New Zealand Army Stores Accounting: 1845-1963: Part 1 -1845 -1918

Leave a comment Robert McKie

The evolution of New Zealand Army stores accounting from 1845 to 1963 reflects the broader transformation of the nation’s military logistics from its colonial origins to a modern, structured system. This study is not a deep dive into the intricate details and complexities of New Zealand military stores accounting but rather an introductory overview of a system that has incrementally evolved over 180 years.

Initially modelled on British military accounting principles, New Zealand’s unique defence requirements—shaped by its geographical isolation, force structure, and operational demands—necessitated continuous refinement. Accounting practices have continuously evolved since the first musket was issued to the militia in 1845. However, it wasn’t until The Public Stores Act of 1867 that structured inventory control and accountability measures were formally introduced. This legislation laid the foundation for military store accounting, marking a significant step towards the professionalisation of the Defence Stores Department. These measures ensured crucial oversight and efficiency in military logistics, particularly highlighted by the demands of the South African War and the two World Wars, underscoring the need for a robust and adaptable system capable of sustaining large-scale military operations.

By the mid-20th century, New Zealand had developed a sophisticated store accounting framework. The introduction of NZP1: Volume I—Stores Accounting in 1951 marked a milestone, formalising the policy regulating the army’s store management. The subsequent 1962 revision further streamlined procedures, ensuring the system remained relevant amid evolving logistical complexities.

New Zealand’s innovations in stores accounting did not go unnoticed. In 1963, the Australian Army sought guidance from New Zealand to modernise its system, acknowledging the effectiveness of the NZ Army’s approach. This recognition underscored New Zealand’s competence in military logistics, demonstrating that despite its smaller size, its expertise had broader strategic significance.

Structure of this Study

Part One will examine the period from 1845 to 1918, tracing the evolution of New Zealand’s military stores accounting system from its British colonial origins to a structured, modern framework comparable to those of New Zealand’s allies by 1914. The demands of the First World War tested the system’s efficiency and resilience, exposing strengths and weaknesses that would shape post-war reforms.
Part Two will cover the period from 1918 to 1945, during which the lessons learned from the First World War were applied to improve inventory control, procurement efficiency, and financial oversight. Economic constraints of the interwar years prompted refinements to stores accounting, leading to the introduction of cost accounting in 1921 and the formalisation of logistical procedures in 1927. The rapid mobilisation for the Second World War tested these systems on an unprecedented scale, accelerating the adoption of modernised inventory tracking and decentralised supply chain management. By 1945, these wartime adaptations had laid the foundation for a more sophisticated and accountable military logistics system.
Part Three will examine the period from 1946 to 1963, focusing on the transition from wartime supply chains to a peacetime military logistics infrastructure. The post-war period saw efforts to streamline surplus disposal, re-establish long-term procurement strategies, and integrate emerging technologies into stores accounting. By 1963, the system had matured into a mature manual store accounting framework, ensuring greater efficiency, accountability, and interoperability.

Military Stores Accounting and Its Distinctions from Commercial Stores Accounting

The primary goal of military stores accounting is to ensure that soldiers on the frontlines, tradesmen in workshops, and medical staff in field hospitals have the necessary tools and equipment to carry out their duties effectively. This involves managing administrative burdens through the command and supply chains and ensuring all required controls are in place for the long-term sustainment and capability maintenance.

Military stores accounting is a specialised system designed to manage and track the acquisition, storage, distribution, and disposal of military supplies. Unlike commercial stores accounting, which primarily focuses on cost control and financial profitability, military stores accounting prioritises accountability, operational readiness, and the efficient utilisation of resources to meet operational outputs.[1]

Differences Between Military and Commercial Stores Accounting

Feature	Military Stores Accounting	Commercial Stores Accounting
Objective	Ensuring operational readiness and accountability	Maximising profit and minimising costs
Nature of Inventory	Includes depreciable assets, expendable, consumable, repairable, and non-expendable items	Primarily consumable and depreciable assets
Accounting System	Uses strict regulatory frameworks and controlled issue systems	Focuses on balance sheets and profit margins
Lifespan of Items	Items can remain in service for decades with periodic refurbishment	Items are typically depreciated and replaced
Valuation	Based on operational utility rather than market price	Based on market valuation and depreciation
Security and Control	Strict control due to security concerns	Less stringent control mechanisms

Classification of Military Stores

Military stores are classified into several categories based on their usage, longevity, and maintenance requirements:

Expendable Stores – Items that are used once and cannot be reused (e.g., ammunition, medical supplies, fuel). These are issued as required and accounted for under strict consumption controls.
Consumable Stores – Items that are used over time and require replenishment (e.g., rations, lubricants, batteries). While they are used up gradually, they still require accountability and stock rotation.
Repairable Stores – High-value equipment that, when damaged or worn, can be repaired and reissued rather than disposed of (e.g., weapons, radios, vehicles). These items are often tracked using maintenance logs and servicing records to maximise their lifespan.
Non-Expendable Stores – Permanent assets that remain in service for extended periods (e.g., buildings, infrastructure, large-calibre weapons). These items require detailed asset management and condition assessments.

The Long-Term Use of Military Equipment

Unlike commercial organisations, where items are often replaced once they end their economic life, military assets— from clothing to high-value or technologically complex equipment—are maintained, refurbished, and upgraded to extend their service life. For example:

Small Arms: Some rifles and sidearms remain in service for decades through regular maintenance and upgrades.
Vehicles: Military transport vehicles, such as trucks and armoured vehicles, can be refurbished multiple times before decommissioning.
Aircraft and Naval Assets: Large defence assets, including ships and aircraft, are often modernised with new technology and systems rather than being replaced outright.
Uniforms and Gear: Certain clothing items and equipment are subject to phased replacement cycles, where only components are updated as needed.

The Importance of Accountability in Military Stores Accounting

Military regulations are always subservient to Government legislation and regulations, especially Treasury rules regarding the expenditure of public monies. Military stores accounting is not a single system, but a collection of specialised accounting frameworks developed to manage different commodities such as ammunition, rations, fuel, vehicles, and technical spares. As military technology has advanced, these systems have evolved parallel to meet modern armed forces’ complex logistical demands.

Accountability is central to military stores accounting, ensuring that every piece of issued equipment is tracked to guarantee:

Proper usage and maintenance,
Prevention of loss or theft,
Compliance with operational requirements,
Efficient resource allocation during deployments.

Military store personnel are responsible for maintaining detailed records, conducting audits, and ensuring strict adherence to regulations. These rigorous accounting and inventory control measures ensure that military resources remain available and serviceable when required. Beyond merely tracking financial transactions, military stores accounting is a critical function that underpins military operations’ effectiveness, security, and sustainability.

Early Developments in Stores Accounting

From 1845, Quartermaster staff managing militia stores and then Volunteer stores from 1858 followed British military procedures. The Defence Stores were formally established in 1862, predating Lieutenant Colonel Edward Gorton’s appointment as Inspector of Defence Stores in 1869. Although Gorton assumed leadership in 1869, the Defence Stores had already been functioning, supporting the colonial military effort.[2]

The 1867 Public Stores Act, implemented under Gorton’s administration, introduced structured accounting procedures.[3] The Defence Stores Department issued circulars and administrative guidelines to ensure proper accountability and management of military supplies. Gorton’s rigorous approach laid the foundation for the 1871 Public Stores Act, which regulated government-wide stores management and standardised accounting practices.[4]

Despite Gorton’s achievements in strengthening accountability, his strict enforcement and meticulous oversight drew criticism, leading to the abolition of the Stores Inspection Department in 1877.[5] However, his Defence Stores procedures remained robust, and a culture od accountability was established within Defence Stores. Thirty years later, Colonel George Macaulay Kirkpatrick of General Kitchener’s staff validated them in 1910, finding them comparable to British military standards.

Stores records were maintained by a system of indents and vouchers, with balances maintained in ledger books. The Defence Stores were required to provide annual reports of stocks on an annual basis, ensuring accountability and transparency in military logistics. These practices laid the foundation for the modern systematic inventory control and efficient stores management.

Development of the Artillery Stores (1880s Onwards)

As New Zealand expanded its Garrison Artillery and introduced new guns, equipment, and ammunition, additional accounting and management procedures became necessary. This was beyond the scope of the existing Defence Stores Department, requiring the expertise of military professionals.

In conjunction with Defence Storekeeper Captain Sam Anderson, Sergeant Major Robert George Vinning Parker, formerly of the Royal Garrison Artillery, developed a system of Artillery Stores Accounting. Parker was in charge of artillery ledgers and stores at Auckland, Wellington, and Lyttelton, ensuring the proper tracking and maintenance of artillery supplies. He continued in this role until 1889 when he was reassigned to Dunedin.[6]

Replacing Parker as the Artillery Ledger Keeper was Regimental Sergeant Major and Instructor in Gunnery Frederick Silver. Silver’s expertise in artillery logistics positioned him as a key figure in the continued refinement of artillery accounting systems. Following the death of Captain Sam Anderson in December 1899, Silver applied for the role of Ledger Keeper in the Defence Stores. Given his extensive experience and close working relationship with Anderson, Silver believed he was the ideal candidate.[7] However, due to his seniority, James O’Sullivan, the Chief Clerk of the Defence Stores, was awarded the role of Defence Storekeeper.[8]

Despite this, Silver was appointed as a temporary clerk in the Defence Stores, transitioning from the Permanent Militia on 25 June 1900. While his new role introduced additional responsibilities, Silver managed Artillery Ledgers seamlessly within the Defence Stores framework.[9]

The relationship between the Defence Stores and the Artillery was cooperative, with both functions operating as a single organisation. The Defence Stores was crucial in supporting the artillery’s logistical needs, ensuring that munitions, equipment, and essential supplies were readily available. The interconnected nature of these two functions allowed for a streamlined approach to military logistics, where artillery-specific requirements were integrated within the broader supply framework managed by the Defence Stores.

This integration led to an efficient system that balanced military necessity with stringent logistical oversight.

Organisational Reforms and the Defence Council (1906)

With the passage of the Defence Act Amendment Act 1906 on 28 October 1906, the Defence Council was established, providing the New Zealand Military Forces with a structured headquarters for the first time. The Act introduced specific staff functions, including:

Director of Artillery Services (Ordnance): Responsible for artillery armament, fixed coastal defences, and ordnance supplies.
Director of Stores: Responsible for clothing, personal equipment, accoutrements, saddlery, harnesses, small arms, ammunition, machine guns, transport, vehicles, camp equipment, and all stores required for the Defence Forces.[10]

As part of this reform, James O’Sullivan was confirmed as Director of Stores for New Zealand and appointed Quartermaster and Honorary Captain in the New Zealand Militia. Silver was designated as Assistant Defence Storekeeper, continuing to oversee Artillery Ledgers, which—despite falling under the purview of the Director of Artillery Services (Ordnance)—remained under Defence Stores control.

Despite these improvements, officers and Quartermaster staff in volunteer units were still elected annually, leading to inconsistency in stores management. Many units functioned more like social clubs than military organisations, resulting in disorganised stores accounts. This led to frequent discrepancies between supplies provided by the Crown and actual inventory.

The continued reliance on part-time and volunteer Quartermasters highlighted the need for further professionalisation of the quartermaster within the New Zealand Military, a challenge that would persist as the New Zealand Military transitioned into the modern era.

The Defence Act 1909 and the Transition to a Citizen Army

The Defence Act 1909 marked a significant transformation in New Zealand’s military organisation, laying the groundwork for a citizen-based Territorial Army and ending the Volunteer System.[11] This fundamental shift required extensive adjustments within the Defence Stores Department to support the expanding force structure.

For O’Sullivan, Silver, and the Defence Stores Department, the challenge was to continue modernising stores and logistics to meet the demands of a rapidly growing army. As the Territorial Force expanded, so did the logistical requirements, necessitating a more structured and professional approach to store management.

On 1 June 1910, Silver’s position was redesignated as Assistant Director of Military Stores, and he was appointed a Quartermaster with the rank of Honorary Lieutenant in the New Zealand Militia. His expertise and leadership played a crucial role in ensuring the Defence Stores Department could support the evolving needs of the New Zealand Military.

Guidance on the duties related to the management of stores

In 1910, Lord Kitchener, renowned as “The Empire’s foremost soldier,” visited New Zealand and thoroughly reviewed its military forces.[12] His assessment led to significant reforms within the NZ Military, including establishing the New Zealand Staff Corps (NZSC) and the New Zealand Permanent Staff (NZPS) in 1911. These changes aimed to create a professional cadre of officers (NZSC) and enlisted personnel (NZPS) capable of providing expert guidance and efficient administration to the Territorial Force units.

Lord Kitchener’s visit critically evaluated the military’s capabilities, revealing deficiencies in equipment care, maintenance, and overall responsibility. The existing Regimental Quartermaster Sergeants (RQMS) lacked the necessary skills, underscoring the need for a professional RQMS cadre.

The Regulations (Provisional) for the Military Forces of New Zealand, which came into effect on 5 May 1911, established the command and administrative structure of the Forces.

The overall responsibility for military stores and equipment was placed under the Commandant of the Forces, with specific duties delegated to key officers and commanders at various levels.

Senior Officers Responsible for Stores and Equipment

Quartermaster General
- Managed mobilisation stores, including policies on reserves of clothing, equipment, and general stores.
- Determined scales of clothing, equipment, and stores needed for troops.
- Oversaw mobilisation arrangements for food, forage, clothing, stores, and equipment.
Director of Supplies and Transport
- Managed the supply of food, forage, fuel, and lighting.
- Responsible for Army Service Corps technical equipment.
Director of Equipment and Stores
- Oversaw clothing, equipment, and general stores.
- Managed supplies of stationery, forms, and books.
- Provided vehicles and technical equipment, except those for Artillery and Engineers.
- Supervised the storage and distribution of small arms and ammunition.
Director of Ordnance and Artillery
- Established reserve scales for arms, ammunition, and technical equipment for Artillery and Engineer units.
- Managed the provision and inspection of guns, small arms, and ammunition.
- Oversaw machine guns, Artillery and Engineer vehicles, and technical stores.
Director of Medical Services
- Provided advice on and inspected all medical equipment to ensure it met operational standards.
Director of Veterinary Services
- Provided expert advice on veterinary stores and equipment.

District and Unit Responsibilities

At a regional level, Commanders of Districts were responsible for maintaining the efficiency of forts and armaments, including all associated buildings, works, stores, and equipment. They also played a key role in ensuring financial prudence by overseeing officers responsible for spending and stores management.

At the unit level, the Commanding Officer had a broad set of responsibilities, including:

Maintaining discipline, efficiency, and proper administrative systems within the unit.
Ensuring accountability for public equipment, clothing, and stores.
Overseeing the maintenance and cleanliness of all issued arms.
Managing the proper receipt and distribution of rations and fuel.
Ensuring daily ration inspections were conducted in the presence of an officer.

Other Regimental Officers, such as Company Commanders, even those in temporary appointments, were also responsible for:

The equipment, ammunition, clothing, and stores assigned to their company.
Ensuring soldiers maintained personal cleanliness and proper care of their uniforms, arms, and accoutrements.
Supervising the quality and adequacy of rations provided to troops.

Finally, the 1911 Regulations clearly stated that any officer or individual responsible for public stores was strictly forbidden from lending any article under their charge unless expressly sanctioned by their Commanding Officer (CO). This regulation reinforced strict accountability and control over military stores, ensuring that all equipment, clothing, and supplies were used solely for authorised military purposes. [13]

To maintain proper accountability and management of military stores, Defence Stores personnel and unit Quartermasters followed detailed policies and procedures outlined in official publications, including:

Regulations (Provisional) for the Military Forces of New Zealand
Financial Instructions and Allowances Regulations for NZ Military Forces
Regulations for Clothing and Equipment of NZ Military Forces
NZ Dress Regulations
Prices Vocabulary of Stores
NZ Mobilisation Regulations

Additional guidance was also found in operational reference materials, such as:

Field Service Regulations
Training Manuals
Field Service Pocket Books

The responsibilities established in 1911 laid the foundation for the structured management of military stores, setting a precedent for all future stores accounting procedures. These early frameworks ensured accountability, efficiency, and operational readiness, embedding core logistical principles underpinning military supply chain management today. While titles and organisational structures have evolved, the fundamental tenets of logistical oversight, resource management, and financial accountability have remained steadfast. Successive iterations of Defence Orders, regulations, and policies have refined and expanded these responsibilities, ensuring their continued relevance and adaptability to the evolving operational and strategic needs of the New Zealand Defence Force in the modern era.

Standardising Stores Management and Training

In November 1911, thirty young men from military districts attended an intensive three-week training course at the Defence Stores Department in Wellington to address this. This comprehensive training, overseen by O’Sullivan, included:

Weapon storage, inspection, maintenance, and accounting
Storage, inspection, and maintenance of leather items (e.g., saddlery and harnesses)
Storage and upkeep of canvas and fabric equipment
Packing procedures for stores
Maintenance of records and documentation

The candidates successfully passed the examinations and were appointed as RQMS under General Order 112/10. Notably, this was the first military trade-related stores course conducted in New Zealand.

“Staff of the Quarter-master General—men who passed as Quarter-master instructors and are being drafted to the various districts, Colourised by Rairty Colour

To ensure consistency across districts, a conference of District Storekeepers was held in Wellington in August 1913. O’Sullivan noted their dedication to maintaining accountability for government property, highlighting their investment in their work.

Historically, annual military camps were managed ad hoc with inconsistent equipment scales. With the establishment of the Territorial Army, the Defence Stores Department introduced standardised camp equipment requirements in 1913.

To streamline supply chain management, temporary Ordnance Depots were established at brigade camps in 1913. Personnel received training under the Director of Equipment and Stores, and roles were assigned as follows:

Ordnance Officer: District Storekeeper Auckland (Lieutenant Beck)
Two clerks
Four issuers

Following the success of the 1913 camps, the system was expanded in 1914, with each regional storekeeper acting as an Ordnance Officer and staff numbers increasing to six clerks and twelve issuers.

Takapau Divisional Camp, 1914. Te Papa (1362454)

Strategic Assessment, Preparedness and Mobilisation

In early 1914, General Sir Ian Hamilton inspected New Zealand’s forces, assessing approximately 70% of personnel. He noted that the Territorial Force was “well-equipped and well-armed” but recommended looking to Australian models for future Ordnance development. O’Sullivan’s annual report for 1914 confirmed that the Defence Stores Department was in a strong position, with ample stocks of small arms, ammunition, clothing, and web equipment.

