of ammunition from disbanded and demobilising Home Defence units, quickly absorbed any remaining capacity.

The Quantitative Reality

The numbers tell the story clearly:

Yet the expansion in infrastructure did not translate into unlimited storage.

Because:

  • A relatively small proportion of ammunition, particularly CAT Z, Groups 5 and 7 high explosive natures, consumed a disproportionate share of allowable capacity
  • Lower-risk ammunition, such as small arms, occupied space but contributed little to the overall hazard

New Zealand built hundreds of magazines to store its wartime ammunition. In the end, it was not space that defined the system, but the limits imposed by explosive risk.

Lessons from Expansion

Looking back over the period from 1941 to 1944, what stands out is not just how much New Zealand built, but how the system actually behaved under pressure.

At the beginning, the problem appeared straightforward. There was not enough, not enough guns, not enough ammunition, not enough capacity. By 1944, that problem had been solved. New Zealand held more weapons, more ammunition, and more infrastructure than anyone in 1941 could reasonably have imagined. Yet the pressure never truly went away.

The reason lies in a constraint that was less visible, but more decisive. The system was never limited by how much it could hold. It was limited by explosive risk. More magazines could be built, depots expanded, and stocks redistributed, but the underlying characteristics of the ammunition could not be changed. That constraint remained constant, regardless of scale.

The expansion itself was not linear. New equipment arrived, but older systems were not immediately replaced. Instead, they remained in service, supplemented rather than withdrawn. The result was a heterogeneous force, combining First World War-era guns, modern British equipment, and whatever could be obtained under wartime conditions. The same pattern is evident in the ammunition, where diversity increased alongside volume.

On paper, the system appears enormous, particularly when small arms ammunition is included. Yet this volume is misleading. The majority of rounds sat within comparatively low-risk categories. The real constraint lay in a much smaller proportion of high-explosive and sensitive natures. These dictated how the entire system had to be organised, stored, and managed.

Before the war, ammunition could be held in a small number of centralised locations. By 1944, it had to be dispersed across the country. This was not simply a matter of efficiency or expansion. It was a matter of survivability. A failure at one site could not be allowed to compromise the entire reserve. Dispersion was therefore not optional, it was essential.

Even then, the system remained under constant pressure. Construction struggled to keep pace with inflow. Ammunition was stored in the open, stocks were redistributed between sites, and depots that appeared only partially full were already at their safe operating limits.

Use added a further layer of complexity. Some weapons remained largely static within the system. Others did not. Anti-aircraft weapons, in particular, transformed the problem. Their rate of expenditure turned stockpiles into flow systems, where sustainability depended not only on what was held, but on how quickly it could be replaced.

What is perhaps most revealing is that the pressure did not end with the war. As units demobilised and overseas stocks returned, the system was required to absorb them. What had once been a problem of shortage became a problem of accumulation. The infrastructure that had struggled to manage inflow now had to accommodate return and retention.

Seen in this light, the story is not one of shortage followed by surplus, but of balance.

New Zealand built a system capable of sustaining a modern force, supporting overseas operations, and managing vast quantities of ammunition. But it never escaped the limits imposed by the nature of what it held.

In the end, the system was not defined by how much it could store, but by how safely it could manage its contents.

Notes

[1] War Office, Ammunition Bulletin No. 4 (1939).

[2] Minisry of Transport, “Rules for the packing, stowage and labeling of explosives for carriage by sea,” Circular No 1895 (T152 recised) (1951).

[3] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541151  (30 June 1944), .

[4] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch.”

[5] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch.”

[6] Deputy Quartermaster General 228/2/6 Ammunition Section _ NZ Army ordnance Corps Dated 13 Oct 1941 “Establishments – Ordnance corps “, Archives New Zealand No R22441743  (9 January 1937 – 1946).

[7] Major J.S Bolton, A History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (Trentham: RNZAOC, 1992).

[8] “Explosion Heard Over Wide Area,” Greymouth Evening Star, 2 March 1945.

[9] “No Casualties Reported,” Waikato Times, 28 February 1945; “Ammunition Explosion at Glentunnel,” Evening Post, 28 February 1945.

[10] “Glentunnel Explosion Follow-up,” Evening Post, 13 April 1945; “Ammunition Store Destroyed,” Evening Post, 28 February 1945.

[11] “Establishments – Ordnance corps,” Archives New Zealand No R22441743  (1937-1968).


Nothing Stays Still

Fred Kreegher and the 2 NZEF Ordnance Field Park, 1941–1944

Fred Kreegher served for forty-three months with the 2nd New Zealand Division Ordnance Field Park (OFP), from its formation in the Western Desert in 1941 through to the Italian campaign in 1944. Of that service, very little survives.

There are photographs, a scattering of names, and a sequence of locations that trace his movement across North Africa, the Middle East, and into Italy. But there is no personal diary, no letters that describe the experience, and no narrative in his own words that explains what those years meant or how they were lived. What remains instead is the record of the system he served within.

Lemon Squeezer as worn my members of the 2nd NZEF NZOC, 1939-44.

The war diaries of the Divisional OFP provide a continuous, if impersonal, account of daily activity, movements, shortages, recoveries, and adaptation under pressure. They do not describe Kreegher directly, but they describe, in detail, the work he was part of, the environment he operated in, and the conditions that shaped his service. This account draws on those records.

It presents a month-by-month reconstruction of events within the OFP, with gaps where no diary survives, and uses them to build an interpretative narrative of Kreegher’s service. It does not attempt to recreate his personal voice, which is lost, but instead situates him within the system that defined his war.

That system was central to the way the 2nd New Zealand Division fought. From Greece and Crete, through the desert war, El Alamein, the advance across North Africa, and into Italy, the Division operated as a highly mobile formation dependent on vehicles and equipment, and on continuous resupply. Its effectiveness relied not only on combat units but on the ability of its supporting elements to sustain movement, recover losses, and adapt across multiple theatres.

The OFP was part of that capability. Its role was not simply to hold stores, but to ensure that the Division’s workshops had the parts required to keep vehicles running, weapons functioning, and units operational. It operated forward, often close behind the fighting troops, and its work expanded or contracted with the tempo of operations.

For men like Kreegher, the war was experienced not through set-piece battles alone, but through the continuous demands of that system. Checking, loading, issuing, recovering, and accounting, carried out in camps, in convoys, at roadheads, and under fire.

This account reconstructs that experience as closely as the surviving record allows. It follows the movement of the system, and places Kreegher within it, not as an observer, but as one of the men who made it work.

Because while his individual voice is absent, the system he served in leaves a clear trace. And through it, his war can still be understood.

The photographs that accompany this account have been kindly provided by Fred’s family. Some are captioned, while others are not. Several appear to be personal photographs taken by Fred and his colleagues, while others are images that could be purchased by servicemen in theatre. Where possible, these images have been integrated into the narrative to support the account. Those that could not be confidently placed have been included in a gallery at the end.

Nothing Stays Still

Ferdinand Charles Kreegher was not, at first glance, the sort of man who seemed destined for war.

He was born on 21 October 1911 at Cunninghams, a small farming district in the Kiwitea country north of Feilding in the Manawatu, and by the late 1930s had settled into a life that was orderly, predictable, and rooted in routine. By 1938, he was working as a clerk with Dalgety & Company at their Kaikohe branch, part of a business that sat at the centre of rural New Zealand’s commercial life.

It was steady work, built on records, accuracy, and trust, the careful management of goods, accounts, and relationships.

Outside of work, he was part of the local community. A volunteer firefighter who was awarded the United Fire Brigades Association Long Service medal for five years of service.

He was also a keen golfer, with newspaper notices regularly placing him on the golf course, a familiar name in club competitions and results columns, and a photo of his collection showing one of his trophies.

It was a life that followed a rhythm: work, community, sport. A pattern that made sense and required no explanation, nothing in it suggested what was coming.

When war came, it did not immediately overturn that world, but it began to pull at it.

Kreegher enlisted in July 1940, his name appearing among those from Northland stepping forward for service. At that stage, the war still carried a sense of distance. There remained an unspoken hope that it might be contained or at least understood in familiar terms. But by the time he mobilised with the 5th Reinforcements and trained at Papakura, that distance had already begun to close. The war was no longer something observed; it was something entered.

Leaving New Zealand aboard the Mauretania on 1 April 1941, Kreegher moved from a known world into one already under strain.

By the time he disembarked in Egypt on 15 May 1941, he was not arriving at the beginning of a campaign, but into the aftermath of Greece and Crete, where the New Zealand Division was rebuilding itself after hard fighting and heavy losses. At first, he was absorbed into the rear of the system, posted to a Base Ordnance Depot.

There, the work would have looked familiar in structure, records, stock, and controlled issue, but on a scale that dwarfed anything he had known before. It was orderly, but distant, with his thoughts recorded in a letter home to his parents in Taihape.

In August, he moved forward and stepped into the New Zealand Divisional OFP, something very different.

The Divisional OFP had only just been formed in July 1941. It was a response to a changing kind of war, one that depended on vehicles, machinery, and constant movement.

Organised with a headquarters and three sections, its purpose was not simply to hold stores, but to keep the Division moving by supplying the spares its workshops needed, wherever they were operating. It was, in effect, a system designed for motion, and when Kreegher joined it, it was still learning how to work.

September 1941 – “Routine work.”

At Bagush, it appeared settled. Stores were checked, vehicles maintained, and inspections carried out. The diary records it all in the language of routine, a steady sequence of tasks completed as expected, but beneath that surface, it was still forming.

  • Loads were shifted and reshaped
  • Vehicles repacked and reorganised
  • Orders arrived, changed, and returned again in altered form

The unit had structure, but not yet experience. For Kreegher, the work would have felt familiar in principle, but different in practice.

There were still stores to manage and vehicles to load, still the same underlying problem of keeping track of goods within a system, but here, nothing remained in place for long. Items moved constantly, forward, back, and forward again and already, one difference would have been clear. In civilian life, delays were inconvenient. Here, they mattered.

November 1941 – “Warning order received… prepare to move.”

Then came Operation Crusader, and with it, the moment the system was tested for the first time.

The OFP ceased to be a rear organisation and became part of the operation itself. It moved forward in sections alongside workshops, supporting brigades as they advanced and manoeuvred across the desert.

