Is it time for New Zealand to rethink ammunition production?

n the mid-1880s, New Zealand found itself in a familiar position: isolated, strategically exposed, and reliant on distant supply chains for its defence needs.

The “Russian Scare” of the period sharpened that awareness. There was a growing recognition that, in the event of conflict, the long lines of communication to Britain could not be assumed secure. Ammunition, the most fundamental requirement of any military force, was entirely imported. If those supply lines were disrupted, New Zealand’s ability to defend itself would be constrained not by strategy or manpower, but by the number of rounds remaining in store.

It was in that environment that Major John Whitney made a decision that, at the time, must have appeared both ambitious and uncertain. Rather than accept dependence, he established Whitney & Sons in Auckland, which became the Colonial Ammunition Company in 1888, the first serious attempt to manufacture ammunition in New Zealand and Australasia.[1]

Whitney’s decision was not merely industrial, it was strategic. It reflected a clear understanding that logistics is not simply about distribution, but about ensuring supply exists at all. His factory did not make New Zealand self-sufficient, but it created optionality. It reduced vulnerability. It marked a shift from passive dependence to limited industrial agency.[2]

That pattern, capability built under pressure and allowed to contract in its absence, recurs throughout New Zealand’s military history. The Colonial Ammunition Company expanded during the Second World War to support the Allied war effort, but even at its peak, it remained part of a wider industrial system rather than a fully sovereign capability. In the decades that followed, as global supply chains stabilised and cost pressures increased, domestic production declined, and reliance on overseas supply resumed.

For much of the post-Cold War period, that reliance appeared rational. It is now being tested.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed the fragility of modern ammunition supply chains. Demand has surged, stockpiles have been depleted, and production capacity for key inputs has struggled to keep pace.[3] What was once a background industrial process has become a strategic constraint.

This brings us back to a question that would have been immediately recognisable to Whitney: What happens when supply cannot be assumed?

At the centre of this issue lies nitrocellulose, or guncotton, a critical component in modern propellants. Without it, ammunition production slows regardless of downstream manufacturing capacity.[4] Traditionally, nitrocellulose has been derived from cotton linters, a relatively specialised and geographically constrained raw material. However, an alternative pathway has long been recognised.

As early as 1915, reports noted that German chemists were experimenting with wood pulp as a substitute for cotton in the manufacture of explosives, overcoming challenges associated with impurities and processing.[5] Subsequent research and patents have confirmed that nitrocellulose can be produced from wood-derived cellulose, broadening the potential raw material base for propellant manufacture.[6]

What has changed is not the underlying chemistry, but the strategic context.

States with significant forestry industries are now reassessing whether they are exporting low-value raw materials while importing high-value, strategically critical derivatives. Canada has explored establishing domestic capacity for nitrocellulose production to address supply vulnerabilities.[7] Finland has similarly examined the potential of its pulp industry to contribute to ammunition supply chains.[8]

This raises a contemporary question with historical resonance: If Major John Whitney had the foresight in the 1880s to establish an ammunition industry in New Zealand, is it time for New Zealand to consider leveraging its forestry sector to support the production of wood-cellulose-based energetic materials?

At a structural level, the alignment is evident. New Zealand maintains a substantial forestry sector, generating significant export revenue and producing large volumes of wood and pulp, much of it exported in relatively low-value forms.[9] Converting part of that output into higher-value, strategically relevant products offers a potential pathway to both economic and defence benefits.

However, the technical and industrial barriers are non-trivial.

While wood pulp can be used to produce nitrocellulose, the process requires cellulose of sufficiently high purity, typically by removing lignin, hemicellulose, and other impurities beyond what standard pulping processes achieve.[10] This generally necessitates the production of specialised “dissolving pulp,” which requires additional chemical processing, lower yields, and purpose-built industrial facilities.[11] In practical terms, this means that conventional pulp mills cannot simply be repurposed for explosive manufacture without significant modification or parallel infrastructure.

The implication is clear. This is not an incremental adjustment to existing industry, but a deliberate industrial decision involving capital investment, regulatory development, and long-term commitment.

There are, therefore, broader considerations. Questions of scale, cost, environmental constraints, and strategic intent all come into play. New Zealand must decide whether it seeks full self-sufficiency, niche contribution to allied supply chains, or simply a degree of resilience against disruption.

What history suggests, however, is that waiting for a crisis to force such decisions is rarely efficient.

Whitney did not act in wartime. He acted in anticipation of vulnerability. That is the enduring lesson.

Over the past three decades, New Zealand has benefited from a relatively stable strategic environment. Defence investment has been constrained, industrial capacity has been allowed to narrow, and global supply chains have been assumed to function reliably. Those assumptions are now under increasing strain.

The question is whether New Zealand is prepared to recognise that shift early enough to respond deliberately, rather than reactively.

This is not an argument for immediate industrial expansion. It is, however, an argument for serious consideration. The intersection of forestry, chemistry, and defence supply chains presents a potential opportunity, but one that must be understood in technical, economic, and strategic terms.

At its core, this is not simply a discussion about explosives or pulp.

It is a question of position.

Whether New Zealand remains a consumer at the end of extended supply chains, or, where it makes sense, chooses to move further up those chains and shape its own resilience.

Whitney answered that question in his time.

We may be approaching the point where it must be answered again.

Footnotes

[1] “Ammunition Technician Origins,” To the Warrior His Arms, History of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and it predecessors, 2017, accessed 1 March, 2026, https://rnzaoc.com/2017/12/14/ammunition-technician-origins/.

[2] McKie, “Ammunition Technician Origins.”

[3] SooToday David Helwig, “Could This Explosives Manufacturing Plant Be in the Sault’s Future?” ” Northern Ontario Business. 2026, https://www.northernontariobusiness.com/industry-news/manufacturing/could-this-explosives-manufacturing-plant-be-in-the-saults-future-11920909.

[4] Tadeusz Urbanski, Chemistry and technology of explosives (1964).

[5] “Cotton Largely Used in Making of Explosives: Germany Finds Substitute,” Bay of Plenty Times, 12 August 1915, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/BOPT19150812.2.11.11.4.

[6] “Preparation Method of Nitrocellulose from Wood Pulp.” CN102219861B. ,” Google Patents, 2026, accessed  https://patents.google.com/patent/CN102219861B/en.

[7] David Helwig, “Could This Explosives Manufacturing Plant Be in the Sault’s Future?”

[8] “Finnish Pulp to Solve Shortage of Ammunition in Ukraine.” ” Forest.fi, 2024, accessed  https://forest.fi/article/finnish-pulp-to-solve-shortage-of-ammunition-in-ukraine/.

[9] “Forestry and Wood Processing Statistics,” Ministry for Primary Industries, updated 20 March 2026, 2026, accessed  https://www.mpi.govt.nz/forestry/forest-industry-and-workforce/forestry-wood-processing-data.

[10] Urbanski, Chemistry and technology of explosives.

[11] Chunxia Chen et al., “Cellulose (dissolving pulp) manufacturing processes and properties: A mini-review,” BioResources 11, no. 2 (2016).