The 1914 mobilisation was the first test of the reorganised and reequipped New Zealand military forces since the South African War. The challenge was immense: raising, equipping, and dispatching an expeditionary force while maintaining the coastal defence garrisons and the Territorial Army for homeland security. O’Sullivan’s Defence Stores supported this effort, which, under his leadership, played a crucial role in successfully mobilising the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF).

The groundwork for the NZEF was laid in March 1914 when General Alexander Godley issued mobilisation regulations, adapted from British Army directives, to guide the formation of an expeditionary force. New Zealand’s commitment to supporting Britain in the event of war had been reinforced at the 1907 and 1911 Imperial Conferences, yet it was only in 1912 that Godley, confident in the growth of the Territorial Army, shifted focus to preparing for an overseas force.

As part of this preparation, Godley identified three likely tasks for the NZEF:

Seizure of German Pacific possessions.
Deployment to protect Egypt from a Turkish attack.
Fighting in Europe alongside British forces.

By mid-1914, New Zealand’s military reorganisation was three years into an estimated seven-year process.

Although at full operational strength, confidence in the military’s preparedness was high. Annual training camps had been completed, and unit stores had been restocked. A major stocktake was planned for August 1914—marking the first such effort in two years, as the 1913 stocktake had been postponed due to industrial strikes.

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 set off a chain of events leading to war. On 30 July, Defence Headquarters instructed District Headquarters to begin precautionary war preparations. By 1 August, partial mobilisation schemes were underway, and further instructions on the composition of the NZEF followed on 2 August.

Each military district contributed a fully equipped infantry battalion, a mounted rifle regiment, artillery, engineers, and medical subunits. These units were to be drawn from the permanent forces, Territorial Force, and reserves. District Storekeepers supported by unit Quartermasters were critical in equipping these units with stores drawn from existing regiments and regional mobilisation depots.

On 3 August, Quartermaster General (QMG) Colonel Alfred William Robin issued detailed instructions regarding individual equipment. Territorial soldiers were to report with their complete kit, while reservists would collect theirs from their regiments. Quartermaster staff were given guidance on recording the transfer of equipment in regimental ledgers.

With war declared, New Zealand’s government announced on 7 August that an Expeditionary Force of 7,000–8,000 men would be mobilised. The response was overwhelming, with thousands of volunteers rushing to enlist. Having had several days’ notice, District Headquarters swiftly implemented mobilisation plans.

Godley’s assumption that the NZEF’s first task would be the seizure of German Pacific territories was proven correct. By 11 August, the New Zealand force for German Samoa—comprising 1,413 personnel—was fully equipped by the Defence Stores and ready for deployment. Additional stores were assembled at Wellington’s wharf for embarkation. The force landed on 29 August, securing Samoa without resistance.

Meanwhile, mobilisation camps were established across New Zealand:

Auckland (Alexandra Park) – District Storekeeper Captain William Thomas Beck set up a mobilisation store, assisted by Sergeant Norman Joseph Levien.
Christchurch (Addington Park) – Captain Arthur Rumbold Carter White managed the Canterbury District mobilisation store.
Dunedin (Tahuna Park) – Captain Owen Paul McGuigan handled equipping recruits, many of whom had no prior military training.
Wellington (Awapuni Racecourse) – The Defence Stores in Wellington directly supported the mobilisation effort.

As the central hub for Defence Stores, Wellington managed the receipt and distribution of equipment nationwide. Public appeals were made for short-supply items like binoculars and compasses. On 14 August, approval was granted for each soldier to receive a second pair of boots—typically, the second pair had to be purchased at a reduced rate.

Mobilisation was not simply a matter of sending troops overseas; it also involved ensuring the ongoing reinforcement of the NZEF and maintaining the Territorial Army at home. Planning for NZEF reinforcements commenced alongside the main mobilisation effort to sustain the force in the field. It was determined that 20% reinforcements would be provided six weeks after the NZEF’s departure, with a further 5% arriving monthly thereafter.

Trentham Camp was selected as the primary training and equipping centre for reinforcement drafts, where the Camp Quartermaster Stores, under Lieutenant (Temporary Captain) Thomas McCristell, played a critical role in ensuring personnel were properly outfitted before deployment. The scale of this task was immense, with store personnel working late into the night to issue uniforms and equipment to the steady stream of reinforcements. While the focus remained on sustaining the NZEF, efforts were also required to maintain the Territorial Army at home, ensuring a trained force remained available for local defence and future deployments. Mobilisation was not a single event but a continuous process that demanded careful logistical planning and execution to sustain the war effort.

Beyond issuing equipment, the Camp Quartermaster Stores also served as a training ground for new Quartermasters destined for overseas service. Selected candidates underwent instruction in key logistical functions, including clothing and equipping troops, managing camp equipment, organising ammunition supplies, and overseeing water distribution and field kitchen setup. This training ensured that reinforcements were well-equipped and supported by skilled personnel capable of sustaining operations in the field.

By September 1914, the Defence Stores had successfully equipped the NZEF. On 24 September, General Godley thanked the Defence Stores staff for their efforts, acknowledging their crucial role in the mobilisation process. However, controversy soon followed.

On 26 October, after ten days at sea, Godley sent a note to Minister of Defence Colonel James Allen, alleging irregularities in Defence Stores operations and implying that O’Sullivan and his staff might be engaging in misappropriation. Despite recognising O’Sullivan’s significant contributions, Godley recommended auditing the Defence Stores’ accounting systems. This unfounded allegation ultimately led to O’Sullivan’s resignation, overshadowing the department’s achievements in successfully mobilising and equipping both the Samoa Expeditionary Force and the NZEF.

New Zealand’s largest military deployment to date placed immense logistical demands on the Defence Stores. The department leveraged pre-war procurement contracts while employing competitive tendering to secure uniforms, equipment, and supplies. This approach facilitated rapid expansion, with Buckle Street in Wellington emerging as a key logistical hub. However, the sheer volume of supplies soon exceeded capacity, necessitating the leasing of commercial storage facilities beyond the department’s central depots in Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin.

As military activity intensified, the establishment of the Palmerston North District Store in early 1915 significantly enhanced logistical capabilities, particularly for units stationed in the lower North Island. This expansion underscored the growing need for decentralised supply operations, improving the efficiency of equipment distribution.

The rapid wartime expansion placed immense strain on both personnel and logistics. Despite increasing responsibilities, the department received only minimal increases in permanent staff, forcing heavy reliance on temporary workers to meet operational demands.

As the war progressed, concerns over procurement methods and accounting procedures led to mounting external scrutiny. In 1915, a Commission of Inquiry was launched to examine the Defence Stores’ business practices, financial controls, and purchasing procedures. While the Commission found no evidence of misconduct, it recommended procedural improvements to enhance transparency and efficiency. In response, the government established the Ministry of Munitions, which took over procurement and supply chain management, streamlining logistical operations..

Supporting the NZEF (1915–1921)

The New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) formed its own New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) in 1915, recognising the need for a more structured military logistics system. This corps provided dedicated logistical support for the NZEF and residual units until 1921. This development was critical as the demands of modern warfare required a more organised and professional approach to supply chain management, equipment maintenance, and ordnance distribution.

Initially, the NZEF relied heavily on British supply lines and logistical structures, with Quartermasters embedded within units managing day-to-day supply requirements. However, as operations expanded and the need for self-sufficiency grew, the establishment of the NZAOC provided a more formal system of procurement, storage, distribution, and maintenance of military stores. The Centre of mass for the NZAOC within the New Zealand Division was the Assistant Director of Ordnance Stores (DADOS) and his staff, who operated in concert with regimental quartermasters, who remained responsible for issuing and maintaining personal and unit equipment at the frontline.

Quartermasters played a pivotal role in ensuring that troops were properly equipped, fed, and clothed and worked closely with the NZAOC to ensure seamless logistical support across different theatres of war, from Gallipoli to the Western Front and the Middle East.

By 1918, the NZAOC had become a critical component of the NZEF’s supply chain, with depots in the UK and the DADOS operating dumps in key operational areas. As the war concluded, the Corps played a crucial role in the demobilisation process, managing the return of surplus equipment, disposal of unserviceable stores, and redistributing serviceable assets to remaining military units and government departments.

The NZAOC continued to support New Zealand’s post-war military commitments until 1921. The lessons learned during the Great War laid the foundation for future developments in ordnance and supply management, shaping the logistics framework of the post-war army.

The role of Quartermasters and the NZAOC in supporting the NZEF between 1915 and 1921 was instrumental in ensuring that New Zealand troops remained equipped and operationally effective throughout the war. Their contributions sustained the force in combat and established enduring logistical principles that continued influencing military store management in the following decades.

Home Service Stores Accounting

On the home front, military authorities pushed for the complete militarisation of stores accounting, aiming to align New Zealand’s system with British Army Ordnance practices. This led to a significant leadership change in 1916, with Major Thomas McCristell replacing James O’Sullivan as Director of Equipment and Stores. Under McCristell’s leadership, the department underwent a comprehensive reorganisation, transitioning into a formal military structure.

By 1 February 1917, the home service New Zealand Army Ordnance Department (NZAOD) and NZAOC were officially established, replacing the Defence Stores Department. This milestone ended 48 years of civilian-led military logistics, marking a shift towards a fully integrated, military-controlled Ordnance service.

Concurrent with the establishment of the Home Service NZAOC, formal Ordnance Procedures were published, and the Regulations for the Equipment of the New Zealand Military were updated. These replaced all previous instructions and formed the foundation for New Zealand’s modern military logistics system.

Conclusion: Towards a Modern Military Stores Accounting System

The period from 1845 to 1918 laid the foundational principles of New Zealand Army stores accounting, evolving from ad hoc militia supply practices to a structured, professional system aligned with British military standards. Early efforts, such as the 1867 Public Stores Act and the establishment of the Defence Stores Department, introduced much-needed oversight and accountability, ensuring military forces were adequately equipped for colonial conflicts and later global engagements.

The early 20th century saw increasing refinement in stores management, with greater formalisation under the Defence Act 1909, the creation of a structured supply organisation, and the introduction of rigorous accounting and inventory control measures. The mobilisation for World War I tested these systems on an unprecedented scale, demonstrating their strengths and the need for further development. The establishment of the NZEF NZAOC in 1915 and the home service New Zealand Army Ordnance Department and Corps in 1917 signified a pivotal transformation, shifting military logistics from civilian oversight to a dedicated military-run system. The experiences of World War I reinforced the importance of accurate, efficient, and adaptable stores accounting systems, setting the stage for continued evolution in the interwar and post-World War II periods. The next part of this study, New Zealand Army Stores Accounting: 1919–1945, will examine how the lessons learned from wartime operations influenced peacetime logistics, the modernisation of accounting frameworks, and the growing role of technology and centralised control in military supply chain management.

Notes

[1] Australian Defence Force, “Logistics Series – Supply,” Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.3 (2004): 1.1-1.16.

[2] “Colonial Defence Force Act 1862,” ed. General Assembly of New Zealand (1, Wellington, 1862). http://www.nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_act/cdfa186226v1862n32291/.

[3] General Assembly of New Zealand, “The Public Stores Act 1867,” (1867), http://www.nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_bill/psb1867831178.pdf.

[4]“The Public Stores Act 1871,” ed. General Assembly of New Zealand (Wellington, 1871).;”Lieut-Colonel Edward Gorton,” New Zealand Gazette, Issue 1, 26 January 1872, 619.

[5] “Reductions,” Thames Advertiser, Volume XI, Issue 2938, 30 May 1878, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/THA18780530.2.10.; “The Government Brander,” Saturday Advertiser, Volume 3, Issue 130 (Wellington), 5 January 1878, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/SATADV18780105.2.13.

[6] Archives New Zealand, “Robert George Vining Parker,” Personal File, Record no R23513898 (Wellington) 1885-1925, https://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE18683088.

[7] Archives New Zealand, “Frederick Silver,” Personal File, Record no R23513983 (Wellington) 1976-1900, https://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE19149654.

[8] “Defence Storekeeper Appointed,” New Zealand Gazette No 98 p. 2154., 29 November 1900, 4.

[9] Archives New Zealand, “Frederick Silver.”

[10] “Defence Act Amendment Act 1906 (6 EDW VII 1906 No 41),” 1906, accessed 30 December 2021, http://www.nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_act/daaa19066ev1906n41250/.

[11] Peter Cooke and John Crawford, The Territorials (Wellington: Random House New Zealand Ltd, 2011), 153.

[12] Paul William Gladstone Ian McGibbon, The Oxford companion to New Zealand Military History (Auckland; Melbourne; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 2000), 369.

[13] “Regulations (Provisional) for the Military Forces of New Zealand “, New Zealand Gazette 5 May 1911.;

The NZDF’s Evolution of Inventory Management from DSSR to SAP, 1984-1998

Leave a comment Robert McKie

SAP, an acronym for Systems, Applications, and Products in Data Processing, is a global leader in enterprise resource planning (ERP) software. Founded in 1972 in Germany, SAP SE has developed comprehensive ERP solutions that integrate various organisational functions into a unified system, including finance, logistics, human resources, and supply chain management. This integration enables real-time data access and streamlines workflows, enhancing operational efficiency and decision-making processes.[1]

For the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), implementing SAP through the Defence Supply Redevelopment Project (DSRP) and Project Fusion marked a shift toward a modern, data-driven approach with the potential to strengthen the NZDFs’ ability to meet the evolving demands of military logistics.

Between 1984 and 1994, the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC) led the NZ Army effort as part of the significant NZDF initiative to reform supply and inventory management via the DSRP and Project Fusion. Building on earlier projects like the Defence Supply Systems Retail (DSSR) and Defence Supply System Development (DSSD) initiatives, the DSRP set a new standard and laid the foundation for ongoing modernisation, leading to SAP’s adoption as the Defence Inventory Management platform in 1998.

Defence Supply Redevelopment Project (DSRP) – 1984

The DSRP sought to transition from manual processes to computerised supply and inventory management. Initially, the focus was on upgrading NCR accounting machines to mainframe-connected terminals, digitising records with minimal functional enhancements. Although limitations persisted, this shift offered benefits like eliminating manual ledger cards, real-time record updates, and enhanced data availability. Notably, the coexistence of three Item Management Records across various levels (the Defence Codification Agency, retail, and depot) led to duplication, inefficiency, and repeated updates of NSNs (National Stock Numbers).

The DSRP’s objectives were ambitious:

Automating supply functions cost-effectively.
Improving the management of high-value repairable items.
Reducing inventory value while maintaining service levels.
Centralising item management.
Enabling multi-level data access.
Supporting national asset management.
Providing analytical and performance measurement tools.
Relating inventory levels to demand rates.
Enhancing warehousing efficiency.
Standardising core functions with adaptable subsystems across services.
Providing forecasting and cost assessment capabilities.

Using the SPECTRUM project management system, the DSRP team conducted research and simulations based on NZ Defence Inventory statistics, testing supply and inventory management theories. Recognising the value of learning from allied practices, the team also conducted international reviews with UK, US, and Australian defence forces to avoid redundant explorations and ensure an informed approach.[2]

Defence Inventory Structure and Challenges – 1985

In 1985, the Defence Inventory comprised approximately 600,000 stock lines valued at NZ$155 million ($560,306,361 in 2024), making it one of the country’s largest inventories. Notably, 90% of depot-level items cost less than NZ$100 ($361.49 in 2024) and 69% less than NZ$10 ($36.15 in 2024), enabling prioritised management of high-cost items. The inventory’s Demand Rate analysis highlighted varying item turnover rates, with the majority (71%) categorised as “Too Slow.” Fast-moving, high-cost items required close stock control to prevent stockouts, optimising budget utilisation and customer service.[3]

The mainframe batch-processing system of the time, linked to data capture machines at supply units, relied on manual data transfer via paper tape. The lag between transaction and data integration often rendered central records outdated, limiting operational efficiency.

Implementation of DSSR

Initially rolled out in 1984, the NZDF implemented DSSR as an intermediate solution. DSSR replaced manual ledger cards with electronic records and simplified stock management at retail units. RNZAF Base Auckland led this transition, with 1 Supply Company, RNZAOC in Ngāruawāhia, the first Army unit to transition.[4] By 1985, DSSR allowed units to conduct transactions, generate automated reports, and maintain up-to-date stock files, reducing dependency on higher Headquarters for stock information. The meticulous planning and testing of DSSR implementation instilled confidence in its effectiveness.

Sergeant Gerry Rolfe and DSSR Terminal, FMG Annual Camp 1988. RNZAOC Collection

Defence Supply System Development (DSSD)

DSSD, the second phase of supply reform, addressed the limitations of NCR accounting machines. Initially established as an expansion of DSSR, DSSD aimed to develop a stable, online supply and replenishment system. Although interim in scope, DSSD laid the foundation for broader supply management enhancements. Developed through a structured project lifecycle, the system addressed fundamental data integrity and management issues within existing supply structures.

DSSD introduced a three-tiered record structure to streamline data handling:

Item Identification Record (IIR): Standardised item information across Defence.
Item Management Record (IMR): Service-specific data, ensuring consistency.
Item Account Record (IAR): Unit-level records linked to IIR and IMR, improving data accuracy and reducing redundancy.

System Enhancements: Provisioning, Receipts, and Stocktaking

DSSD incorporated key supply functions, enabling more accurate provisioning, automated stock level monitoring, and faster transaction processing. Notable improvements included:

Automated provisioning using a refined Provision Management Code (PMC) for faster processing and workload reduction.
Receipt processing through warehouse-located Visual Display Units (VDUs), enabling immediate stock updates and more efficient stocktaking.
Bin Management: Enhanced warehousing efficiency by managing stock by location and expiry, supporting FIFO (first-in, first-out) principles.[5]

Consumer Unit Accounting – 1993

In 1993, the NZ Army implemented Consumer Unit Accounting within its Quartermaster Stores, preparing for an eventual transition to Project Fusion. By trialling this system at 2nd Field Hospital, the NZ Army established a streamlined Q Store management model within DSSD, with full implementation planned for mid-1993.[6]

Transition to SAP

By 1996, with the dust barely settled on the DSSD and Consumer Unit Accounting implementations, the NZDF inventory and supply system continued to evolve significantly. The SAP finance module went live that year, followed by SAP Inventory Management in 1998 and SAP Plant Maintenance in 1999.

SAP’s implementation was intended to be transformative by providing an integrated platform encompassing inventory, finance, and maintenance management. It promised enhanced transparency, accountability, and streamlined workflows across the NZDF. SAP’s ERP structure enabled a comprehensive view of the NZDF’s resources, potentially allowing for more efficient stock control, cost management, and operational readiness. However, SAP’s rollout in the NZDF was not seamless. The broader organisational restructuring—such as the merging of Army logistics corps and trades, commercialisation pressures, service-specific variances and the East Timor Deployment—created friction in the system’s adoption and efficacy. Initial teething issues with SAP exposed gaps between its ambitious capabilities and the practical realities of NZDF’s operational needs, including cultural resistance, institutional disobedience and adjustment issues across the NZDF.