The idea behind it, holding the right spares and getting them forward quickly, was now being applied under real conditions and it began, slowly, to work.

Late November 1941 – “Short notice to move… one hour.”

The pace changed completely. There was no longer time to prepare once an order was given. Everything had to be ready in advance, loads pre-configured, vehicles maintained to a standard that assumed immediate movement.

Convoys formed quickly and moved out across the desert, often at short notice. Vehicles broke down, were recovered, repaired, and sent forward again. Stores were issued in response to unpredictable demand.

For Kreegher, the work shifted from structured to immediate; it was no longer enough to know what was held, he had to know where it was, how quickly it could move, and what mattered most when everything was urgent.

December 1941 – “Sea water entered camp… stores damaged.”

December brought both confirmation and cost.

By now, the OFP had been fully committed to operations, functioning as intended, organised with its headquarters and three sections, moving with the Division and supporting it under pressure. Like any unit of the Division, it was not immune to loss.

Major William Knox, the OFP Officer Commanding, had been injured after his vehicle struck a landmine during operations. Evacuated through Tobruk, he was lost at sea when the vessel carrying him was sunk. The loss does not appear in the daily rhythm of the diary, but it sits behind it, shaping the experience of those who remained.

At the same time, a storm flooded the camp. Stores were damaged, and work halted while everything was shifted to higher ground. It was a different kind of disruption, but just as real.

The system was exposed to everything and had to continue regardless; by the end of the month, the Division withdrew to Egypt. The OFP went with it, no longer untested but already altered by its first experience of war.

January 1942 – “Routine work.”

The new year begins with the same phrase, but it carries a different meaning now. Routine no longer suggests stability. It means the system is still functioning.

Day after day, the diary repeats it: “Routine work and maintenance of vehicles and stocks.” But underneath that repetition, the strain is visible.

Personnel are constantly moving in and out. Men are detached to workshops, others to salvage work, others to Cairo. Vehicles and drivers are sent forward. Others are loaned out to keep other parts of the system running. Even in “routine”, the unit is being pulled in multiple directions. There is also uncertainty, and it sits just below the surface.

Movement orders are issued, then questioned, then delayed. Advance parties are warned off, then stood down. Plans are made, then cancelled with little notice. At one point, the unit is preparing to move, lifting stores and coordinating transport, only to be told the move will not proceed: “Movement cancelled.”

That matters because movement is not just relocation; it is disruption. It means breaking down a functioning system and reassembling it somewhere else, often under pressure. By the end of the month, the movement will finally happen.

Sections begin to disperse. Transport is allocated to support infantry movement. One section moves forward to Mersa Matruh. The rest follow in stages, moving from Bagush through Amiriya and Mena, finally arriving at Fayid.

It is not a single move. It is a staggered, uncertain progression, shaped as much by changing orders as by intent and when they arrive, the final entry says it plainly: “Routine and camp duties. Erection of camp.”

Back to routine, but now in a different place.

February 1942 – “Routine, under pressure”

If January is uncertainty, February is pressure. The month opens exactly as the last one ended: “Routine work.” But almost immediately, the cracks show. There is a warning order to move to Tel el Kebir. A liaison is sent forward. Then the move is cancelled.

This pattern repeats. Orders are issued. Adjusted. Withdrawn. The system never quite settles.

At the same time, leadership and personnel are shifting. Command changes hands. Officers are sent forward or to Cairo. Sections operate semi-independently. The OFP is not acting as a single, stable entity; it is being stretched across tasks and locations, with the cost becoming;

“Pte. Condon killed in Matruh.”
“Sgt. Moore killed – result of motor accident.”

These are not battle casualties in the traditional sense. They are the cost of movement, of vehicles, of long distances, of a system operating under constant strain. At the same time, the work does not slow. Trucks are moving constantly, to Tel el Kebir, to Abbassia, collecting parts, building up scales, trying to complete holdings. Engines are already appearing as a recurring requirement, being brought back in loads to keep vehicles operational.

Training begins to reassert itself. Courses are planned, cancelled, and then replaced with structured syllabi. Rifle practice is carried out. Maintenance and interior economy are scheduled. This is important, even in instability, the Division is trying to impose structure.

But by the end of the month, the underlying reality returns. A warning order of movement is received.

March 1942 – “Move ordered.”

When the Division moves to Syria, the system is stretched again, this time by distance rather than tempo.

The convoy north is long and deliberate, moving through Palestine and Lebanon into Syria. It is not a quick repositioning, but a sustained movement across a wide theatre, and in that movement, the OFP changes again.

Sections are attached to brigades and workshops, operating independently while remaining linked. The unit is no longer defined by location, but by the flow of stores and support across distance; it becomes, in effect, a network.

April 1942 – “Routine, across distance”

By April, the word “routine” is still there, but it no longer describes a single place. It describes a system spread across the Middle East with the month opening with what looks familiar: “Routine – settling in new area.”

But almost immediately, the scale becomes apparent. Trucks are moving not just locally, but across the theatre:

  • To Aleppo.
  • To Beirut.
  • To Haifa.
  • To Damascus.

This is not one OFP in one location. It is a network.

Sections are operating forward and rearward at the same time. “A” Section is forward at Aleppo. “C” Section moves through Damascus. Other elements are tied into Base Ordnance Depots and Advanced Depots, collecting, returning, redistributing. The system is no longer just moving. It is stretched, and at the centre of it, the same pressure point is emerging, more clearly now: Engines.

Requests go to ADOS. Trucks are sent to Advanced Ordnance Depots. Engines are collected, allocated, and sent forward again. There are moments where the scale becomes visible.

  • Eighteen Ford engines collected.
  • Fourteen engines issued forward to units.

Even then, it is not enough with a constant flow because the demand is constant. Around that, everything else continues. Oxygen and acetylene are being sourced from Beirut to support workshop output. Electrolyte is sought, but unavailable. Tyres require authorisation. “Quick moving parts” are identified and prioritised.

Fred and the remains of a Vichy French Aircaft somewhere in Lebanon

This is a system trying to define what matters most. At the same time, administration is catching up. Lists of dead stock are compiled for return to depots. Personnel rotate through “tours of duty” at Base Ordnance Depots. Sections report, detach, and re-form.

It is no longer just about issuing it is about controlling the flow, and then there is another layer: The routine orders. On paper, they look like administrative detail, but they tell you something about the environment the system is operating in.

  • A vehicle left unattended is stripped almost completely before it can be recovered, radiator, carburettor, wiring, even seats and glass.
  • Anti-malarial discipline is being enforced because units are not taking it seriously enough.
  • Even ice cream is banned, not as a comfort issue, but as a disease risk.

These are not side notes. They are reminders that the system is operating in an environment where:

  • equipment disappears if not secured,
  • disease is a constant threat,
  • and small failures quickly become bigger ones.

Through it all, the diary still returns to the same word: “Routine.”

Fed Kreeeger Checking stores in his truck

But by April, that word has changed again. It no longer means the system is simply functioning. It means it is functioning across distance, under constraint, and with no single point of control.

May 1942 – “Trucks away to Haifa… Beirut… Aleppo.”

By mid-1942, that network is fully established. Vehicles move constantly between depots and forward elements. Engines circulate through repair and reissue. Stores move forward, are consumed or damaged, and then re-enter the system through recovery and repair. The distances are greater, the coordination more complex. And at the centre of it all is the same constraint: engines.

The Division’s mobility depends entirely on them. Without engines, vehicles stop. Without vehicles, movement stops. And without movement, operations stall.

Yet even amid this relentless tempo of war, there were brief moments where time could be found to step beyond the immediate demands of operations. In those intervals, however rare, it was possible to take in the history of the region, to observe the landscape not just as ground to be traversed or fought over, but as a place shaped by those who had come before. These moments did not diminish the intensity of the campaign but rather provided a quiet counterpoint, a reminder of the broader world beyond the machinery of war.

Group photo from Fred Kreegers’ collection taken at the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem

June 1942 – “Engines short.”

By June, the pressure is constant. There are never enough engines. Deliveries arrive slowly, demands increase, and the system is forced to adapt.

For Kreegher, this marks another shift. The work is no longer simply about handling stores. It becomes about judgment. Deciding what moves first, what can wait, and how to keep the system functioning when it cannot meet every demand.

July–November 1942 – El Alamein

The Division returns to the desert, first at Mersa Matruh and then at El Alamein. By now, the OFP is no longer learning how to operate.
It is operating. What had been a system still forming in early 1942 is now functioning under pressure, and at scale. The diaries begin to read differently. Less about arrangements, more about execution.

In July, there had still been signs of friction, reorganisation, and uncertainty. Convoys arrived, loads were redistributed, and the question of how stores should flow through the system was still being worked out.

By August, that friction was being resolved. Vehicle holdings increased, bin trucks were introduced, and coordination with workshops, Base Ordnance Depots, and transport units became routine rather than negotiated.

By November, at El Alamein and during the advance that followed, the difference is clear.

The system holds. Stocks are described as good, sustained by the regular arrival of convoys from the rear. Sections move forward, split, and rejoin without disrupting output. Stores are received, broken down, and issued forward almost as soon as they arrive. The OFP is no longer tied to a place. It moves with the Division, and the tempo reflects that.

Orders to move come with little notice. Positions change frequently. The unit advances forward through Sidi Haneish, toward Sidi Barrani, and beyond, at times halted by enemy movement, traffic congestion, or uncertainty ahead, then moving again as soon as routes open. Even in those moments, the work does not stop. Convoys are met. Stores are offloaded. Loads are prepared for issue. Units arrive to collect what they need, and are turned around quickly. The system continues, even while in transit.

There are small details that reveal the scale of what is happening. Engines arrive and are issued immediately. Oxygen and acetylene are collected to sustain workshop output. Tyres, springs, and vehicle components move continuously through the system. Controlled stores are tracked, returned, and reissued.

Nothing sits still, and the volume is increasing.

By late November, the unit had recorded over 2,000 issues in two weeks, compared with a previous peak of 1,565 during operations in Syria. The demand is higher, the flow faster, and the consequences of delay more immediate. There is also strain.

Routes are blocked. Movement is delayed. Units stage overnight waiting for orders or clearance forward. At Halfaya Pass, traffic and congestion slow movement to a crawl before the unit pushes through and rejoins the advance. But the system adapts.

Loads are rearranged. Trucks are redirected. Sections move independently and then reform. Indents are pushed back through Corps channels, and stores continue to flow forward. It does not break, and for Kreegher, this is the point where the nature of the work settles into something constant. There is no longer a distinction between routine and operation. This is both.

The work is the same, checking, loading, issuing, accounting, but now it is done:

  • on the move,
  • at short notice,
  • and with no margin for delay.

By the time the fighting at El Alamein gives way to pursuit, the OFP has reached a point of quiet competence. It is no longer reacting to the war. It is keeping pace with it.

December 1942 – “Packed up… moved… issues only.”

After the advance from El Alamein, the movement does not stop. If anything, it becomes more complicated.

The Marble Arch (Arch of the Philaeni) and its adjacent airfield in Libya, which the New Zeland Division captured on December 1942

December is defined by constant displacement. The unit moves repeatedly, sometimes by day, sometimes at night, often covering significant distances before halting, only to move again shortly after. Convoys stretch out, break, reform, and push on. Breakdowns occur. Vehicles are taken in tow. Routes are blocked and reopened.

There is no fixed position. Even when halted, the work continues. The diary captures it in fragments:

“Moved 70 miles…”
“20 miles night move…”
“Broke down and stayed put…”
“Issues only…”

That last line matters.

“Issues only” does not mean less work.
It means the system has no time for anything else.

Stores are coming forward from 30 Corps. Trucks are being sent back to Benghazi and Corps depots. Engines arrive in small numbers and are immediately allocated. Tyres, springs, and general stores move through as quickly as they can be handled.

There is also a noticeable shift as stocks begin to build again. Late in the month, the diary notes engines arriving in quantity, Bedford engines, Chevrolet engines, stores accumulating to a point where the unit is no longer operating hand-to-mouth but beginning to regain depth, but that does not reduce the pressure. It changes it.

Now the problem is not simply receiving stores but controlling them, allocating them, and pushing them forward quickly enough to meet demand. By the end of December, the OFP is busy, continuously issuing, receiving, and already preparing for the next move.

January 1943 – Movement Without Pause

January opens the same way December ends. Movement orders. Convoys. Repositioning. The OFP shifts repeatedly as part of Administrative Groups, moving tens of miles at a time along the Divisional axis, often delayed, sometimes held up for an entire day, then pushed forward again.

The diary reflects a system in motion, but not always smoothly: “Very poor run… held up most of day… only 17 miles.” Distance is no longer the only problem.

Congestion, coordination, and timing now shape movement just as much as terrain. At the same time, the work continues.

Trucks move constantly between Corps depots, vehicle parks, and the unit. Engines are collected, returned, reallocated. Vehicles are issued forward and recovered back. Sections split across groups, then rejoin. There is also a growing administrative load.

Courts of inquiry. Conferences with ADOS. Reorganisation discussions. Selection of personnel for return to Base or continuation of service. The system is no longer just moving stores.

It is managing itself and running through it all, unchanged, and the same constraint is Engines. They are collected from Corps and returned when unserviceable. Reissued when available. Allocated carefully, often in small numbers, always with demand exceeding supply.

For Kreegher, this is where the work becomes sharper. It is no longer about keeping up. It is about making decisions inside a system that cannot satisfy every requirement.

February 1943 – Pressure Becomes Routine

By February, the character of the work changes again, no because the pressure lifts, but because it settles.

The diary becomes repetitive in a different way:

  • “Engines issued…”
  • “Engines received…”
  • “Allocated to units…”
  • “Routine…”

But that “routine” is deceptive.

Engines are still arriving from Corps and Advanced Ordnance Depots and are being issued forward immediately. Repairable engines are returned. Indents continue. Demand remains constant. What has changed is the system’s ability to absorb it.

The opening of 557 Advanced Ordnance Depot for issue marks a shift. Indents are now directed through a more structured channel. Stock flow becomes more predictable, even if still insufficient. At the same time, the scale remains high. Vehicles and guns are collected and redistributed. Infantry sections are busy. Engine issues for the month are recorded as high, and there is another subtle development.The system is being adjusted.

Conferences are held on establishments. Changes are made to include Reserve Vehicle Park (RVP) functions within the OFP structure. Roles are refined, not in response to a crisis, but in anticipation of what is next.

By now, the OFP is no longer reacting to the campaign. It is sustaining it, and for the men inside it, the work has settled into something constant, not easier, but understood.

24 February 1943 – Promoted Lance Corporal

The promotion reflects what has already happened. Kreegher is no longer new to the system. He understands it.

5 March 1943 – “Engine situation still acute… not good.”

The strain continues into 1943. Supply struggles to keep up, and the system remains under pressure, but it holds, and by now, Kreegher is part of the reason it holds, and by March, he is no longer simply receiving instructions; he is inside the machinery of it. At the corporal level, and moving toward greater responsibility, his world is not the broader strategy of the campaign, but the immediate, relentless problem of making the system function when it is short of everything that matters, and nothing matters more than engines.

The war diary records the problem in blunt, almost repetitive language: “Supply very slow… not up to figures expected.” “Engine situation still acute… not too good.”

For Kreegher, this is not an abstract shortage. It is practical, daily friction, it is vehicles waiting in lines that cannot be issued forward. It is workshops demanding engines that have not arrived.It is checking manifests against reality and finding gaps that cannot be closed. It is loading trucks with what is available, knowing it is not enough.His work sits at the point where paper meets reality. Indents say one thing, stock on hand says another, and it is the NCOs who reconcile the difference.

Day after day, that means:

  • organising collection parties,
  • supervising loading and unloading,
  • tracking controlled stores,
  • and reallocating what little is available to the units that need it most.

There is no single moment of decision; there is only constant adjustment, and when engines do arrive, the pressure does not ease. It shifts.

“Received 40 engines, all allocated.”

For Kreegher, that means the work accelerates.

Forty engines do not sit in a yard.

They are immediately broken down into tasks:

  • identifying allocations,
  • matching engines to vehicle types,
  • organising transport forward,
  • and ensuring that nothing is lost, miscounted, or misdirected in the process.

Mistakes here do not stay local. An incorrectly issued engine can immobilise a unit miles ahead. So the work is careful, even when it is rushed. Especially when it is rushed. At the same time, the unit is moving, and movement multiplies the difficulty. Convoys form at short notice. Orders change. Sections are split and recombined. Some elements move forward while others remain back to rebuild stocks.

For Kreegher, that means doing the same work, but now:

  • in transit,
  • in new locations,
  • often in the dark,
  • and with incomplete information.

The diary notes: “Very slow moving… everything came through satisfactorily.”

That “satisfactorily” is earned, it reflects the work of men like him, ensuring that stores are accounted for, loads are secured, and nothing critical is left behind in a system that is constantly on the move. There is no space for failure. Only for recovery.

April 1943 – “Working at scale”

By April 1943, the word “routine” still appears, but now, it means something very different. The OFP is no longer struggling to function, it is working, and working at scale. The month opens with movement, but it is controlled movement.

The unit shifts with Workshops to a new location near Divisional Headquarters, immediately issuing engines and dispatching loaded trucks forward. There is no pause.

Engines arrive, are allocated, and disappear into the system almost as quickly as they come in.

Trucks are sent back to Tripoli for stores. Others return from Corps units loaded with engines, vehicles, and controlled stores. The flow is constant, and now, it is organised.

Even when the unit is not advancing, it is not static. Orders to move come, are acted on, and executed with little disruption.

The OFP packs, moves, and re-establishes itself as part of a larger formation movement, covering significant distances in a single day: “Moved at 0700 hrs… run for day 85 miles.” Then again:

  • Night moves.
  • Short bounds.
  • Repeated relocations along the Divisional axis.

But unlike 1942, the movement does not break the system; it is part of it. Stores continue to arrive from Tripoli. Engines continue to be collected from 10 Corps. Trucks continue to be loaded, unloaded, and turned around. The system moves and continues to function while moving. By now, the central constraint is unmistakable. Everything revolves around engines. They are:

  • Collected from 10 Corps depots
  • Returned when unserviceable
  • Allocated centrally through ADOS
  • Distributed immediately to units

At one point, the scale becomes explicit: “Total of 40 engines allocated and distribution made out.”

That is not incidental. That is the system operating at volume and yet, even here, supply is uneven. On some days engines arrive in quantity and are issued out immediately. On others: “No engines received.” The flow is constant but never assured.

What sets April 1943 apart is not just activity but control. The system is now managing itself.

  • Controlled stores are tracked and redistributed
  • Vehicles are collected from Corps parks and issued forward
  • Dead stock is identified and returned
  • Personnel are reassigned between sections to meet demand
  • Census of controlled stores is conducted under ADOS direction

Even the structure is being adjusted. Sections are reorganised. Personnel move between Reserve Vehicle Platoon (RVP), Holding, and operational sections.
Additional tradesmen are brought in from NZEME. This is no longer a system reacting, it is a system refining itself.

By the end of the month, the scale of output is clear. Issues are running at: “approximately 200 per day.” That is sustained throughput. Not a surge. Not a peak. Routine.

Stocks are building gradually. Supply lines from Tripoli are functioning. Vehicles, carriers, and equipment are being pushed forward continuously, but the system is not yet comfortable. Tyres remain low, engines remain the constraint, future movement is still uncertain: “Unit still static with no information re moving.”

Even at this stage, there is no sense of permanence.

May 1943 – “Issues easing off as unit stocks improve.”

After Tunisia, the pressure begins to ease. Stocks improve, and the flow of stores becomes more predictable. For the first time in months, the system feels as though it is catching up with itself and for Kreegher, that changes the nature of the work.

The tempo drops, but the responsibility does not if anything, it becomes more visible.

The diary clearly reflects the shift: “Issues easing off as unit stocks improve.”  “Things very quiet generally… issues slackening off.”

Where March had been defined by shortage and urgency, May is defined by consolidation.

But consolidation is not passive, it is detailed work.

For Kreegher, this is where his pre-war skills begin to reassert themselves more clearly.