SAP marked a significant leap in data integration and accessibility but has also introduced complexities that did not exist in the manual and earlier computerised systems. While these older systems were labour-intensive, they were simple and provided a level of clarity that more complex ERP systems can obscure. For example, SAP’s reliance on data accuracy and interlinked functions can be both a strength and a weakness; if data entry processes or interservice coordination falter, SAP can lead to cascading errors or inefficient resource allocation. This contrasts with the older systems, where more direct oversight allowed immediate corrective actions, albeit with higher personnel involvement.

The NZDF’s historical reliance on incremental upgrades also indicates a pattern of preferring stability over rapid technological shifts, which may have contributed to SAP’s challenges in achieving full operational potential. Further, legacy systems’ straightforward data architecture may have been more adaptable to ad-hoc military requirements. At the same time, SAP’s complex structure requires rigorous adherence to standard operating procedures, which can be challenging in dynamic military environments.

In summary, the NZDF’s journey from DSSR to SAP encapsulates the challenges of modernising logistics within a traditional military framework. While SAP has undeniably centralised and automated NZDF’s inventory management, unlocking its full potential requires addressing its limitations, particularly regarding adaptability, deployability in operational environments, data integrity, and interservice coordination. A balanced approach incorporating lessons from legacy systems while leveraging SAP’s advanced capabilities could provide the NZDF with a practical, adaptable logistics system tailored to its unique operational demands.

Notes

[1] “What is SAP ERP?,” 2024, accessed 11 November, 2024, https://www.sap.com/products/erp/what-is-sap-erp.html.

[2] Lou Gardiner, “Defence Supply Redevelopment Project,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine (8 March 1984): 14.

[3] Lou Gardiner, “The Current Defence Inventory,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine (8 March 1984): 15-18.

[4] Frank Ryan, “DSSR Implementation Update,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine (8 March 1984): 19.

[5] Grahame Loveday, “Defence Supply System Development,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine 1/87 (April 1987): 49-53.

[6] Kevin Riesterer, “Consumer Unit Accounting,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine 1993 (July 1993): 9.

New Zealand Army Stores Accounting (1939-1944): Overcoming Wartime Supply Challenges

Leave a comment Robert McKie

Between 1939 and 1944, the New Zealand Army’s home-front logistics functions undertook a monumental task. They faced significant obstacles in maintaining accurate record-keeping and inventory control, dealing with challenges such as limited storage capacity, a shortage of experienced personnel, and high turnover rates. At the peak of this period, nearly 200,000 regular, Territorial, and Home Guard troops were mobilised and dispersed in numerous units across New Zealand and the Pacific, all in need of weapons, ammunition, clothing, and equipment. The scale of their operation was immense, and their efforts were crucial to the war effort. Supplying and maintaining this force, especially as they were dispersed and many required specialised and technical resources, was a testament to the dedication and resourcefulness of the personnel tasked with stores accounting.

With allied forces unable to stem the Japanese offensive in Asia and the Pacific and invasion likely, the situation’s urgency demanded swift and efficient mobilisation. However, the constant reshuffling of personnel and frequent transfers of equipment and ammunition between units added further complexity. Organisational changes and equipment shortfalls were frequent, compounding the difficulty of building up and sustaining military readiness at home while supporting New Zealand’s deployed forces overseas. Despite these hurdles, the New Zealand Army’s logistics efforts achieved significant milestones. Their resilience and adaptability in the face of immense national and global pressure are a source of admiration.

The Accounting System

Like the armies of Canada and Australia, the New Zealand Army was organised and equipped in line with British doctrine, with the New Zealand Army General Staff determining the Army’s organisation with local modifications to fit New Zealand’s unique requirements. These organisational structures were formalised through three main types of documents:

The Order of Battle (ORBAT): This outlined the number and composition of formations, detailing the units they commanded following the General Staff’s policy decisions.

The War Establishment (WE): This document specified each unit’s authorised staffing and structure, which were, in most cases, identical to the British Army war establishments.

The Unit Equipment Table (Form NZ 483): These defined each unit’s authorised stores and equipment. Examples of Equipment Tables approved from July 1939 were:[1] [2]

Form NZ 483-2: – HQ of a Mounted Rifle Brigade
Form NZ 483-3: – HQ of Infantry Brigade
Form NZ 483-5: – HQ of Infantry Brigade and Attached Troops
Form NZ 483-6: – HQ of a Medium Regiment, NZ
Form NZ 483-21: – A Mounted Rifle Regiment (Horse)
Form NZ 483-22: – A Mounted Rifle Squadron (Motorised)
Form NZ 483-23: – An Independent Mounted Rifle Squadron
Form NZ 483-24: – A Motor Regiment
Form NZ 483-32: – A Medium Battery
Form NZ 483-52: – A Field Company, RNZE
Form NZ 483-61: (a) – HQ of a District Signals Company
Form NZ 483-61: (b) – No 1 Sect, A District Signals Company
Form NZ 483-61: (c) – No 2 (M.R Brigaded Section) A District Sigs Coy
Form NZ 483-61: (d) – No 3 (Fd Arty Bde Sect) A District Sigs Coy
Form NZ 483-61: (e) – No 4 (Med Arty Bde Sect) A District Sig Coy
Form NZ 483-61: (f) – No 5 (Inf Bde Sect) A District Sig Coy
Form NZ 483-71: – An Infantry (Mixed) Battalion
Form NZ 483-72: – An Infantry (Mixed) Battalion (Fortress)
Form NZ 483-73: – No 2a (LMG) Platoon, for a Fortress Bn
Form NZ 483-76: – A Detached Rifle Company, National Military Reserve
Form NZ 483-81: – A Composite Company, ASC
Form NZ 483-82: – A Reserve MT Company, ASC
Form NZ 483-83: – A Composite Company, AHQ Reserve Group
Form NZ 483-91: – A Field Ambulance (Mechanised)
Form NZ 483-101: – A Light Aid Detachment, NZAOC

Changes to the unit organisation often stemmed from General Staff policy decisions regarding equipment scales—such as weapons, vehicles, and wirelesses—resulting in corresponding amendments to the War Establishments and Unit Equipment Table Form NZ 483 tables.

Each unit maintained both ‘peace’ and ‘war’ establishments. While the peace establishment included reduced personnel and resources for peacetime training, the war establishment detailed the full complement of men and equipment needed for active service. From 1939, regular and territorial units in New Zealand began mobilising to war strength with reservists, integrating the Territorial Force and recruits through the New Zealand Temporary Staff (NZTS), marking the shift to a wartime footing.

With an established table of what stores they should hold, A unit or sub-unit knew exactly what equipment they were responsible for, including spades, shovels, axes, etc. They would also have items of controlled stores usually identified with a serial number – the controlled stores would include compasses, binoculars, wristwatches, etc., which, when issued, would be signed for. When losing a controlled item, a Board of Inquiry was conducted to establish the circumstances of loss and determine who (usually the soldier) should pay for it.

The Company Quartermaster Sergeant (CQMS), whose rank could be Sergeant, Staff Sergeant of Warrant Officer Class Two, or, of course, the Company Commander, was responsible for the accountability of the unit or sub-unit stores. Standards of accountability for unit stores varied, with some units conducting regular kit checks and publishing lists of soldiers with deficiencies and the amount they owed in unit routine orders.

Manual Systems and Administrative Burden

The Army stores accounting system applied to all units of the New Zealand Army. It was based on a unit ledger, supported by inventories, vouchers, schedules, and scales of issue, which recorded all store items and transactions in the unit. All entries in ledgers were to be supported by a voucher, and all vouchers were cleared by posting to the ledger or annotated with a reference to another voucher or to the point of issue. Stores could only be struck off charge by one of the following:

An Issue Voucher, signed by the recipient of the stores
A Certificate Issue Voucher, where the recipient was not required to sign for the stores
A Board of Survey or Certificate of Condemnation
By an application to write of Army Stores

Units such as NZAOC depots, MT Branch depots, mobilisation units and Camp Quartermaster Stores were classed as accounting units. They managed their stocks with a ledger card system using the NZ161 Ledger card.[3]

Field Force units maintained their NZ Equipment Table as the main ledger, recording all items issued to the unit and their distribution.

Photograph of World War II servicewomen unloading pillows. Ref: PAColl-8846. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22327559

While effective, the system was inflexible compared to today’s digital Inventory Management systems. Under the pressures of wartime, maintaining rigorous documentation proved challenging, and adherence to procedural norms was sometimes relaxed to expedite supply to forces in the Pacific and Home Defence.

Mobilisation and Training Impact

In 1941, brigade and district manoeuvres escalated the army’s activity tempo, and early in 1942, the entire Territorial Force was mobilised, and tactical responsibilities with the Home Guard were formalised. Many units operated in active service conditions, with newly trained Quartermasters and staff often lacking prior military store management experience. The potential threat of invasion by Japanese forces added a sense of urgency and pressure, making training and equipping all available troops the top priority, even if it meant sacrificing strict clerical accuracy.[4]

Members of the New Zealand Home Guard receiving equipment. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch:Photographs relating to World War 1939-1945. Ref: DA-00477. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22871820

Before total mobilisation, many of the Regular and Territorial Force personnel and civilian staff skilled in stores accounting had deployed overseas with the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) in the Middle East or with the Brigade Group in Fiji. This left domestic units staffed by officers and NCOs with limited military stores experience, often stationed in field locations without adequate storage facilities. Despite these challenges, the dedication and commitment of these officers and NCOs were unwavering, even as ongoing personnel rotation severely hindered inventory management.

Progress in Accounting Practices

By late 1943, the strategic situation had stabilised, and the threat of invasion was removed, with the demobilisation of the Home Guard and Territorial Force underway by early 1944. As part of this process, comprehensive audits of unit accounts were conducted. Despite some losses due to unrecorded stores, the overall value of missing inventory remained relatively low compared to the total volume managed. The following table presents the total amount written off from April 1939 to March 1944, which was £259,200 (equivalent to $28,119,860 in 2024).

Note that “Deficiencies” – representing faulty accounting – contributed £84,710 ($9,165,191.67 in 2024). Including estimates for undetailed years, this figure suggests that deficiencies represented less than 40% of the total write-offs.[5]

Reflecting on Wartime Logistics and Accountability

During the peak demand period of 1942 and early 1943, stores accounting took a secondary role to the urgent need to supply the mobilised units efficiently. The New Zealand Army was not only receiving large shipments of war material from the United Kingdom and North America but also managing the distribution of substantial volumes of the same equipment for both Pacific deployments and Home Defence, prioritising speed over strict procedural adherence. While this approach led to some irregularities, major scandals were avoided, and only minor cases of misappropriation occurred. This flexibility demonstrates the staff’s pragmatic approach to balancing efficiency and accountability under extreme conditions, ensuring operational needs were met without compromising integrity.

Lessons for Contemporary Military Stores Accounting

This analysis provides a perspective for modern logistics professionals, especially when using contemporary data management systems. Despite the sophisticated features of these platforms—like precise tracking and real-time reporting—the effectiveness of these tools is often linked to the skills and judgment of the personnel who operate them. The lessons from the New Zealand Army’s wartime experiences demonstrate that the strategic use and flexibility in stores accounting can be crucial in emergencies. However, suppose the benefits of the modern systems are not being fully realised. The root cause likely lies in the organisation’s skill sets for managing and leveraging these resources.

Rigidly following procedures can sometimes hinder progress, just as it did in the past when wartime conditions demanded quick and adaptable responses. For today’s logistics leaders, the real challenge is recognising when to exploit the flexibility offered by modern data systems and when to relax procedural controls. Balancing this requires training and experience, especially in crises where the pressure to deliver supplies efficiently can tempt managers to bypass standard processes. While this may be necessary temporarily, the quick restoration of standard procedures is essential to maintaining accountability and data quality.

The key is adaptability, but only to the extent that it does not lead to long-term compromises in record-keeping and operational integrity. If modern data management tools are underperforming, investing in staff training and developing the necessary expertise could ensure these advanced systems are used to their full potential.

Notes

[1] “New Zealand Equipment Tables -Provisional,” New Zealand Army Order 164 (1 July 1939).

[2] “New Zealand Equipment Tables -Provisional,” New Zealand Army Order 216 (1 October 1941).

[3] “FORMS AND BOOKS: Forms adopted,” New Zealand Army Order 266 (1 October 1939).

[4] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150 (1944).

[5] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541151 (30 June 1944).

Bringing the 3rd New Zealand Division Home: The Unheralded Triumph of New Zealand’s Greatest Military Reverse Logistics Operation

Leave a comment Robert McKie

Introduction

Since 1940, New Zealand played a pivotal role in the Pacific theatre, initially maintaining a brigade group in Fiji from 1940 to 1942. After a brief reorganisation and training back home, this brigade group was reformed in 1943 as the 3rd New Zealand Division, the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific (NZEF IP). Well-equipped with thousands of vehicles, tanks, and an extensive supply of ammunition and ordnance stores, the division conducted several successful amphibious combat operations. However, by 1944, sustaining this division became untenable. This led to one of the most remarkable reverse logistics operations in New Zealand’s military history: the withdrawal and redeployment of the 3rd New Zealand Division back to New Zealand. This colossal effort faced unprecedented challenges, including the lack of modern material handling equipment (MHE) and the absence of information technology (IT) systems.

New Zealand World War II soldiers loading stores into infantry landing craft, Vella Lavella, Solomon Islands. Ref: 1/2-044734-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22411372

The Deployment and Its Challenges

After reorganising in New Zealand, the 3rd New Zealand Division was deployed to the Solomon Islands, with its primary base in New Caledonia. By 1944, it became evident that New Zealand could no longer support this division due to the demands of both the Pacific and European theatres.[1] The decision was made to withdraw, with personnel either demobilised or redeployed to reinforce the 2nd New Zealand Division fighting in Italy. This withdrawal initiated a significant reverse logistics operation—one of the most remarkable in New Zealand’s military history.

Military reverse logistics involves returning equipment, supplies, and personnel from forward operational areas to home bases or depots. It encompasses transportation and the recovery, inspection, refurbishment, and redistribution of materials. This inherently complex task demands meticulous coordination to ensure that every piece of equipment and supply is accounted for.[2]

Despite its importance, many modern militaries do not sufficiently train for or practise reverse logistics, often leading to significant delays in regenerating forces after deployment. The lack of emphasis on these tasks can slow down the redeployment and recovery of operational capabilities, as critical items may be lost, damaged, or delayed in transit.

Moreover, reverse logistics involves disposing of or recycling obsolete or damaged equipment, adding another layer of complexity. The pressure to quickly remove materials from operational theatres often conflicts with the need for thorough inspection and assessment. Without proper planning and execution, militaries may be unable to effectively reconstitute their forces for future missions, resulting in decreased readiness and prolonged downtime.

Between August 1944 and July 1945, New Zealand undertook the monumental task of returning all equipment from the Pacific to its depots. This operation involved over 50,000 items held by the NZEFIP Ordnance depots, 3,274 vehicles, 25 tanks, and tonnes of ammunition and New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) supplies. Despite the vast scale of this effort, the return of the 3rd New Zealand Division has largely faded from memory. Nevertheless, it stands as a remarkable logistical achievement, showcasing the adaptability and efficiency of New Zealand’s military personnel under demanding conditions. Incorporating reverse logistics into military training and planning is vital for improving operational efficiency, reducing delays, and maintaining readiness—a challenge many modern forces still struggle to address fully.

Infrastructure and Manual Labour as the Backbone

The success of this operation heavily relied on the infrastructure at Mangere Crossing Camp in Auckland. Initially built for United States forces and known as Camp Euart, the camp was named in honour of Captain Elwood J. Euart of the United States Army Field Artillery. Captain Euart heroically lost his life while saving others during the sinking of the U.S. Army Transport President Coolidge due to striking a Japanese mine off the Island of Espiritu Santo, Vanuatu. Upon learning that soldiers were trapped in the ship’s infirmary, he re-entered the sinking vessel to assist them. Tying himself to the lower end of a rope, he held it steady enough for the trapped men to climb to safety despite the ship’s heavy listing. Tragically, when Euart attempted to climb the rope himself, the vessel suddenly careened and sank, preventing his escape. His selfless courage and devotion to duty cost him his life.[3]

Camp Euart began hosting US forces in September 1942 and, at its peak, accommodated 5,000 troops—nearly equal to the entire population of Otahuhu at the time.[4] The camp remained under U.S. control until 1944, when it was vacated and handed over to the New Zealand forces. In August 1944, it became the Mangere Stores Sub Depot of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) Main Ordnance Depot (MOD), designated to receive supplies and equipment returned from the Pacific by the 3rd New Zealand Division, which established its advanced base headquarters at what became known as Mangere Crossing Camp.

Strategically located near key rail and road networks, the 80-acre site became a central hub for processing vast quantities of war material. Although optimised for storage and handling, the logistics teams relied on manual labour, as no modern MHE was available then.

The camp featured five warehouses designed for large-scale equipment storage:

Two warehouses, each measuring 300 by 120 feet (91 by 36 metres)
One warehouse measuring 300 by 60 feet (91 by 18 metres)
One warehouse measuring 360 by 120 feet (109 by 36 metres)
One warehouse measuring 200 by 240 feet (60 by 73 metres)

These warehouses provided 190,200 square feet (17,670 square metres) of storage space. Adding three ancillary buildings increased the total space to 207,600 square feet (19,287 square metres). Each warehouse had concrete floors, wooden framing, and fibrolite walls and roofs, ensuring durability and protection from the elements.[5]

An aerial view of the World War II US military camp, known as Camp Euart, and the supply depot at Mangere Crossing, 1944. Manukau Research Library, PAP: IV, Footprints 02152. Papatoetoe Historical Society.

New housing beside industrial area in Otahuhu, Auckland 1949. Whites Aviation Ltd: Photographs. Ref: WA-19438-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22322624

A key logistical advantage of the camp was its railway siding, which extended directly into the warehouse block. This allowed trains to deliver supplies straight into the camp, reducing handling time and labour demands. Integrating transport and storage was vital for managing the massive flow of materials—including 10,000 tonnes of mixed stores and 3,000 vehicles—that arrived over three months starting in August 1944.[6]

3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library

Without modern IT systems for inventory tracking or automated equipment for loading and unloading, work parties manually handled over 250,000 packages, each averaging 100 pounds (45 kilograms).[7]

The Ordeal of the Quartermasters

One of the most remarkable aspects of this operation was the work of the quartermasters. Many of these men were not professional logisticians but wartime soldiers who had learned logistics and planning over the previous four years. The quartermasters from the 3rd Division, overseeing 90 accounting units, ensured every piece of equipment was meticulously accounted for and documented before leaving New Caledonia.