  • Stocktaking
  • Sorting
  • Balancing holdings
  • Ensuring that what is on hand matches what is recorded

After months of operating at the edge of capacity, the system now has space to correct itself and that work falls heavily on NCOs. Stores are no longer just issued as they arrive. They are:

  • counted
  • inspected
  • repacked
  • and redistributed

Captured equipment is processed and handed over. Vehicles are returned, repaired, or reallocated. Summer clothing is issued, requiring organisation, sizing, and controlled distribution across units. None of it is dramatic but all of it is necessary.

The unit is described as “generally quiet,” transport “mainly static,” but that quiet reflects control, not inactivity, it means that work is being done properly, deliberately, with time to get it right and beyond the immediate tasks, there is a growing awareness of transition.

“North African campaign over. Warning order to move…”

For Kreegher, this is another shift from sustaining a campaign to closing it down. Stores are sorted for return.Salvage is processed. Loads are reconfigured for movement back to Egypt.

The same skills apply, but the purpose is different. Taken together, these months mark a turning point in his war. In March, he is working inside a system under strain, learning to operate under pressure, making decisions in the moment, and keeping things moving with limited resources.

By May, he is part of a system regaining control, applying discipline, restoring balance, and preparing for what comes next. The work has not become easier, It has become clearer and that is the quiet transformation not from chaos to order, but from survival to control.

And Kreegher is now firmly in the middle of it.

June 1943 – “Setting things straight”

By June, the movement has stopped not completely, but enough that something else can begin. The unit comes through from Amiriya and settles into a new position. Vehicles are in. Camp is established. Tents go up. For the first time in months, there is time to lay things out properly.

The diary captures it in a tone that feels almost unfamiliar: “Great day’s work… moved camp site and all tents erected.” That line says more than it appears to, this is not a convoy halt, this is a position, and with that comes a different kind of work.

Personnel changes begin immediately. Men move out to Base Ordnance Depot under exchange schemes. Others arrive. Leave programmes are worked through. Promotions are processed. The unit is being reset, not just physically, but administratively. There is also an effort to impose order.

Parades are held. Equipment is checked. Camp is “generally straightened out.” The language is telling and after months of movement, the priority is no longer speed, it is control. But even in this quieter phase, the underlying pressure does not disappear.

Stores are still being sorted. Tyres are still being accounted for. Issues may be fewer, but demand remains, and running through it, unchanged: Engines. The diary notes discussions with ADOS on engine requirements, anticipated collections, and ongoing shortages. By mid-month, the unit finally comes back together.

The Armoured Section rejoins from 4 NZ Armoured Brigade. For the first time since its formation in 1941, the OFP is concentrated in one place. That matters because it allows the system to function as a whole again. From there, the tempo begins to build, but in a different way.

Trips are made to Base Ordnance Depots, particularly Tel el Kebir, to collect engines, Ford engines, Bedford engines, whatever can be obtained. Trucks go out loaded with demands and return loaded with what can be secured.  By the end of the month, a pattern is clear: “Trucks from Tel el Kebir with engines… issuing… stocks building up.” It is not abundance, but it is enough to start building depth. June is not a pause. It is a reset.

July 1943 – Work Resumes, Properly

If June is about getting ready, July is about getting back to work. The diary opens simply: “Collecting engines and stores from Tel el Kebir.” That is the month in a sentence.

Men return from leave. The unit is again at full strength, and the tone shifts immediately. There is no more settling in. The system is expected to function. Stores are now flowing steadily. Engines continue to arrive, still insufficient, still in demand. Requests go back to ADOS for more. Every arrival is allocated. Every allocation leaves a gap somewhere else but the key difference from earlier in the campaign is this: The system is no longer improvised it is organised.

Sections are issuing regularly. The Infantry Section takes over responsibility for issuing to divisional units. Workshops are engaged, welding, fitting, repairing. Vehicles are inspected, recovered, and redistributed.  There is structure to the work now. There is also discipline.

Lectures are given. Parades held. Training introduced, even night exercises. Inspections take place. Conferences with ADOS shape how the system will operate going forward and still, through it all, the same constraint remains: Engines, tyres, springs. Collected from Tel el Kebir. From Abbassia. From wherever they can be obtained. Loaded onto trucks, brought forward, issued out.

Even the quieter entries reinforce it: “Routine only” by now, that phrase carries weight.

  • Routine means engines are still being chased.
  • Routine means vehicles are still short.
  • Routine means the system is still under pressure.

But it also means something else iIt means the system is working.

7 August 1943 – Promoted Corporal

The promotions come quickly now. They reflect both experience and necessity. The system is expanding, and it needs people who understand how it works.

August 1943 is not a dramatic month in the way the desert fighting had been, but it is no less important. The Division is no longer fighting for survival, it is reorganising for what comes next, and the OFP is right at the centre of that process. At first glance, the war diary reads almost casually: “Unit picnic at Barrage… skeleton staff left to picquet the lines.” There is rifle drill in the afternoons, inspections arranged, cricket matches played against rear units. It would be easy to read it as a period of rest, it isn’t.

Beneath that surface, the system is being adjusted, tightened, and reworked. Indents are reviewed, delivery systems questioned, and priorities argued through with Base Ordnance and ADOS. There is a constant thread of meetings, discussions, and quiet friction, not about whether stores exist, but about how fast they can move, and who gets them first. By mid-month, that work sharpens.

Conferences are held on the reorganisation of the OFP itself, including proposals to operate its own forward distribution, a recognition that the existing system is not fast enough for what lies ahead. Vehicles and personnel are reviewed, redistributed, and re-tasked.

“Conference… re-organisation of Ord. Fd. Pk… for more efficient service to Units.”

This is the moment when the OFP begins to shift from a supporting unit to something closer to a forward logistics node, integrated into the Division’s tempo rather than trailing behind it and running through it all is one very specific problem: engines.

Day after day, the diary returns to them. Chevrolet engines, Ford engines, Albion engines, controlled stores tied to them, allocations, collections, deliveries. Officers moving between depots, chasing availability, arguing allocations, arranging transport. “Collected engines and delivered as allocated… system now working.”

It is not just a supply issue.It is a readiness issue. Vehicles are the Division’s mobility, and mobility is its survival. Keeping engines flowing forward is not background work; it is an operational necessity.

By the end of August, the system is beginning to settle into a pattern. Stores’ positions are described as “good”, arrangements are in place, and the engine recovery and distribution system is functioning with some consistency. At the same time, there are clear signs of what is coming next.

Discussions about reinforcements, promotions, and the movement of sections begin to appear more frequently. The unit is not just sustaining the Division; it is preparing to move with it.

1 September 1943 – Promoted Sergeant

September 1943 brings that shift into focus as the tone changes immediately: “Stores coming through and issues heavy.” There is no longer any pretence of a lull. Volume increases, and with it, pressure. Engines continue to arrive from Base Ordnance Depots, now in larger numbers. Tank scaling for Sherman units is being issued. Ford scout car components, tyres, and controlled stores all begin to move through the system in parallel.

The problem is no longer a shortage alone. It is capacity. There is simply more to handle than the system was originally designed for. Even the diary notes it indirectly: “Impossible to carry same with present transport.”

Scaling, entitlement, and physical lift are misaligned. The system is being stretched, and adjustments have to be made in real time. At the same time, personnel turnover increases. Reinforcements arrive, postings change, and conferences focus as much on people as on stores. This is where Kreegher’s promotion to Sergeant on 1 September sits. It is not ceremonial, it is functional. The system needs NCOs who can run sections, interpret orders, manage priorities, and make decisions without waiting for direction. The flow of stores is now complex and continuous, and relies on the experienced men.

Mid-month, movement begins. Orders are issued. Sections are prepared to deploy. Vehicles are loaded, stores consolidated, accommodation equipment handed in, and the unit begins to break down its static footprint.

“Issued movement order… Armd Section packing up prior to move.” The move to Burg el Arab is deliberate, controlled, and tightly planned. Convoys are timed, routes specified, halts limited, spacing enforced. This is not just a relocation, it is a rehearsal. The OFP is learning to move as part of a larger operational system, not just as a unit changing camps.

Once in position, the work resumes immediately. The recovery and delivery sections are busy collecting and issuing vehicles. Controlled stores are distributed as units arrive. Base vehicles are received, processed, and pushed forward. The language of the diary becomes familiar again: issues, allocations, conferences, inspections. But the context has changed. By late September, there is a noticeable shift in tone: “Issues still high, although easing off slightly.”

The surge is stabilising, and stocks are building. Plans for the future begin to appear more frequently in discussions. Swimming parties start. Inoculations are carried out. Conferences are held to discuss what comes next, not just what is happening now. The system is no longer reacting, it is preparing. For Kreegher, this is the period where everything comes together.

By August, he understands the system, by September, he is helping run it. His promotions reflect that, but more importantly, they are a recognition that the war, at this stage, is being sustained not just by supply, but by organisation, adaptation, and control. The desert had demanded endurance. Italy would demand precision.

And the OFP is quietly reshaping itself to meet that demand.

October 1943 – “The system unwinds”

For Kreegher, October begins as it has for months: “Routine. Issues still heavy.”

Engines are still being issued.
Stores are still moving.
Vehicles still going back and forward to Base Ordnance Depots.

On the surface, it is familiar work, the same tasks, the same rhythm, but he would have recognised what was happening underneath.

The system was no longer building forward. It was being cleared.

  • Stocks pushed through.
  • Stores tidied and accounted for.
  • Supply lines are beginning to close down.

For someone who had spent the past year learning how to keep that system moving, this is something different, not sustainment, closure. Then the scale shifts: “27 truck loads of stores arrived…”

Kreegher is now part of the effort to concentrate what remains.

  • Sorting
  • Loading
  • Clearing

Not building a system, but dismantling it in an orderly way. Then, abruptly, the break.

  • Transit camps
  • Embarkation
  • Sailing

“Embarked… Sailed… At sea…”

For the first time since arriving in theatre, the work disappears. No engines to issue, no stores to account for, Just waiting, boat drill and routine at sea. A pause, but not a rest. More the absence of something that has become constant. Then: “Arrived TARANTO.” And whatever comes next, he will have to learn it again.

November 1943 – “Starting again, but not from nothing”

November does not begin with pressure, it begins with something quieter: “Routine. Foot drill. Rifle exercises.”  For Kreegher, this is a shift. After months of continuous operational work, he is back on parade, back in training cycles, back in something that looks like structure. But it is not a return to the beginning. It is preparation. Movement returns, but it feels different now. More deliberate and less uncertain.

  • Advance elements move
  • The rest follow
  • Arrival near San Severo

Kreegher moves with the unit, but there is nothing familiar waiting for them. No established base system and no known flow of supply, just ground,l so the work begins again.

Kreegher is now part of a system that no longer sits in one place. It is spread out, attached, moving in parts rather than as a whole. That changes how the work feels.It is less central., more immediate and more dependent on what is happening around him, and almost immediately, the pressure returns.

“Innumerable enquiries for stores.” Units are asking, and the system is not ready. Kreegher is no longer just processing stores. He is part of a system that is trying to catch up. By the end of the month, it begins to take shape. Not stable, but functioning.

He knows the work now, but the system around him is still settling.

December 1943 – “Learning a different kind of difficulty”

By December, the work is fully back, but it feels different.Movement is no longer just movement it is difficult.

  • Rain turns roads into mud.
  • Vehicles struggle to get through.
  • Recovery becomes constant.

The Diary notes “Road in was in a bad state… recovery indispensable.” For Kreegher, this changes the day, what was once routine movement now takes time, effort, and coordination. Nothing is simple.

Supply tightens and Depots restrict what can be drawn with only priority demands are met with “Only VOR indents getting any action.” He is still issuing and still accounting, but now, not everything can be satisfied. Distance changes the work. “Trip to Foggia takes practically three days.”

For Kreegher, that means delay and what is needed now will not arrive today or tomorrow. The system is no longer immediate and stocks become uneven, some things arrive, some do not. Engines still dominate demand, fast-moving parts remain short.

The work becomes more deliberate with more decisions and more prioritisation, so the system adapts, and Kreegher adapts with it.

  • Unserviceable engines gathered at road junctions
  • Recovery vehicles kept in constant use
  • Trucks sent out for days to find what is needed

This is not the system he learned in North Africa, but the work is still recognisable and the scope widens.

  • Weapons
  • Ammunition
  • Blankets
  • Stretchers
  • Mule equipment

For Kreegher, the realisation is quiet but important, this is not just about vehicles, it never was. By the end of December, something settles. Not easy to understand; he knows the work, he understands the system, but the system itself has changed and is slower, more fragile, and more dependent on everything around it. By the end of 1943, Kreegher had learned how the system worked. What he was now learning was how easily it could be made to struggle.

January 1944 – “Heavy snow… roads impassable.”

The year does not begin with movement, it begins with weather, with the diary noting “Heavy fall of snow… tried to make the main road, but failed.” For Kreegher, this is something new. In the desert, distance had been the problem here, it is access. The system cannot move because the ground will not allow it.So it adapts.

  • A dump is established near the main road
  • Stores are offloaded and sorted forward
  • Loads are broken down where they can be reached, not where they were intended to go

Kreegher is no longer working in a flowing system, he is working in fragments as conditions worsen.

  • Mud
  • Snow
  • Sleet

“Sorting continues in the rain and sleet… a very sorry spectacle for valuable stores.” This is not inefficiency, it is a necessity.By the end of the month, the pattern is clear.

  • Forward dumps
  • Controlled movement
  • Short-haul distribution

The system is no longer pushing forward. It is feeding forward.

29 January 1944 – Promoted to Staff Sergeant

The promotion reflects more than experience.Kreegher has moved with the system through every stage:

  • From formation
  • to function
  • to maturity

Now, he is part of how it is controlled.

February 1944 – “Arranging supply… not sufficient”

February brings structure, but not relief. Trips to Naples, Salerno, and forward depots become routine. Contacts are established, and supply chains begin to take shape. For Kreegher, the system is becoming visible again. Not as movement, but as a network. But the limits are already clear.“Monthly allocation… will not suffice.” Supply exists but not in the quantities required. The work becomes one of arrangement with less physical effort and more coordination. Movement continues, but in smaller bounds.

  • Short displacements
  • Advance parties
  • Rear parties left behind

The system is no longer continuous. It is staged. For Kreegher, this changes the work. Not just issuing, but deciding what can be issued.

March 1944 – “Area cutting up badly… all transport in and out.”

By March, the problem is no longer a shortage; it is congestion with too many vehicles and too little ground. The diary noting : “AOD area cutting up badly… all transport coming in and out.” Kreegher is now working inside a system at capacity. Transport is not lacking.It is competing. Bulk breaking becomes constant. Stores arriving from multiple depots. Sorted, divided, and pushed forward again. The system is functioning. But only because everything is being managed closely and the structure continues to evolve.

Vehicles are split between Armoured and Infantry OFP Sections with new establishments adopted and roles refined. This is no longer an adaptation. It is optimisation under pressure.

April 1944 – “Engines going out slowly…”

April brings a different problem, not congestion but flow: “Engines going out slowly… ahead of arriving stores.”  Demand is ahead of supply. For Kreegher, this means working with imbalance. Issuing what is available and managing what is not. Large quantities begin to move again.

  • Tyres in bulk
  • Major assemblies
  • RVP vehicles supporting distribution

The system has depth again, but not consistency. Movement resumes in a more deliberate form.

  • Packing
  • Loading
  • Relocation across rivers and choke points

This is controlled mobility and still, the same underlying constraint:

  • Manpower
  • Time
  • Flow

May 1944 – “Engine releases to hand…”

By May, the system begins to ease.Engine releases arrive and stocks begin to clear. For the first time in months, Kreegher is working with supply that is catching up. But the work does not slow.

  • Monthly returns
  • Policy discussions
  • Coordination with Corps and Brigade Ordnance elements

The system is now administrative as much as physical. New relationships form as  South African Ordnance elements arrive with shared arrangements are agreed. The system is no longer purely New Zealand. It is part of a wider structure.

Shortages remain: “Oxygen in short supply.” Even as some constraints ease, others emerge. For Kreegher, the work is now balanced between:

  • Issuing
  • coordinating
  • and managing expectations

June 1944 – “Hostile shelling… vehicles dispersed.”

By June, the system moves forward again and with it, Kreegher. Movement to forward areas is rapid.

  • Convoys in
  • Stores offloaded
  • Sections pushed forward

But now, there is something new.Threat. “Hostile shelling… vehicles dispersed… camouflage precautions taken.”

The OFP is no longer behind the war It is inside it. This changes everything. Vehicles cannot concentrate, stores cannot be held in one place, movement must be controlled and concealed. At the same time, demand increases. The system is under pressure from both sides: Enemy action and operational demand.

For Kreegher, this is the most complex phase yet: movement, supply, and threat all at once.

July 1944 – “Move commenced 0200 hrs… 105 miles.”

By July, the system moves again, north. Convoys form and night movement begins with long distances covered. Kreegher is back in motion, but this is not the desert, movement now includes:

  • Forward supply
  • Rearward recovery
  • Return of stores
  • Redistribution of equipment

August 1944 – “Engines allocated and delivered… trucks to roadhead.”

The system is no longer one-directional; it is circular. The system is repositioning itself, but even in this, the work continues, Stores arriving from Naples. from Bari, from railheads. The flow never stops for Kreegher, this is now familiar, movement, pause, reorganisation, continuation. By mid-1944, Kreegher was no longer adapting to the system, he was part of how it adapted to everything placed against it.

By late 1944, the system was operating at full tempo. Engines were being allocated, issued, and moved forward continuously. Trucks ran to roadheads, often returning partially loaded, sometimes empty, but always moving. The work was constant, defined less by individual tasks than by the flow itself.

Even routine entries reveal the scale of effort, vehicles cycling through, stores arriving unevenly, and controlled items being tracked carefully across multiple nodes.

September 1944 – “Thirty-six trucks in… tyres and stores… issues slow.”

Volume became the defining challenge. Large numbers of vehicles arrived with stores, but distribution struggled to keep pace. Issues slowed, not due to shortage, but due to the difficulty of handling and moving what was already available.

Movement orders came and went, sections repositioned, and the system adjusted again.

October 1944 – “Heavy issues… winter clothing… vehicles delayed.”

Seasonal change brought its own demands. Winter clothing and equipment were issued in bulk, adding pressure to an already stretched system. Vehicles struggled to reach forward areas due to terrain and congestion, and the simple act of getting stores into position became increasingly difficult. Even so, the system held.

November 1944 – “Quiet day… stores loaded… vehicles returning.”

By November, a different rhythm begins to emerge. There are still movements, still issues, still recoveries, but the intensity begins to ease. More vehicles return than depart. Backloading increases. Controlled stores are redistributed rather than urgently demanded. It is not a pause.But it is a shift.

December 1944 – “Stores slow… little activity… conference on organisation.”

By December, the tempo drops noticeably. Stores arrive more slowly. Issues are lighter. Conferences begin to focus on organisation rather than immediate demand. Sections are reviewed, roles adjusted, and the structure refined. The system is no longer reacting. It is stabilising.

January 1945 – “Stores becoming available… sections quiet… snow heavy.”

The new year begins quietly. There is work, but it lacks the urgency of earlier periods. Stores are now available in greater quantity, and the system shifts from managing shortage to managing distribution and storage. Snow and weather restrict movement, reinforcing a slower tempo.

Conferences with senior ordnance officers become more frequent, focusing on policy, organisation, and future structure rather than immediate operational demands.

February 1945 – “Reorganisation going to plan… issues low… quiet day.”

By February, the change is clear. Reorganisation is underway. Sections are adjusted. Personnel are reviewed. Reinforcements arrive, though not always to immediate effect.

Issues are low. Activity is steady but subdued. The system is no longer under strain. It is being reshaped.

March 1945 – “Salvage still rolling… sections packing to move… general quiet.”

March brings a sense of transition. Salvage operations continue, clearing equipment, recovering stores, and closing out areas. Sections are being prepared to move, packing, reorganising, and shifting locations. There is still work, but it is different work.

Less forward movement, more consolidation, more preparation for what comes next. The diary speaks of routine, but it is a quieter routine now, punctuated by conferences, inspections, and the gradual winding down of activity.

March–May 1945 – “Returned, but not yet finished”

Kreegher left the theatre before the war formally ended. He returned to New Zealand aboard the Tongariro, departing in late March 1945 and disembarking at Wellington on 21 April.

But the return did not mark an immediate end to his service. He was not released on arrival. Instead, he remained under military care, undergoing rehabilitation and minor surgery for a hernia, a condition he had been unaware of during his time overseas.