Once the shipments arrived in New Zealand, their responsibilities intensified. They had to navigate shipping schedules, locate and verify their units’ equipment, and secure space for inspection—a massive logistical challenge requiring precision under pressure.

Their task did not end with verification. Each item had to be cleaned, repaired if necessary, and repacked, all while passing rigorous inspections by the MOD staff and Defence Auditors. These inspectors refused to accept any equipment in less-than-perfect condition, leading to a detailed audit process. Quartermasters had to account for every lost or damaged item, often relying on incomplete records, while facing auditors who were relentless in spotting discrepancies. Clearance was only granted when the records were flawless, adding immense pressure to a demanding job.

The success of this operation is even more impressive, considering these men were not trained logisticians. Their ability to plan, organise, and execute such a complex task highlights their adaptability and determination.

A Triumph Despite the Odds

By July 1945, the reverse logistics operation had been successfully completed. Equipment had either been returned to New Zealand’s MOD at Trentham or the Northern District Ordnance Depot at Hopuhopu, with many vehicles transferred to Sylvia Park, a former US stores depot repurposed for New Zealand military use. Equipment deemed damaged beyond repair or surplus was either sold through the War Assets Realisation Board or disposed of by public auction.

Despite the absence of modern tools and systems, this operation was a remarkable achievement in New Zealand military logistics, unmatched today. While the infrastructure at Mangere Crossing Camp played a crucial role, the determination and resilience of New Zealand’s military personnel ensured the successful completion of this massive logistical effort.

Conclusion

The withdrawal of the 3rd New Zealand Division from the Pacific was not merely a redeployment after successful combat operations but a logistical achievement of remarkable scale. Conducted under extreme conditions, without the advantages of modern MHE or IT systems, the operation relied heavily on the strategic utilisation of available infrastructure, such as Mangere Crossing Camp, and the dedication of New Zealand’s military personnel. The meticulous coordination required to recover, sort, inspect, and redistribute thousands of items, vehicles, and stores showcased the exceptional adaptability of New Zealand’s logistics teams. This operation—the most significant reverse logistics effort in the nation’s military history—remains a powerful testament to the skill, resourcefulness, and perseverance of those who brought the 3rd New Zealand Division home under incredibly demanding circumstances. Though often overlooked, it is a crucial chapter in New Zealand’s military logistics legacy.

Notes

[1] Matthew Wright, Pacific War: New Zealand and Japan 1941-45 (Auckland, N.Z.: Reed, 2003, 2003), Bibliographies, Non-fiction.

[2] Kristin F. Lynch, John G. Drew, Robert S. Tripp, and C. Robert Roll., Sustaining Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Major Findings on the Experience of Army Logistics in the Field (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006).

[3] “An Undeniable Act Of Self Sacrifice,” South Pacific World War II Museum, Espiritu Santo Vanuatu, 2024, 2024, https://southpacificwwiimuseum.com/euart/.

[4] Matthews and Matthews Architechs Ltd., “Otahuhu Historic Heritage Survey – Overview Report,” (2014): 32, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/arts-culture-heritage/heritage/heritagesurveys/otahuhu-heritage-survey-01.pdf.

[5] F Grattan, Official War History of the Public Works Department (PWD, 1948), 687.

[6] E.V Sale, Base Wallahs: Story of the units of the Nase Organisation, NZEF IP (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 254-56.

[7] P.P Henley, Ordnance: The unofficial history of the New Zeland Ordnance Corps in the Pacific from 1940 until the third division was disbanded in 1944 (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 225.

Debunking the Myth of New Zealand’s Military Unpreparedness During the Interwar Period

Leave a comment Robert McKie

During the interwar period, a popular myth emerged that New Zealand allowed its military to downsize so that by 1939, the country was woefully unprepared for war, with many contemporary studies highlighting that New Zealanders went to war no better equipped than their fathers in the First World War. While there is some truth to this narrative, a closer examination of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) and the broader activities of the New Zealand Army from 1931 to 1939 tells a more nuanced story. Despite material and personnel deficiencies, a keen awareness of global events prompted continuous military doctrines and preparations updates. These efforts ensured that, in the event of war, New Zealand could quickly mobilise not only the basic framework of an expeditionary force but also the necessary resources to support it in the long term.

Evidence of Preparedness

In 1931, the NZAOC had shrunk from a strength of 120 in 1930 to 21 officers and soldiers supported by a cadre of civilian staff in the Ordnance Depots and Workshops at Threntham, Hopohopu and Burnham. From 1934, Major Thomas Joseph King, the Director of Ordnance Services (DOS), ensured that critical positions were filled by competent and experienced personnel. Some were drawn from the existing NZAOC civil staff ranks (many were former NZAOC soldiers transferred to the civil staff in 1931), and others were recruited explicitly into the NZAOC, such as Allan Huia Andrews.

Jonathan Fennell, in his book Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War, identifies that throughout the interwar years, the British Military establishment analysed the lessons of the previous war and interpreted contemporary developments. Updating doctrine throughout the 1930s, the British Military progressively transformed into a mechanised force armed with some of the era’s most advanced weapons and equipment. The Field Service Regulations (FSR), the tactical bible of British Commonwealth armies, was updated with at least four editions, proving that the British Army was willing to learn from past mistakes. Compared to the two German and French equivalent doctrine editions produced during the same period. Following the British lead, New Zealand kept as much abreast of these developments as practically possible.

Limited by the financial constraints of the time, training exercises and war games were conducted to keep military personnel sharp and ready from 1936. These exercises often simulated various scenarios, including mobilisation and deployment, ensuring that the army could respond effectively in times of crisis. Additionally, experiments with motor vehicles and motorcycles and testing modifications by the NZAOC workshops of WW1 artillery pieces fitted with pneumatic wheels and new carriages were undertaken.

Ford Marmon Herrington Artillery Tractor, Limber and 4.5-inch Howitzer

60 Pounder Guns showing both the original carriage and the New Zealand-built carriage

Detailed mobilisation plans were undertaken behind the scenes, with Lieutenant A.H. Andrews playing a pivotal role in updating and developing mobilisation scales. These plans included stockpiling essential supplies at Trentham, Burnham, and Hopuhopu and identifying critical infrastructure vital in supporting an expeditionary force, which saw new construction of logistic infrastructure at all camps. In terms of resources, the following equipment was on order from the United Kingdom in 1938:

Bren Guns complete with equipment and components – 248 (in addition to 100 ordered in 1936)
QF 2Pdr with equipment and accessories – 16
Wireless sets No. 9 and No. 11

Given that all the equipment was only accepted into British service from 1935, it is clear that by ordering these items, New Zealand was keen on modernising with the latest equipment and was equipped on a par with contemporary forces in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

Soldier with Bren gun at Waiouru Army Training Camp, taken circa 1936-1938 by Errol Cliff Morton. . Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22316064

In addition, as the New Zealand Permanent Air Force (NZPAF) was preparing to transition independently from the army and become the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) in 1937, Major King of the NZ Army developed a new system for managing stores specifically for the RNZAF in 1936.

The New Zealand military leadership kept pace with global events and potential threats, which influenced the earlier planning and helped prevent the country from being caught entirely off guard when war eventually broke out. This global awareness likely also influenced the Four Colonels’ Revolt. Several senior officers, alarmed by the decline of the Territorial Force, protested directly to the press against the reforms of New Zealand Chief of Staff Major General Sir John Evelyn Duigan. As a result, they were placed on the retired list as punishment.

The Importance of a Balanced Approach

The interwar period underscored the importance of maintaining a long-term vision for military preparedness. While immediate readiness may have been compromised by budget cuts, strategic planning and resource mobilisation efforts ensured New Zealand could enhance its military capabilities.

Adapting and updating doctrines and strategies in response to global events proved crucial. This flexibility enabled New Zealand to sustain a level of preparedness that, though not immediately apparent, proved effective over time.

Effective collaboration and coordination among military branches and civilian authorities were essential for maintaining readiness. This ensured comprehensive coverage of all military operations, from logistics to combat readiness.

Lessons for the Modern Logistician

One of the key takeaways for modern logisticians is the importance of strategic foresight. The ability to anticipate future needs and plan accordingly can significantly impact readiness and response times in crises.

Effective resource management is crucial. During the interwar period, New Zealand stockpiled its limited available supplies and ordered advanced equipment for the next war to ensure readiness. Modern logisticians must ensure that resources are managed efficiently and critical supplies are readily available.

The experiments with motor vehicles and artillery modifications highlight the need for adaptability and innovation. Modern logisticians should continually seek ways to improve processes and equipment to maintain a competitive edge.

The importance of collaboration between military branches and civilian authorities cannot be overstated. Effective communication and coordination ensure that all aspects of logistics, from supply chains to support services, are streamlined and efficient.

Training exercises and war games prepared the New Zealand military despite financial constraints. Modern logisticians should emphasise continuous training and development to ensure personnel are always ready to respond effectively.

Interconnected Efforts of the NZAOC, Quartermaster General, and NZASC

The interwar efforts significantly contributed to the rapid expansion of the New Zealand logistics systems from 1939. It’s important to note that the work of the NZAOC wasn’t carried out in isolation but was part of a coordinated effort involving the Quartermaster General and the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC). The Quartermaster General’s office was pivotal in overseeing the overall logistical strategy and ensuring all branches worked together. The NZASC, responsible for supply and transport, worked closely with the NZAOC to ensure that rations, fuels, forage and transport services were efficiently managed and distributed. This integrated approach ensured that logistical operations were cohesive and effective, maximising the New Zealand Army’s readiness.

Conclusion

While it is acknowledged that New Zealand’s military faced significant downsizing during the interwar period, the assertion of complete unpreparedness by 1939 oversimplifies the historical context. The strategic appointments within the NZAOC, under Major King’s direction, and continuous updates to military doctrine exemplify proactive measures taken to maintain readiness amidst global uncertainties. Despite material and personnel shortages, training exercises from 1936 onwards and innovative adaptations in weaponry underscored New Zealand’s commitment to enhancing military capabilities.

This nuanced and proactive approach ensured New Zealand could swiftly mobilise and sustain an expeditionary force when needed, challenging the myth of its military unpreparedness during the interwar years. However, further study is necessary to fully grasp the intricacies of New Zealand’s military preparedness during this period. Detailed archival research, comparative analyses with other Commonwealth nations, and deeper exploration of socio-political influences on military policy would provide a more comprehensive understanding. Such research would illuminate the successes and limitations of New Zealand’s strategic decisions, offering valuable insights into military preparedness in times of global uncertainty.

For modern logisticians, the lessons from this period underscore the importance of strategic foresight, resource management, adaptability, collaboration, and continuous training—key components in ensuring a state of readiness in an ever-changing global landscape. The collaborative efforts of the NZAOC, the Quartermaster General, and the NZASC exemplify how integrated logistical planning and execution are critical to maintaining military effectiveness.

The 1931 Reductions of the New Zealand Military: A Historical Analysis

Leave a comment Robert McKie

Largely forgotten today, the early 1930s marked a tumultuous period for the New Zealand military which was profoundly impacted by the Great Depression. In 1931, facing unprecedented economic pressures, the military was compelled to enact severe cutbacks and reductions. The lessons drawn from these pivotal events offer invaluable insights into fortifying the resilience and adaptability of today’s military forces amidst contemporary strategic and economic uncertainties.

Establishment and Early Developments

Established in 1917, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) quickly became integral to the country’s Permanent Military Forces. However, the onset of the global economic depression triggered substantial changes in New Zealand’s military funding and organisational structure. As the worldwide economic downturn took hold, austerity measures and restructuring became unavoidable, necessitating a comprehensive overhaul of the NZAOC to align with the new economic realities.

Badges of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 1917 -1937. Robert McKie Collection

Established in 1917, the intervening years had seen the NZAOC decline in personnel from its peak strength of 493 in 1919 to an average of 118 officers and other ranks between 1920 and 1930. Despite this reduction, significant infrastructural advancements replaced the colonial-era facilities with modern buildings across various locations. Key NZAOC establishments included:

Northern Military District:
- Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Waikato Camp in Hopuhopu, constructed in 1928.
- Ordnance Workshop at Devonport’s artillery yard (now the RNZN Museum).
- Small Arms Ammunition Testing Staff stationed at the Colonial Ammunition Company factory in Mount Eden, Auckland.
Central Military District:
- The Main Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Trentham was established as a permanent camp in 1915.
- The Ammunition Section at Fort Balance.
Southern Military District:
- The Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Burnham Camp was established in 1921 with the ongoing construction of new infrastructure.

These developments underscored the NZAOC’s strategic presence in the Northern, Central, and Southern Military Districts.

1938 Military Camp, Hopuhopu, Waikato. Whites Aviation Ltd: Photographs. Ref: WA-55972-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23181165

Economic Downturn and Military Reorganisation

The economic downturn of the early 1930s necessitated severe cuts to government expenditure, compelling the New Zealand military to undergo substantial reorganisation. In 1930, the military’s strength stood at 555 regulars and 16,990 Territorials. By 1931, this was reduced to 349 regulars and 3,655 Territorials. These reductions were implemented under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1930 (No. 2), which facilitated compulsory retirements and transfers to civilian roles for many NZAOC personnel.

The Act authorised the retirement on superannuation of any member of the Permanent Force or the Permanent Staff under the Defence Act, 1909, or of the clerical staff of the Defence Department whose age or length of service was such that if five years had been added they would have been enabled as of right or with the consent of the Minister of Defence to have given notice to retire voluntarily. Compulsory retirement under this Act was facilitated in two tranches:

Tranche 1: Personnel Retired without Superannuation:
- Servicemen eligible for retirement under the provision of the Act who were not contributing to the superannuation scheme were notified on 13 December 1930 of their impending release. They were granted six weeks of special leave, effective 31 December 1930, with their final release scheduled for 11 February 1931 after completing their notice period.
Tranche 2: Personnel Retired with Superannuation:
- Servicemen eligible for retirement under the provision of the Act who were contributing to the superannuation scheme received notification on 13 December 1930. Their salary continued until 31 March 1931, with superannuation benefits commencing in April. Accrued leave entitlements were taken concurrently during this notice period, resulting in much leave accrued forfeited.

These tranches included Ordnance soldiers who had joined the NZAOC since its formation in 1917. Some had transferred directly from the Defence Stores, while others had served in the pre-war Permanent Forces or had active service with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF). Their compulsory retirement represented a significant loss of knowledge and experience for the New Zealand military. Under the provisions of section 39 of the Finance Act, 1930 (No. 2), 44 members of the NZAOC were placed on compulsory retirement, including the following personnel who have so far been identified.

Northern Military District

948. Lieutenant Michael Joseph Lyons, MSM

968 Sergeant Thomas Alexander Hunter, MSM

62 Private Frank Jewiss

166 Sergeant William John Rabbidge

268 Staff Quartermaster Sergeant James Alexander Kenning

Captain Frank Edwin Ford

Central Military District

19 Sergeant Alfred Charles Butler

39 Corporal Simon Alexander Fraser

64 Gunner Maurice Francis Johnstone

111 Corporal John Sawyer

920 Corporal Gordon James Francis Arenas

941 Sergeant William Hans McIlraith

956 Staff Sergeant Saddler George Alexander Carter, MSM

960 Sergeant Frank William Ching

965 Corporal Philip Alexander MacKay MSM

976 Private William Valentine Wood MSM

978 Corporal Earnest John Williams MSM

1018 Sargeant Major James Oliver Pringle Southgate

1024 Armament-Artificer Eric Wallace Jepson

Lieutenant L.A Clement

Captain Alfred William Baldwin

Captain William Moody Bell

55 Staff Quartermaster Sergeant John Francis Hunter MSM

143 Armament Sergeant Major (WO1) Joseph Warren

995 Staff Sergeant Wilfred Robert White

Southern Military District

2 Armament Staff Quartermaster Sergeant John Alexander Adamson MSM

1006 Lance Corporal Norman William Wilkie

Corporal Cecil John Knight

Captain Arthur Rumbold Carter White

966 Lance Corporal William Terrington Popple, MSM

Transition to Civilian Roles

To achieve further cost savings, 74 NZAOC soldiers received notifications in December 1930 that their positions would be retained but transferred to civilian roles with civilian pay rates. This transition took effect in February 1931, causing significant disruption for those affected, including the loss of accumulated leave and adjustment to civilian life..

Some of these soldiers were transferred to other departments within the defence establishment, while the majority remained in their current roles within the NZAOC Ordnance Depots and workshops. They transitioned overnight from wearing uniforms to civilian clothes, with significantly reduced rates of pay and civil service conditions of service. The following personnel have so far been identified as being transferred to the Civil Staff.