Like much of his war, it passed without comment. There was no clear moment that marked the transition from soldier to civilian.

October 1945 – Discharge

His final discharge came in October 1945. By then, the war had ended, and the system he had spent four years inside had begun to unwind. The urgency, the movement, the constant demand, all of it was gone.

He returned to Northland. To the same world he had left in 1940.

In December 1949, he married Enid Jean Chatfield in Remuera, Auckland. Together, they began building a life that, on the surface, reflected the same order and structure that had defined his pre-war years.

Fred Kreegher died at his home in Mount Albert, Auckland, on 26 May 1956. He was forty-four.

Closing Reflection

Like many men of his generation, he did not speak much about the war. There are no detailed personal accounts, no reflections in his own words that explain what those years meant. What remains are fragments:

  • A few photographs
  • A handful of names
  • A sequence of places

He was not a prominent figure. He did not command units or shape strategy. But he was part of something larger. He was one of the men who kept the system working. One of the clerks, storemen, NCOs, and technicians who ensured that vehicles moved, that weapons functioned, and that the Division could continue to fight.

Work that rarely appears in history. But without which the war could not have been sustained. He left behind little in the way of personal record. But the system he served in, and helped keep moving, leaves a clear trace. And through it, his war can still be understood.

Gallery


ANZAC Day 2026 – The Service That Never Ends

ANZAC Day follows a familiar rhythm.
Dawn services. The march. The silence at 11 a.m.

But in 2026, something has changed, not in the ceremony, but in what it represents.

Amendments to the Anzac Day Act 1966 now recognise all New Zealanders who have served in war and warlike operations, regardless of when or where that service occurred. They also acknowledge those whose deaths are connected to service, not only those killed in action, but those lost in training, on operations, or in the years that follow.

This is a quiet but significant shift. It removes the old hierarchy of conflicts and generations and recognises a simple reality: service did not end in 1945. It continues, often out of sight, through modern operations, readiness, and support roles.

It also recognises something long overlooked, not all who serve fall in battle.

Remembrance has tended to focus on the visible, the battlefield and the moment of loss. Gallipoli, the Somme, El Alamein, Cassino. These remain central to our national story.

But they are not the whole story.

Service carries consequences that are not always immediate or visible. Some emerge over time. Some leave no outward mark at all. For many, the real weight of service begins after deployment ends.

There are those who have been lost to that reality, not in theatre, not in uniform, but still because of their service.

If ANZAC Day is to remain meaningful, it must make space for that truth.

The 2026 change reflects a deeper shift, from seeing service as an event to understanding it as a continuum. The uniform may come off, but the experience, and sometimes the damage, remains.

This applies not only to those on operations, but to those who sustain them. The supplier, the mover, the maintainer, the transporter. Always present, rarely visible. From the New Zealand Wars to today, logistics has been a constant, defined not by moments of heroism, but by sustained effort.

“We will remember them” is a powerful phrase. But remembrance cannot be confined to a single day.

The change in law broadens who we remember. The real question is whether we act on it. Do we recognise the experiences of those who have served, and the impact on their families? Do we accept that the cost of service is not always immediate, nor always visible?

Or do we fall back on a simpler story that is easier to commemorate?

ANZAC Day 2026 points towards a more honest form of remembrance. One that includes not just those who fell, but those who lived with the consequences.

The ceremony will endure. It should.

But remembrance must extend beyond it.

Because service does not last a day.
It lasts a lifetime.


Grenades and Mortars in New Zealand Service, 1944

Grenades and mortars formed the essential bridge between the individual soldier and organised firepower in the Second World War. Where the rifle provided precision and reach, and artillery delivered massed effect, grenades and mortars filled the critical space in between, enabling infantry to generate explosive force at close and medium range.

For New Zealand, the period from 1941 to 1944 marked a decisive transition. Early reliance on hand-thrown grenades and rifle dischargers gave way to a system increasingly centred on mortars. These weapons provided controlled, repeatable, and responsive firepower at the section and battalion level. This shift was not simply tactical. It reflected the rapid expansion of the Army, the development of local munitions production, and the integration of New Zealand forces into a wider Allied system of supply and operations.

By March 1944, New Zealand’s holdings of grenades and mortar systems clearly illustrate this transformation. What began as a collection of individual weapons had evolved into a coherent, layered support system, one that fundamentally reshaped how infantry fought and how logistics sustained them.

Weapons and Ammunition Holdings

The figures presented here are drawn from the 1944 Quartermaster returns, which detail weapons and ammunition received from overseas and manufactured in New Zealand up to 31 March 1944.[1]

They do not represent total holdings in service. Instead, they reflect the scale of wartime procurement and production, and therefore exclude weapons and ammunition already held by the New Zealand Military Forces prior to mobilisation.

As a result, when compared against pre-war stocks, these quantities should be understood as representing the expansion of capability during the war, rather than the complete inventory on hand.

Mortars

TypeQuantity
Ordnance SBML 2-inch mortar1,484
Ordnance ML 3-inch mortar1,688
M2 60-mm mortar24

Mortar Ammunition

TypeRoleQuantity
2-inch Mortar HEClose support HE770,000
2-inch Mortar HE (Local Pattern)Close support HE299,000
2-inch Mortar SmokeScreening452,000
2-inch Mortar IlluminatingIllumination54,750
3-inch Mortar HEMedium HE support643,000
3-inch Mortar HE (Local Pattern)Medium HE support150,000
3-inch Mortar SmokeScreening161,300
3-inch Mortar RedSignalling15,000
3-inch Mortar GreenSignalling9,000
60-mm MortarClose support HE45,000
Women assembling mortar shells, Swan Electric Company, Wellington – Photographer unidentified. Pascoe, John Dobree, 1908-1972 :Photographic albums, prints and negatives. Ref: PAColl-0783-2-0437. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23056313

Grenades and Discharger Systems

TypeRoleQuantity
No.36M (4 sec)Fragmentation552,000
No.36M (7 sec)Fragmentation / Rifle2,446,700
No.63 Rifle SmokeSmoke screening8,900
No.68 Rifle ATRifle anti-tank58,000
No.69 BakeliteFragmentation18,000
No.74 Sticky BombAnti-tank33,000
No.75 HawkinsAnti-tank / demolition98,000
Discharger GrenadeRifle grenade system6,038
Discharger Smoke GeneratorSmoke projection66
Discharger SmokeSmoke projection290

Fragmentation Grenades: The Backbone

The No.36M Mills grenade remained the backbone of New Zealand’s grenade inventory, with nearly 3 million held in stock. It was the standard infantry grenade for close combat, trench clearance, and defensive fighting.

Like the 3-inch mortar, the Mills grenade followed a clear trajectory from the First World War into the Second. It had proven its effectiveness in 1914–1918 and was retained in service during the interwar years, forming part of the limited but enduring infantry support capability maintained by the Territorial Force.

Rearmament began modestly. In 1935, an initial order of 640 Mills grenades was placed, followed by a further 2,360 in 1939 as the international situation deteriorated. These early procurements mirror the pattern seen with mortars, small initial steps followed by rapid expansion once war became imminent.

No 36m Grenade

This continuity ensured that, on mobilisation, New Zealand was able to expand an existing and familiar system, rather than introduce an entirely new one.

A key strength of the No.36M was its adaptability. It could be fitted with:

  • 4-second fuse for hand throwing
  • 7-second fuse for rifle discharger use

This allowed it to function as both a hand grenade and rifle grenade, simplifying logistics while expanding tactical flexibility.

All No.36M grenades were produced in New Zealand during the war, with total output reaching approximately 3 million.[2]

Ministerial party inspecting hand grenade factory. Pascoe, John Dobree, 1908-1972 :Photographic albums, prints and negatives. Ref: PAColl-0783-2-0207. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23025683

Grenade, hand, No 69 Mk I

New Zealand also held approximately 18,000 No.69 Bakelite grenades, sourced from the United Kingdom. These used an all-ways impact fuze and produced reduced fragmentation, making them more suitable for offensive operations where rapid detonation was required.[3]

Grenade, hand, No 69 Mk I

Rifle Dischargers: A Transitional Capability

The presence of 6,038 grenade dischargers highlights an important transitional phase in infantry weapons development, bridging the gap between hand-thrown grenades and mortar-based firepower.

Fitted to the muzzle of a rifle, the discharger allowed grenades, most commonly the No.36M fitted with a 7-second fuze, to be projected out to ranges of approximately 150–200 yards. This extended the reach of the infantryman and enabled engagement of targets beyond normal throwing distance, including those behind cover.

Of the total held, 1,125 dischargers were manufactured in New Zealand, with the remainder sourced from overseas.

British No. 36M Mk. I Hand Grenade, and No. I Mk. I Cup Discharger. https://questmasters.us/ordnance.html

Associated with these were small holdings of specialised smoke equipment:

  • Discharger Smoke Generators (66)
  • Discharger Smoke rounds (290)

These limited numbers indicate that smoke delivery via discharger was never developed as a major capability.

Despite their utility, dischargers had clear limitations:

  • Single-shot operation, limiting rate of fire
  • Reduced accuracy compared to mortars
  • Dependence on specialised blank cartridges
  • Mechanical strain on rifles

By 1944, these limitations had become decisive. While still held in significant numbers, dischargers were increasingly superseded by the 2-inch mortar, which offered greater range, accuracy, and sustained fire.

Anti-Tank Grenades: Close-Range Solutions

New Zealand held a range of anti-tank grenade types:

No.68 Rifle Grenade

The No.68 rifle grenade was an early-war attempt to give infantry a practical anti-tank capability at section level before dedicated anti-armour weapons became widely available. Fired from a rifle using a discharger cup and a special blank cartridge, it employed a shaped-charge (HEAT) warhead capable of penetrating light armour under favourable conditions. In theory, it allowed infantry to engage armoured vehicles at short range without closing to hand-thrown distance. In practice, however, its effectiveness was limited. Accuracy was inconsistent, range was modest, and its performance against increasingly well-armoured vehicles declined rapidly as the war progressed. It also imposed mechanical strain on rifles and required specific drill and ammunition, adding to the burden on the soldier.

No.68 Rifle Grenade

No.74 Sticky Bomb

The No.74 “Sticky Bomb” was an improvised anti-tank grenade developed in response to the urgent need for close-range infantry anti-armour capability in the early years of the war. It consisted of a glass sphere filled with nitroglycerine-based explosive, coated in a strong adhesive and enclosed within a protective metal casing. Once armed, the casing was removed, exposing the adhesive surface, allowing the grenade to be thrown against a vehicle, where it would stick before detonating after a short delay.

In concept, it offered infantry a means of defeating armour by placing an explosive charge directly onto the target. In practice, however, it was hazardous to use. The adhesive could be unreliable, particularly in wet, dusty, or muddy conditions, and there was a real risk of the grenade sticking to the user or failing to adhere to the target. Employment required the soldier to close to extremely short range, often under fire, making it a weapon of last resort.

By 1944, while still held in service, the Sticky Bomb had largely been overtaken by more effective and safer anti-tank weapons. Its continued presence in inventories reflects the urgency of early-war improvisation rather than enduring tactical value

No.75 Hawkins

The No.75 Hawkins grenade was a versatile anti-tank and demolition charge designed to provide infantry with a simple, robust means of defeating vehicles and creating obstacles. Unlike the more hazardous Sticky Bomb, the Hawkins was a flat, rectangular device containing a substantial explosive charge and fitted with a pressure fuze. It could be used in several ways, placed on roads or tracks as an improvised mine, laid against vehicles, or employed as a general-purpose demolition charge.

Its strength lay in this adaptability. It did not require the soldier to attach it to a moving target physically, and its pressure activation made it particularly effective against vehicles passing over it. This made it well-suited to defensive operations, ambushes, and the preparation of anti-tank obstacles. It could also be used to damage infrastructure or equipment where required.

By 1944, the Hawkins grenade remained a useful and widely held system, reflecting its practicality and relative safety compared to earlier improvised anti-tank weapons. While more advanced anti-tank weapons were coming into service, the Hawkins continued to offer a reliable, low-technology solution that could be employed across a range of tactical situations

No.75 Hawkins

No.63 rifle smoke grenade

The No.63 rifle smoke grenade reflects an earlier stage in infantry smoke provision.

New Zealand procured these during the interwar period, with 1,806 ordered in 1935 and a further 7,194 in 1939, mirroring efforts to maintain a baseline infantry support capability alongside grenades and mortars.

No.63 rifle smoke grenade

However, unlike those systems, the No.63 did not transition successfully into the later war environment. By 1943 it had been rendered obsolete, overtaken by the far more effective 2-inch mortar smoke bomb, which provided greater range, repeatable fire, and improved control of smoke effects.

With over 450,000 mortar smoke rounds available, rifle smoke grenades had ceased to be a primary system, and existing stocks were not intended for replacement.

Doctrinal Shift: From Discharger to Mortar

The relationship between the rifle discharger and the 2-inch mortar illustrates a clear doctrinal transition.

Where the discharger extended the reach of the individual soldier, the mortar introduced controlled, repeatable firepower at section level. It allowed commanders to engage targets beyond line of sight, deliver multiple rounds in quick succession, adjust fire based on observation, and integrate smoke, HE, and illumination.

In effect, the mortar replaced individual effort with system-based firepower, marking a fundamental shift in infantry tactics. By 1944, mortars had become central to New Zealand infantry operations.

2-inch Mortar: Section-Level Weapon

With 1,484 mortars on hand, the 2-inch mortar was embedded at section level.

Of these, 579 were manufactured in New Zealand, reflecting a significant domestic contribution.

Supported by large ammunition stocks, the 2-inch mortar provided immediate HE fire, smoke, and illumination, and had effectively replaced the rifle grenade as the infantry’s primary close-support weapon.

3-inch Mortar: Battalion Fire Support

The 3-inch mortar, with 1,688 weapons on hand, formed the backbone of battalion-level indirect fire support.

Of these, 488 were produced in New Zealand, with the majority imported.

Importantly, the Ordnance ML 3-inch mortar did not emerge in isolation. It replaced the earlier 3-inch Stokes mortar, which had served New Zealand effectively during the First World War and was retained in limited use during the interwar period, particularly within Territorial battalion support platoons.

Efforts to rebuild this capability began before the outbreak of war. Sixteen 3-inch mortars were ordered between 1935 and 1937, followed by a further 20 in 1939, reflecting growing recognition of the importance of indirect fire support.

These early procurements provided the foundation for rapid wartime expansion. A key advantage of the system was that modern 3-inch mortar ammunition was designed to function in both the ML and earlier Stokes mortars, ensuring continuity and allowing older weapons to remain in use for training and secondary roles.

With ammunition holdings including over 643,000 HE rounds, the 3-inch mortar system supported sustained fire support, area suppression, and the neutralisation of enemy positions.

60-mm Mortar: Allied Integration and Pre–Lend-Lease Procurement

The 24 M2 60-mm mortars held by New Zealand in 1944 represent a small and ultimately transitional capability within the wider development of infantry firepower.

Acquired in 1942 under urgent conditions, their introduction reflects a period when New Zealand was still adapting to wartime expansion.

From the outset, the 60-mm mortar was tied primarily to Pacific operations. The weapons were issued to the Fiji Defence Force, where they formed part of New Zealand’s regional defence commitments. In this role, they provided a useful but limited close-support capability.

However, as the strategic situation evolved, so too did their employment. With the withdrawal and redeployment of New Zealand forces from Fiji, the mortars were returned to New Zealand. They were issued to Northern Military District Home Defence units, where they filled a niche role within a largely static defensive framework.

This redistribution is significant. It reflects the system’s position on the margins of New Zealand’s ordnance structure. While sufficient for local defence and training purposes, the 60-mm mortar did not align with the standardised British-pattern systems that were becoming dominant across the Army.

Unlike the 2-inch and 3-inch mortars, which were embedded at section and battalion level and supported by established doctrine, training, and supply arrangements, the 60-mm mortar remained limited in scale and application. Early consideration was given to expanding the capability, but this was quickly abandoned, with existing holdings deemed sufficient for requirements. As Lend-Lease supplies matured, the advantages of standardisation became decisive. British-pattern mortars offered commonality of equipment, ammunition, and training across the force, while the 60-mm system remained logistically distinct and operationally isolated.

Production and Supply Context

The broader system reinforces the scale of effort:

  • Over 7 million bombs and grenades handled
  • Approximately 3½ million from local production
  • Mortars, dischargers, and ammunition all saw partial domestic manufacture alongside large-scale imports

New Zealand’s approach was pragmatic:

  • Produce what could be scaled locally
  • Import complex and specialised systems

Conclusion: A Layered System of Firepower

By MarBy March 1944, New Zealand had developed a coherent and layered infantry support system:

  • Grenades for immediate, close combat
  • Rifle dischargers as a transitional extension of the individual soldier
  • 2-inch mortars providing responsive firepower at the section level
  • 3-inch mortars delivering sustained support at platoon and battalion levels

What is most striking is not simply the presence of these systems, but the way they evolved. Many, such as the Mills grenade and Stokes-derived mortar, traced their lineage back to the First World War, were retained in limited form during the interwar years, and then rapidly expanded and modernised as New Zealand mobilised for war.

The decisive transformation was the shift from individual, manually delivered effects to controlled, repeatable, and coordinated firepower systems, with mortars at the centre. This marked a fundamental change in how infantry generated combat power, moving from isolated actions to integrated, scalable effects across the battlefield.

Equally significant was the transformation behind the front line. At the outbreak of war, New Zealand was largely a beneficiary of externally supplied military equipment. By 1944, it had become an active contributor, producing large quantities of grenades, mortar bombs, and selected weapons domestically. This shift did not eliminate reliance on overseas supply, but it reduced vulnerability, increased resilience, and enabled participation in the wider Allied supply system.

This was not merely an increase in quantity. It was the emergence of a mature, adaptable, and partially self-sustaining combat system, underpinned by a logistics organisation capable of expanding production, integrating Allied supply, and sustaining operations at scale. In this, New Zealand’s experience reflects a broader wartime reality: success depended not only on weapons but on the systems that supported, supplied, and evolved them.

Notes

[1] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541151  (30 June 1944), .

[2] “Hand grenades, general – August 1942 – June 1945,” Archives New Zealand Item No R6280793  (1941-1944).

[3] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch.”

[4] “Guns – Mortars – 60mm, purchase of equipment,” Archives New Zealand Item No R22442139  (1942-1970).


From Empire to Corps

The Influence of Indian Army Ordnance Experience on the RNZAOC, 1947–1950

In the immediate post-war years, the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC) entered a period of transition. Wartime expansion gave way to peacetime contraction, and the Corps, like the wider New Zealand Army, was required to redefine itself outside the framework of a global imperial system.

Yet, at precisely this moment, the RNZAOC received an understated but important reinforcement, the arrival of experienced ordnance personnel from the disbanding structures of the British Indian Army.

This was not a formal transfer scheme, nor a large intake. But what the Corps gained was not numbers, it was experience at scale.

The Indian Army Ordnance Corps in Context

The Indian Army Ordnance Corps (IAOC) operated within one of the most complex military systems of the Second World War. It sustained a force composed of multiple races, languages, and religions, each with distinct requirements for food, clothing, and equipment.[1]

For the ordnance system, this complexity translated directly into supply:

  • multiple ration systems aligned to religious dietary laws
  • specialist clothing and equipment scales reflecting cultural requirements
  • dispersed supply chains operating across jungle, desert, and mountain terrain
  • integration of mechanised transport with animal systems, including camels, bullock carts, and elephants

The IAOC’s role was to provide “the thousand and one different items required by a modern army in the field.”[2]

This was not a system built on neat standardisation. It was a system built on adaptation, scale, and control under pressure.

When India gained independence in 1947, that system fractured. British and Dominion personnel were discharged or repatriated. Some chose to continue their service elsewhere in the Commonwealth. A number came to New Zealand.