Northern Military District

967 Corporal Robert John Gamble

974 Corporal Henry William Le Comte

983 Sergeant Clifford Verne Little

996 Lance Corporal Athol Gilroy McCurdy

202 Lance Corporal Arthur Graham Munday

Central Military District

972 Private John Dennis Anderson

35 Lance Corporal Harry Harper Ekins

1061 Lance Corporal Earnest Fenton

4 Sergeant Kenneth Olaf John Andersen

699 Corporal Oliver Avis, MM

889 Staff Sergeant George Bagnell

1004 Lance Corporal James Johnston Bolt

961 Lance Corporal Edgar Charles Boult

1000 Private George Cumming Bremner

1027 Artificer William Cowan Brizzle

1003 Lance Corporal Ernest Carr

1012 Lance Corporal Charles Fred Ecob

864 Corporal William Charles Francis

1025 Tent-Repairer-Artificer Herbert Roy Griffin

714 Lance Corporal Kenneth Hoare

1016 Private Ernest William Hughes

989 Corporal Percy Reuben Hunter

213 Lance Corporal William Saul Keegan

1019 Private Edward Gavin Lake

342 Corporal Allen Charles Leighton

998 Lance Corporal Allen Dudley Leighton

1011 Lance Corporal Geoffrey Charles Leighton

363 Staff Sergeant David Llewellyn Lewis, MSM

1007 Lance Corporal Thomas James Mclaughlin

1020 Private John Douglas Melville

894 SQMS (WO2) James Moroney Sergeant David Nicol]

1023 Lance Corporal John Nixon

467 Corporal George Wantford Pamment

1013 Private Francis Reid

1022 Private Henry McKenzie Reid

1014 Wheeler-Artificer Robert Stacey Vincent Rowe

665 Private William Alexander Sammons

927 Private Leonard William Sanders

963 Corporal Albert Edward Shadbolt

138 Lance Corporal David Henry Strickland

1017 Private Lionel Herbert Stroud

Southern Military District

970 Sergeant Edward Vincent Coleman

1028 Private Percival Nowell Erridge

959 Sergeant Charles Edward Gleeson

1276 Private Lewis Haslett

885 Corporal Charles James Johnston Storie

728 Private William Sampson Valentine

Impact on Military Preparedness and Social Consequences

The compulsory retirements and transfers to civilian roles led to a reduction in the NZAOC’s military strength, impacting its preparedness during subsequent years. However, beginning in 1934, improved government finances allowed for an increase in the army’s training tempo, despite global events hinting at looming conflict. The following personnel who have so far been identified as been retained:

Northern Military District

984 Staff Sergeant Thomas Joseph Holliday

1260 Armament Staff Quartermaster Sergeant Samuel Thomson MSM

915 Armament Staff Sergeant Eric John Hunter

141 Armourer Corporal Reginald Samuel Henry Lyons

Central Military District

14 Armament Sergeant Major Bertram Buckley

992 Armament Corporal Hilliard Charles Cooper

1029 Artificer James Dabney

964 Warrant Officer Class 1 John William Dalton

1032 Armourer Staff Sergeant Frederick Henry Dew

979 Armourer Staff Sergeant John William Evers

1026 Armament Sergeant Leo Stanley Jefcoate

Major Thomas Joseph King

945 WO2 Armament SQMS Henry Albert Wiliam Pierard

1021 Armament Staff Sergeant Arthur Sydney Richardson

1010 Lance Corporal George Frederick Robert Ware

Southern Military District

7 Corporal Percey Charles Austin

25 Armourer Staff Sargeant Francis Augustus Clapshaw

Lieutenant Henry Erridge Erridge

The reduction in the Territorial Force in 1931 resulted in decreased activity in subsequent years. However, beginning in 1934, improved government finances allowed for an increase in the army’s training tempo. Concurrently, global events in China, Ethiopia, and Germany hinted at looming conflict, prompting a gradual shift towards preparing for future mobilisation. Under the leadership of Major Thomas Joseph King, who served as Director of Ordnance Services (DOS) since 1924, the NZAOC worked diligently within its means to enhance readiness, including designing a new system of stores accounting for the emerging Royal New Zealand Air Force.

The new NZAOC Badge was approved in 1937. Robert McKie Collection

King focused on recruiting new personnel and leveraging his civilian staff, who were former NZAOC soldiers, to reenlist experienced individuals into key leadership roles at Trentham, Hopuhopu, and Burnham. When war was declared in September 1939, King successfully mobilised his small military and civilian team to form the rump of the New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC) within the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF).

During the 1938-45 war, nearly all NZAOC soldiers who had been transferred to civilian roles in 1931 found themselves back in uniform, restarting their military careers as Ordnance Officers, Warrant Officers, and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) alongside their peers who had been retained. Many from this group continued to provide leadership within the RNZAOC and Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RNZEME) up to the 1960s, with several even holding the prestigious position of DOS in the post-war army.

Lieutenant Colonel Francis Reid handed over the position of DOS to his brother, Lieutenant Colonel Henry McKenzie Reid, on 31 March 1957. Both brothers joined the NZAOC as soldiers in the late 1920s, only to be transferred to the civilian staff in 1931. Commissioned during WW2, both served with distinction throughout the war.

Negative Effects and Lessons Learned

The 1931 reductions in the New Zealand military, driven by the economic pressures of the Great Depression, had profound and lasting negative effects, both socially and in terms of military preparedness. Socially, the abrupt compulsory retirements and transitions to civilian roles caused significant upheaval for the affected soldiers and their families. The loss of accumulated leave and the sudden shift from military to civilian life resulted in considerable stress and financial strain.

In terms of military preparedness, the reductions led to a substantial loss of experienced personnel and institutional knowledge. The drastic decrease in the Territorial Force and overall military strength severely hampered the country’s ability to maintain an effective and ready military force. The reduced activity and training during the early 1930s left the military less prepared for the impending global conflicts of the late 1930s and early 1940s than in 1914. This lack of preparedness could have had dire consequences had international tensions escalated more quickly.

However, subsequent efforts to rebuild, modernise, and mobilise the military demonstrated the resilience and adaptability of the New Zealand military. Starting in 1934 under the leadership of Major Thomas Joseph King, the NZAOC enhanced its readiness by recruiting new personnel and reenlisting former soldiers from the civilian staff. The return of nearly all NZAOC soldiers to uniformed service during the 1939-1945 war showcased their dedication and the critical role of experienced personnel in maintaining military effectiveness.

The 1931 reductions’ experiences highlight the importance of balancing economic constraints and the need for a capable and prepared military force. These lessons remain relevant today as modern military forces navigate similar challenges amidst strategic and economic uncertainties. Ensuring that reductions do not compromise long-term readiness and resilience is crucial for the effective functioning of any military organisation.

Notes

[1] (1930). “H-19 Defence Forces of New Zealand, Annual report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces.” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives.

[2] (1931). “H-19 Defence Forces of New Zealand, Annual report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces June 1930 to May 1931.” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1 January 1941.

[3] (1914). King, Thomas Joseph. Personal File, Archives New Zealand. Wellington.

The Evolution of Army Catering in New Zealand (1845-1948)

1 Comment Robert McKie

“If you were an army cook on leave and met some of the troops accompanied by their girlfriends, wives or mothers, which would you rather hear them say: “There’s the chap who turns out the great meals I’ve told you about”; or, “That’s the bloke who murders good food?”

Question placed to trainee cooks by Sergeant-Cook Instructor Bourke (Paddy to all the camp) at Waikato Camp, 1942

Over the last two hundred years, the adage attributed to Napoleon, “An army marches on its stomach,” underscored the paramount importance of sustenance in military operations. In the annals of the New Zealand army, this principle has been diligently upheld, with meticulous attention paid to ensuring soldiers are well-fed, notwithstanding the challenges posed by varying locations and conditions. Establishing the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) units during the tumultuous periods of the First and Second World Wars is a testament to this commitment. NZASC units were principally charged with baking bread, butchering meat, and procuring and distributing fresh and packaged provisions to frontline units, playing a pivotal role in sustaining the morale and effectiveness of New Zealand forces during these conflicts. Even in more recent conflicts, such as those in Southeast Asia during the 1950s and 60s, New Zealand troops operated on ration scales notably more generous than their British counterparts, a testament to the nation’s dedication to the well-being of its service members. However, despite the recognition of logistical efforts in military history, a notable gap remains in the literature concerning the contributions of New Zealand Army cooks. While Julia Millen’s comprehensive work, Salute to Service: A History of the Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport, acknowledges the significance of Cooks from when they became part of the RNZASC in 1948, scant attention has been paid to the preceding 103 years, from 1865 to 1948.

This article draws upon primary sources and aims to redress this oversight by delving into the hitherto unexplored realm of New Zealand Army catering. By shedding light on the endeavours of these unsung culinary heroes, it seeks to enrich our understanding of the multifaceted efforts required to sustain a fighting force, thereby honouring their indispensable contributions to New Zealand’s military heritage.

Since the first New Zealand Militias were created in 1845, there was always a need to feed the militias when called out for service. Given the nature of Militia service and the fact that they would not serve far from their home location, their messing requirements would have been minimal. Some individuals would likely have been selected from within the ranks to collect any rations provided and prepare meals.

With the advent of the volunteer era in 1858, the New Zealand military became a mixed force of Infantry, Cavalry and artillery who, on occasion, would assemble for annual camps where units within a district would assemble and conduct combined training. While rations were paid through District Headquarters and Defence Stores, messing arrangements would be rudimentary, with men selected from within the ranks preparing the meals from the rations sourced from local vendors. This situation was mirrored in the Permanent Militia, which had staffed coastal defence forts and the military depot at Mount Cook in Wellington since the 1880s.

Clutha Mounted Rifles 1899. Camp Cooks. Hocken Collection.

During New Zealand’s involvement in the war in South Africa, the issue of messing arose as large numbers of mobilising men were stationed in camps. Messing arrangements involved a combination of civilian contractors and regimental cooks. However, an inquiry into soldiers’ comfort, housing, and victualling at the Newtown Park Camp and Volunteer Billets revealed widespread dissatisfaction. Numerous complaints were lodged regarding the quality and quantity of rations provided, the low standard, and, at times, the lack of meals prepared by contractors and regimental cooks.[1] In South Africa, rations, following the British scale, were supplied by the British Army Service Corps (ASC), supplemented by fresh mutton acquired from the enemy and cooked by members of the contingent.[2]

After the conclusion of the South Africa War, interest in the military surged, prompting a reorganisation of the volunteer movement into a more robust and structured system of regiments and battalions. Despite discussions in 1904 regarding establishing a New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC), no decision was indicated in the Commandant of the Forces’ annual report on its formation.[3]

Further reorganisation in 1908 saw the ASC matter addressed by the Adjutant General, with discussions continuing into 1909. The Defence Act of 1909 disbanded volunteer forces and established the Territorial Force, supported by conscription. Major General Alexander Godley’s appointment as Commandant of the New Zealand Military Forces in December 1910 provided momentum for reform. In his first year, Godley revitalised the military’s organisational structure, made crucial command and staff appointments, and laid plans to develop the NZASC, which, though officially designated in May 1910, remained only a force on paper.[4]

Despite the Defence Stores Department’s existence since 1869, an ASC nucleus was lacking for forming new units. The proposed NZASC envisioned eight Transport and Supply Columns, divided into Mounted and Mixed Brigade units allocated to each of New Zealand’s four Military Districts and was to be organised by British ASC officer Henry Owen Knox, who arrived in New Zealand in June 1911 and later supported by four ASC officers and Warrant Offices from early 1913. While the NZASC would handle the procurement and distribution of rations, receipt and cooking remained a Regimental responsibility.

Under Godley’s command, the Territorial Army underwent rapid organisation, culminating in the inaugural brigade camps held in 1913. During these camps, the newly established NZASC established its initial depots, receiving supplies previously ordered by the Quartermaster General based on expected strength states and ration scales.

Forty-seven candidates across the Territorial Army were selected in October 1912 to undergo a comprehensive month-long training at Trentham. This pioneering catering course encompassed kitchen work and cooking techniques for field conditions, including practical exercises such as constructing and operating field ovens, fry pans, 8 and 20-gallon boilers and camp kettles.

Of the initial candidates, thirty-eight successfully qualified to supervise cooking for a regiment, with an additional seven attaining certification as company cooks. Unfortunately, two candidates were unable to qualify due to illness. For the 1913 camp, the establishment allowed for a Sergeant Cook per regiment, each granted an additional allowance of 1 Shilling 6 Pence a day (equivalent to 2024 NZD $16.16), while qualified company cooks received 1 Shilling a day (equivalent to 2024 NZD $10.10). Those who served as cooks during the camps were excused from further military training for the rest of the year.[5]

At Trentham, an additional course of instruction was conducted in October 1913, attended by sixty-two territorial soldiers. Thirty-two qualified as competent to supervise cooking for a regiment, making them eligible for appointment as sergeant cooks if vacancies existed within their units. Twenty-seven soldiers qualified as assistant or company cooks; unfortunately, three did not meet the qualifications.

By the end of 1913, this initiative provided the New Zealand Military with a potential pool of 104 trained cooks. However, it was recognised that further efforts were necessary to ensure a sufficient number of cooks would be available to meet the messing needs of the Territorial Force in the event of mobilisation.[6]

A System Under Strain, Lessons Unlearned in the Interwar Years

By the late 1930s, nearly two decades after the end of the First World War, there remained a persistent unease about the Army’s ability to feed its soldiers effectively. While institutional reforms had begun, contemporary commentary suggests that many of the fundamental issues experienced during the war had not yet been fully resolved.

A 1937 article in the Auckland Star, written by W. Revell Reynolds, provides a stark and unvarnished account of army catering during the First World War. Drawing on personal experience across training camps, Egypt, and Gallipoli, Reynolds described a system characterised not by scarcity, but by failure in execution.

Food, he noted, was often adequate at the point of issue, but was rendered unpalatable or even inedible through poor preparation. Cooks were frequently untrained and, in many cases, selected from those seeking to avoid frontline duties rather than for any culinary competence. Officers, for their part, were described as largely ignorant of catering and nutrition, with institutional focus placed elsewhere.

More concerning were allegations of systemic weaknesses in control and accountability. Reynolds pointed to instances of misappropriated allowances, questionable quality of supplied goods, and the hoarding or misallocation of rations. Whether exaggerated or not, such perceptions highlight a broader lack of confidence in the integrity of the supply and catering system at the time.

Perhaps most significantly, Reynolds drew a direct connection between poor nutrition and operational effectiveness. The absence of basic dietary components such as fresh vegetables, fats, and stimulants was linked to widespread illness, particularly dysentery and other gastrointestinal conditions, which were endemic in theatres such as Gallipoli. In this sense, catering was not merely a matter of comfort, but of survival.

Reynolds’ account suggests that the issue was not supply alone, but the absence of a professional system capable of turning rations into effective sustainment.

His concluding concern was forward-looking. Writing in 1937, Reynolds questioned how the Army intended to feed its soldiers in any future conflict, suggesting that without meaningful reform, the same deficiencies would re-emerge under the pressures of mobilisation.

The outbreak of the Second World War would force that reform. Under the pressures of mobilisation, the Army moved decisively toward a more professional, standardised, and controlled system of catering and supply, laying the foundations for the modern military catering capability.

The declaration of war and subsequent mobilisation halted any plans for further peacetime training of cooks, as all efforts shifted towards providing trained personnel for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. The NZASC expanded its role at home and as part of the NZEF, taking on responsibility for bakeries and butcheries. However, despite ensuring the provision of necessary food items to units, cooking remained the responsibility of each unit. Cooks were trained at the Army School of Instruction at Trentham, with further training conducted at NZEF camps in the United Kingdom.In New Zealand, military and civilian cooks fulfilled the necessary messing functions at various mobilisation and Territorial Camps, while unit cooks supported units in the field.

Cooks with first frozen mutton received in the desert during WWI. Hood, D : Photographs relating to World War I and II. Ref: 1/2-067444-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23212994

Wellington Regiment cooker, and men, within 1000 yards of the front line, Colincamps, France. Royal New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association :New Zealand official negatives, World War 1914-1918. Ref: 1/2-013209-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22604005

During the interbellum period, the Army School of Instruction in Trentham ceased operations in 1921, with few records of formal training for Army cooks until 1938.

In 1937, the Special Reserve Scheme was introduced to provide personnel for the coast defence batteries and three infantry battalions of Fortress troops. Under this scheme, single soldiers underwent three months of continuous training, followed by a three-year commitment to attend training for 10 days annually, with an obligation to report for service within New Zealand in the event of a national emergency. During their three months of training, they were also allowed to attend technical college, free of charge, on a course of their choice. Facilitating the necessary training, the Army School of Instruction (ASI) was re-established at Trentham, supported by District Schools of Instruction (DSI) at Narrow Neck, Trentham, and Burnham.[7]

The first account of cooks participating in this training scheme saw a batch of seventy-two, nine of whom were cooks, enter Trentham in August 1938 for their initial military training, beginning their vocational training in January 1939 with three of the cooks going to Narrow Neck in Auckland and the other six to Fort Dorset.[8] Reviewing the work of the officers and men under his command, the Officer Command the Central Military District, Colonel E Puttick, commented in April 1939 that “there had never been any complaint about the food, and it was clear that the special reservists who had taken cookery training as their vocational course in the Army Training School at Trentham had received excellent instruction”.[9]

While Colonel Puttick may have been satisfied with the catering arrangements in his district, there was dissatisfaction with the quality of rations and cooks in the northern and Southern Districts. In May 1939, reports of sub-standard rations, the performance of civilian cooks at territorial Camps resulting in their packing up and walking out mid camp and the refusals of Territorial soldiers to work on mess fatigue parties led the District Commander, Colonel P.H Bell to call an all-day conference with his Quartermaster and Quartermaster Sergeants to consider the Army’s food problems, including the quality of rations and most importantly how to resolve the fundamental problem that the Army had no cooks of its own, engaging civilians for the period of camps. [10] In the Northern District, a deputation of civilian cooks led by Mr W. R Connolly, a cook with 37 years’ experience of cooking in military camps, went directly to the officer of the Star Newspaper with their grievances following a ten-day camp with A Squadron of the 4^th Mounted Regiment. Joining the squadron on 3 May at Cambridge, they deployed to Rotorua, Tauranga, and Paeroa, finishing up at Narrow Neck on 12 May. The cook’s issue was that they were civilians contracted to work in a fixed camp and not on the march, and they were at much reduced rates than they had received before the depression.[11]

Despite these challenges, the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 prompted a renewed focus on army catering. On the declaration of war, it was decided that New Zealand would contribute an Expeditionary Force. Initially, a “Special Force” was planned, with one battalion in each of the three military districts. The Special Force was later expanded into the 2^nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2 NZEF).

Three weeks before the Special Force encamped at Trentham, Acting Prime Minister Mr Peter Fraser and Minister of Defence Mr Frederick Jones visited the site to inspect preparations for the new mobilisation camp. During their visit, the Commandant of the ASI, Major J I Brook, hosted them for lunch. Impressed by the meal, they specifically requested the Regular Force Mess diet sheet and received positive feedback from regular soldiers on the meal quality. The Ministers inquired about the possibility of providing similar meals to the men of the Special Force. In response, Major Brook suggested that providing the same meals to the Special Force could be achieved if cooks were available and ample rations were provided. Following this discussion, permission was granted to establish an Army School of Cookery under the ASI.[12]

By December 1939, under the tutelage of a fully qualified army cookery instructor, the first batch of thirty-two men had completed their training at the Army School of Cookery, with a second batch completing their training on 8 December. Initial training was on the standard equipment found in any camp, typically three ovens able to bake for 120 men. Once qualified in the basics of camp cooking, training on the Portable Cooker No. 1 and other field cookery followed.[13]

As the 2NZEF established itself in Egypt, the significance of quality cooking was duly recognised. Although the Cooks selected for the First Echelon underwent training courses at the Trentham School of Cookery, they were not qualified cooks under Middle East conditions. They required instruction on breaking down bulk rations and handling food in the field, so arrangements were made to train New Zealand cooks at the Army School of Cookery in Cairo. Additionally, the services of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) from the 7th British Armoured Division was enlisted as an instructor to the 2 NZEF under the supervision of the Divisional Supply Column officer. With the second Echelon diverted to England, General Freyberg consulted the manager of the Lyons chain of restaurants, who was an adviser to the War Office on army catering, with arrangements made with the War Office in London for the secondment of four NCOs to the 2 NZEF to form the nucleus of the 2 NZEF cookery school. These NCOs accompanied the Second Echelon troops from England to Egypt.[14]

A typical New Zealand field cookhouse in the desert during World War II. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch :Photographs relating to World War 1914-1918, World War 1939-1945, occupation of Japan, Korean War, and Malayan Emergency. Ref: DA-00798-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23050225

With this reorganisation and expansion, the NZEF cookery school conducted thorough training and testing for cooks. Starting from February 1941, all cooks were required to be qualified either at the NZEF school or the Middle East school before being eligible for extra-duty pay.[15]

As the war progressed, the Army School of Cookery at Trentham continued to run regular courses. However, the demand for cooks necessitated the DSIs to conduct cookery instruction to train men as they were called up for the NZEF and Home Defence. In addition to male soldiers training as cooks, from 1939, the first females from Auckland Womans Service Corps were employed as cooks in Papakura Camp to supplement the civilian and military cooks. Although on the Army payroll, the initial female cooks were not considered serving soldiers. By June 1941, fifteen female cooks were working across all the Military districts. However, it was not until July 1942 that approval was given for the New Zealand Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) in New Zealand, formally establishing these female cooks as part of the military establishment.[16]

Cook from the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps putting meat in an oven to roast, for men at a World War II military camp in New Zealand. New Zealand Free Lance : Photographic prints and negatives. Ref: PAColl-8602-40. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22895614

By October 1942, three hundred men of the Territorial Force had received training at Ngawahiwaha Camp. The established ratio for cooks to troops was one cook for every 50 men, two for 100, three for 150, and an additional cook for every 100 additional men. Throughout the Army, the standard of cooking, in terms of variety and quality, had seen significant improvement. It was widely acknowledged that a properly trained army cook could secure employment in a civilian hotel or restaurant upon demobilisation.[17]

Sergeant “Paddy” Bourke, veteran army cook, turns the roast. He was in Egypt with the Expeditionary Force of a generation ago; (Evening Post, 13 April 1940). Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/17717327

In May 1944, the use of WACs as cooks had become a normalised and essential function of the war effort, with an article in the Dominion newspaper detailing the work of the 65 WAACs on the messing staff of Trentham Camp and providing details of the training of the latest batch of eighteen female cooks who had just completed a three-week cooking course the Trentham ASI.[18]It’s essential to recognise that New Zealand was not operating in isolation but rather observing developments across the armies of the British Empire as they transitioned from the regimental cook system to a more centralised and professional model. In the United Kingdom, the Cook trade was under the control of the Army Catering Corps (ACC) upon its creation in March 1941, forming as a subsidiary element of the Royal Army Service Corps Supply Branch. Australia followed suit in 1943, establishing the Australian Army Catering Corps. Canada took a similar approach, forming the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC) Catering Wing at No. 1 Reinforcement Unit in Britain in August 1942 to train cooks for the Army.

A cook with the 22 New Zealand Battalion, stokes up his fire in the forward areas near Rimini, Italy, 21
September 1944 during World War II. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History
Branch

The Canadian Army’s experience was that many cooks had previously been members of their unit. However, experience revealed that they were not necessarily skilled soldiers and often functioned as poor cooks tasked with feeding their comrades. Consequently, starting in 1942, all cooks were transferred to the RCASC, which then assigned them to the various units they were to serve. This change resulted in a rapid improvement in cooking standards.[19] Although New Zealand had adopted other British logistical organisational changes, such as the formation of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, with enthusiasm, it was more reserved about any changes to its cooks, combining cooks into a single corps was not a wartime priority.

In 1944, New Zealand commenced the demobilisation process, which included disbanding the Home Guard and the standing down of elements of the Territorial Force. By the war’s conclusion in 1945, most of the forces stationed at home underwent rapid demobilisation. The 2NZEF was disbanded by 1946, aligning with the downsizing trend seen in many Western militaries. However, despite this size reduction, the Government and the Army hesitated to revert the military to its pre-war dimensions and structure. Instead, they opted to reorganise it into what became known as the Interim Army.

New Zeland Army Order 60/1947 of 1 August 1947 detailed the trade classification and promotion requirements of the Regular Force. This order retained cooks as two specific All Arms trades;

Cooks, Hospital. A Group A trade applicable to All Arms, including the New Zealand Army Nursing Service (NZANS)
Cooks (other than hospital cook). A Group B trade applicable to All Arms, including the NZWAAC

The Commandant of the ASI set the syllabus for the Cooks, hospital, and Cooks (other than hospital cooks). During his period, there was no steward’s trade.[20]

In 1947, three officers and four NCOs were brought out from Britain to raise the standards of catering in the New Zealand Army. This task included providing training and instruction in cooking and catering and guidance on ration scales and meal planning. With the New Zealand Army perceived as too small for a stand-alone Catering Corps, considering that the NZASC was responsible for the Supply function, Butchers and Bakers, it made sense to emulate the Canadian model and bring all cooks under the umbrella of the RNZASC.

To facilitate this transition, the Army Board approved the formation of a Catering Group as a section of the RNZASC. It issued New Zealand Army Instruction (NZAI) 2049 on 15 February 1948 detailing the Supplies and Transport Catering Group (STCG) formation. Initially, the STCG comprised of;

A Staff Officer (Catering) in the Directorate of Supplies and Transport at Army Headquarters.
District Catering advisers (NC0s) on the staff of the Districts Assistant Director Supply and Transport (ADST)
Instructors on the staff of the Army School of Instruction to operate a Catering Wing.
Cooks and kitchenhands on unit peace establishments.

The function of the STCG was to

To train and provide unit cooks and kitchen hands.
Instruction in and supervision of the management of the Army ration scale.
Improvement of standard of food preparation and cooking.
Advice on the installation and instruction in the operation of cooking appliances and kitchen equipment.
Advice on the layout of mess buildings.[21]

Despite NZAI 2049 bringing all army catering services under the jurisdiction of the RNZASC, the Cooks trade remained dispersed among various units. However, this issue was addressed with the implementation of NZAI 2147 in September 1948.[22]

No 2147. SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT CATERING GROUP, RNZASC
NZAI 1319 and 2049 are hereby cancelled.

Approval has been given for the formation of a catering Group in RNZASC.
This group will be known as the Supplies and Transport Catering Group (abbreviated title STCG).

The functions of the STCG are –
a. To train and provide unit, &c, cooks and messing staffs.
b. Instruction in and supervision of the management of the Army Ration Scale.
c. The preparation, cooking and serving of all rations.
d. Advise on the installation and instruction in the operation of cooking appliances and kitchen equipment.
e. Advise on the layout of mess buildings.

Initially the STCG will comprise-
a. A Staff Officer (Catering) on the Directorate of Supplies and Transport at Army HQ.
b. District catering advisers (NCOs) on the staff of ADs ST District.
c. Instructors on the staff of ASI to operate a “Catering Wing”.
d. Messing Staff of all units

In order to implement para 3 above, the following action will be taken:-
a. From the date of publication of this instruction soldiers classified as “kitchen hands” or “Mess Orderly” will be classified as “probationer cook” or “mess steward” respectively. The terms “kitchen hands” or “mess orderly” will no longer be used.
NOTES: –
(i) For star classification purposes “probationer cooks” will form the “learner: class of the group “B” trade of cook and will be treated as Group “D” tradesmen
(ii) Whenever the term “messing staffs” is used in this instruction, it will included “cooks,” “probationary cooks,” and “mess stewards”
b. All cooks, probationer cooks, and mess stewards, other than of the NZWAC, will be posted to RNZASC.
c. All messing staffs. including NZWAC messing staffs, in districts will be carried on the establishments of district ASC Coys under the sub heading of STCG.
d. OsC Districts will allot messing staffs to units on the recommendations of DA DsST.
e. Messing staffs, including NZWAC messing staffs, of Army HQ units will be carried on the establishments of the respective units under the sub heading STCG.

STCG messing staff strengths will be assessed according to unit messing strengths as follows:-
a. Unit messing strengths will be taken as establishment strength less 20 per cent (to allow for personnel Living out).
b. Cooks. – Cooks will be allocated to units on the following scale:
i. One cook per unit all ranks (or portion thereof) on unit messing strength up to a total of 650.
ii. One extra cook p er 90 all ranks (or portion thereof) on unit messing strength in excess of 650.
iii. One extra cook for each cookhouse in excess of one.
iv. In addition, one chief cook (WO or NCO) for each unit. The rank of this WO or NCO shall be dependent on the strength of the messing staff serving in the unit concerned,
in accordance with the scale laid down in para 6 below.
c. Probationer Cooks:-
i. Two probationer cooks to each kitchen where cooking is carried out for messing strength of 65 or under.
ii. Four probationer cooks to each kitchen where cooking is carried out for messing strength in excess of 65
d. Mess Stewards:
i. One mess steward for each 25 all ranks (or portion thereof) on unit messing strength.
ii. In addition, one mess steward for each 6 officers (or portion thereof) on unit messing strength up to a total of 42 officers.
iii. When the number of officers exceeds 42, one extra mess steward for each 9 officers ( or portion thereof) on unit strength in excess of 42).
iv. Mess stewards in any mess to include at least one NCO, except when total number of mess stewards is less than 3.

In calculating ranks of messing staff, the following guide will be used: In every 69 messing staff OR’s carried on establishment under STCG there may be 21 NCOs from Corporal upwards on the following scale:
One Warrant Officer.
Two Staff Sergeants.
Six Sergeants.
Twelve Corporals.

The chief cook in any unit will rank as the senior member of the messing staff, irrespective of the rank of the senior mess steward. He will be responsible for:
a. The proper functioning of the messing staff.
b. Close co-operation with the unit messing officer.
c. Training of probationer cooks.

Amended establishments will be issued shortly.

New Zealand Army Instruction 2147, 15 September 1948

With this new directive, New Zealand Army cooks (NZWAC cooks and stewards, which remained a separate corps but were under technical control of the RNZASC for catering purposes, until 1977 when they joined the RNZASC) were finally consolidated into a single corps, allowing for a standardised training syllabus. Additionally, to enhance the catering function and provide a comprehensive messing service, the Stewards trade was formalised as part of the RNZASC. By the end of 1948, the groundwork had been laid for the RNZASC Catering trade to support the evolving New Zealand army.

In conclusion, the evolution of Army catering in New Zealand from 1845 to 1948 reflects a journey marked by adaptability, innovation, and a commitment to sustaining the morale and effectiveness of New Zealand’s military forces. During this period, New Zealand’s military catering underwent a significant transformation from rudimentary messing arrangements in the early militia days. However, the importance of well-fed troops was consistently recognised, as evidenced by the efforts to improve messing arrangements, the establishment of training programs for cooks, and the integration of civilian and military personnel into the catering function. Despite challenges such as dissatisfaction with rations and the shortage of trained cooks, the New Zealand Army continually sought to enhance its catering capabilities, particularly in response to the demands of wartime mobilisation.
The establishment of the Army School of Cookery, the integration of female cooks into the military establishment, and the adoption of international best practices, such as those observed in the British and Canadian armies, demonstrate New Zealand’s commitment to modernising its catering services and ensuring the provision of quality meals for its troops.
By consolidating army catering services under the RNZASC umbrella and formalising the Cooks and Stewards trades, the New Zealand Army laid the groundwork for a more structured and professional catering function as the country transitioned into the post-war era. By 1948, the stage was set for the RNZASC Catering trade to play a pivotal role in supporting the evolving needs of the New Zealand army, reflecting a legacy of culinary excellence and dedication to service.

Notes

[1] “Newtown Park Camp (Inquiry into Conduct of),” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1901 Session I, H-19a (1901).

[2] “New Zealand Contingent (No 1): Extracts from Reports by Major Robin, Commanding New Zealand Contingent, to Officer Commanding Forces,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1900 Session I, H-06a (1900).

[3] J Babington, “Defence Forces of New Zealand (Report on the) by Major General J.M Babington, Commandant of the Forces.,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1904 Session I, H-19 (1904).

[4] Based on the British logistics system the NZASC was to be responsible for the Transport and the supply of forage, rations and fuel. The supply and maintenance of all small-arms, ammunition, accoutrements, clothing, and field equipment Stores was to remain a responsibility of the Defence Stores Department which in 1917 became the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps. Robert McKie, “Unappreciated Duty: The Forgotten Contribution of New Zealand’s Defence Stores Department in Mobilising the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in 1914: A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand” (Massey University, 2022).

[5] “H-19 Report on the Defence Forces of New Zealand for the Period 28 June 1912 to 20 June 1913,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives (1913).

[6] “Military Forces of New Zealand (Report by the Inspector General of Ther Overseas Forces on the),” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1914 Session I, H-19a (1914).

[7] “H-19 Military Forces of New Zealand, Annual Report of the Chief of the General Staff,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, (1938).

[8] “Vocational Training,” Wairarapa Times-Age, , 17 January 1939.

[9] “Military Camps,” Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 80, , 5 April 1939.

[10] “Army Cooks,” Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 103, , 4 May 1939.

[11] “Walked out Army Cooks,” Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 114, , 17 May 1939.

[12] “Soldier Cooks,” King Country Chronicle, Volume XXXIII, Issue 4856,, 1 November 1939.

[13] “Diet for Troops,” King Country Chronicle, Volume XXXIII, Issue 4856,, 1 December 1939.

[14] William Graham McClymont, To Greece, vol. 4 (War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1959), 23.

[15] Thomas Duncan MacGregor Stout, New Zealand Medical Services in Middle East and Italy, vol. 12 (War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1956), 47.

[16] Iris Latham, The Waac Story (Wellington, New Zealand1986), 1-4.

[17] “Moral Builders NZ Army Cooks,” Bay of Plenty Times, Volume LXXI, Issue 13760,, 1 October 1942.

[18] “Waac’s New Role,” Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 207, , 30 May 1944.

[19] Arnold Warren, Wait for the Waggon: The Story of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (McClelland, 1961).

[20] “Special New Zealand Army Order 60/1947 – the Star Classification and Promotion of Other Ranks of Ther Regular Force,”(1947).

[21] “New Zealand Army Instruction 2049 – Supplies and Transport Catering Group, Rnzasc,”(1948).

[22] “New Zealand Army Instruction 2147 – Supplies and Transport Catering Group, Rnzasc,”(1948).

Transition and Transformation: RNZAOC in 1972

3 Comments Robert McKie

In the historical tapestry of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC), 1972 is a pivotal year, marking twenty-two years since New Zealand’s initial involvement in combat operations in South Korea. The nation continued actively participating in conflicts such as the Malayan Emergency, the Indonesian Confrontation, and the South Vietnam War. Throughout this period, New Zealand maintained a robust part-time territorial army sustained by Compulsory Military Training, all aimed at creating a versatile, all-arms Combat Brigade Group.

However, 1972 marked a turning point. It witnessed the conclusion of Compulsory Military Training, resulting in a reduction in the Territorial Force and its transformation into a volunteer force. Concurrently, with the conclusion of New Zealand’s commitment to the Vietnam War, the country entered a phase marked by individual engagements in United Nations Peacekeeping operations, a eighty-day mission to Rhodesia, the establishment of a permanent peace monitoring force in the Sinai, and participation in exercises both in New Zealand and overseas. This era ushered in a period of peace for the New Zealand Army, with nearly two decades passing before the RNZAOC would deploy a unit into a combat environment once again.

As 1972 concluded and the New Zealand Army and the RNZAOC entered this new era, they did so with a cadre of well-trained and experienced warrant and non-commissioned officers. This article will delve into the RNZAOC Regular Officer Cadre of 1972, as documented in the New Zealand Army Graduation List Regular Officer of 31 Oct 1972.

The RNZAOC of 1972 consisted of around 350 Regular and Territorial Officers and Other Ranks, including Storeman Clerks, Ammunition Technicians, Auto Parts, Footwear Repairers, Motor Trimmers, Tailors, and Clerks across numerous units, including.

Main Ordnance Depot, Trentham
RNZAOC School, Trentham
1 Central Ordnance Depot, Hopuhopu
2 Central Ordnance Depot, Linton
3 Central Ordnance Depot, Burnham
1 Composite Ordnance Depot, Mangaroa
5 Advanced Ordnance Depot, Singapore
Workshops Stores Section in RNZEME Workshops’
As Staff in various Headquarters

At this stage, female soldiers belonged to the New Zealand Woman’s Royal Army Corps (NZWRAC), with many posted to RNZAOC units as integral members of those units.

The Graduation List Regular Officer is divided into three Parts.

Part 1 – Regular Officers
Part 2 – Regular Quartermaster Officers
Part 3 – Supernumerary List

Part 1 – RNZAOC Regular Officers

Lieutenant Colonels

Clifford Leaman Sanderson, psc
Geoffrey John Hayes Atkinson, MBE, M Inst PS

Majors

John Barrie Glasson, (T/Lt-Col 1 Jan 71)
Malcolm John Ross, psc (T/Lt-Col 20 Oct 72)

Captains

Arthur John Campbell, ANZIM, psc (T/Maj 1 Aug 68)
Piers Martin Reid, (T/Maj 1 Feb 69)
Michael Dawney Hunt, ANZIM (T/Maj 1 Feb 69)
Terence David McBeth, (T/Maj 1 Nov 69)
Ian Geoffrey Ross
Ronald Leslie Cross, psc (T/Maj 21 Jun 70)
Gary Malcolm Corkin
John Andrew Henderson
John Robert Hicks
David John Rees
Michael Joseph Cooper
Terence John Verrall

Lieutenants

Maxwell Frederick Newnham, (T/Capt 7 Mar 70)
Patrick Te Tahuri Puohotaua
Michael Alexender Cowan
John Francis Hyde, (T/Capt 1 Apr 71)
Kevin John Dreyer, (T/Capt 22 Jun 72)
Paul Edwin Dangerfield
Keith David Hansen
Mark David Stuart, BA (mil)
Peter Martin O’Brien
Grant William Blackburn

Second Lieutenants

Noel Anthony Hitchings
Allan Charles Lash

Part 2 – RNZAOC Quartermaster List

Captains and Quartermasters

William Maxwell Campbell, (T/Maj & QM 1 Aug 68)
Patrick George Burns, (T/Maj & QM 25 Apr 69)
David Ralph Hughes, T/Maj & QM 3 Jun 70)
Keith Alexander Watson
Ian Roy Larsen
Alan Paul Bezar

Lieutenants and Quartermasters

Donald Winter Stewart, (T/Capt & QM 22 Feb 71)
Hector Searle McLachlan, (T/Capt & QM 1 May 71)
Godfrey Edward Lee, (T/Capt & am 5 Apr 71)
Stewart McDonald Fussell, (T/Capt & QM 5 Apr 71)
John Edward Hancox, (T/Capt & QM 1 Jul 70)
Edward Vennell Sweet, (T/Capt & QM 11 Aug 71)
Alfred Stephenson Day, (T/Capt & QM 3 Sep 71)
James William Twist

Part 3 – RNZAOC Supernumerary List

Majors

Ronald George Henderson Golightly

Captains

Carleton Robert Duggan, (T/Maj & QM 14 Sep 68)
George Edward Butler, (QM) (T/Maj & QM 4 Aug 69)

Statistics on the RNZAOC 1972 Officers List

Duntroon Graduates- 1
Portsea Graduates -10
RF Cadets – 2
Served in other Corps before joining RNZAOC – 7

Operational Service

WW2 – 4
J Force – 2
K Force – 2
Malaya – 6
Vietnam – 15

Service and Age

1972 Average age – 36 years
Average age on leaving RNZAOC – 44 years.
Over 20 years of RNZAOC Service – 27
Cumulative amount of RNZAOC Service – 880 Years
Shortest Service in RNZAOC – 2 Years
Longest Service in RNZAOC – 36 Years
Average length of NZ Army Service – 62 Years
Average length of RNZAOC Service – 59 Years

Appointments

Chief of General Staff- 1
Director of Ordnance Services – 7
Chief Instructor RNZAO School – 8
Chief Ammunition Technical Officer – 3
Colonel-Commandant – 2

In 1972, the RNZAOC entered a transformative period, marked by changes in training, force structure, and the cessation of its involvement in the Vietnam War. The graduation list reflects a diverse group of officers, well-versed in various aspects of military service. As the RNZAOC transitioned into a new era characterised by peacekeeping missions and operational diversification, the officers of 1972 carried with them a wealth of experience and training, setting the stage for the Corps’ future endeavours. The statistical overview provides insights into the officers’ backgrounds, service history, and appointments, highlighting the depth of expertise within the RNZAOC during this pivotal time.

10 LAD, Water Supply – Operation Compass, December 1940 – January 1941

Leave a comment Robert McKie

Accounts of New Zealand Ordnance Units’ wartime activities are rare, with one of the few accounts from the Second World War found in the wartime publication Prelude to War.

Prelude To Battle was the first of ten surveys on the 2^nd New Zealand Expeditionary Forces (2 NZEF) produced by the New Zealand Army Board during the Second World War to provide short articles on the activities of 2 NZEF.

Prelude To Battle was published by Whitcombe & Tombs, in 1942 and covers the first Libyan Campaign of June -December 1940. Prelude To Battle includes chapters on

the LRDG,
Divisional Signals,
NZASC, 4th NZ Mechanical Transport Company (4RMT), and
New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC), 10 Light Aid Detachment (10 LAD) attached to New Zealand Engineers (NZE), 5 Field Park Company

The chapter Water Supplies covers explicitly the activities 10 LAD during Operation Compass, which was the first significant British military operation of the Western Desert Campaign (1940–1943), during which British, Empire and Commonwealth forces attacked Italian forces in western Egypt and Cyrenaica, the eastern province of Libya, from December 1940 to February 1941.

10 LAD was one of 11 LADs, numbered 9 to 19, raised as part of the NZOC in late 1939 to render assistance and repair mechanic transport and the anti-tank units of 2 NZEF. Raised at Hopuhopu Camp, 10 LAD was commanded by Second Lieutenant George D Pollock, and attached to 5 Field Park Company, NZE. 10 LAD sailed as part of the Main Body of 2 NZEF in January 1940, Disembarking in Egypt in February 1940.

In late 1940 New Zealand units, including the Fifth Field Park Company, with 10 LAD attached, Divisional Signals, 4 RMT and other specialist troops, had been seconded to General Archibald Wavell for Operation Compass. The official War History New Zealand Engineers, Middle East states, “but beyond guarding the water pipeline and establishing water points and forward dumps at Charing Cross, the Company was not much affected. The British Army seemed to do very well without its assistance”. However, as this Prelude To Battle chapter describes, 10 LAD played a critical role in ensuring water supply to the advancing allied units.

A Light Aid Detachment, Water Colour by Captain Peter McIntyre

The Prelude to Battle chapter, Water Supplies, reads:

Concerned with the maintenance of water plants to supply the troops advancing into Cyrenaica and the servicing of Royal Engineers’ equipment, the 10th Light Aid Detachment of the New Zealand Ordnance Corps entered each town almost immediately after its capture to attend to the water installations and pumping appliances.

Before the British assumed the offensive, the 10^th LAD has succeeded in drawing water from about ten feet below the surface at Burbeita and in the sandhills at Baggush. When Fort Nibeiwa was attacked on 8 December, the 10^th LAD were in caves in the escarpment at Charing Cross, several miles inland from Mersa Matruh. As soon as the last of the Sisi Barrano forts was captured, Major G. D. Pollock, who commanded the 10^th LAD went to Sidi Barrani to attend to the water works there. He found in perfect order a Fiat diesel pumping engine capable of 250 litres an hour and a plant for distilling salt water. The remainder of the 10th LAD entered Sidi Barrani two days later. The Italians also left a large pumping station almost at Buqbuq, half way between Sidi Barrani and Sollum .

As the Australians concentrated for the Battle of Bardia, the 10^th LAD were filling and working water wagons for Sollim. At this stage they began to operate closely with the 5^th Field Park Company and on 10 January they moved with them to the harbour at Bardia. A fortnight later they were in Tobruk at work on the large distilling plant. After the Battle of Derna and the subsequent Italian withdrawal towards Benghazi, the 10^th LAD were given a special job. The British command had made the decision to cut across the plateau south of Benghazi: the success of this plan depended on getting a supply of water quickly to Msus, some 500 miles south-west of Derna. it was the responsibility of the 1Oth LAD to have ninety-five tons of water at this point for the armoured division. This was accomplished. The operation succeeded, Benghazi fell, and the whole of Cyrenaica was subsequently occupied. In northern Cyrenaica, the water problem ceased. West of Derna lies a region of small streams, trees and green countryside decorated with fresh white buildings. When the British consolidated in this area in February 1941 the work of the 10^th LAD ended and they followed the New Zealand signallers. Transport driver and engineers back to Helwan, where the New Zealand Division had taken up its station preparatory to its departure for Greece.
Prelude to Battle Page 32-34

Following this brief excursion into Libya, 10 LAD continued to be attached to 5 Field Park, NZE for the remainder of the war. In November 1942, the New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NZEME) was formed as part of 2 NZEF and 10 LAD transferred from the NZOC to the NZEME. 10 LAD was disestablished in late 1945.

“Arte et Marte”
By Skill and By Fighting

New Zealand’s Flaming “A” Badge

1 Comment Robert McKie

In the New Zealand Army realm, there exists a group of exceptional individuals known as Ammunition Technical Officers (ATOs) and Ammunition Technicians (ATs). These brave men and women have adored a distinctive emblem since 1971—the Flaming “A” Badge—a symbol that embodies their trade’s hazardous and highly skilled nature. But this badge represents far more than just a visual representation of their profession. It is a tribute, recognising their trade’s extensive and illustrious heritage.

What began as the management of powder magazines in the 19th century has evolved into a responsibility encompassing the entire spectrum of ammunition and explosives available to the modern New Zealand Army. The AT trade has adapted and grown, keeping pace with the changing times and technologies. And since 1971, the Flaming “A” Badge has remained a constant, a badge of honour that signifies the dangerous nature of their work and the expertise required to execute it with precision.

Beyond its symbolism, the Flaming “A” Badge is a profound acknowledgement to those who wear it—a testament to the long and proud whakapapa (genealogy) of their trade. It is a reminder of the individuals who came before them, laying the foundation and forging the path they now tread. Each wearer of the badge carries the weight of history, embodying the spirit and dedication that has defined the AT trade over the years.

During the early colonial period in New Zealand, importing ammunition and explosives from the United Kingdom and Australia was necessary. Powder magazines were established at Mount Cook in Wellington and Mount Albert in Auckland to store and distribute these essential supplies safely. The responsibility of handling and storing these stocks fell upon qualified individuals from the British Military Stores Department and Royal Artillery and Engineer officers.

As the Imperial Forces gradually withdrew from New Zealand in 1870, the full responsibility for the country’s magazines and ammunition transferred to the Defence Stores Department. Subsequently, new facilities were constructed at Mount Eden in Auckland and Kaiwharawhara in Wellington, replacing the previous powder magazines at Mount Albert and Mount Cook. These new sites remained in use until the 1920s. Additionally, magazines were maintained by the Defence Stores Department in various provincial centres to support the dispersed Militia and Volunteer Forces.

In 1884, the permanent Garrison Artillery was formed, and two experienced individuals, Frederick Silver and Robert George Vinning Parker, were transferred from the Royal Marine Artillery and Royal Garrison Artillery to serve as instructors. Their expertise proved invaluable in mounting New Zealand’s Garrison Artillery, as they compiled books and manuals and managed artillery ammunition stocks in collaboration with the Defence Storekeeper.

Capitalizing on the government’s support, Major John Whitney established Whitney & Sons as an ammunition manufacturing company in Auckland. Later, with additional investors, the company evolved into the Colonial Ammunition Company (CAC) in 1888—the first ammunition manufacturer in New Zealand and Australasia. The CAC contracted with the New Zealand Government to produce Small Arms Ammunition (SAA). The agreement stipulated that the government supplied the powder while the CAC provided the components to manufacture complete cartridges. Each batch underwent government inspection and quality control checks before acceptance by the New Zealand Forces. The testing process involved firing a small percentage of the batch to determine its performance and whether it met the required standards.

By 1890, the production of .577 Snyder Ball Ammunition was underway, and the initial batches underwent testing, inspection, and acceptance under the supervision of Major John Pirie of the New Zealand Militia. Major Pirie, a former Major in the Guernsey Militia, had immigrated to New Zealand and assumed the Auckland District Musketry Instructor role in 1881. He continued to inspect manufactured ammunition until July 1891 when Major Goring, Officer Commanding the Auckland District, took over the responsibility. Lieutenant J E Hume of the Permanent Militia assumed the ammunition examination duties from 1893 while concurrently handling other responsibilities.

On 6 February 1898, a formal request was made to the United Kingdom to recruit a suitable Warrant Officer from the Royal Artillery to oversee the testing operations and supervise the manufacture of Small Arms Ammunition. Quartermaster Sergeant Instructor Arthur Duvall from the Artillery College in the Royal Garrison Artillery was selected as the Small Arms Testing Officer for the New Zealand Forces. Upon appointment, he was promoted to 3rd Class Master Gunner and engaged for three years at a rate of Nine Shillings per day, along with free quarters or a housing allowance of £50 per annum. Duvall arrived in New Zealand in July 1898 and began his work at the CAC premises in Mount Eden, Auckland. He extended his engagement every three years and completed twenty years of service with the British Army in 1911. Duvall then took his discharge in New Zealand, immediately enlisting in the New Permanent Staff as an Honorary Lieutenant on 26 April 1912, followed by a promotion to Honorary Captain on 1 April 1914.

In 1902, Frederick Silver transitioned from the Artillery and took on the role of Assistant Defence Storekeeper. While fulfilling his duties in this position, Silver managed all Artillery stores and ammunition. After implementing the Defence Act 1909 and subsequent reorganization, Silver transferred from the Defence Stores to the office of the Director of Artillery. He was appointed Quartermaster (Honorary Lieutenant) as Artillery Stores Accountant, retaining his responsibilities overseeing Artillery stores and ammunition. Silver retired in June 1913, and Robert George Vinning Parker succeeded him as Artillery Stores Accountant after being promoted from Warrant Officer to Quartermaster (Honorary Lieutenant).

Although the Colonial Ammunition Company (CAC) in Auckland provided self-sufficiency in Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) production, the same could not be said for artillery ammunition, which still had to be imported. Parker conducted a cost-benefit analysis and concluded that significant annual savings of £3,333 (2022 NZD$ 633,605) could be achieved by cleaning and refilling casings, inspecting and refurbishing propellant bags, and manufacturing new ones as needed. To realize these savings, Parker recommended the establishment of a specialized Royal New Zealand Artillery Ordnance Corps Section responsible for manufacturing and modifying ammunition. General Godley approved the proposal in mid-1914, and on 1 March 1915, under New Zealand Defence Forces General Order 90, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Section was authorized and established from 1 April 1915.

On 31 May 1917, regulations were approved and published, constituting the New Zealand Army Ordnance Department (NZAOD) and New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC), with retroactive effect from 1 February 1917. This marked the end of the forty-eight-year service the Defence Stores Department provided. Administrative control of the New Zealand Artillery Ordnance Section was transferred to the NZAOC, and Parker was commissioned as Captain in the NZAOD, serving as the Inspector of Ordnance Machinery. However, Parker’s tenure in this position was brief, as he retired on 30 September 1919.

On 10 January 1918, Arthur Duvall was transferred from the Permanent Staff to the NZAOD, assuming the role of Proof Officer SAA with the rank of Captain. The post of Proof Officer SAA would continue to be a continuous appointment in the New Zealand Army’s ammunition supply chain until 1968, when the CAC relocated its operations to Australia, concluding its longstanding association with the New Zealand Army.

The experiences of World War I emphasized the need for specialized officers with technical knowledge of ammunition. Captain William Ivory, RNZA, returned to New Zealand in 1919 after completing several courses of instruction in the United Kingdom and assumed the position of Inspecting Ordnance Officer (IOO). Lieutenant A de T Nevill, RNZA, served as Acting IOO in 1925, allowing Ivory to fulfil regimental duties within the RNZA. Ivory resumed the position of IOO on 2 January 1927. Upon Ivory’s retirement in 1933, Lieutenant Ivan Roberts Withell, RNZA, succeeded him as IOO, a role he held until his passing on 31 August 1946.

In 1917, the Royal New Zealand Artillery (RNZA) Ordnance Section at Fort Ballance came under NZAOC control upon the formation of the NZAOC. The section continued its responsibilities for storing, repairing, and refurbishing ammunition under the supervision of the RNZA. With the closure of the Kaiwharawhara Magazines in the early 1920s, Watts Peninsula on the north end of Wellington’s Miramar Peninsula became the primary ammunition depot of the NZAOC. This depot consisted of 19 magazines, one store, and a laboratory spread across Shelly Bay, Kau Point, Mahanaga Bay, Fort Ballance, and Fort Gordon. These facilities were repurposed submarine mining and coastal artillery fortifications dating back to the 1880s. The large six- and eight-inch disappearing guns had been removed in the early 1920s, and the gun pits were converted into makeshift magazines. However, these accommodations were not ideal as they lacked proper temperature and moisture control, posing potential risks to ammunition stocks.

A smaller Ammunition section was also maintained at Mount Eden in Auckland until 1929 when, along with some staff from Fort Ballance, the Mount Eden Ammunition Section was transferred to New Magazines at Hopuhopu Camp. Intended to serve as the principal ammunition depot for New Zealand, between 1925 and 1927, eleven magazines and a laboratory were constructed at Hopuhopu Camp. The magazines, built into the hillside to contain any blasts, were made of concrete with double walls, creating an inspecting chamber. The purpose of the inspecting chamber was to enable sentries to monitor thermometers and adjust ventilation to maintain the optimal temperature of the stocks by consulting a chart.

In 1931, the NZAOC Ammunition sections underwent civilianization, transferring nearly all the NZAOC military staff to the Public Service as civilian employees, usually at lower pay rates or placing them on superannuation due to government budgetary constraints.

When New Zealand entered the Second World War in September 1939, the responsibility for ammunition was shared between the RNZA and the NZAOC.

The Director of Artillery was responsible to the General Officer Commanding for.
- The provision and allocation of gun ammunition,
- The receipt, storage, and issue of gun ammunition and explosives other than small-arms ammunition
The Director of Ordnance Services, assisted by the IOO and the SAA Proof Officer, were responsible to the Quartermaster-General for.
- The inspection and repair of gun ammunition,
- The provision, receipt, storage and distribution of small arms ammunition.

NZAOC Ammunition facilities and personnel shared by the RNZA and NZAOC in September 1939 consisted of.

The IOO, Captain I.R Withell, RNZA
The Proof Officer, SAA Mount Eden Auckland, Honorary Lieutenant J.W Fletcher, NZPS
19 Magazines, 1 Store, and an Ammunition Laboratory at Fort Ballance managed by
- an RNZA WO1 seconded to the NZAOC
- five members of the NZAOC civilian staff
11 Magazines and an Ammunition Laboratory at Hopuhopu Camp managed by
- an RNZA WO1 seconded to the NZAOC and
- two members of the NZAOC civilian staff.
Single SAA Magazines at Trentham and Burnham Camps.

From 1940 as the New Zealand Army moved from a peacetime to a wartime footing, the Ammunition trade grew exponentially as new infrastructure was constructed to accommodate the extensive range of ammunition required for training and home defence, with Modern Explosive Store Houses built at.

Burnham – 8 Magazines
Ohakea – 6 Magazine
Papakura (Ardmore)- 28 Magazines
Hopuhopu and Kelms Road – 55 Magazines
Waiouru – 45 Magazines
Makomako – 39 Magazines
Trentham (Kuku Valley) – 22 Magazines
Belmont – 62 Magazines
Glen Tunnel – 16
Mount Somers – 10
Fairlie – 9
Alexandra – 9

In 1942 a conference of the QMG, DQMG2, AQMG5, COO, DCOO and IOO reset the wartime policy and organisation of New Zealand Military Ammunition services in which,

The COO and the Ordnance Ammunition Group were responsible for the management and storage of ammunition
the Chief IOO (CIOO) was responsible for all technical management and inspection of ammunition.

With the role of the IOO branch now defined, from January 1943, the establishment of the IOO Branch was steadily increased to more robust levels.

From mid-1945, discussions started taking place on the post-war shape of the NZAOC. Some thought was given to returning the NZAOC to its pre-war status as a predominantly civilian organisation. Reality prevailed, and the future of the NZAOC was assured as a permanent component of the post-war Army.

The Proposed establishment of NZAOC Ammunition units saw the first widespread use of Ammunition Examiner (AE) as the ammunition trade name. AEs had existed in the British Army since 1923, evolving from the trade of Military Laboratory Foreman that had been established in 1886. Although the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) authorised the use of a specialist AE badge consisting of an ‘AE in Wreath’ in 1942, permission to wear this badge was not granted to New Zealand AEs.

RAOC Ammunition Examiner Trade Badge 1942 to 1950 with ‘homemade’ Brass Version.

The first New Zealand AE were in the 2^nd New Zealand Expeditionary (2NZEF), where New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC) AEs were included as part of the 2nd New Zealand Division NZASC Ammunition Company establishment. Little information is known about the 2NZEF AEs. They were likely recruited from within 2NZEF, given some rudimentary training by the RAOC and set to work.

From 1 June 1945, the Artillery Headquarters element responsible for managing Gun Ammunition, the Ammunition and Equipment Section, was transferred to the control of the Chief Ordnance Officer (COO), ending the RNZA roles in the management of ammunition that had existed since the 1880s and the employment of Parker and Silver. As a result of the transfer, 11 Officers and 175 Other Ranks of the Royal New Zealand Artillery were absorbed into the NZAOC establishment.

On 15 November 1945, the QMG directed that the care, maintenance, accounting and storage of all ammunition and explosives was the responsibility of the COO. Under the COO, these duties were to be undertaken by

The IOO Section
The NZAOC Ammunition Section

Under the CIOO, the IOO Section was responsible for.

The control of all work on ammunition for all purposes other than accounting and storage,
Maintenance of Ammunition and explosives in stock in a serviceable condition and ready for use,
Provision of personnel for inspection and repair and for working parties to carry out repairs,
Provision of all equipment and stores required for the inspection and repair of ammunition,
Provision and accounting for Motor Transport necessary for the transport of stock for inspection and repair,
Administration and control of Repair Depot Trentham,
Maintenance of buildings at Repair Depot Trentham.

The NZAOC Ammunition Section was responsible for.

The accounting, storage and care of ammunition and explosives,
Maintenance or magazines areas and of buildings and services connected with the storage of ammunition and explosives,
Administration of personnel of the IOO Section, while attached to ammunition depots concerning pay, rations, quarters, clothing and discipline,
Transport arrangements for the movement of ammunition not connected with the inspection and repair of ammunition at depots.

The provision of suitably trained personnel was a constant problem for the CIOO. A course for IOOs was conducted over November/December 1945 to provide sufficient Officers to fill the IOO establishment.

In December 1945, the results for No. 2 Course of Instruction—Inspection Ordnance Officers—were published. Of the thirty-five officers and other ranks who sat the written examination, eighteen achieved the qualifying mark of 50 per cent or better. Twelve officers were duly appointed as Inspection Ordnance Officers; from the ranks, two Warrant Officers Class I, a Staff Sergeant, a Sergeant, a Corporal, and a Private qualified as Ammunition Examiners.

On 1 September 1946, Army Headquarters “Q” Branch underwent a significant reorganisation that established the New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NZEME). New Zealand’s Ordnance Services were also restructured under the Director of Army Equipment (DAE), who became the senior NZAOC position.

The reorganisation led to the division of Ordnance Services under the DAE into the following roles:

COO: This role oversaw Headquarters New Zealand Ordnance Services, including the Provision Group.
CIOO: This role held responsibility for the IOO Group.

Following the retirement of Lieutenant Colonel C.S.J. Duff, DSO, RNZA, who served as the incumbent DAE, on 3 July 1947, the position was renamed Director of Ordnance Services (DOS). Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Huia Andrews, RNZAOC, assumed the role as the first post-war DOS on 1 October 1947.

By 1949 the Ammunition organisation had further evolved, combining the IOO and NZAOC Section into a single ammunition organisation, with

The CIOO and staff providing DOS with the required technical advice on ammunition
District IOOs appointed to each District Headquarters as the Ammo advisor to the District DADOS
District Ammunition Sections now renamed as
- Northern District Ammunition Depot
- Central District Ammunition Depot
- Southern District Ammunition Depot
Army Ammunition Repair Depot
Army Ammunition Supply Depot

To facilitate the further reorganisation and refinement of the Ammunition functions, the DOS hosted the first conference of Senior Ammunition Officers at Trentham Camp from 21-24 June 1949.

As the role of Inspection Ordnance Officers and Ammunition Examiners became integrated into the structure of the New Zealand Army, the Ammunition trade continued to face challenges due to limited resources, despite operating at a high tempo. Throughout the 1950s, the trade supported various activities, including:

Continuous inspection of wartime ammunition held in depots.
Disposal of surplus and obsolete ammunition through methods such as dumping at sea, destruction within depots, sale to the public (SAA natures), and transfer to allied nations.
The Supply of ammunition to support Compulsory Military Training.
The Disposal of blinds and unexploded ammunition discovered in wartime training areas.
The conduct of trials and introduction of new types of ammunition into service.
The provision of technical ammunition support to the Fiji Military Forces.

Meanwhile, an exciting development occurred in the United Kingdom in 1948 when a competition was held to design a new badge for RAOC (Royal Army Ordnance Corps) Ammunition Examiners. Major Leonard Thomas Herbert Phelps submitted a design that was eventually accepted. The badge featured a 3″ x 2″ Flaming Grenade in red, black, and gold, with the letter “A” incorporated within the grenade. This symbolised the AE trade’s status as an “A” Class trade and became the British Army’s first three-colour trade badge. There were rumours that the Elizabeth Arden Cosmetics Company logo inspired the design.

The year 1950 marked a significant milestone as the British Army Dress Committee granted permission for Ammunition Examiners (AEs) with the rank of Sergeant and above to wear the esteemed ‘Flaming A’ Trade Badge as a distinguished ‘Badge of Appointment’. Although this recognition was granted, it took some time for the approval to extend to the Ammunition Trades within New Zealand. Nonetheless, the journey was underway to officially embrace the ‘Flaming A’ Badge within the ranks of New Zealand’s Ammunition Trades..

Large ‘Ammunition Examiner’ Badge c1950, Brass and Anodized ‘Flaming A’ Badges. https://raoc.websitetoolbox.com/post/ammunition-technicians-badge-1566875?highlight=ammunition%20technician%20badge

In 1959, a thorough evaluation of army dress embellishments was undertaken to establish a clear policy regarding the wear of various embellishments, including:

Shoulder titles
Formation Patches
Service Badges
Badges of Appointment
Instructors Badges
Skill-at-Arms Badges
Tradesmen’s badges

During the review of Badges of Appointment, it was noted that specific badges worn by the British Army were also authorised for wear by the New Zealand Army. These badges, such as the Gun for RNZE, Grenade for RNZA, Hammer and Pincers for RNZEME, and Lyre for Bandsmen, were worn by Warrant Officers, Staff Sergeants, and Sergeants in their respective units.
Regarding the flaming “A” badge of the RAOC AE, it was recognised that it held significance and merit for adoption by the ammunition trades of the RNZAOC. Consequently, the adoption of the flaming “A” badge was recommended.

Despite the numerous recommendations during the army dress embellishment review, only decisions regarding shoulder titles and formation patches were made. The Army Dress Committee requested the Adjutant General to prepare a paper on dress embellishments and develop a policy specifically addressing Badges of Appointment, Instructors Badges, Skill-at-Arms Badges, and Tradesmen’s badges. Unfortunately, the wait for a badge for AEs was set to continue.

As the RNZAOC organisation matured in the late 1950s, it became apparent that the system in place of having separate Ordnance, Vehicle and Ammunition Depots located in the same locations but under different command arrangements was impracticable and not an efficient use of resources. Starting in 1961, a reorganisation was undertaken to consolidate administrative, accounting and store functions under one headquarters. The restructuring resulted in only one RNZAOC depot in each district, which consisting of,

Headquarters,
Stores Sub-Depot,
Ammunition Sub-Depot,
Vehicle Sub-Depot
Traffic Centre.

To achieve this, all the existing District Ammunition Depots became sub-depots of a District Ordnance Depot, designated as.

Ammunition Sub-Depot, Northern Districts Ordnance Depot (NDOD) – Ngāruawāhia,
Ammunition Sub-Depot Central Districts Ordnance Depot (CDOD) – Linton,
Ammunition Sub-Depot Southern Districts Ordnance Depot (SDOD) – Burnham

Ammunition Sub-Depots now consisted of:

Ammunition Inspection Section.
Ammunition Repair Section.
Non-Explosive Store.
NDOD Ammunition Areas.
- Ardmore
- Kelm road
- Ngāruawāhia
CDOD Ammunition Areas
- Waiouru
- Makomako
- Belmont
- Trentham
SDOD Ammunition Areas
- Burnham
- Glentunnel
- Fairlie
- Mt Somers

In 1960 the RAOC renamed their Ammunition Trades, and concurrent with the 1961 reorganisation, the RNZAOC decided to align the Ammunition Trade with the RAOC and adopt the same trade names, making the following changes.

Chief Inspecting Ordnance Officer became Chief Ammunition Technical Officer
Senior Inspecting Ordnance Officer became Senior Ammunition Technical Officer
District Inspecting Ordnance Officer became District Ammunition Technical Officer
Inspecting Ordnance Officer became Ammunition Technical Officer
Ammunition Examiner became Ammunition Technician

Up to 1961, Ammunition Technical Officers (ATOs) were usually only employed in Ammunition-related duties. However, as a result of this reorganisation, ATOs were now used across all of the RNZAOC and, as such, were required to balance their regular duties with their Ammunition responsibilities.

1968 saw further reorganisation with the Main Ordnance Depot at Trentham was renamed 1 Base Ordnance Depot and the District Ordnance Depots renamed

Northern District Ordnance Depot to 1 Central Ordnance Depot
Central District Ordnance Depot to 2 Central Ordnance Depot
Southern District Ordnance Depot to 3 Central Ordnance Depot

A significant aspect of the 1968 reorganisation was the Disestablishment of The Small Arms and Proof Office co-located at Mount Eden when the CAC closed down, ending the ammunition trades’ long relationship with the CAA. Additionally, the Ammunition Proof and Experimental Centre operations at Kuku Valley was closed down, and its operations moved to the new Joint Services Proof Establishment at Kauri Point in Auckland.

Keen to provide the Ammunition trade with a suitable trade identifier Major D.H Rollo, the CATO, sent a message to the New Zealand Defence Liaison Staff in London in September 1968 requesting the following information from the UK Chief Inspector of Land Service Ammunition (CILSA) on the RAOC AT Badge

Do other ranks and officers wear it
Conditions of entitlement to wear
Cost of badge
Possibility of procuring samples
Any other pertinent details which may guide in adopting a similar badge

By the end of November 1968, through the New Zealand Defence Liaison Staff, the UK CILSA provided the following information on the RAOC AT badge to the New Zealand CATO,

Worn by all Ammunition Technicians on No 1 and No2 Dress. It is not worn with any other form of dress.
Price
- No1 Dress – 7/6d each,
- No 2 Dress – 5.1/4d each
Samples of each badge to be provided

In April 1969, CATO submitted a proposal to the 77th meeting of the Army Dress Committee, seeking approval to introduce the Flaming “A” badge for New Zealand Ammunition Technicians (ATs). However, the submission was deemed insufficient and was ultimately declined, citing the following reasons:

Equality among trades: It was argued that other trades within the Army equally deserved a similar badge, and singling out ATs may not be justified.
Lower qualification standards: Concerns were raised regarding the perceived lower standards required to qualify for the badge than other trade badges.

The Dress Committee agreed to revisit the matter if additional justification could be provided.

During the same period, developments in the United Kingdom and the ongoing troubles in Northern Ireland led to the unofficially wearing of the RAOC AT badge by Ammunition Technical Officers (ATOs). Subsequently, in June 1971, an ATO badge was introduced through the DOS (Director of Ordnance Services) Bulletin. This badge featured a small ‘Flaming Circle’ without the superimposed letter A, distinguishing it from the badge worn by ATs.

Ammunition Technical Officer’s Badge c1971 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/626107/2017-03109.pdf

Moving forward from Major Rollo’s initial submission, New Zealand’s CATO, Major Bob Duggan, reconsidered the earlier proposal and, on 13 July 1970, through the DOS, submitted the following for a combined AT/ATO Badge,

CONSIDERATIONS

6.            R & SO Vol II provides for the wearing of qualification badges, and a study of that publication reveals that a large proportion of Army Corps already have these. Many badges require less effort for qualification than would the exacting trade of Ammunition Technician. In addition, and supporting the acceptance of an ATO/AT Badge, these technicians are frequently required to deal with other services and members of the public.

7.            The low standard required to qualify for this badge has been reconsidered in light of information obtained on similar standards received from overseas. In addition, it was never the intention to cheapen the significance of this badge in the RNZAOC or those of any other Corps. The standard required to qualify for the ATO/AT badge would now be as follows:

a. Technical Officers who have practised for a minimum of one year.

b. All Ammunition Technicians, regardless of rank, who have qualified in all ways for four stars in their trade.

8.            The Public Relations side of the duties of ATO/Ats, as mentioned in paragraph 6 above, is further explained. This aspect concerns the collection and disposal of stray ammunition and explosives as well as involvement with the Police and other Government Departments in bomb scares. The average annual number of items, all natures and types of stray ammunition which have been collected over the last three years is 5750, which represents approximately 450 calls by ATOs or four-star ATs. ATO/ATs are requested by Police Stations throughout New Zealand

a. To visit many private homes to identify-stray ammunition.

b. Assess whether or not the items are in a dangerous state, and

c. Remove such items for disposal. If an item is in an armed state, it could mean disposal in situ’.

9.            The request is therefore not for a trade badge, but one of recognition and identification as to the dangerous and skilful nature of their specialist work.

With the Support of the Army Q Branch, the Army Dress committee approved the introduction of the AT Badge for qualified RNZAOC ATOs and ATs on 31 May 1971

The New Zealand AT badge adopted in 1971 was identical to the RAOC AT Badge. The criteria for being awarded was for Officers to have completed one year of practical experience after graduating from the ATOs Course in Australia or the United Kingdom. For ATs to qualify, they were required to be qualified in all aspects of the trade, which could take up to six years.

The New Zealand AT Badge was approved to be worn with the following orders of dress;

No 2 Dress Mess Kit, No 3 Dress Summer Mess Kit. On the left lower sleeve, 165mm above the bottom of the cuff
.No 4A Dress Service Dress. On the left lower sleeve, 165mm above the bottom of the cuff, except with warrant officers, it was worn immediately above the badge of rank on the left sleeve.

The United Kingdom continues to maintain different ATO and AT badges. The Australian Army utilises an RAOC style, ATO badge with a stylised Wattle for ATOs and ATs.

Australian Army Ammunition Technical Officer/Ammunition Technician Badge. Robert McKie Collection

Examples of New Zealand ATO/AT Badges

1st pattern Ammunition Technician Badge. Robert McKie Collection

1st pattern Ammunition Technician Badge Mess Kit Badge. Robert McKie Collection

On 24 May 1985, the Army Dress Committee endorsed a proposal that all New Zealand Army Qualification Badges eventually conform to a common heraldic motif as an initiative to develop insignia with a unique New Zealand flavour. The common heraldic motif consisted of the qualification badge surrounded by fern fronds providing a badge with a distinct national character.

Although a scroll could be included, if this was not necessary, the fronds continued and stopped just short of the centre point.

Approved for adoption by the CGS on 6 November 1985, the request went out to trade sponsors to prepare drawings of the current qualification badges encompassing a surround of fern fronds for consideration by the Army Dress Committee.

Although tasked with providing a design of the AT badge incorporating the common motif, on 1 April 1987, CATO provided a submission including the current AT Badge with the common motif, as well as an alternative design in keeping with the requirement to ‘New Zealandise’ qualification badges.

Design provided by CATO of current badge with fern fronds

At the Army Dress Committee meeting on 12 May 1987, it was agreed that to ensure uniformity of design, the AT badge design incorporating the fern fronds was recommended for approval by CGS. This badge was introduced into service in 1988.

In April 1987, the New Zealand AT Badge was approved for wear with Summer Dress (Dacrons) on the left arm 50mm below the point of the shoulder.

2nd pattern Ammunition Technician Badge. Robert McKie Collection

New Zealand ATOs and ATs matured into a highly specialised trade that, on the amalgamation of the RNZAOC into the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment (RNZALR) in 1996, had a wide range of responsibilities, including

The inspection, storage and maintenance of all ammunition and explosives used by the Army
The conduct of technical trials on new ammunition,
The conduct investigations into ammunition incidents and accidents,
The disposal of unserviceable or obsolete ammunition,
The management of Explosive Ordnance Devices and Improvised Explosive Devices.

New Zealand’s Ammunition trade has progressed from storing and managing black powder magazines in the 19th century to managing the many modern ammunition natures available to the 21^st century New Zealand Army. Although introduced in 1971 to recognise and identify the specialist, dangerous and skilful nature of the Ammunition trade, the flaming “A” badge is a fitting symbol of the trade’s progress.

Hopuhopu

Structure of this Study

Military Stores Accounting and Its Distinctions from Commercial Stores Accounting

Differences Between Military and Commercial Stores Accounting

Classification of Military Stores

The Long-Term Use of Military Equipment

The Importance of Accountability in Military Stores Accounting

Early Developments in Stores Accounting

Development of the Artillery Stores (1880s Onwards)

Organisational Reforms and the Defence Council (1906)

The Defence Act 1909 and the Transition to a Citizen Army

Guidance on the duties related to the management of stores

Senior Officers Responsible for Stores and Equipment

District and Unit Responsibilities

Standardising Stores Management and Training

Strategic Assessment, Preparedness and Mobilisation

Supporting the NZEF (1915–1921)

Home Service Stores Accounting

Conclusion: Towards a Modern Military Stores Accounting System

Notes

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Defence Supply Redevelopment Project (DSRP) – 1984

Defence Inventory Structure and Challenges – 1985

Implementation of DSSR

Defence Supply System Development (DSSD)

System Enhancements: Provisioning, Receipts, and Stocktaking

Consumer Unit Accounting – 1993

Transition to SAP

Notes

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The Accounting System

Manual Systems and Administrative Burden

Mobilisation and Training Impact

Progress in Accounting Practices

Reflecting on Wartime Logistics and Accountability

Lessons for Contemporary Military Stores Accounting

Notes

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Introduction

The Deployment and Its Challenges

Infrastructure and Manual Labour as the Backbone

The Ordeal of the Quartermasters

Conclusion

Notes

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Northern Military District

Central Military District

Northern Military District

Central Military District

Southern Military District

Northern Military District

Central Military District

Southern Military District

Notes

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A System Under Strain, Lessons Unlearned in the Interwar Years

Notes

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Part 1 – RNZAOC Regular Officers

Lieutenant Colonels

Majors

Captains

Lieutenants

Second Lieutenants

Part 2 – RNZAOC Quartermaster List

Captains and Quartermasters

Lieutenants and Quartermasters

Part 3 – RNZAOC Supernumerary List

Majors

Captains

Statistics on the RNZAOC 1972 Officers List

Operational Service