Transfers into the RNZAOC

Between 1947 and 1948, a small but significant cohort of former Indian Army personnel entered the RNZAOC, bringing with them experience from one of the largest ordnance systems of the Second World War. These included:

  • Percy Hardie Murray Galbraith, late Lieutenant Colonel, Indian Army, appointed Temporary Major on 3 March 1948[3]
  • Derek Evelyn Albert Roderick, late Major Indian Army, appointed Lieutenant (on probation) with seniority from 27 May 1942, effective 20 February 1948[4]
  • John Francis Finn, late Major, Indian Army) appointed Captain (on prob:), with seniority from 3rd February 1944.[5]
  • Henry Partridge White (late Major, Indian Army) appointed temp Captain (on prob.), with seniority from 12th January 1944, and posted for duty to the Main Ordnance Depot, Trentham on 12 January 1948.[6]
  • Clifford Arthur Penny (late Major, Indian Army) appointed temp Captain (on prob.), with seniority from 3 February.[7]
  • Austin Whitehead (late Captain, Indian Army) appointed temp Captain (on prob.), with seniority from 3 February 1948.[8]
  • Gerald Norman Weston (late Captain, Indian Army) appointed temp Captain (on prob.), and posted for duty to Ordnance Section, Northern Military District, Auckland on 15 January 1948.[9]
  • Alfred Wesseldine, attested 4 March 1948 as Substantive Warrant Officer Class II (Temporary Warrant Officer Class I), posted to the Main Ordnance Depot, Trentham[10]
  • Patrick William Rennison, former Indian Army officer, was appointed Officer Commanding No. 2 Ordnance Depot, Linton in 1948, assuming responsibility for a key regional ordnance node within the Central Military District[11]

This initial intake was reinforced in the following years by additional former Indian Army Ordnance Corps personnel and those with service across the wider imperial ordnance system, including:

  • R. T. Marriott, who joined the RNZAOC in 1949 and later served as Chief Ammunition Technical Officer[12]
  • J. H. Doone, who transferred via the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and joined the RNZAOC in 1952, later also serving as Chief Ammunition Technical Officer[13]

Collectively, this group represents more than a series of individual transfers. It reflects the movement of experienced ordnance officers and senior non-commissioned officers from the disbanding imperial system into the RNZAOC, bringing with them capability across depot command, ammunition technical services, and stores administration at a critical point in the Corps’ post-war development.

Voices from the Field: Experience Carried Across the Empire

Major R. T. Marriott – Ammunition Expertise at the Highest Level

Major R. T. Marriott’s career illustrates the technical depth carried into the RNZAOC. After service with the Irish Guards and the Gurkhas, he joined the IAOC in 1943 before transferring to New Zealand in 1949.

His first appointment at Trentham as depot inspecting ordnance officer placed him at the centre of the Army’s ammunition system. He later became Chief Ammunition Technical Officer at Army Headquarters, responsible for the inspection, testing, and proving of all ammunition used by the New Zealand Army.

Major J. H. Doone – Continuity Across Imperial Systems

Major J. H. Doone’s career reflects the broader movement across imperial and Commonwealth ordnance systems. After service with British infantry units, he transferred to the IAOC during the war and later moved through the Royal Army Ordnance Corps before joining the RNZAOC in 1952.

By the end of his career, he too held the position of Chief Ammunition Technical Officer, reinforcing the pattern of IAOC-trained personnel occupying key technical roles within the New Zealand Army.

Alfred ‘Wes’ Wesseldine – Building the Post-War System

Wesseldine represents the clearest example of IAOC experience translated directly into RNZAOC capability.

WO1 Wesseldoine RSM RNZAOC School Sept 1958-Oct 1968

Enlisting in 1932 with the Lincolnshire Regiment, Wesseldine served in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and India, where he was employed as an instructor and qualified in both education and Urdu, before transferring to the IAOC in 1939. In the IAOC, he served in key wartime appointments across India, Iraq, Persia, and the Persian Gulf. As a Stores Branch Sergeant, Base Ordnance Warrant Officer, and later Ordnance Sub-Conductor, he operated within Line of Communication systems sustaining major formations.

Mentioned in despatches, he later held senior depot and staff appointments before being compulsorily retired following Indian independence. Arriving in New Zealand in 1948, he joined the RNZAOC and was posted to Trentham.

Placed in charge of the Motor Transport Sub-Depot, he centralised spare parts supply and improved system efficiency across Army and RNZAF support elements. His later appointments as Regimental Sergeant Major of the Main Ordnance Depot, Trentham Camp, and the RNZAOC School saw him shape training, standards, and professional culture across the Corps for more than a decade.

Patrick William Rennison – From System Rebuild to Operational Service

Rennison’s career demonstrates how IAOC-derived experience translated into both command and operational effectiveness within the RNZAOC.

Appointed Officer Commanding No. 2 Ordnance Depot at Linton in 1948, he assumed responsibility for a key node in New Zealand’s post-war ordnance system. Linton controlled a dispersed network of sub-depots, including ammunition facilities, vehicle depots, and general stores across the Central Military District.

Central Districts Ordnance Depot, Linton Camp 1949. Back Row: Private R. Pickin, Lance Corporal R Riordan, Corporal Downing, Corporal Carswell. Private Shepherd, Corporal Blanchard, Corporal Wackrow, Corporal Ayers. Center Row: Corporal Kearns, Lance Corporal Parking, Private Norris, Lance Corporal Thorn, Corporal Fry, Unidentified, Private Simpson, Lance Corporal Alger, Sergeant Whaler, Sergeant Colwill. Front Row: Sergeant Rogers, Sergeant Riordan, Lieutenant O’Connor, Captian Rennison, Warrant Officer Class Two Colwill, Sergeant Wells, Sergeant Kempthorne. Photo: E Ray

Under his command, the unit was redesignated as the Central Districts Ordnance Depot, reflecting the RNZAOC’s transition to a regional sustainment structure aligned to peacetime requirements.

Rennison later served with K Force during the Korean War, one of a small group of RNZAOC officers deployed to sustain New Zealand and Commonwealth forces in theatre. His career thus spans the full arc of post-war development, from reconstruction of the domestic ordnance system to renewed operational deployment.

Experience at Scale

What these men brought was not simply experience, but experience of a different order.

They had operated in systems where:

  • supply chains stretched across continents
  • multiple transport methods, mechanised and non-mechanised, had to be integrated
  • cultural and environmental factors directly shaped sustainment
  • failure in supply had immediate operational consequences

New Zealand’s wartime experience had exposed the RNZAOC to elements of this complexity, but often within a larger British framework. In the post-war environment, those responsibilities increasingly rested within New Zealand’s own institutions.

These men had already operated at that level, and understood both the demands and the risks.

Influence within the Corps

The influence of IAOC-trained personnel was not delivered through doctrine or formal reform. It was embedded through practice.

At Trentham and Linton, the Corps’ primary centres of gravity, experienced personnel applied that knowledge to:

  • Reorganising depot structures
  • enforcing stores accounting discipline
  • developing training systems
  • setting professional expectations

Rennison’s command at Linton and Wesseldine’s influence at Trentham illustrate how this experience was embedded across both structural and training nodes.

Their impact was cumulative. As those trained under them moved through the Corps, the standards they established spread with them.

This is how institutional knowledge transfers, not through documents, but through people.

Reinforcing Professional Identity

The late 1940s were formative years for the RNZAOC as a peacetime corps. Without the urgency of war, the challenge was to maintain standards and preserve capability. What IAOC veterans contributed was not just experience, but perspective. They reinforced the understanding that ordnance was not an administrative function, but a core component of operational effectiveness.

At the same time, their presence maintained continuity with the wider Commonwealth ordnance tradition at a moment when the imperial system that had sustained it was dissolving. In doing so, they helped shape the professional identity of the RNZAOC in its transition from wartime expansion to a smaller, but more self-reliant, force.

Conclusion

The transfer of personnel from the Indian Army into the RNZAOC was modest in scale but significant in effect. At a critical moment in the Corps’ development, these men brought experience drawn from one of the most demanding logistical systems of the Second World War. They reinforced standards, shaped training, and contributed directly to the professionalisation of the RNZAOC in the early Cold War era.

By the early 1950s, that influence was already visible. The same Corps that had absorbed IAOC experience in the late 1940s was now deploying to Korea as part of K Force, operating once again within a Commonwealth framework, and doing so with a level of professionalism that owed much to those earlier transfers.

Their legacy is not found in a single reform or directive, but in the standards they set and the system they helped build. In that sense, the post-war RNZAOC was not created in isolation. It was, in part, inherited.

Footnotes

[1] “The Indian Army,” Evening Post, Volume CXXXIX, Issue 67, , 20 March 1945, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19450320.2.21.

[2] “The Indian Army.”

[3] “Appointments, Promotions, Transfers, and Resignations, of Officers of the New Zealand Army “, New Zealand Gazette No 18 (Wellington), 8 April 1948, , https://www.austlii.edu.au/nz/other/nz_gazette/1948/18.pdf.

[4] “Appointments, Promotions, Transfers, and Resignations, of Officers of the New Zealand Army “.

[5] “Appointments, Promotions, Transfers, and Resignations, of Officers of the New Zealand Army “, New Zealand Gazette No 10 (Wellington), 19 Feb 1948, , https://www.austlii.edu.au/nz/other/nz_gazette/1948/10/7.pdf.

[6] “Appointments, Promotions, Transfers, and Resignations, of Officers of the New Zealand Army “, New Zealand Gazette No 4 (Wellington), 23 January 1948, , https://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nz_gazette/1948/4.pdf.

[7] “Appointments, Promotions, Transfers, and Resignations, of Officers of the New Zealand Army “.

[8] “Appointments, Promotions, Transfers, and Resignations, of Officers of the New Zealand Army “.

[9] “Appointments, Promotions, Transfers, and Resignations, of Officers of the New Zealand Army “.

[10] “NZAOC June 1947 to May 1948,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2017, accessed 1 March, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2017/07/10/rnzaoc-june-1947-to-may-1948/.

[11] McKie, “NZAOC June 1947 to May 1948.”; “Ordnance in the Manawatu 1915 – 1996,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zeland Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2020, accessed 14 November 2024, 2024, https://rnzaoc.com/2020/12/21/ordnance-in-the-manawatu-1915-1996/.

[12] “Thirty-One Years’ Service Ended,” Evening Post, 9 May 1962, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19620509.2.76; Major J.S Bolton, A History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (Trentham: RNZAOC, 1992).

[13] “Plunket Society’s New Secretary,” Evening Post, 4 September 1963, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19630904.2.70.9.;Bolton, A History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps.