Rethinking Military Logistics for New Zealand: Building Resilience from Within

The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine have starkly revealed the vulnerabilities of global supply chains. As these chains slowed and, at times, ceased to be responsive or even function, it has become alarmingly clear that New Zealand’s approach—dismantling much of its manufacturing capacity and relying on international markets—places it at significant risk, especially in times of crisis. In New Zealand, military logisticians face distinct professional challenges unique to our geographical and resource constraints, relying on training based on lessons learned from foreign militaries and doctrine hinged upon greater resources and fewer constraints with little relevance to New Zealand’s unique position in the world. To address the pressing needs of a minor, geographically isolated force, New Zealand must urgently shift towards developing a logistics doctrine rooted in its military history and experiences.

 Traditionally, New Zealand’s military logisticians have relied on international texts like Martin van Creveld’s Supplying War, Kenneth Privratsky’s Logistics in the Falklands War, and William Pagonis’s Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War. While these sources offer invaluable insights into logistics for large, well-resourced armies, their practical relevance for New Zealand’s military, which operates within a distinct set of constraints in staffing, budget, location, and strategic reach, is limited. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower once remarked, “Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.”[1]    This often-quoted statement underscores the importance of logistics in every military operation. Yet, New Zealand’s logisticians often base decisions on lessons that, while effective for larger forces, may not apply to a minor, leaner military.

Examples of international practices adopted by the New Zealand Military, such as “just-in-time” (JIT) logistics and the commercialisation of logistics functions, have occasionally proved inefficient or costly when scaled down. JIT, a model inspired by commercial business efficiency, prioritises minimising inventory costs and streamlining supply chains. However, for a small military, the risk of adopting strategies such as JIT can fail, as they do not have the flexibility and redundancy required to support and sustain dynamic and prolonged military operations in challenging and dispersed environments.[2] Meanwhile, commercialising military logistics functions often results in declining critical military skills among service personnel. Outsourcing military logistics to civilian contractors reduces the opportunity for military personnel to gain hands-on experience and develop specialised logistic skills, with a decrease in core logistic skills, reducing the military’s organic capabilities.[3] Additionally, dependency on commercial service providers whose motivation is profit may not fully align with or prioritise military readiness and operational effectiveness. This can have the effect of creating vulnerability and hindering military responsiveness and adaptability. Commercial service providers often are unwilling to invest in training and lack incentive or strategic focus inherent in military logistics operations, and this can compromise the military’s self-sufficiency, limit flexibility, and reduce the military’s ability to maintain a robust logistical foundation internally.[4]

New Defence Force clothing contractor ADA multi-function logistics hub, Palmerston North. https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/new-uniform-supplier-opens-logistics-hub-in-manawatu/

Lessons from New Zealand’s Own Military History

New Zealand’s military history contains logistics lessons that could be the basis for a locally relevant approach. During the South African War, New Zealand’s swift deployment of troops marked the first time the country supported an overseas conflict. Despite limited resources, infrastructure and logistical experience, New Zealand’s military demonstrated skill and adaptability in logistics, efficiently mobilising personnel and sourcing and distributing resources.[5] This agility foreshadowed the logistical challenges of World War I when New Zealand’s contribution to the Allied effort saw the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) become one of the largest, best-equipped, and best-trained contingents to leave its shores.[6] These efforts required substantial logistical coordination to rapidly equip, train, and deploy forces at home and across multiple theatres of war, demonstrating New Zealand’s ability to project and sustain military capability.

1999.2624 National Army Museum: Troops washing-up after cooking at Trentham Camp in 1915.

The 1941-42 mobilisation is one of the most prominent examples of New Zealand’s logistical achievement. Following Japan’s entry into World War II, New Zealand continued to support the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) abroad while also bolstering its Home and Pacific defences in response to the threat of Japanese invasion. Within months, New Zealand’s Territorial Force was entirely mobilised, Pacific Island garrisons strengthened, existing units expanded, and new units were established to support this increased defence commitment. By mid-1942, New Zealand had mobilised approximately 200,000 troops for home defence and in the Pacific Garrisons, including the raising of the 3rd Division for service in the Pacific, providing them with essential equipment, including a dramatic expansion of the Army’s vehicle fleet from just 62 in 1939 to 30,236 by 1944. All this was achieved with limited infrastructure and resources while also establishing additional logistics functions related to movements, quartering, and sustenance, demonstrating remarkable logistical skill and adaptability and proving that an inexperienced force can conduct effective logistics in times of crisis.[7]

3 NZ Division vehicles parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944 (Colourised). Alexander Turnbull Library

A Missed Opportunity to Teach Applicable Lessons

Despite these considerable historic achievements, New Zealand’s military logisticians are rarely, if ever, exposed to their history as a foundation for their logistics training. Instead, case studies of large-scale operations, such as German Logistic planning in 1940, the Burma Campaign or the Gulf War, are often favoured, overlooking relevant examples highlighting logistics’ importance in smaller-scale and austere operations that New Zealand forces are likely to encounter.[8] General Omar Bradley’s words, “Supreme excellence in logistics consists of breaking the enemy’s will to fight without fighting,” resonate with New Zealand’s experience during the 1941-42 mobilisation.[9] This massive effort in logistics management stands as a masterclass in resourceful logistics that has been forgotten and not included in military professional development training programs.

The absence of knowledge of these logistics successes is a missed opportunity to develop logisticians who can adapt to New Zealand’s unique military demands. Former U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis once said, “The most important six inches on the battlefield is between your ears. But the muscles that bring the supply lines are just as essential and often go unappreciated.”[10]  Mattis’ sentiment reinforces the importance of logistics as the backbone of military capability, especially for a small nation whose experience during WWII demonstrates the benefits of efficient logistical planning and execution.

Integrating Local Lessons for Future Resilience

By recognising and using examples from New Zealand’s logistical history, New Zealand’s military can create a training framework that places logistics on an equal footing with combat operations. New Zealand’s military history illustrates that logistical resourcefulness, agility, and adaptability are essential and achievable, even with limited resources. Lieutenant Colonel Scott Fowler’s observation that “Logistics lacks the glamour of combat operations, but history has repeatedly shown that without it, the sharp end of the spear would quickly dull” aptly captures logistics’ crucial role in military readiness.[11] Therefore, establishing logistics as a value-adding competency anchored on relevant lessons should become a priority to foster a resilient, responsive and capable defence logistical organisation.

In conclusion, while international case studies provide valuable insights and lessons, they often lack relevance to New Zealand’s unique military logistic challenges. By studying New Zealand’s logistical achievements, such as the 1941-42 mobilisation, more robust preparation can be enabled to prepare its logisticians better to operate effectively within the constraints of a smaller force. Through this approach, New Zealand’s military logisticians would better understand the principles required to meet the relevant and unique operational demands facing New Zealand in a challenging and unpredictable world.


Notes

[1] Dwight D Eisenhower quoted in Robert A. Doughty; Ira D. Gruber and Roy K. Flint, Warfare and Logistics Along the Mississippi: A Case Study of the Civil War. (Boston: Boston University Press, 1998), 145.

[2] David Taylor and John Kingman., “Just-In-Time and the Military: An Examination of a Flawed Strategy,” Journal of Military Logistics 13, no. 2  (2005): 77-89.

[3] Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. 3rd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

[4] John R Martin and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (Routledge, 2015).

[5] Robert McKie, “Unappreciated duty: the forgotten contribution of New Zealand’s Defence Stores Department in mobilising the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in 1914: a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand” (Massey University, 2022), 44-54.

[6] Colin Richardson, “General Sir Alexander Godley, The last Imperial Commander,” in Born to lead? Portraits of New Zealand commanders, ed. Joel Hayward Glyn Harper (Exisle, 2003), 46.

[7] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150  (1944).

[8] Defence Logistics NZDDP-4.0 (Second Edition), New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication: NZDDP, (New Zealand Defence Force, 2020), Non-fiction, Government documents. https://fyi.org.nz/request/18385/response/73807/attach/5/NZDDP%204.0.pdf.

[9] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944.”

[10] James Mattis quoted in Peter J. Munson, War, Welfare & Democracy: Rethinking America’s Quest for the End of History (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2014), 45.

[11] Scott Fowler, The Fundamentals of Marine Corps Logistics ( Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2013)), 34.


Bringing the 3rd New Zealand Division Home: The Unheralded Triumph of New Zealand’s Greatest Military Reverse Logistics Operation

Introduction

Since 1940, New Zealand played a pivotal role in the Pacific theatre, initially maintaining a brigade group in Fiji from 1940 to 1942. After a brief reorganisation and training back home, this brigade group was reformed in 1943 as the 3rd New Zealand Division, the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific (NZEF IP). Well-equipped with thousands of vehicles, tanks, and an extensive supply of ammunition and ordnance stores, the division conducted several successful amphibious combat operations. However, by 1944, sustaining this division became untenable. This led to one of the most remarkable reverse logistics operations in New Zealand’s military history: the withdrawal and redeployment of the 3rd New Zealand Division back to New Zealand. This colossal effort faced unprecedented challenges, including the lack of modern material handling equipment (MHE) and the absence of information technology (IT) systems.

New Zealand World War II soldiers loading stores into infantry landing craft, Vella Lavella, Solomon Islands. Ref: 1/2-044734-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22411372

The Deployment and Its Challenges

After reorganising in New Zealand, the 3rd New Zealand Division was deployed to the Solomon Islands, with its primary base in New Caledonia. By 1944, it became evident that New Zealand could no longer support this division due to the demands of both the Pacific and European theatres.[1] The decision was made to withdraw, with personnel either demobilised or redeployed to reinforce the 2nd New Zealand Division fighting in Italy. This withdrawal initiated a significant reverse logistics operation—one of the most remarkable in New Zealand’s military history.

Military reverse logistics involves returning equipment, supplies, and personnel from forward operational areas to home bases or depots. It encompasses transportation and the recovery, inspection, refurbishment, and redistribution of materials. This inherently complex task demands meticulous coordination to ensure that every piece of equipment and supply is accounted for.[2]

Despite its importance, many modern militaries do not sufficiently train for or practise reverse logistics, often leading to significant delays in regenerating forces after deployment. The lack of emphasis on these tasks can slow down the redeployment and recovery of operational capabilities, as critical items may be lost, damaged, or delayed in transit.

Moreover, reverse logistics involves disposing of or recycling obsolete or damaged equipment, adding another layer of complexity. The pressure to quickly remove materials from operational theatres often conflicts with the need for thorough inspection and assessment. Without proper planning and execution, militaries may be unable to effectively reconstitute their forces for future missions, resulting in decreased readiness and prolonged downtime.

Between August 1944 and July 1945, New Zealand undertook the monumental task of returning all equipment from the Pacific to its depots. This operation involved over 50,000 items held by the NZEFIP Ordnance depots, 3,274 vehicles, 25 tanks, and tonnes of ammunition and New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) supplies. Despite the vast scale of this effort, the return of the 3rd New Zealand Division has largely faded from memory. Nevertheless, it stands as a remarkable logistical achievement, showcasing the adaptability and efficiency of New Zealand’s military personnel under demanding conditions. Incorporating reverse logistics into military training and planning is vital for improving operational efficiency, reducing delays, and maintaining readiness—a challenge many modern forces still struggle to address fully.

Infrastructure and Manual Labour as the Backbone

The success of this operation heavily relied on the infrastructure at Mangere Crossing Camp in Auckland. Initially built for United States forces and known as Camp Euart, the camp was named in honour of Captain Elwood J. Euart of the United States Army Field Artillery. Captain Euart heroically lost his life while saving others during the sinking of the U.S. Army Transport President Coolidge due to striking a Japanese mine off the Island of Espiritu Santo, Vanuatu. Upon learning that soldiers were trapped in the ship’s infirmary, he re-entered the sinking vessel to assist them. Tying himself to the lower end of a rope, he held it steady enough for the trapped men to climb to safety despite the ship’s heavy listing. Tragically, when Euart attempted to climb the rope himself, the vessel suddenly careened and sank, preventing his escape. His selfless courage and devotion to duty cost him his life.[3]

Camp Euart began hosting US forces in September 1942 and, at its peak, accommodated 5,000 troops—nearly equal to the entire population of Otahuhu at the time.[4] The camp remained under U.S. control until 1944, when it was vacated and handed over to the New Zealand forces. In August 1944, it became the Mangere Stores Sub Depot of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) Main Ordnance Depot (MOD), designated to receive supplies and equipment returned from the Pacific by the 3rd New Zealand Division, which established its advanced base headquarters at what became known as Mangere Crossing Camp.

Strategically located near key rail and road networks, the 80-acre site became a central hub for processing vast quantities of war material. Although optimised for storage and handling, the logistics teams relied on manual labour, as no modern MHE was available then.

The camp featured five warehouses designed for large-scale equipment storage:

  • Two warehouses, each measuring 300 by 120 feet (91 by 36 metres)
  • One warehouse measuring 300 by 60 feet (91 by 18 metres)
  • One warehouse measuring 360 by 120 feet (109 by 36 metres)
  • One warehouse measuring 200 by 240 feet (60 by 73 metres)

These warehouses provided 190,200 square feet (17,670 square metres) of storage space. Adding three ancillary buildings increased the total space to 207,600 square feet (19,287 square metres). Each warehouse had concrete floors, wooden framing, and fibrolite walls and roofs, ensuring durability and protection from the elements.[5]

An aerial view of the World War II US military camp, known as Camp Euart, and the supply depot at Mangere Crossing, 1944. Manukau Research Library, PAP: IV, Footprints 02152. Papatoetoe Historical Society.
New housing beside industrial area in Otahuhu, Auckland 1949. Whites Aviation Ltd: Photographs. Ref: WA-19438-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22322624

A key logistical advantage of the camp was its railway siding, which extended directly into the warehouse block. This allowed trains to deliver supplies straight into the camp, reducing handling time and labour demands. Integrating transport and storage was vital for managing the massive flow of materials—including 10,000 tonnes of mixed stores and 3,000 vehicles—that arrived over three months starting in August 1944.[6]

3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library

Without modern IT systems for inventory tracking or automated equipment for loading and unloading, work parties manually handled over 250,000 packages, each averaging 100 pounds (45 kilograms).[7]

The Ordeal of the Quartermasters

One of the most remarkable aspects of this operation was the work of the quartermasters. Many of these men were not professional logisticians but wartime soldiers who had learned logistics and planning over the previous four years. The quartermasters from the 3rd Division, overseeing 90 accounting units, ensured every piece of equipment was meticulously accounted for and documented before leaving New Caledonia.

Once the shipments arrived in New Zealand, their responsibilities intensified. They had to navigate shipping schedules, locate and verify their units’ equipment, and secure space for inspection—a massive logistical challenge requiring precision under pressure.

Their task did not end with verification. Each item had to be cleaned, repaired if necessary, and repacked, all while passing rigorous inspections by the MOD staff and Defence Auditors. These inspectors refused to accept any equipment in less-than-perfect condition, leading to a detailed audit process. Quartermasters had to account for every lost or damaged item, often relying on incomplete records, while facing auditors who were relentless in spotting discrepancies. Clearance was only granted when the records were flawless, adding immense pressure to a demanding job.

The success of this operation is even more impressive, considering these men were not trained logisticians. Their ability to plan, organise, and execute such a complex task highlights their adaptability and determination.

A Triumph Despite the Odds

By July 1945, the reverse logistics operation had been successfully completed. Equipment had either been returned to New Zealand’s MOD at Trentham or the Northern District Ordnance Depot at Hopuhopu, with many vehicles transferred to Sylvia Park, a former US stores depot repurposed for New Zealand military use. Equipment deemed damaged beyond repair or surplus was either sold through the War Assets Realisation Board or disposed of by public auction.

Despite the absence of modern tools and systems, this operation was a remarkable achievement in New Zealand military logistics, unmatched today. While the infrastructure at Mangere Crossing Camp played a crucial role, the determination and resilience of New Zealand’s military personnel ensured the successful completion of this massive logistical effort.

Conclusion

The withdrawal of the 3rd New Zealand Division from the Pacific was not merely a redeployment after successful combat operations but a logistical achievement of remarkable scale. Conducted under extreme conditions, without the advantages of modern MHE or IT systems, the operation relied heavily on the strategic utilisation of available infrastructure, such as Mangere Crossing Camp, and the dedication of New Zealand’s military personnel. The meticulous coordination required to recover, sort, inspect, and redistribute thousands of items, vehicles, and stores showcased the exceptional adaptability of New Zealand’s logistics teams. This operation—the most significant reverse logistics effort in the nation’s military history—remains a powerful testament to the skill, resourcefulness, and perseverance of those who brought the 3rd New Zealand Division home under incredibly demanding circumstances. Though often overlooked, it is a crucial chapter in New Zealand’s military logistics legacy.


Notes

[1] Matthew Wright, Pacific War: New Zealand and Japan 1941-45 (Auckland, N.Z.: Reed, 2003, 2003), Bibliographies, Non-fiction.

[2] Kristin F. Lynch, John G. Drew, Robert S. Tripp, and C. Robert Roll., Sustaining Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Major Findings on the Experience of Army Logistics in the Field (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006).

[3] “An Undeniable Act Of Self Sacrifice,” South Pacific World War II Museum, Espiritu Santo Vanuatu, 2024, 2024, https://southpacificwwiimuseum.com/euart/.

[4] Matthews and Matthews Architechs Ltd., “Otahuhu Historic Heritage Survey – Overview Report,”  (2014): 32, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/arts-culture-heritage/heritage/heritagesurveys/otahuhu-heritage-survey-01.pdf.

[5] F Grattan, Official War History of the Public Works Department (PWD, 1948), 687.

[6] E.V Sale, Base Wallahs: Story of the units of the Nase Organisation, NZEF IP (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 254-56.

[7] P.P Henley, Ordnance: The unofficial history of the New Zeland Ordnance Corps in the Pacific from 1940 until the third division was disbanded in 1944 (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 225.


Mechanised Mobilisation: New Zealand’s Military Vehicle Expansion September 1939-March 1944

Occasionally, photos emerge on various internet forums, capturing a striking scene: a vast lineup of vehicles at the Mangere Ordnance Sub Bulk Depot, freshly returned from New Zealand’s 3rd Division after its service in the Pacific. These images display Bren Gun Carriers, trucks, and tanks awaiting inspection, repair, redistribution, or disposal. However, these powerful visuals often come with little context, typically identified only as vehicles from the 3rd New Zealand Division with no connection to the broader motorisation of the New Zealand Military between 1939 and 1944.

This article delves into the remarkable expansion of New Zealand’s military vehicle fleet between 1939 and 1944—a fleet that grew from a mere 62 vehicles in September 1939 to a staggering 22,190 by March 1944. The vehicles captured in the Mangere photos represent about 11% of this massive expansion, marking a crucial chapter in New Zealand’s military history.

3 NZ Division vehicles parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944 (Colourised). Alexander Turnbull Library

Prelude to War

A prevailing myth suggests that New Zealand allowed its military to shrink during the interwar period, leaving the country ill-prepared for the outbreak of war in 1939. Contemporary studies echo this sentiment, claiming that New Zealanders were no better equipped for war than their fathers had been during the First World War. While there is some truth to this narrative, a closer examination of the broader activities of the New Zealand Army from 1934 to 1939 reveals a more nuanced story.

Despite material and personnel deficiencies, the New Zealand Army demonstrated a keen awareness of global events and the changing nature of warfare. This awareness, combined with meticulous and thorough updates to military doctrines and preparations, ensured that New Zealand could swiftly mobilise the basic framework of an expeditionary force and the necessary resources to sustain it in the long term, should war break out. The Army’s profound understanding of the international situation provided a sense of security and confidence in its ability to respond effectively.

From the mid-1930s, the New Zealand military closely observed the mechanisation efforts of the British Army, which had been updating its doctrines throughout the decade. The British military had transformed into a mechanised force with some of the era’s most advanced weapons and equipment. The Field Service Regulations (FSR), the tactical bible of British Commonwealth armies, underwent several revisions, reflecting the British Army’s commitment to learning from past mistakes.[1] Following the British lead, the New Zealand Army endeavoured to stay abreast of these developments, demonstrating its commitment to strategic planning and learning from history.

Initial Mechanisation

When war was declared in September 1939, the New Zealand Military Forces possessed a total of 62 vehicles, consisting of:

  • Six motorcycles
  • Two cars
  • 54 trucks and tractors

These were not outdated relics from the First World War but the latest military models imported from the United Kingdom in the late 1930s. This modest re-equipment initiative, which began in 1934, aimed to align New Zealand’s military hardware with that of peer forces in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

With a clear understanding of the demands of mechanised warfare, a significant inventory of vehicles for impressment in times of national emergency was compiled in 1935. These vehicles were categorised by type, carrying capacity, and horsepower. A total of 20 types of vehicles were identified, including

  • 10,818 Fords,
  • 5,915 Chevrolets,
  • 1,654 Dodges, and
  • 1,466 Morris’s

culminating in a record of 26,839 trucks, trailers, tractors, and omnibuses. [2]

The Organisation of National Security (ONS) convened the Transport Industry (Supply) Subcommittee to organise and implement the impressment scheme. This subcommittee drafted the first version of the Motor-Vehicle Impressment Emergency Regulations in May 1939, followed by a second draft in August. Although these regulations were enacted on 4 September 1939, impressment did not commence immediately due to a lack of immediate need for a mobile home defence force. The Transport Legislation Emergency Regulations 1940 further allowed suspending any transport-related legislation necessary to prosecute the war.

Supported by this legislative framework, the New Zealand Military Forces implemented plans to requisition and purchase vehicles from New Zealand’s motor assembly factories and retailers. Between September 1939 and March 1944, 9,879 vehicles were put into service with the New Zealand Military Forces. These vehicles were then supplemented with additional purchases from New Zealand distributors and suppliers to ensure the expanding military forces were adequately equipped.[3]

Table 1 – Impressed and New MT Vehicles purchased in NZ from Distributors up to 31 March 1944
Chevrolet 4×4 truck used by the army circa 1940. Ref: 1/2-036839-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22809745

Cooperation with Allies

With remarkable speed, New Zealand transitioned its economy from peacetime to wartime, focusing on ensuring it could support its deployed forces and contribute effectively to the global war effort. The Government implemented initiatives to provide security in international trade and commerce. In July 1940, the New Zealand Minister of Supply and a small delegation of officials engaged in talks with their Australian counterparts to strengthen cooperation between the two nations. [4]

In October 1940, the Eastern Group Conference convened in Delhi with the primary objective of coordinating a joint war supply policy for the United Kingdom, Australia, India, South Africa, New Zealand, and other territories including East Africa, Palestine, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, and Hong Kong, with the Government of the Netherlands East Indies attending as observers. This conference led to the formation of the Eastern Group Supply Council (EGSC) in Delhi, tasked with coordinating and optimising the production and distribution of war materials across the British colonies and dominions in the Eastern Hemisphere. [5]

New Zealand contributed four Government officials and two officers from the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC). Concurrently, in New Zealand, the War Cabinet approved the establishment of the New Zealand Defence Services Provision Officer (DSPO) to facilitate coordination between the EGSC and New Zealand.

In March 1941, the United States passed the Lend-Lease Act, under which New Zealand became eligible to trade in November 1941. A New Zealand Supply Mission was established in Washington, DC, to manage Lend-Lease agreements and cash requisitions. Upon the United States’ entry into the war, a Joint Purchasing Board was set up in New Zealand, streamlining processes and reducing delays by liaising directly with the New Zealand Commissioner of Supply and pre-screening eligibility and priority requirements through an Allied Committee in Washington, DC.

Full Military Mechanisation

As the war progressed, New Zealand’s motor industry proved its ability to adapt to wartime demands by shifting production to essential materials such as grenade bodies, mortars, and 560 Bren gun carriers manufactured by General Motors. This adaptability underscored New Zealand’s resourcefulness in times of conflict.

By March 1944, in addition to the vehicles impressed and purchased since 1939, an additional 15,097 different types of vehicles were acquired by cash purchases or through the Lend-Lease programme. While some arrived in New Zealand as complete vehicles, 11,797 were received as knocked-down kits to conserve shipping space and assembled locally.

Table 2 – MT Vehicles Assembled in New Zealand

Many vehicles arrived as bare chassis with specialist bodies to allow them to perform the vast array of functions required by the military. By 1940, the New Zealand Railway Workshops had constructed speciality Breakdown and Workshop bodies, with the broader New Zealand industrial base constructing 11,703 load-carrying and specialist bodies tailored to New Zealand’s needs by March 1944.

11,321 specialist bodies were manufactured for the Army, 275 for the RNZAF, one for the Navy, and 106 for the United States Forces.

Table 3 – Bodies built in New Zealand for MT Vehicles
Inside the factory of Standard Motors (probably Standard Motor Bodies Ltd), Wellington, during World War II, showing workers stretching sheet metal that will form bodywork on an army truck. Photograph taken between 1939 and 1945 by the National Publicity Studios. New Zealand. Ref: PAColl-0783-2-0431. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23114774
Table 4 – Total purchases of new vehicles by manufacturer and country of origin up to 31 March 1944 (Includes new Vehicles purchased directly from distributors in NZ (5089) and from United States Forces (145)

Pacific Garrisons

From 1940, New Zealand established garrisons in Tonga, Fiji, and Norfolk Island. In 1943, the 3 (NZ) Division was deployed to New Caledonia, conducting amphibious operations in the Solomon Islands. These deployments included 3,630 vehicles, ranging from motorcycles to tanks. To address shortages, 145 vehicles were taken over from United States Forces. Over time, 730 vehicles were returned to New Zealand, 23 were transferred to the RNZAF, and 467 were sold to local forces. By March 1944, New Zealand forces in the Pacific retained 2,604 vehicles.

Table 5 – MT Vehicles supplied to, received by and on hand with 3 NZ Division 31 March 1944
Table 6 – MT Vehicles supplied to, received by and on hand with Tonga Force, 31 March 1944
Table 7 – MT Vehicles supplied to, received by and on hand with Fiji Force, 31 March 1944
Table 8 – MT Vehicles supplied to, received by and on hand with Norfolk Force, 31 March 1944

Between 1939 and 1944, the vehicles received by the New Zealand Army at home and in the Pacific were not exclusively retained. By March 1944, 8,108 vehicles had either been transferred to the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Middle East, RNZAF, and Navy or sold to the United States Forces, foreign governments, other government departments, or private owners. Surprisingly, only 83 vehicles were written off charge.

Table 9- Schedule showing all transactions in MT Vehicles – Sept 1939 to 31 March 1944

The Mechanical Transport Branch

Recognising the urgent need to expand and manage the Army’s Mechanical Transport fleet, the Quartermaster General (QMG) Colonel Henry Esau Avery established a separate Mechanical Transport Branch (MT Branch). This move allowed the NZAOC to focus on its core responsibilities, with the MT Branch managing and maintaining the multitude of purchased or impressed vehicles required by the military. Drawing from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) experience in the United Kingdom, the MT Branch wisely recruited extensively from New Zealand’s motor industry into the New Zealand Temporary Staff (NZTS), ensuring a wealth of specialised knowledge and experience was brought to the forefront of this critical military function.

In December 1942, the MT Branch consisted of:

MT Workshops:

  • 1 MT Workshop, Trentham
  • 2 MT Workshop, Waiouru
  • 3 MT Workshop, Papakura
  • 4 MT Workshop, Whangarei
  • 5 MT Workshop, Palmerston North
  • 6 MT Workshop, Wellington
  • 7 MT Workshop, Blenheim
  • 8 MT Workshop, Burnham
  • 9 MT Workshop, Dunedin

MT Depots, which provided pools of vehicles:

  • 1 MT Depot, Auckland
  • 2 MT Depot, Hamilton
  • 3 MT Depot, Napier
  • 4 MT Depot, Wanganui
  • 5 MT Depot, Christchurch

MT Stores Depots, supplying MT spares, tools, and equipment for MT Workshops and Depots:

  • 1 Base MT Stores Depot, Wellington
  • 2 MT Stores Depot, Auckland
  • 3 MT Stores Depot, Wellington
  • 4 MT Stores Depot, Christchurch
  • 7 MT Stores Depot, Blenheim

By March 1944, with reduced military activity in New Zealand and the demobilisation of home defence units established in 1941/42 to counter potential invasion, the MT Branch underwent reorganisation into a streamlined structure, which included Stores and Equipment Sections, Workshops, Vehicle Holding Parks, and Vehicle Reception Depots. However, wartime personnel shortages meant that the MT Branch could only muster 1,255 officers and soldiers, approximately 75% of its authorised capacity of 1,674 officers and soldiers.

Parts and Spares

Up to 31 March 1944, the MT Stores Depots had handled the following quantities of tyres and MT Parts and spares:

Tyres

  • 180 different sizes of tyres
  • Purchased from overseas – 83,174
  • Purchased in New Zealand – 12,534
  • Total Purchased – 95,708
  • Transferred to Supply Department – 11,018
  • Other issues – 28,700
  • In stock 31/3/1944 – 55,990
  • Used tyres recapped and re-treaded – 9,983
  • Reconditioned tyres reissued – 7,301
  • Reconditioned tyres in stock 31 March 1944 – 2,682

MT Parts (Not including body-building material)

  • Received from overseas (Total of 9,182 Tons)
  • Wheeled vehicles, parts- 20,472 Packages
  • Tracked vehicles and parts – 39,408 Packages
  • Tracked vehicles, tracks – 8,280 Bundled
  • Packages broken down and binned – 23,895
  • Packages transferred to United States Forces – 1,050
  • Packages in Bulk Store – 43,215

Shipments of MT Parts and Tyres to the Pacific

  • 3 Division – 1,149 Tons
  • Fiji – 406 Tons
  • Tonga – 112 Tons
  • Norfolk – 30 Tons

Conclusion and Lessons Learned

This article explores the dramatic expansion of New Zealand’s military vehicle fleet during World War II, highlighting the country’s transition from a small force with only 62 vehicles in 1939 to an impressive 22,190 vehicles by 1944. This growth was crucial to New Zealand’s military preparedness and response during the war, reflecting a strategic adaptation to the demands of mechanised warfare.

A common misconception persists that New Zealand was ill-prepared for World War II due to the neglect of military readiness during the interwar period. However, this article argues that the New Zealand military was, in fact, acutely aware of global military developments and took proactive steps to modernise its forces in anticipation of potential conflict. By closely following the mechanisation efforts of the British Army, New Zealand updated its doctrines and prepared for the rapid mobilisation of resources.

At the outbreak of war, the New Zealand Military Forces possessed a modest but modern fleet of vehicles, which was quickly expanded through impressment (the requisition of civilian vehicles) and new purchases. A comprehensive inventory of potential impressment vehicles was compiled in the mid-1930s, and by 1939, regulations were in place to facilitate the requisition of vehicles as needed.

Cooperative efforts between New Zealand and its allies, primarily through the Eastern Group Supply Council and the Lend-Lease Act, allowed the country to acquire additional vehicles and equipment. New Zealand’s motor industry also adapted to wartime demands, producing essential military vehicles and parts, including 560 Bren gun carriers.

By 1944, New Zealand’s military vehicle fleet had grown substantially, with vehicles serving both at home and in various Pacific garrisons. This expansion was managed by the MT Branch, a specialised unit within the military that oversaw the maintenance and distribution of vehicles. Despite challenges such as personnel shortages, the branch effectively supported New Zealand’s military operations throughout the war.

Lessons Learned:

Strategic foresight and adaptation played a pivotal role in the New Zealand military’s preparedness and effectiveness during World War II, as it anticipated and responded to the demands of mechanised warfare through meticulous strategic planning and doctrinal updates.

The establishment of the MT Branch, alongside a comprehensive logistical framework, ensured that the military could efficiently manage and sustain its rapidly expanded vehicle fleet. New Zealand’s success in acquiring and managing military vehicles was further bolstered by close cooperation with allies, mainly through initiatives like the Lend-Lease Act and the Eastern Group Supply Council.

The adaptability of New Zealand’s motor industry to wartime production needs highlights the critical importance of a robust domestic industrial base in supporting military efforts. Additionally, pre-emptive planning and detailed inventory management, including a comprehensive record of potential impressment vehicles, enabled New Zealand to mobilise and sustain its military forces rapidly. The effective distribution and redistribution of vehicles across different operational theatres underscored the importance of flexibility in resource allocation during wartime.

In conclusion, the mechanisation of New Zealand’s military during World War II was a significant achievement that contributed to the country’s wartime efforts and provided valuable lessons for contemporary military logistics and strategic planning.

Table 11 – MT Vehicles by type in possession of Army in New Zealand and Pacific – 31 March 1944

Notes

[2] “Supply – Munitions and Equipment – Supply of defence vehicles from local sources,” Archives New Zealand Item No R18872527  (1934-1945).

[3] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541151  (30 June 1944), .

[4] “Unity in War Effort,” Evening Star, Issue 23622, 8 July 1940, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19400708.2.42.

[5] Bertram Stevens, “The Eastern Group Supply Council,” The Australian Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1941),https://doi.org/10.2307/20630952, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/stable/20630952.


Debunking the Myth of New Zealand’s Military Unpreparedness During the Interwar Period

During the interwar period, a popular myth emerged that New Zealand allowed its military to downsize so that by 1939, the country was woefully unprepared for war, with many contemporary studies highlighting that New Zealanders went to war no better equipped than their fathers in the First World War. While there is some truth to this narrative, a closer examination of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) and the broader activities of the New Zealand Army from 1931 to 1939 tells a more nuanced story. Despite material and personnel deficiencies, a keen awareness of global events prompted continuous military doctrines and preparations updates. These efforts ensured that, in the event of war, New Zealand could quickly mobilise not only the basic framework of an expeditionary force but also the necessary resources to support it in the long term.

Evidence of Preparedness

In 1931, the NZAOC had shrunk from a strength of 120 in 1930 to 21 officers and soldiers supported by a cadre of civilian staff in the Ordnance Depots and Workshops at Threntham, Hopohopu and Burnham. From 1934, Major Thomas Joseph King, the Director of Ordnance Services (DOS), ensured that critical positions were filled by competent and experienced personnel. Some were drawn from the existing NZAOC civil staff ranks (many were former NZAOC soldiers transferred to the civil staff in 1931), and others were recruited explicitly into the NZAOC, such as Allan Huia Andrews.

Jonathan Fennell, in his book Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War, identifies that throughout the interwar years, the British Military establishment analysed the lessons of the previous war and interpreted contemporary developments. Updating doctrine throughout the 1930s, the British Military progressively transformed into a mechanised force armed with some of the era’s most advanced weapons and equipment. The Field Service Regulations (FSR), the tactical bible of British Commonwealth armies, was updated with at least four editions, proving that the British Army was willing to learn from past mistakes. Compared to the two German and French equivalent doctrine editions produced during the same period. Following the British lead, New Zealand kept as much abreast of these developments as practically possible.

Limited by the financial constraints of the time, training exercises and war games were conducted to keep military personnel sharp and ready from 1936. These exercises often simulated various scenarios, including mobilisation and deployment, ensuring that the army could respond effectively in times of crisis. Additionally, experiments with motor vehicles and motorcycles and testing modifications by the NZAOC workshops of WW1 artillery pieces fitted with pneumatic wheels and new carriages were undertaken.

Ford Marmon Herrington Artillery Tractor, Limber and 4.5-inch Howitzer
60 Pounder Guns showing both the original carriage and the New Zealand-built carriage

Detailed mobilisation plans were undertaken behind the scenes, with Lieutenant A.H. Andrews playing a pivotal role in updating and developing mobilisation scales. These plans included stockpiling essential supplies at Trentham, Burnham, and Hopuhopu and identifying critical infrastructure vital in supporting an expeditionary force, which saw new construction of logistic infrastructure at all camps. In terms of resources, the following equipment was on order from the United Kingdom in 1938:

  • Bren Guns complete with equipment and components – 248 (in addition to 100 ordered in 1936)
  • QF 2Pdr with equipment and accessories – 16
  • Wireless sets No. 9 and No. 11

Given that all the equipment was only accepted into British service from 1935, it is clear that by ordering these items, New Zealand was keen on modernising with the latest equipment and was equipped on a par with contemporary forces in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

Soldier with Bren gun at Waiouru Army Training Camp, taken circa 1936-1938 by Errol Cliff Morton. . Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22316064

In addition, as the New Zealand Permanent Air Force (NZPAF) was preparing to transition independently from the army and become the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) in 1937, Major King of the NZ Army developed a new system for managing stores specifically for the RNZAF in 1936.

The New Zealand military leadership kept pace with global events and potential threats, which influenced the earlier planning and helped prevent the country from being caught entirely off guard when war eventually broke out. This global awareness likely also influenced the Four Colonels’ Revolt. Several senior officers, alarmed by the decline of the Territorial Force, protested directly to the press against the reforms of New Zealand Chief of Staff Major General Sir John Evelyn Duigan. As a result, they were placed on the retired list as punishment.

The Importance of a Balanced Approach

The interwar period underscored the importance of maintaining a long-term vision for military preparedness. While immediate readiness may have been compromised by budget cuts, strategic planning and resource mobilisation efforts ensured New Zealand could enhance its military capabilities.

Adapting and updating doctrines and strategies in response to global events proved crucial. This flexibility enabled New Zealand to sustain a level of preparedness that, though not immediately apparent, proved effective over time.

Effective collaboration and coordination among military branches and civilian authorities were essential for maintaining readiness. This ensured comprehensive coverage of all military operations, from logistics to combat readiness.

Lessons for the Modern Logistician

One of the key takeaways for modern logisticians is the importance of strategic foresight. The ability to anticipate future needs and plan accordingly can significantly impact readiness and response times in crises.

Effective resource management is crucial. During the interwar period, New Zealand stockpiled its limited available supplies and ordered advanced equipment for the next war to ensure readiness. Modern logisticians must ensure that resources are managed efficiently and critical supplies are readily available.

The experiments with motor vehicles and artillery modifications highlight the need for adaptability and innovation. Modern logisticians should continually seek ways to improve processes and equipment to maintain a competitive edge.

The importance of collaboration between military branches and civilian authorities cannot be overstated. Effective communication and coordination ensure that all aspects of logistics, from supply chains to support services, are streamlined and efficient.

Training exercises and war games prepared the New Zealand military despite financial constraints. Modern logisticians should emphasise continuous training and development to ensure personnel are always ready to respond effectively.

Interconnected Efforts of the NZAOC, Quartermaster General, and NZASC

The interwar efforts significantly contributed to the rapid expansion of the New Zealand logistics systems from 1939. It’s important to note that the work of the NZAOC wasn’t carried out in isolation but was part of a coordinated effort involving the Quartermaster General and the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC). The Quartermaster General’s office was pivotal in overseeing the overall logistical strategy and ensuring all branches worked together. The NZASC, responsible for supply and transport, worked closely with the NZAOC to ensure that rations, fuels, forage and transport services were efficiently managed and distributed. This integrated approach ensured that logistical operations were cohesive and effective, maximising the New Zealand Army’s readiness.

Conclusion

While it is acknowledged that New Zealand’s military faced significant downsizing during the interwar period, the assertion of complete unpreparedness by 1939 oversimplifies the historical context. The strategic appointments within the NZAOC, under Major King’s direction, and continuous updates to military doctrine exemplify proactive measures taken to maintain readiness amidst global uncertainties. Despite material and personnel shortages, training exercises from 1936 onwards and innovative adaptations in weaponry underscored New Zealand’s commitment to enhancing military capabilities.

This nuanced and proactive approach ensured New Zealand could swiftly mobilise and sustain an expeditionary force when needed, challenging the myth of its military unpreparedness during the interwar years. However, further study is necessary to fully grasp the intricacies of New Zealand’s military preparedness during this period. Detailed archival research, comparative analyses with other Commonwealth nations, and deeper exploration of socio-political influences on military policy would provide a more comprehensive understanding. Such research would illuminate the successes and limitations of New Zealand’s strategic decisions, offering valuable insights into military preparedness in times of global uncertainty.

For modern logisticians, the lessons from this period underscore the importance of strategic foresight, resource management, adaptability, collaboration, and continuous training—key components in ensuring a state of readiness in an ever-changing global landscape. The collaborative efforts of the NZAOC, the Quartermaster General, and the NZASC exemplify how integrated logistical planning and execution are critical to maintaining military effectiveness.


The 1931 Reductions of the New Zealand Military: A Historical Analysis

Largely forgotten today, the early 1930s marked a tumultuous period for the New Zealand military which was profoundly impacted by the Great Depression. In 1931, facing unprecedented economic pressures, the military was compelled to enact severe cutbacks and reductions. The lessons drawn from these pivotal events offer invaluable insights into fortifying the resilience and adaptability of today’s military forces amidst contemporary strategic and economic uncertainties.

Establishment and Early Developments

Established in 1917, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) quickly became integral to the country’s Permanent Military Forces. However, the onset of the global economic depression triggered substantial changes in New Zealand’s military funding and organisational structure. As the worldwide economic downturn took hold, austerity measures and restructuring became unavoidable, necessitating a comprehensive overhaul of the NZAOC to align with the new economic realities.

Badges of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 1917 -1937. Robert McKie Collection

Established in 1917, the intervening years had seen the NZAOC decline in personnel from its peak strength of 493 in 1919 to an average of 118 officers and other ranks between 1920 and 1930. Despite this reduction, significant infrastructural advancements replaced the colonial-era facilities with modern buildings across various locations. Key NZAOC establishments included:

  • Northern Military District:
    • Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Waikato Camp in Hopuhopu, constructed in 1928.
    • Ordnance Workshop at Devonport’s artillery yard (now the RNZN Museum).
    • Small Arms Ammunition Testing Staff stationed at the Colonial Ammunition Company factory in Mount Eden, Auckland.
  • Central Military District:
    • The Main Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Trentham was established as a permanent camp in 1915.
    • The Ammunition Section at Fort Balance.
  • Southern Military District:
    • The Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Burnham Camp was established in 1921 with the ongoing construction of new infrastructure.

These developments underscored the NZAOC’s strategic presence in the Northern, Central, and Southern Military Districts.

1938 Military Camp, Hopuhopu, Waikato. Whites Aviation Ltd: Photographs. Ref: WA-55972-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23181165

Economic Downturn and Military Reorganisation

The economic downturn of the early 1930s necessitated severe cuts to government expenditure, compelling the New Zealand military to undergo substantial reorganisation. In 1930, the military’s strength stood at 555 regulars and 16,990 Territorials. By 1931, this was reduced to 349 regulars and 3,655 Territorials. These reductions were implemented under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1930 (No. 2), which facilitated compulsory retirements and transfers to civilian roles for many NZAOC personnel.

The Act authorised the retirement on superannuation of any member of the Permanent Force or the Permanent Staff under the Defence Act, 1909, or of the clerical staff of the Defence Department whose age or length of service was such that if five years had been added they would have been enabled as of right or with the consent of the Minister of Defence to have given notice to retire voluntarily. Compulsory retirement under this Act was facilitated in two tranches:

  • Tranche 1: Personnel Retired without Superannuation:
    • Servicemen eligible for retirement under the provision of the Act who were not contributing to the superannuation scheme were notified on 13 December 1930 of their impending release. They were granted six weeks of special leave, effective 31 December 1930, with their final release scheduled for 11 February 1931 after completing their notice period.
  • Tranche 2: Personnel Retired with Superannuation:
    • Servicemen eligible for retirement under the provision of the Act who were contributing to the superannuation scheme received notification on 13 December 1930. Their salary continued until 31 March 1931, with superannuation benefits commencing in April. Accrued leave entitlements were taken concurrently during this notice period, resulting in much leave accrued forfeited.

These tranches included Ordnance soldiers who had joined the NZAOC since its formation in 1917. Some had transferred directly from the Defence Stores, while others had served in the pre-war Permanent Forces or had active service with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF). Their compulsory retirement represented a significant loss of knowledge and experience for the New Zealand military. Under the provisions of section 39 of the Finance Act, 1930 (No. 2), 44 members of the NZAOC were placed on compulsory retirement, including the following personnel who have so far been identified.

Northern Military District

  • 948. Lieutenant Michael Joseph Lyons, MSM

  • 968 Sergeant Thomas Alexander Hunter, MSM

  • 62 Private Frank Jewiss

  • 166 Sergeant William John Rabbidge

  • 268 Staff Quartermaster Sergeant James Alexander Kenning

  • Captain Frank Edwin Ford

Central Military District

  • 19 Sergeant Alfred Charles Butler    

  • 39 Corporal Simon Alexander Fraser

  • 64 Gunner Maurice Francis Johnstone          

  • 111 Corporal John Sawyer   

  •  920 Corporal Gordon James Francis Arenas 

  • 941 Sergeant William Hans McIlraith         

  •  956 Staff Sergeant Saddler George Alexander Carter, MSM

  • 960 Sergeant Frank William Ching

  • 965 Corporal Philip Alexander MacKay MSM

  • 976 Private William Valentine Wood MSM

  • 978 Corporal Earnest John Williams MSM

  • 1018 Sargeant Major James Oliver Pringle Southgate           

  • 1024 Armament-Artificer Eric Wallace Jepson       

  •  Lieutenant L.A Clement

  • Captain Alfred William Baldwin

  • Captain William Moody Bell

  • 55 Staff Quartermaster Sergeant John Francis Hunter MSM

  • 143 Armament Sergeant Major (WO1) Joseph Warren

  • 995 Staff Sergeant Wilfred Robert White

Southern Military District

  • 2 Armament Staff Quartermaster Sergeant John Alexander Adamson MSM

  • 1006 Lance Corporal Norman William Wilkie

  • Corporal Cecil John Knight

  • Captain Arthur Rumbold Carter White

  • 966 Lance Corporal William Terrington Popple, MSM

Transition to Civilian Roles

To achieve further cost savings, 74 NZAOC soldiers received notifications in December 1930 that their positions would be retained but transferred to civilian roles with civilian pay rates. This transition took effect in February 1931, causing significant disruption for those affected, including the loss of accumulated leave and adjustment to civilian life..

Some of these soldiers were transferred to other departments within the defence establishment, while the majority remained in their current roles within the NZAOC Ordnance Depots and workshops. They transitioned overnight from wearing uniforms to civilian clothes, with significantly reduced rates of pay and civil service conditions of service. The following personnel have so far been identified as being transferred to the Civil Staff.

Northern Military District

  • 967 Corporal Robert John Gamble

  • 974 Corporal Henry William Le Comte

  • 983 Sergeant Clifford Verne Little

  • 996 Lance Corporal Athol Gilroy McCurdy

  • 202 Lance Corporal Arthur Graham Munday

Central Military District

  • 972 Private John Dennis Anderson   

  • 35 Lance Corporal Harry Harper Ekins        

  • 1061 Lance Corporal Earnest Fenton

  • 4 Sergeant Kenneth Olaf John Andersen     

  •  699 Corporal Oliver Avis, MM

  • 889 Staff Sergeant George Bagnell   

  • 1004 Lance Corporal James Johnston Bolt  

  • 961 Lance Corporal Edgar Charles Boult     

  • 1000 Private George Cumming Bremner      

  • 1027 Artificer William Cowan Brizzle         

  • 1003 Lance Corporal Ernest Carr      

  • 1012 Lance Corporal Charles Fred Ecob      

  • 864 Corporal William Charles Francis          

  • 1025 Tent-Repairer-Artificer Herbert Roy Griffin   

  • 714 Lance Corporal Kenneth Hoare  

  • 1016 Private Ernest William Hughes            

  • 989 Corporal Percy Reuben Hunter  

  • 213 Lance Corporal William Saul Keegan   

  • 1019 Private Edward Gavin Lake     

  • 342 Corporal Allen Charles Leighton

  • 998 Lance Corporal Allen Dudley Leighton 

  • 1011 Lance Corporal Geoffrey Charles Leighton     

  • 363 Staff Sergeant David Llewellyn Lewis, MSM

  • 1007 Lance Corporal Thomas James Mclaughlin     

  • 1020 Private John Douglas Melville 

  • 894 SQMS (WO2) James Moroney  Sergeant David Nicol]

  • 1023 Lance Corporal John Nixon      

  • 467 Corporal George Wantford Pamment    

  • 1013 Private Francis Reid     

  • 1022 Private Henry McKenzie Reid 

  • 1014 Wheeler-Artificer Robert Stacey Vincent Rowe              

  • 665 Private William Alexander Sammons    

  • 927 Private Leonard William Sanders           

  • 963 Corporal Albert Edward Shadbolt          

  • 138 Lance Corporal David Henry Strickland

  • 1017 Private Lionel Herbert Stroud  

Southern Military District

  • 970 Sergeant Edward Vincent Coleman

  • 1028 Private Percival Nowell Erridge

  • 959 Sergeant Charles Edward Gleeson

  • 1276 Private Lewis Haslett

  • 885 Corporal Charles James Johnston Storie

  • 728 Private William Sampson Valentine

Impact on Military Preparedness and Social Consequences

The compulsory retirements and transfers to civilian roles led to a reduction in the NZAOC’s military strength, impacting its preparedness during subsequent years. However, beginning in 1934, improved government finances allowed for an increase in the army’s training tempo, despite global events hinting at looming conflict. The following personnel who have so far been identified as been retained:

Northern Military District

  • 984 Staff Sergeant Thomas Joseph Holliday

  • 1260 Armament Staff Quartermaster Sergeant Samuel Thomson MSM

  • 915 Armament Staff Sergeant Eric John Hunter

  • 141 Armourer Corporal Reginald Samuel Henry Lyons

Central Military District

  • 14 Armament Sergeant Major Bertram  Buckley           

  • 992 Armament Corporal Hilliard Charles Cooper

  • 1029 Artificer James  Dabney          

  •  964 Warrant Officer Class 1 John William Dalton

  • 1032 Armourer Staff Sergeant Frederick Henry Dew

  • 979 Armourer Staff Sergeant John William Evers

  • 1026 Armament Sergeant Leo Stanley Jefcoate

  • Major Thomas Joseph King

  • 945 WO2 Armament SQMS Henry Albert Wiliam Pierard

  • 1021 Armament Staff Sergeant Arthur Sydney Richardson

  • 1010 Lance Corporal George Frederick Robert Ware

Southern Military District

  • 7 Corporal Percey Charles Austin

  • 25 Armourer Staff Sargeant Francis Augustus Clapshaw

  • Lieutenant Henry Erridge Erridge

The reduction in the Territorial Force in 1931 resulted in decreased activity in subsequent years. However, beginning in 1934, improved government finances allowed for an increase in the army’s training tempo. Concurrently, global events in China, Ethiopia, and Germany hinted at looming conflict, prompting a gradual shift towards preparing for future mobilisation. Under the leadership of Major Thomas Joseph King, who served as Director of Ordnance Services (DOS) since 1924, the NZAOC worked diligently within its means to enhance readiness, including designing a new system of stores accounting for the emerging Royal New Zealand Air Force.

The new NZAOC Badge was approved in 1937. Robert McKie Collection

King focused on recruiting new personnel and leveraging his civilian staff, who were former NZAOC soldiers, to reenlist experienced individuals into key leadership roles at Trentham, Hopuhopu, and Burnham. When war was declared in September 1939, King successfully mobilised his small military and civilian team to form the rump of the New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC) within the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF).

During the 1938-45 war, nearly all NZAOC soldiers who had been transferred to civilian roles in 1931 found themselves back in uniform, restarting their military careers as Ordnance Officers, Warrant Officers, and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) alongside their peers who had been retained. Many from this group continued to provide leadership within the RNZAOC and Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RNZEME) up to the 1960s, with several even holding the prestigious position of DOS in the post-war army.

Lieutenant Colonel Francis Reid handed over the position of DOS to his brother, Lieutenant Colonel Henry McKenzie Reid, on 31 March 1957. Both brothers joined the NZAOC as soldiers in the late 1920s, only to be transferred to the civilian staff in 1931. Commissioned during WW2, both served with distinction throughout the war.

Negative Effects and Lessons Learned

The 1931 reductions in the New Zealand military, driven by the economic pressures of the Great Depression, had profound and lasting negative effects, both socially and in terms of military preparedness. Socially, the abrupt compulsory retirements and transitions to civilian roles caused significant upheaval for the affected soldiers and their families. The loss of accumulated leave and the sudden shift from military to civilian life resulted in considerable stress and financial strain.

In terms of military preparedness, the reductions led to a substantial loss of experienced personnel and institutional knowledge. The drastic decrease in the Territorial Force and overall military strength severely hampered the country’s ability to maintain an effective and ready military force. The reduced activity and training during the early 1930s left the military less prepared for the impending global conflicts of the late 1930s and early 1940s than in 1914. This lack of preparedness could have had dire consequences had international tensions escalated more quickly.

However, subsequent efforts to rebuild, modernise, and mobilise the military demonstrated the resilience and adaptability of the New Zealand military. Starting in 1934 under the leadership of Major Thomas Joseph King, the NZAOC enhanced its readiness by recruiting new personnel and reenlisting former soldiers from the civilian staff. The return of nearly all NZAOC soldiers to uniformed service during the 1939-1945 war showcased their dedication and the critical role of experienced personnel in maintaining military effectiveness.

The 1931 reductions’ experiences highlight the importance of balancing economic constraints and the need for a capable and prepared military force. These lessons remain relevant today as modern military forces navigate similar challenges amidst strategic and economic uncertainties. Ensuring that reductions do not compromise long-term readiness and resilience is crucial for the effective functioning of any military organisation.


Notes

[1] (1930). “H-19 Defence Forces of New Zealand, Annual report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces.” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives.

[2] (1931). “H-19 Defence Forces of New Zealand, Annual report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces June 1930 to May 1931.” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1 January 1941.

[3] (1914). King, Thomas Joseph. Personal File, Archives New Zealand. Wellington.


RNZAOC Corps Day 2024

In the New Zealand Army, commemorating significant days by various Corps and Regiments serves a dual purpose: honouring historical milestones and fostering unit cohesion. Each celebration, whether it’s “Gunners Day” for the Royal New Zealand Artillery or “Corps Day” for the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC), holds profound symbolic value.

For the RNZAOC, the designation of 12 July as Corps Day is more than just a date on the calendar. It signifies a commitment to readiness and operational excellence. This day marks the granting of Royal Status in 1947, acknowledging the NZAOC’s pivotal contributions during World War II. It reminds us of their indispensable role in providing logistical and ordnance support, which is critical for our military’s operational success.

In today’s geopolitical landscape, characterised by a resurgence in potential peer-to-peer conflicts reminiscent of the 1940s, nations like New Zealand are grappling with the limitations of past strategies. Attempts to globalise manufacturing, civilianise military supply chains, and adopt lean models post-Cold War have left us less prepared for contemporary warfare challenges compared to the military readiness observed before the conflicts of the late 1930s.

Historically, the NZAOC faced significant challenges, notably in 1931 during a global financial downturn when the New Zealand Army underwent substantial reductions. Despite these setbacks, from 1934 onwards, the NZAOC began rebuilding its capabilities, laying the groundwork for mobilising an expeditionary force by 1939. This transformation positioned the NZAOC as a well-organised corps crucial to supporting New Zealand’s military efforts during the Second World War.

Recognising its wartime contributions by granting Royal status in 1947 was a testament to the NZAOC’s resilience and excellence. Even as the RNZAOC was disbanded in 1996 and its functions integrated into the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment, concerns over the loss of institutional knowledge emerged. The expertise accumulated since 1917, when the RNZAOC pioneered military stores provisioning and warehousing in New Zealand, has significantly diminished due to modernisation efforts within the NZDF to streamline logistics operations.

While these observances uphold institutional memory and traditions within our military, critics argue they risk becoming mere rituals without meaningful engagement with contemporary challenges or advancements in military practice. Hence, while honouring historical milestones remains crucial, adapting to modern operational demands is equally imperative for our military’s continued success. Keeping the window to past achievements open allows us to draw inspiration and lessons from history while evolving to effectively meet present and future challenges.

In conclusion, the observance of Corps and Regimental days in the New Zealand Army is pivotal in maintaining tradition and bolstering unit cohesion. However, this must be complemented by a forward-looking approach that ensures readiness and effectiveness in contemporary military operations. Balancing these aspects is key to navigating future challenges while honouring our rich military heritage.

Sua Tela Tonanti


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The Battle of Crete: Overlooked Logistics Behind a Pivotal WWII Conflict

The Battle of Crete fought from 20 May to 1 June 1941, is a significant episode in World War II history, marked by remarkable successes and glaring failures. This battle was the first primarily airborne invasion, where German paratroopers (Fallschirmjäger) played a crucial role in the Axis powers’ strategic operations. Despite the eventual German victory, the high cost of casualties and the fierce resistance from Allied forces, including British, Australian, New Zealand, and Greek troops, left an indelible mark on military tactics and strategy.

While much has been written about the dramatic combat actions and strategic implications of the Battle of Crete, the logistics behind providing ammunition and other essential stores remain unknown. The rapid pace of the German invasion, coupled with the chaotic and desperate defence mounted by the Allies, meant that detailed records of logistical operations were often overlooked or lost. This gap in historical documentation has left many questions unanswered about how the defenders managed to sustain their efforts under such dire circumstances.

However, the War Diary of the New Zealand Division Assistant Director of Ordnance Services (ADOS) is a valuable resource on this overlooked battle aspect. This diary provides a rare and insightful glimpse into the New Zealand Division’s logistic efforts, revealing logistics challenges, resourcefulness, and critical role in the battle. Through the entries of this war diary, we gain a deeper understanding of the behind-the-scenes efforts that supported the front-line troops, highlighting the unsung heroes who, as much as practicably possible, ensured that ammunition and other stores reached those in need, often under the most perilous conditions.

This article explores the lesser-known logistical efforts that played a crucial role in the conflict. By delving into the War Diary of the New Zealand Division ADOS, we aim to provide a different understanding of the battle, understanding the resilience and ingenuity of those who worked tirelessly behind the scenes to support the New Zealand defence.

Following the disastrous Greek campaign, General Freyberg assumed command of Crete Force (Creforce) for the defence of Crete on 1 May 1941, deploying approximately 28,600 British, Australian, Greek, and New Zealand troops across four sectors: Heraklion, Retimo, Suda Bay, and Maleme. Despite the seemingly adequate size of this force, several factors significantly reduced its combat effectiveness. The Germans held complete air superiority, with only the British 14th Brigade fully equipped. A severe shortage of small arms ammunition and the lack of vehicles rendered mobile defence impossible. Each sector had to maintain a static defence within its locality, contributing to the island’s immobility and, ultimately, the failure to repel the enemy.

Initially, the Ordnance aspects of the operation were under the command of Creforce Assistant Director of Ordnance Services (ADOS) Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hitchcock of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC), who arrived on 24 April. However, by mid-May, he was recalled to Egypt, and the leadership was passed to Lieutenant-Colonel S. T. Rooke RAOC, who had also been evacuated from Greece.[1]

There was a small RAOC Base Ordnance Depot (BOD)depot in Canea, with a Base Ammunition Depot (BAD) established approximately two miles south at Katisfariana. Following the evacuation of forces from Greece and their immediate pivot to defend Crete, the immediate task was to supply clothing, essentials, blankets, and accommodation stores to thousands of troops who had landed from Greece. Three camps were set up:

  • Peribolia for 17,000 British troops
  • Kalibes for 12,000 men of the 6th Australian Division
  • Platanias for 14,000 New Zealanders
British, Australian and New Zealand troops disembark at Suda Bay, Crete, during World War II. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch. Ref: DA-01611-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23172196

This number was eleven times greater than originally planned for clothing and equipment supply. Transporting stores between ports was primarily conducted by caiques under cover of night. However, the supply of weapons and ammunition remained highly problematic. The general strategy involved holding ammunition primarily in fighting sectors, with only a fifth stored in the BAD. The LADs, having been forced to abandon their equipment in Greece, were severely restricted in their capacity for first-line repairs.

The Australians benefited from the well-trained 3 Advanced Ordnance Depot (3AOD) supporting their division, whereas New Zealand’s ordnance support was more ad hoc.[2] It relied on New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC) members from the NZ Divisional staff to establish makeshift Ordnance Dumps and a distribution system. Major Allan Huia Andrews, as the New Zealand Division Assistant Director of Ordnance Services (ADOS), and Captain John Owen Kelsey, serving as DADOS Engineering (DADOS(E)), commanded these efforts. However, both Divisions struggled because the proper supply and support systems that should have been in place for such a campaign were non-existent.

The NZ Division ADOS war diary opened on 25 May 1941 as the NZ Division ADOS evacuated from Greece and arrived in Crete

25 April

At sea

Convoy attacked but raiders driven off.

Arrived at Crete

26 April

At Crete

27 April

With ADOS to see ADOS of Creforce and W/Ksps.

Issued with 1 8-cwt truck for Div HQ.

28 April

Act as Div Transport officer with 6 trucks ex Welch Regt.

Move to Div HQ location

29 April

Normal routine

30 April

To 1Fd Wksp to take OC’s orderly room in the absence of ADOS. Case of Private Burnt who discharged a rifle and killed a local inhabitant. Summary of evidence and charges read to the accused who pleads “Not Guilty”. The case is remanded. Summary of evidence submitted to ADOS.

ADOS Leave Crete, and I am temporally appointed to act for him

1 May

After the departure of Major Andrews, Major Kelsey was temporarily appointed DADOS of the Maleme Sector of Crete Force.

Collected stores and ammunition from Ordnance Dump for Div. Reserves.

To Inspect NZ Ordnance Dump.

Reported on the position of re-equipment of NZ Units to AA and QMG

2 May

Completed report of DADOS(E) on the work of Fd. Workshops, LADs. and OFP. in Greece and submitted this to DDOS, HQ 2NZEF

3 May

Normal routine

4 May

Collected supplies from BOD. Normal routine

5 May

Collected supplies from BOD. Normal routine.

6 May

Distributed shorts, shirts, hose tops, 2” and 3” Mortars, Anti-Tank Rifles and ammunition to Units.

7 May

To Canea to interview ADOS and COO of Crete Force

Further distribution of clothing and camp equipment to 5 Inf Bde

8 May

Normal Routine

10 May

Normal routine

Further distribution of stores and ammunition to units

11 May

Normal routine

12 May

To see ADOS Creforce and work with him on plan for equipping NZ units on a pro-rata basis

13 May

Fierce Air Raid over Suda Bay.

Bdes issued with 5 Carriers Bren each.

All units were requested to render deficiencies in clothing and camp equipment.

Distributed 1400 coils of wire and pickets to 5 and 10 Bdes.

14 May 1941

Further distribution of ammunition, wire, and pickets to all units.

Issue of 12 M/Cycles to NZ units.

Move with Div. HQ. to a new location 1 1/2 miles from Canea.

 Heavy Air Raid.

15 May

Move the NZ Ordnance Dump to the NZ Div HQ area as there was no protection where this dump was previously located.

Prepare issue orders for all Bde Groups.

Lieut Cooper (16 LAD) was instructed to report to Suda Bay to assemble 75mm French and Italian Guns

16 May

To Canea to investigate the position of Ordnance supplies

Heavy Air raid in Suda Bay

17 May

36 15cwt trucks and 7 M/Cycles issued to NZ units

18 May

Normal routine

19 May

Normal routine

20 May

The German invasion of Crete began, and the parachutists landed.

General strafing all-day

Delivered ammunition as follows:

97250rds SAA

20000rds Stripless LMG

500rds A/Tk

Cpl Solon was taken prisoner but later recaptured.

21 May

Repetition of the previous day.

Collect ammunition reserve at dawn

Issue and blankets to German wounded

Heavy naval action at sea

Ammunition issued as follows:

110000rds SAA

100 Grenades

1100rds 75mm French and Italian

22 May

Very fierce strafing during the afternoon.

Ammunition issued as follows

97000rds SAA

6000rds Stripless LMG

340 Grenades

23 May

Very fierce strafing and bombing

Ammunition and stores issued as follows:

27000rds SAA

200 A/Tk mine

148 Grenades

700 Shovels

190 Picks

70 Coils of wire

140 Pickets

100 Local Bombs

24 May

The worst staffing so far experienced

Canea was systematically bombed.

Propose to recommend WO1 Schou for decoration for his conspicuous gallantry in delivering ammunition to units.

I was promoted to the rank of temp major while performing the duties of DADOS (E ).

Ammunition and stores issued as follows

90000rds SAA

10000rds Stripless SAA

480rds 75mm

8000rds Thompson Sub-MG

72rds Mortar 3”

60 coils wire and pickets

250 Shovels

60 Picks

25 May

Div HQ bombed

Ammunition issued as follows:

55000rds SAA

6000rds Stripless

2000rds Thompson Sub-MG

500rds A/tk

Div HQ moved to new location by wireless station outside Canea.

BAD Canea objects to the issue of ammunition after midnight as “their books were closed”. However, ammunition was obtained.

26 May

Serious strafing.

Bdes retiring

Take back 3 Ammunition lorries fully loaded to the east of Suda Bay and join Div HQ there

27 May

Move again down Sparkis Road.

Deliver Ammunition to 4 and 5 Bdes as follows:

100000rds SAA

10000rds Stripless LMG

2000rds Thompson Sub-MG

Strafed ceaselessly all day.

Move only at night.

28 May

Ammunition lorries taken by Force HQ.

Move again with Div HQ

Learn of evacuation scheme

29 May

Food and water position acute

March 12 miles to Embarkation Point but remain there.

30 May

Moral of troops getting low on account of enemy air activity and lack of food and water.

Prepare to embark

31 May

Embark with Div HQ at 2 am on destroyer “Nizam” and cross to Alexandria.

Bombed by 12 Planes en route but with only one “near miss”.

Arrive in Alexandria at 1830hrs.

ADOS NZ Div DADOS(E) War Diary for April 1941

World War II paratroopers and aeroplanes in the sky above Crete. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch : Ref: DA-12638-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22913202

In conclusion, the Battle of Crete was pivotal in World War II, marked by heroic defiance and sobering logistical challenges. From May 20 to June 1, 1941, German forces conducted the first large-scale airborne invasion in history, targeting the strategically vital island defended by British, Australian, New Zealand, and Greek troops. Despite fierce resistance, the overwhelming German air superiority and logistical deficiencies amongst the Allies ultimately led to their defeat.

While the battle is often remembered for its strategic implications and high casualties, the logistical efforts behind supplying essential stores like ammunition remained largely unexamined. The NZ Division ADOS War Diary offers a glimpse into the critical logistics operations that sustained the New Zealand defence. It reveals the resourcefulness and dedication of personnel who, under extreme conditions, where practicable possible, ensured that vital supplies reached frontline troops.

The logistical challenges faced during the battle, such as ammunition shortages and makeshift supply systems, underscore the critical importance of logistics in military operations. Though overshadowed by the dramatic combat actions, these efforts were instrumental in supporting the frontline troops and mitigating the impact of German assaults.

In commemorating the Battle of Crete, honouring the valour of those who fought on the front lines and the unsung heroes who laboured tirelessly behind the scenes is essential. Their contributions, as detailed in the War Diary and other historical records, provide a deeper understanding of the complexities and sacrifices of war. By remembering these logistical efforts, we gain a more comprehensive perspective on the battle, highlighting the resilience and ingenuity that defined the New Zealand defence on the island of Crete.

Thus, the Battle of Crete serves as a poignant reminder of the intertwined roles of combat and logistics in shaping war outcomes, leaving an enduring legacy in military history.


Notes

[1] Fernyhough, A. H. (1958). History of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps 1920-1945, Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

[2] Tilbrook, J. D. (1989). To the warrior his arms: A History of the Ordnance Services in the Australian Army Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps Committee.


From Volunteer to Territorial: The Evolution of Field Cooking in New Zealand’s Military 1908-1915

The history of field cooking in New Zealand’s military from the 19th to the early 20th centuries showcases a journey marked by resilience, ingenuity, and progress. Initially, the New Zealand military relied on the sometimes-questionable ability of regimental cooks, who managed to provide sustenance for the troops despite adverse conditions and makeshift equipment. However, the need for more efficient cooking solutions became apparent as the military evolved into a Territorial Force.

The introduction of mobile field kitchens, inspired by innovations such as Karl Rudolf Fissler’s “Goulash Cannon,” represented a significant advancement. Nonetheless, the ingenuity of a New Zealand Territorial Officer truly revolutionised New Zealand Military field cooking with the creation of the “Salamander” cooker. Renowned for its remarkable efficiency and versatility, this cooker enabled the preparation of large quantities of food with minimal fuel consumption.

Initially compared to other models from England, like the Lune Valley and Sykes cookers, the Salamander’s superior efficiency, fuel economy, and suitability for New Zealand’s unique conditions quickly set it apart. The New Zealand Defence Department’s subsequent procurement of additional units underscored the Salamander cooker’s pivotal role in New Zealand’s military catering capabilities.

Although the outbreak of World War I shifted priorities, the innovations and lessons from this period laid a crucial foundation for New Zealand’s future military logistics and catering practices. This commitment to enhancing soldiers’ conditions through improved field cooking solutions highlights New Zealand’s dedication to adaptability and innovation in military operations.

Volunteer to Territorial

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, participants in New Zealand’s volunteer encampments relied heavily on the unwavering dedication of regimental cooks for their sustenance. Undeterred by the elements, these cooks operated makeshift camp kitchens, often little more than shallow trenches dug into the ground over which they balanced pots and pans. Despite the challenges of these temporary structures, which required significant setup and operation time, the cooks persevered. Meals, though taking up to four hours to prepare, were a testament to their resourcefulness and commitment.

Efforts to create mobile, horse-drawn kitchens had been ongoing, with one of the earliest and most successful examples being designed in the late 1800s by a young German named Karl Rudolf Fissler. Fascinated by steam engines, Fissler developed the Feldkochherd or Feldküche by 1892, a mobile field kitchen with a unique boiler system. This innovation, quickly nicknamed the “Goulash Cannon” or ‘Gulaschkanone’ due to the furnace tube’s resemblance to a cannon barrel, allowed for the preparation of complete menus. Inspired by Fissler’s invention, France and England soon created their own versions of the Goulash Cannon.

As New Zealand’s military transitioned from a volunteer force to a Territorial Force, the lessons from the war in South Africa remained fresh. The importance of not only ammunition supply but also the supply of hot rations was crucial, as it could be the deciding factor in morale and battle effectiveness.[1] This ensured that the quest for more efficient methods of sustaining troops remained a priority. Initially looking to England for solutions, New Zealand ultimately developed a local alternative. This homegrown innovation propelled the nation to the forefront of field cooking technology, demonstrating its commitment to improving its military personnel’s conditions and its ability to adapt and innovate.

The early Territorial years

The Defence Act of 1909 disbanded the existing volunteer forces and established the Territorial Force, supported by conscription. A pivotal moment in this reform came with the appointment of Major General Alexander Godley as Commandant of the New Zealand Military Forces in December 1910. Under his leadership, the military’s organisational structure was revitalised, and key command and staff appointments were made. As the army reorganised, it became clear that a modern catering system was necessary to support the large numbers of men entering camps and training together. To manage the procurement and distribution of rations, the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) was officially designated as a unit of the Territorial Force on 12 May 1910. However, the responsibility for cooking rations remained with the regimental cooks.

Regimental cooks in the latter part of the 19th century and early 20th century were masters of improvised field cooking. They were skilled at building a remarkable range of makeshift field stoves and ovens, using wood, oil or coal for fuel. They prepared meals in Aldershot ovens and trenches, or makeshift walls constructed from bricks mortared with mud, using frying pans, 8 and 20-gallon boilers, and camp kettles. In October 1912, forty-seven candidates from the Territorial Army were selected for an intensive month-long training course at Trentham to improve the standard of cooking across the New Zealand Forces. This pioneering course covered kitchen work and cooking techniques suitable for field conditions, including practical exercises. Although these methods were effective, they were also time-consuming, required considerable effort from the cooks, and were static and unsuitable for an army on the march.

Single Filed Oven (Aldershot Oven) School of Cookery Camp, Trentham 1912. Joseph Zachariah, DONZ Collection
Long trenches with camp kettles and hot plate. School of Cookery Camp, Trentham 1912. Joseph Zachariah, DONZ Collection

In March 1911, a mobile cooking solution was proposed to New Zealand when Wellington engineering firm Richardson Blair and McCabe Limited, the sole New Zealand agents for the Lune Valley Engineering Company of Lancaster, England, sent a copy of the 1910 Lune Valley Portable Field Cooker catalogue to James O’Sullivan, the New Zealand Director of Military Stores. O’Sullivan then forwarded it to the Quartermaster General (QMG) for consideration. A year later, in March 1912, Richardson Blair and McCabe Limited followed up with the 1911 Lune Valley Engineering catalogue. The QMG acknowledged receipt on 12 March 1912, noting that the catalogue’s contents had been reviewed and would be considered should the Defence Department require any of the items listed.[2]  Although the New Zealand military seemed uninterested in cooking technologies, officers posted to England noted the latest innovations, which they used to develop a broad user requirement for the New Zealand Military Forces.

While attending Staff College at Camberley in 1912, Major George Spafford Richardson of the New Zealand Staff Corps (NZSC) submitted a report regarding field cooking ovens to the New Zealand Government. Richardson noted the advanced cooking arrangements at various Territorial Camps, attributing the improvement mainly to the quality of ovens. One such oven, observed with the Berks Yeomanry, particularly caught his attention — the ‘Tortoise oven,’ capable of cooking for 600 men. Its lightweight and portability, even during marches, impressed Richardson, who advocated for similar ovens in New Zealand.

Tortoise Field Cooking Ovens for Camp purposes, No 3. Archives New Zealand R11096710 Cooking equipment – Cooking ovens as used by Imperial troops re – Obtaining for use in New Zealand

On 15 August 1912, Major Richardson’s report reached the New Zealand Defence Department, prompting Major General Godley to recommend to Cabinet the acquisition of 16 ‘Tortoise Ovens’ for the Territorial Force’s Annual Training Camps. This proposal was swiftly approved on 7 September 1912, with £480 allocated for the purchase.

To expedite the acquisition process, a cable instructing the procurement of the ovens was dispatched from the Prime Minister’s office to the High Commissioner in London on 9 September. Major Richardson was tasked with determining the specific requirements, reaching out to Major Lewis Rose of the Berkshire Yeomanry for details on the ovens mentioned in his report.  By 14 October 1916, Major Rose confirmed his regiment’s use of Portway’s Portable ovens, No 3, and expressed satisfaction with their performance. He provided Richardson with the manufacturer’s contact information and a catalogue.

Informed by Major Rose’s feedback, Richardson told the High Commissioner that the ‘Tortoise Ovens’ were suitable for stationary camps and marches. He cautioned against considering a wheeled cooker currently undergoing British army trials, citing its limited utility and advising awaiting improvements. Subsequently, on 18 October, Tortoise Stove Works of Halstead Essex submitted a quotation for 16 Tortoise Field Cooking Ovens, No 3, with five shelves, at a total cost of £441.13.9. They offered to conduct final inspections within six weeks of acceptance, facilitating onward delivery to New Zealand.

Despite his preferences, Richardson conceded that he would like Colonel Alfred William Robin to inspect the ovens before making any purchase decision. Colonel Robin was New Zealand’s most experienced officer at the time. He had served as a volunteer since 1878, and in September 1899, he was commissioned into the New Zealand permanent forces. Notably, he commanded the first New Zealand contingent to South Africa. In December 1906, Robin was appointed to the newly established Council of Defence as Chief of the General Staff, becoming the first colonial to hold the country’s highest military position. Upon Godley’s appointment as the commandant of the New Zealand Forces, Robin assumed the role of adjutant and QMG.

In February 1912, Robin became the New Zealand representative on the Imperial General Staff at the War Office in London. During this time, he actively participated in discussions regarding training dominion forces. Additionally, he studied ordnance, administrative services, and the movement of troops by land and sea.[3]  Moreover, Robin prepared a mobilisation scheme for dominion territorial forces as part of his duties. His extensive experience and expertise made him an asset in military matters, including evaluating equipment such as ovens.

Concurrent with Richardson’s reports, Robin thoroughly evaluated cookers and travelling kitchens and their suitability for use by the New Zealand Forces. In a report sent to Headquarters New Zealand Forces on 15 November 1912, Robin identified five classes of cookers and travelling kitchens for evaluation purposes during his investigation of field cookers.

  • Class 1 – Cookers or Kitchens carried on “General Service” or Forage wagon, cooking while on the march.
  • Class 2 – Cookers, Stove or ovens for cooking while in camp, but not adapted to cook on the march.
  • Class 3 – Travelling Kitchens on special vehicles, either limbered or on a single wagon, cooking while on the march.
  • Class 4 – Cookers or Kitchens above named using oil or paraffin as a fuel.
  • Class 5 – Cookers or Kitchens above named using wood, coal, coke or any consumable material as fuel.

Based on these classes, Robin summarised his report and his findings as follows.

  1. If to burn Oil Fuel, should not be sent to New Zealand.
  2. If not suitable for cooking on the march, but only for fixed camps. What space and weight are they for Transport purposes?
  3. There are several reputable firms in New Zealand that make all classes of fixed stoves and ranges. These could be made in New Zealand, suitable to local conditions at less cost and saving freight from England.
  4. Are cooking utensils included in the cost?
  5. How many men will No 3, as per tender, cook for?
  6. These stoves are excellent for Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers Mess at Yeomanry and Territorial Camps, where even the rank and file are catered for as if in a hotel. Here, for roast purposes, they may cook for 250, but in New Zealand, where men consume more than double the quantity of meat, their capacity would only be half at most of the above.
  7. Such stoves or cookers are not a government issue. Regiments buy for themselves.
  8. Robins’s main contention was that New Zealand could best produce cookers for fixed camps.

Robin recommended against the ‘Tortoise Ovens,’ stating that while they were suitable for specific cooking tasks, they fell short of meeting New Zealand’s requirements. Instead, he proposed considering either the War Office pattern Traveling kitchen, which was still under development, or a similar piece of equipment developed by Captain Arthur Sykes, Quartermaster of the Princess Victoria (Royal Irish Fusiliers). In Robin’s opinion, both options offered excellent features that better suited New Zealand’s needs.[4]

As Robin’s reports underwent analysis by the Defence Staff in Wellington, attention turned to the impending Brigade camps. A December 1912 inventory of camp equipment revealed a shortage of cooking implements across all districts. Consequently, the QMG instructed the Director of Equipment and Store to seek quotations for 43 Aldershot Cooking Ovens with dishes.[5] The distribution plan allocated 12 ovens to each of the Auckland, Canterbury, and Otago Districts, with seven designated for the Wellington district. One Aldershot oven (comprising two parts with two ends) and one baking dish were dispatched from Wellington to each district as samples to facilitate the process. Additionally, quotation forms were provided to enable each district to obtain quotations from local manufacturers. However, due to some local innovation initiated by Lieutenant James Ferdinand Groom Roberts, the Quartermaster of the 5th Wellington Regiment, the requirement and request for tenders were premature and were cancelled in February 1913.[6]

The Salamander Cooker

An engineer draftsman by trade, Roberts possessed extensive military experience, including eight years of service in the 2nd Royal Warwick Volunteer Regiment in the United Kingdom, followed by service in the 1st Battalion Wellington Rifles since 1909. In February 1912, he assumed the role of Quartermaster of the 5th Wellington Regiment. Amidst his varied responsibilities as Battalion Quartermaster and later as Brigade and Coast Defence Supply Officer, Roberts dedicated considerable thought to improving the regimental kitchen. His aim was to create a solution that could efficiently boil the billy while on the march, ensuring that meals could be promptly served when the regiment halted.

To meet these objectives, Roberts sought to develop a solution that was lightweight, sturdy, fuel-efficient, powerful in cooking capabilities, simple to construct, and, above all, mobile. After careful consideration and planning, and concurrent with Richardsons and Robins’s examination of field catering solutions in England, Roberts unveiled his prototype to the Defence Force on 8 November 1912.

With tables set with black-handled knives and forks, enamel plates and mugs, jars of jam, stacks of butter, and loaves of bread, the aroma emanating from Roberts’ Camp Stove tantalised the hungry men, heightening their anticipation for the forthcoming meal. Typically, a meal in a camp setting could take up to four hours to prepare, including the time needed to construct the oven. However, the self-contained cooker that Roberts demonstrated proved remarkably efficient. In just one and a half hours, it produced a meal for an audience of 300. This efficiency was further underscored by the stove’s ability to achieve such results using only one hundred-weight of coal (equivalent to 50kg) while still preparing an impressive array of food consisting of;

  • Three carcases of mutton
  • 120lbs of fore-quarter beef (approximately 55kg)
  • 45lb of silversides (about 20kg)
  • Potatoes
  • Onions

Additionally, it kept 75 gallons (approximately 340 litres) of water boiling. Remarkably, the stove still had the capacity to accommodate another carcase of mutton for roasting easily and steamed two more pots of vegetables.[7]

The demonstration at the Buckle Street Drill Hall was well received, prompting further testing of the cooker in its mobile configuration. This test took place from 29 November to 1 December 1912, during which H Company (Victoria College) of the 5th Regiment embarked on a three-day trek through the hills east of Wellington under field conditions. When the company reached South Makara, dinner consisted of a clear soup, roast beef and mutton, boiled vegetables, boiled plum duff, and jam roll. Other meals throughout the weekend were similarly elaborate and easily digestible, demonstrating the usefulness of Roberts’ cooker.[8]

Roberts 2a Oven (Travelling) for 250 Men. Archives New Zealand R22432833 Cookers – Field- Roberts travelling

Marketed as the “Salamander”, Robert’s cooker was a marvel of simplicity and efficiency, ingeniously utilising every inch of space. Half of each side was a water reservoir, each tank holding approximately 40 gallons (181 litres). These reservoirs provided boiling water for tea and helped retain the oven’s heat. The front halves house the ovens, while on top are the steamers, resembling kerosene tins placed lengthwise in wire baskets. Potatoes and vegetables are steamed with hot water poured in, generating steam for cooking.

The process of cooking a large meal with the cooker was fascinating to observe. After filling the water reservoirs and lighting the fire, the oven was brought to the required heat in about 20 minutes. Then, trays of meat were placed inside the ovens, and pans of peeled potatoes went into the steamers. The cook’s role then mainly involved stoking the fire and occasionally checking the meat until the meal was ready, ensuring everything was cooked simultaneously.

An advantage of the cooker is its ability to prepare everything simultaneously. Thanks to the heat generated by the boiling water in the tank, preparations can be made in the morning before moving off, and the meal can be cooked as the vehicle travels.

The cooker was designed to be versatile, allowing it to be operated in various setups. It could function either dismounted in a standing kitchen, mounted on a GS Trailer in its mobile configuration, or in its most common arrangement, akin to a field gun and limber. In this configuration, the cooker replaces the gun, while the limber portion houses large food storage compartments capable of carrying up to 250 pounds (113kgs) of meat, 150 gallons (680 Litres) of water, along with provisions such as potatoes, tea, coffee, and cocoa.

When unlimbering, the limber was detached from the cooker wagon with a king bolt and split pin. A strut was then extended from under the second carriage to keep it upright. The cooker stood with its funnel facing forward, protected by a screen against cold winds. Union bolts secured the cooker in position, and footboards allowed the cook to access and operate the oven doors easily.

Behind the cooker, ample floor space allows the chef to work comfortably. Fuel storage boxes were located underneath the rear of the carriage, accessible through floor lids. Every aspect of the cooker was designed to facilitate the cook’s tasks, with easy access to all parts, even while travelling. The detachability of the limber offers advantages such as adjusting to changing wind directions and easy mobility in search of provisions. Both carriages are mounted on sturdy springs for a smooth ride, and the cooker carriage is equipped with a ratchet brake for stability on slopes.[9]

Acknowledging the diverse needs of the military and the necessity to accommodate units of various sizes, the Salamander was available in the following sizes with all models, including transport cart, larder, tank and fuel bunker:[10]

NoTo Cook forApprox WeightNotes
0201 cwt (50kg)Without boiler
0a201 cwt (50kg)With boiler
1a402 cwt (101kg)With boiler
1b6021/2 cwt (127kg)With boiler
1c1003 cwt (152kg)With boiler
1d1504 cwt (203kg)With boiler
22005 cwt (254kg)With boiler
2a25051/2 cwt (279kg)With boiler
33006 cwt (304kg)With boiler
3a4007 cwt (355kg)With boiler
45009 cwt (457kg)With boiler
5100013 cwt (660kg)With boiler
Roberts No 4 (Stationary) for 250 Men. Archives New Zealand R22432833 Cookers – Field- Roberts travelling

Headquarters of New Zealand’s Military Forces were impressed with the Salamander cookers and supported by Richardsons and Robin’s reports on developments in the United Kingdom, where units could procure items like field cookers using Regimental funds, General Godley authorised New Zealand units to purchase Salamander cookers under the same arrangement, an option which the 10th Mounted Rifles Regiment took up and acquired their own Salamander cooker.  To support the Brigade camps planned for the next Easter, the Defence Department purchased 24 No 4 (500man) Salamander cookers in early 1913.[11]

The initial purchase of 24 Salamander stoves were issued on the proportion of two per regiment in preparation for the Easter Brigade Camps at Cambridge, Oringi, Yaldhurst and Matarae. These proved to be a resounding success, enabling regimental cooking to be carried out in more favourable circumstances. An additional benefit was that the Salamander cookers provided savings in labour and fuel. The savings in fuel were substantial enough to pay for the initial purchase of the cookers, leading to the recommendation that additional cookers be purchased for subsequent camps.[12]

From May 1913, Roberts undertook a series of visits to Australia to demonstrate his ovens. He provided demonstrations to Australian Officers and Quartermasters, including Colonel Selheim QMG, Colonel Dangar, Chief of Ordnance, Captain Marsh, Director of Supplies and Transport, Major Forsyth, Director of Equipment, and Mr Pethebridge, Secretary for Defence, who all expressed their satisfaction at the completeness and success of the “kitchen.”[13]

Roberts Cooker Mounted on GS Wagon for Australian Trials

With interest in the Salamander oven growing, Roberts registered the Salamander Filed Cooker Company (Australasia) in March 1913 with a capital of £3600 in £1 shares and began marketing his range of cookers not only to the New Zealand and Australian Militaries but also as a solution for railway work, contractors, shearers and flax millers’ camps, and even race meetings.[14]

As Roberts developed the Salamander cooker, this was parallel to work undertaken in Australia by Boer War veteran James F. Wiles of Ballarat. Wiles had joined the 7th Australian Infantry Regiment in 1903 and, during his time with this regiment, determined that the cooking system in the field needed improvement. This led him to invent and patent the Wiles Travelling Kitchen and enter competition with Roberts in the Australian market.

Following the success of the Salamander cookers during the 1913 Camps, an additional 11 No 4 (500 Man) and 16 2a (250 man) Salamander cookers were obtained and distributed to all the military districts with the distribution in May 1914 been;

  • No 4 (500 Man)
  • Auckland -9
  • Wellington – 10
  • Canterbury – 8
  • Otago – 8
  • No 2a (250 man)
  • Auckland -4
  • Wellington – 4
  • Canterbury – 4
  • Otago – 4[15]

A course of instruction conducted in October 1913, attended by sixty-two territorial soldiers, included training on the Salamander Cooker along with traditional methods.

During the 1914 camps, the Salamander cookers enabled regimental cooking to be carried out under more favourable conditions and again ensured considerable labour and fuel savings. The Salamanders also eliminated the need to provision for large numbers of camp ovens, frying pans, and boilers, the stock of which would have required considerable augmentation due to much of the pre-1914 stock having become unserviceable from past usage.

Providing an additional capability to the Salamanders were two Lune Valley travelling cookers that had been imported using Regimental funds by the 9th (Wellington East Coast) Mounted Rifles. A Sykes travelling cooker from England had also been received from England and allotted to the mounted brigade for the 1914 Takapau camp. [16]

Lune Valley Field Cooker for 500 Men. Archives New Zealand R24764956 Lune Valley Engineering Company, Lancaster – Portable field cooker

Resuming his appointment as QMG on his return from England, Robin requested that the three types of cookers (Roberts, Lune Valley and Sykes) be placed in competition during the Takapau Camp and reported on by a Board of Officers from the Army Service, Medical and Veterinary Corps. For the report, Robins’s terms of reference that the board of offices was to report on were;

  • Haulage and state of horses etc.
  •  Consumption of fuel per day or meal.
  • Nature of meals cooked, viz stews, Boils, Roast, Vegetables etc. and state when cooked.
  • Time of cooking, and if meals are ready at times ordered.
  • General suitability of the vehicle for NZ Conditions, weight per horse, the width of the track, if suited to road track, if considered strong enough for continued work, or vehicle could be lightened.
  • Comparison as to ease, or otherwise, of issue of cooked meals, from the cooker to the Unit.
  • Facilities for carrying any cooked rations and groceries, supply of hot water. Is the stated capacity of each Cooker possible, ie, does a 250-man Cooker etc, actually cook that amount on a colonial ration?
  • Any other points notices.

On 9 May 1914, the board of officers assembled at Takapau Camp. The board consisted of:

  • President: Lt Col J Sandtmann, 9th (Wellington East Coast) Mounted Rifles
  • Members:
    • Captain N.C Hamilton, ASC
    • Major A.R Young, NZVC
    • Major P.R Cook, NZMC

The board inspected and evaluated the three types of cookers, weighing each type’s advantages and disadvantages. However, a full evaluation was not possible due to a shortage of cookers, which necessitated the reallocation of the trial Salamander cooker from the  Mounted Brigade to the kitchen of the 7th (Wellington West Coast) Regiment; additionally, severe weather conditions prevented the conduct of the planned travelling trial. Regardless of this, the board’s report was nonetheless submitted to Colonel Chaytor, the Commander of the Wellington Military District. It was incomplete but based on their best observations.

Of the three cookers evaluated, the board concluded that the Lune Valley oil-fed cooker best met New Zealand’s requirements for the following reasons:

  • Economy of fuel and labour.
  • Ease of carrying 48 hours supply of fuel on the vehicle itself.
  • Compactness.
  • Freedom from risk of spilling.
  • Routine absence of smoke.
  • Facilities for adjusting the degree of heat.
  • Repeated reliability of cooking.
  • Ease of cleaning.

Despite positive feedback on the Salamander cookers since their introduction in 1913, the board concluded that the Salamander travelling cooker was unsuitable due to its weight and the lack of a mechanism to prevent food from overcooking if troops were late for set mealtimes.

Although the Salamander cooker was not trialled at Takapau Camp in its travelling configuration, D (Mountain) Battery of the Field Artillery had used one during their April camp, which included a trek from Palmerston North to Wellington. They were satisfied with its performance, preparing meals of stews and roasts that were generally ready within one and a half hours of reaching camp. The battery used a mixture of coal and wood for fuel, finding wood more satisfactory than coal for heating.[17]

The test of War

Soldier using a field oven, Egypt. Ref: DA-00639 Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23078026

The declaration of war on 4 August 1914 and subsequent mobilisation shifted all efforts towards providing trained personnel for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF). The NZASC expanded its role at home and as part of the NZEF, taking on responsibility for bakeries and butcheries. However, despite ensuring the provision of necessary food items to units, cooking remained the responsibility of each unit. Further, Salamander cookers were purchased for the main mobilisation camp soon established at Trentham; however, it is less certain if units of the NZEF departing for overseas service deployed with Salamander cookers. General Order 312, which detailed the composition and strength of the NZEF, only provided an allocation of General Service (GS) horse-drawn wagons for the use of regimental cooks.[18] By January 1915, it became clear that the New Zealand units encamped in Egypt required field cookers. The NZEF Headquarters in Egypt placed orders through the High Commissioner in London for eight Imperial Pattern cookers. These cookers, supplied by the Lune Engineering Company, were delivered directly to the NZEF in Egypt.

Roberts’ efforts to break into the Australian market in May 1913 proved somewhat successful. The Australian military, benevolent organisations (which then gifted the cookers to individual units), and commercial organisations such as railways, all purchased Salamander Cookers. However, Roberts’ biggest success came after several trials comparing the Salamander Cooker against the Sykes Travelling Kitchen and the Australian Wiles Travelling Kitchen. Roberts won a contract to supply 40 Salamander Cookers to the Australian military.

1st order of 40 Roberts Travelling Cookers for Australia. Archives New Zealand R22432833 Cookers – Field- Roberts travelling

In the spirit of Australian sportsmanship, James Wiles was not pleased with the initial trial results. He convinced the Australian authorities to conduct a second round of trials, which eventfully led to Wiles supplying over 300 of his travelling kitchens to the Australian military during the war.[19]

By May 1915, as new battalions were formed at Trentham, there was a strong desire to equip them as thoroughly as possible, including with travelling cookers. Feedback from the Australians on their Salamander cookers was positive, noting they were satisfactory for infantry use but had limited utility for mounted units.

Robin, now commanding New Zealand forces, strongly advocated for purchasing New Zealand-made equipment, believing it would benefit the units by allowing them to become accustomed to the cookers before deployment. However, the Takapau report still influenced the decision to recommend the Lune Valley Engineering product over the Salamander cooker. Additionally, eight Imperial Pattern cookers from Lune Valley Engineering were already in service with the NZEF in Egypt.

Given these factors, purchasing eight more Imperial Pattern Cookers from Lune Valley Engineering in England was approved. It must be noted that the Lune Valley Engineering Travelling cookers purchased from England in 1915 were manufactured to the Imperil Pattern standard. Not the same pattern as the Lune Valley Engineering cookers trailed in 1914. The main difference was that the cookers trailed in 1914 were oil-fired. In contrast, the Imperial Pattern cooers were multi-fuel and could be fired by wool, coal, or oil.

The Imperial Pattern Travelling Filed kitchen body consists of a rectangular-shaped steel frame covered with steel sheets. The kitchen included two 75-lb capacity Steel pots fitted with trunnion plates and pins that prevented spillage when travelling over rough ground. One steel frying pan fitted with handles was also provided for use when one of the pots was removed. The body was also fitted with two roasting or baking ovens fitted with baking tins; under each oven was a receptacle for drying green wood. It fitted with a central fire grate with two funnels that could be folded down for travelling. A shovel, rake, poker, lifting bar and stirring rake carried on buckets attached to each side of the body were also provided. A limber was also provided with an additional two stew pots and storage space for rations and condiments and could be used as a serving area.

Soldiers preparing food, 1000 yards of the front line, Colincamps, France. Ref: 1/2-013114-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23131784

The failure to support the New Zealand industry by adopting the Imperial Pattern Cooker was a wise decision for New Zealand regarding training and logistics. The NZEF’s main contributions to the war effort were an Infantry Division and a Mounted Brigade. Although these formations were small and primarily equipped similarly to their British and Imperial counterparts, their contribution and quality far exceeded their size. Unlike Australia and Canada, which had the mass and industrial capacity to field national-specific equipment, New Zealand did not have this luxury.

A Wellington Regiment’s field kitchen near the front line, World War I. Ref: 1/2-013518-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22696605

Roberts continued to supply cookers to the New Zealand Military throughout the war, equipping the numerous training camps, hospitals, and rehabilitation facilities necessary to support the war effort at home. However, his focus shifted from mobile kitchens to static ones. Following the war’s end in 1918 and the rapid demobilisation and reduction of forces in the interwar period, there was little need for new equipment until existing stockpiles were depleted. It is possible that some Roberts Salamander travelling cookers remained in use with New Zealand’s Territorial Regiments post-1919, but no evidence has been found to support this.

While Roberts’ Salamander Kitchen was an excellent product, it would have been logistically challenging to support it on the other side of the world during wartime. Suppose Roberts had had a few more years to market and improve his product, increase production output, or issue licences to overseas manufacturers. In that case, he might have achieved the same success as Wiles did in the 1940s with the Wiles Junior Field Kitchen, which was adopted by New Zealand in 1952 and remained in service until the 1980s.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the evolution of field cooking in New Zealand’s military from the 19th to the early 20th centuries reflects a remarkable journey of innovation, adaptation, and perseverance. Initially relying on the resourcefulness and commitment of regimental cooks, who worked under challenging conditions with makeshift equipment, the New Zealand military recognised the need for more efficient and practical solutions as they transitioned to a Territorial Force.

The introduction of mobile field kitchens, particularly inspired by Karl Rudolf Fissler’s “Goulash Cannon,” marked a significant advancement. However, New Zealand ultimately developed its own innovative solution with the “Salamander” cooker, designed by Lieutenant James Ferdinand Groom Roberts. This cooker showcased remarkable efficiency, versatility, and practicality, capable of quickly preparing large quantities of food with minimal fuel. Its success in various camps and demonstrations underscored its value and led to widespread adoption within the military.

Despite initial competition and comparisons with other cookers, such as the Lune Valley and Sykes models, the Salamander’s advantages in efficiency, fuel economy, and suitability for New Zealand’s conditions were evident. The Defence Department’s support and procurement of additional units further cemented its role in enhancing military catering capabilities.

The onset of World War I shifted priorities, yet the lessons learned and innovations developed during this period laid a foundation for future military logistics and catering practices. The dedication to improving soldiers’ conditions through better field cooking solutions exemplifies New Zealand’s commitment to adaptability and innovation in military operations.


Notes

[1] Clayton, A. (2013). Battlefield Rations: The Food Given to the British Soldier For Marching and Fighting 1900-2011, Helion.

[2] (1911). “Lune Valley Engineering Company, Lancaster – Portable field cooker.” Archives New Zealand Item No R24764956.

[3] O’Shea, P. (1966). “ Alfred William Robin.” Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand. Retrieved 2 June 2024, from https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/3r25/robin-alfred-william.

[4] (1912). “Cooking equipment – Cooking ovens as used by Imperial troops re – Obtaining for use in New Zealand.” Archives New Zealand Item No R11096710.

[5]  The Aldershot Oven comprised two sheets of iron, approximately 1500mm long, rolled into a semi-circular shape. Each sheet is reinforced on each end and in the middle with an iron bar riveted to it. One sheet is slightly larger than the other, with a lip that slips under the rim of the other sheet. The oven includes two semi-circular ends.  The Aldershot oven was a ‘ground oven’, in which the fire burns in the oven and must be raked out before the bread is put in. The bread is baked by the heat retained in the oven’s walls. (1910). Manual of military cooking, Prepared at the Army School of Cookery. London Printed under the authority of His Majesty’s Stationery Office by Harrison and sons.

[6] (1912). “Cooking equipment – Cooking ovens supply to be obtained locally.” Archives New Zealand Item No R11096711.

[7] (1912). Argentine Shipments. Evening Post, Volume LXXXIV, Issue 114. Wellington.

[8] (1912). Territorials. Evening Post, Volume LXXXIV, Issue 133. Wellington.

[9] (1915). Travelling Cooker Operated in Camp. Herald No 12149(Melbourne, Vic). Melbourne, Vic.: 1.

[10] (1915). “Cookers – Field- Roberts travelling.” Archives New Zealand Item No R22432833.

[11] (1912). “Cooking equipment – Field cooking ovens – For use of units in camp or at manoeuvres.” Archives New Zealand Item No R11096715.

[12] (1913). “H-19 Report on the Defence Forces of New Zealand for the period 28 June 1912 to 20 June 1913.” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives.

[13] (1913). FEEDING AN ARMY. Age (Melbourne, Vic. : 1854 – 1954). Melbourne, Vic.: 10.

[14] Initial shareholders were: J.F.G Roberts £1920, R St J Beere £600, E.W Hunt £300, J.S Barton £180, J.G Roach £180, J J Esson £180, A.S Henderson £120, J McIntosh £120.  (1913). Companies Registered. Evening Post, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 10. Wellington.

[15] O’Sullivan, J. (1914). “Report of the Director of Equipment & Stores for the year ending 31 March 1914.” Archives New Zealand Item No R22432126.

[16] (1914). “H-19 Report on the Defence Forces of New Zealand for the period 20 June 1913 to 25 June 1914.” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives.

[17] (1915). “Cookers – Field- Roberts travelling.” Archives New Zealand Item No R22432833.

[18] (1914). Troopships; Embarkation Orders; Daily Field States; and a large chart of ‘New Zealand Expeditionary Forces – Personnel’ as at 1 June 1915). Archives New Zealand Item ID R23486740. Wellington.

[19] (1915). THE CAMP COOKER QUESTION. Age (Melbourne, Vic. : 1854 – 1954). Melbourne, Vic.: 6.


NEW ZEALAND ARMY – 1956

In 1955, the New Zealand Army found itself poised for significant transformation. The eruption of the Korean War and the escalating conflict in Malaysia compelled New Zealand to reassess its military strategy. Structured and equipped to provide an Expeditionary Force centred around a division supporting British forces in the Middle East, the evolving political situation in Asia placed the army on the cusp of a paradigm shift. This strategic shift redirected the focus of deployment from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, marking a crucial juncture in the army’s trajectory. [1] This article provides insights into the organisational and equipment state of the New Zealand Army of 1956 as it pivoted towards service in Asia.

Command and Control

Chief of the General Staff – Major-General C. E. Weir, CE., CBE., DSO.

Vice-Chief of the General Staff – Brigadier R. C. Queree, CBE., DS0.

Adjutant-General – Brigadier L. W. Thornton, OBE.

Quartermaster-General – Brigadier J. R. Page, CBE., DSO.

Strength

Regular Force

  • Authorised Strength – 4200
  • Actual Strength
    • Officers:          552
    • Other Ranks:   3276
    • Total:               3828

Territorial Force

NZ Army 3 Pl HB Regiment, 19th intake, Linton Military Camp, February 1956. Crown Studios Ltd :Negatives and prints. Ref: 1/1-033934-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22364964

Under the Compulsory Military Training Act of 1949, all males, whether European or Māori, became liable for military service upon reaching 18 years of age. Trainees had to undergo 14 weeks of intensive, full-time training, three years of part-time service, and six years in the Army Reserve. By 31 March 1956, 50,846 men had been trained under this scheme. The strength of the Territorial Force in 1956 was:

  • Officers:         
    • 1440
  • Other Ranks:  
    • 25846 – Effective Strength
    • 10065 – Completed whole-time training available for part-time training from 1 April 1956
    • 1760 – Held on strength but not available for training
    • Total                37671

School Cadet Corps

School Cadet Units were maintained at schools and were voluntarily for male students aged 14 to 18. In 1956, 807 officers and 38,032 cadets served in 140 secondary school cadet units.[2]

Organisation

Except for units of the NZ Cadet Corps, the following units comprised the New Zealand Army, which was organised into Army Troops, District Troops and the New Zealand Division:[3]

Army Troops

  • Army Headquarters
  • The Army Schools
  • Royal New Zealand Armoured Corps Depot RNZAC.
  • Royal New Zealand Corps of Signals Depot.
  • School of Military Engineering, RNZE
  • Royal New Zealand Army Medical Corps Depot.
  • Army Headquarters, Wireless Training Troop, RNZ Sigs.
  • Main Ordnance Depot, RNZAOC
  • Small Arms Ammunition Production Proof Office, RNZAOC
  • Inspecting Ordnance Officer Group, RNZAOC
  • Trentham Camp Hospital, RNZAMC.
  • Papakura Camp Hospital, RNZAMC
  • Waiouru Camp Hospital, RNZAMC.
  • Linton Camp Hospital, RNZAMC.
  • Burnham Camp Hospital, RNZAMC.
  • Army Headquarters, Dental Section, RNZDC
  • Whenuapai Dental Section, RNZDC.
  • Hobsonville Dental Section, RNZDC.
  • Ohakea Dental Section, RNZDC.
  • Woodbourne Dental Section, RNZDC.
  • Wigram Dental Section, RNZDC
  •  Services Corrective Establishment.

District Troops

  • Headquarters, Northern Military District.
    • Headquarters, Area 1, Auckland
    • Headquarters, Area 2, Tauranga.
    • Headquarters, Area 3, Whangarei.
    • Headquarters, Area 4, Hamilton.
    • Narrow Neck Camp (.(Incl Fort Cautley).
      • 9th Coast Regiment, RNZA
      • 9th Coast Regiment Signal Troop, RNZ Sigs.
    • Papakura Camp.
      • Northern District Construction Squadron, RNZE.
      • Papakura Dental Section, RNZDC
      • Northern District Army Education and Welfare Service, NZAEC.
    • Waikato Camp.
      • Northern District Company, RNZASC.
      • Northern District Signal Troop, RNZ Sigs.
      • Northern District Ordnance Depot, RNZAOC.
      • Northern District Ammunition Depot, RNZAOC
      • Northern District Ammunition Repair Depot, RNZAOC
      • Northern District Vehicle Depot, RNZAOC
      • Northern District Workshop, RNZEME.
  • Headquarters, Central Military District.
    • Headquarters, Area 5, Wellington.
    • Headquarters, Area 6, Wanganui.
    • Headquarters, Area 7, Napier.
    • Headquarters, Area 8, New Plymouth.
  • Waiouru Camp.
    • Central District Workshop (Waiouru), RNZEME.
    • Waiouru Dental Section, RNZDC.
  • Linton Camp.
    • Central District Training Depot.
    • Central District Construction Squadron, RNZE.
    • Central District Signal Troop, RNZ Sigs.
    • Central District Company, RNZASC.
    • Central District Ordnance Depot, RNZAOC.
    • Central District Vehicle Depot, RNZAOC.
    • Central District Army Education and Welfare Service, NZAEC.
Army Personnel wearing Medals, Linton – Elmar Studios, 459 Main Street, Palmerston North
Attribution + NonCommercial
https://manawatuheritage.pncc.govt.nz/item/246a3281-6b19-423a-9fed-00cf6de767a1
  • Trentham Camp.
    • Central District Ammunition Depot, ‘RNZAOC
    • Central District Ammunition Repair Depot, RNZAOC.
    • Central District Mechanical Transport Workshop (Trentham) RNZEME.
    • Central District Armament and General Workshop (Trentham), RNZEME.
    • 2nd General Hospital, RNZAMC
    • Trentham Dental Section, RNZDC.
  • Fort Dorset Base Camp
    • 10th  Coast Regiment, RNZA.
    • 10th CoastRegiment Signal Troop, RNZ Sigs.
  • Headquarters, Southern Military District,
    • Headquarters, Area 9, Nelson.
    • Headquarters, Area 10, Christchurch.
    • Headquarters, Area 11, Dunedin.
    • Headquarters, Area 12, Invercargill.
    • Burnham Camp
      • 11th Coast Regiment, RNZA.
      • 11th Coast Regiment Signal Troop, RNZ Sigs
      • Southern District Construction Squadron, RNZE.
      • Southern District Signal Troop, RNZ Sigs.
      • Southern District Company, RNZASC.
      • Otago University Medical Company, RNZAMC.(Dunedin)
      • Southern District Ordnance Depot, RNZAOC.
      • Southern District Ammunition Depot, RNZAOC.
      • Southern District Ammunition Repair Depot, RNZAOC.
      • Southern District Vehicle Depot, RNZAOC.
      • Southern District Mechanical Transport Workshop (Burnham), RNZEME.
      • Southern District Armament and General Workshop (Burnham), RNZEME.
      • Burnham Dental Section, RNZDC.
      • Southern District Army Education and Welfare Service, NZAEC

New Zealand Division

  • Headquarters, New Zealand Division.
    • Headquarters, New Zealand Division Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
  • Headquarters, RNZA, New Zealand Division.
    • 1st Field Regiment, RNZA.
      • 1st Field Regiment Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 2nd Field Regiment, RNZA.
      • 2nd Field Regiment Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 3rd Field Regiment, RNZA.
      • 3rd Field Regiment Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 4th Medium Regiment, RNZA.
      • 4th Medium Regiment Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 5th Light Regiment, RNZA.
      • 5th Light Regiment Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RNZA.
      • 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 12th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RNZA.
      • 12th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Workshop, RNZEME.
    • 1st Locating Battery, RNZA.
  • Headquarters, 1st Infantry Brigade.
    • 1st Battalion, The Northland Regiment, RNZ Inf.
    • 1st Battalion, The Auckland Regiment (Countess of Ranfurly’s Own) RNZ Inf.
    • 1st Battalion, The Hauraki Regiment, RNZ Inf.
    • Headquarters, 1st Infantry Brigade Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
  • Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Brigade.
    • 1st Battalion, The Wellington Regiment (City of Wellington’s Own)RNZ Inf.
    • 1st Battalion, The Wellington West Coast and Taranaki Regiment. RNZ Inf.
    • 1st Battalion, The Hawkes Bay Regiment. RNZ Inf.
    • Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Brigade Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
  • Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Brigade.
    • 1st Battalion, The Nelson, Marlborough, and West Coast Regiment, RNZ Inf.1st Battalion, The Canterbury Regiment RNZ Inf.1st Battalion, The Otago and Southland Regiment, RNZ Inf.
    • Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Brigade Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME
  • Headquarters, 4th Armoured Brigade.
    • 1st Armoured Regiment (Waikato), RNZAC.
      • 1st Armoured Regiment (Waikato} Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 4th Armoured Regiment (Wellington and  East Coast), RNZAC.
      • 4th Armoured Regiment (Wellington and East Coast) Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 1st Armoured Car Regiment (New Zealand Scottish), RNZAC.
      • 1st Armoured Car Regiment ,(New Zealand Scottish) Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
  • Headquarters, RNZE, New Zealand Division
    • 1st Field Engineer Regiment, RNZE.
      • 1st Field Engineer Regiment Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 4th Field Park Squadron, RNZE.
      • 5th Independent Field Squadron, RNZE
  • 1st Divisional Signal Regiment, RNZ Sigs.
    • 1st Divisional Signal Regiment Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
  • Headquarters, Commander RNZASC, New Zealand Division.
    • 1st Transport Company, RNZASC.
      • 1st Transport Company, RNZASC Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 4th Transport Company, RNZASC.
      • 4th Transport Company, RNZASC Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME.
    • 6th Transport Company, RNZASC.
      • 6th Transport Company, RNZASC Light Aid Detachment, RNZEME
    • Headquarters, 21st Supply Company, RNZASC.
    • 1st Supply Platoon, RNZASC.
  • Headquarters, RNZAMC, New Zealand Division.
    • 1st Field Ambulance, RNZAMC.
    • 2nd Field Ambulance, RNZAMC.
    • 3rd Field Ambulance, RNZAMC.
    • 1st Field Dressing Station, RNZAMC.
    • 1st Casualty Clearing Station, RNZAMC.
    • 1st Field Hygiene Section, RNZAMC.
    • 2nd Field Hygiene Section, RNZAMC.
    • 3rd Field Hygiene Section, RNZAMC.
  • Headquarters, Commander RNZAOCs, New Zealand Division.
    • 1st Divisional Ordnance Field Park, RNZAOC.
Anti Tank Platoon, Special Company, 16th Intake, Central District Training Depot, Linton – Elmar Studios, 459 Main Street, Palmerston North
Attribution + NonCommercial
https://manawatuheritage.pncc.govt.nz/item/03b0653f-c589-46e5-934e-22b8f6c41763
  • Headquarters, Commander RNZEME, New Zealand Division.
    • 1st Infantry Workshop, RNZEME.
    • 2nd Infantry Workshop, RNZEME.
    • 3rd Infantry Workshop, RNZEME.
  • 1st Mobile Dental Unit, RNZDC.
  • 2nd Mobile Dental Unit, RNZDC.
  • 3rd Mobile Dental Unit, RNZDC.
  • 1st Divisional Provost Company, RNZ Pro.

Overseas Units

  • New Zealand Army Liaison Staff London
    • New Zealand Army Liaison Staff Melbourne
    • New Zealand Fiji Cadre.
    • Headquarters, New Zealand Kayforce.
      • A Transport Platoon (Korea), RNZASC.
    • The New Zealand Special Air Service Squadron. (Malaya)

Note: Apart from the New Zealand Women’s Army Corps (NZWRAC) depot, there were no standalone NZWRAC units, with all members distributed across units of the NZ Army

Equipment

After the First World War, the New Zealand Army underwent re-equipment, acquiring enough equipment to outfit an Infantry division, Artillery Brigade, and Mounted Rifle Brigade.[4] However, by 1934, much of this equipment had reached the end of its operational life. In line with mechanisation experiments, the first wave of modern uniforms and equipment began to be introduced into New Zealand’s service, including Anti-Aircraft Artillery, Bren Guns, and Universal Carriers from 1938.[5]

The advent of the Second World War saw the comprehensive re-equipment of the New Zealand army. By 1946, it was equipped on par with its peers in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, with the available equipment viewed as sufficient for the immediate post war training purposes.[6]

MMG Platoon, Special Company, 15th Intake, Central District Training Depot, Linton – Elmar Studios, 459 Main Street, Palmerston North Attribution + NonCommercial https://manawatuheritage.pncc.govt.nz/item/a97629cc-4f4b-4ad9-9260-811bcf3ef3ec

Between 1946 and 1950, the demand for new or additional equipment was minimal. However, during this time, all remaining pre-war field artillery was replaced with more modern systems developed during the war. Substantial advancements occurred from 1950 onward, including the introduction of new Land Rover 4-wheel-drive vehicles, Centurion tanks, Armoured Cars, and anti-armour weapons, as well as the initial deployment of the Larkspur radio system. However, despite this purchase of a token amount of equipment, much of the army’s World War Two equipment although in service for less than twenty years was facing bulk obsolescence and included the following equipment.

Weapons and Communications Equipment

TypeModelQty (If known)
RiflesLee Enfield No4 Mk1 and Mk1*40000
RiflesLee Enfield No 1 Mk324000
RiflesRifles No 8 Mk3 .22-in 
RiflesX8E1 FN FAL 7.62mm Rifles for troop trials22
PistolsRevolver Smith & Weston No2 .38-inch 
PistolsPistol, Signal No1 Mk3 
Submachine GunSten 9mm Mk 2 & Mk 3 
Machine GunBren. 303-inch 
Machine GunVickers .303-inch 
Machine GunBrowning .30-inch 
Machine GunBESA MK1,2 and 3 
MortarOrdnance SBML two-inch mortar430
MortarOrdnance ML 3-inch mortar 
MortarOrdnance ML 4.2-inch Mortar36
Anti-ArmourM20 Mk2 3.5-inch Rocket Launcher57
Anti-Armour120mm BAT L2 Recoilless Rifle18
Anti-ArmourOrdnance QF 6-pounder 
Anti-ArmourAnti-Tank Grenade No 94 (ENERGA) 
Field ArtilleryOrdnance QF 25-pounder Mk2 
Field ArtilleryBL 5.5-inch (140mm) calibre,  Mk 312
Anti-Aircraft ArtilleryBofors 40 mm L/60 gun396 (most in storage)
Anti-Aircraft ArtilleryQF 3.7-inch Mk3193 (most in storage)
Coast ArtilleryBL 9.2inch Mk XV6
Coast ArtilleryBL 6-inch Mk XXIV3
Coast ArtilleryBL 6-inch Mk XXI6
Coast ArtilleryBL 6-inch Mk VII2
Coast ArtilleryQF 6-Pounder, 10 cwt Twin4
RadarRadar, Anti-Aircraft No 3, Mark 79
Range FinderRange Finder No 12 Mk VII 
RadiosWireless Set No. 19 
RadiosWireless Set No. 22 
RadiosWireless Set No. 31 
RadiosWireless Set No. 33 
RadiosWireless Set No. 38 
RadiosWireless Set No. 48 
RadiosWireless Set No. 52 
RadiosWireless Set No. 53 
RadiosWireless Set No. 62 
RadiosWireless Set No. 88 
RadiosWireless Set No ZC 1 Mk II (NZ) 
MOR Platoon, Special Company, 13th Intake, Central District Training Depot, Linton – Elmar Studios, 459 Main Street, Palmerston North Attribution + NonCommercial https://manawatuheritage.pncc.govt.nz/item/bbb5c07a-6cae-443c-affe-6141015ee1a1
Signals Platoon, Special Company, 14th Intake, Central District Training Depot, Linton – Elmar Studios, 459 Main Street, Palmerston North Attribution + NonCommercial https://manawatuheritage.pncc.govt.nz/item/4a24b2bf-4bfd-4784-8daf-4efb919b14e6

Vehicles

In 1939, the New Zealand Army inventory of vehicles consisted of.

  • 6 Motorcycles
  • 2 Cars
  • 54 Tracks and tractors

By 1944, this fleet had expanded to 20311 vehicles of all types from the United States, Canada and Great Britain.[7]  Reductions of surplus vehicles due to the war’s end had reduced this holding to 10931 vehicles in 1945. Operational wear and tear and a shortfall in unit maintenance capability further reduced the fleet, necessitating placing most vehicles into regional Vehicle Depots managed by the RNZOAC. Under this system, units maintained a minimum of vehicles for routine activities; however, before an exercise, the unit’s additional vehicle requirement was drawn from the supporting Vehicle Depot.

ModelQty (If known)
Centurion Mk 33
Valentine Mk 3 and V 
Daimler Mk II ‘Dingo’ scout car84
Daimler Mk 2 Armoured Car11
NZ Pattern Wheeled Carrier Mk 2 
Universal LP2A Carrier& 
Motorcycle BSA M20 
Motorcycle Indian Model 741B 
Land-Rover Series 1 80″384
Willys Jeep 
AEC Matador 4×4 artillery tractor 
Bedford MWC 200Gallon Water Cart 
Bedford MWC Ambulance 
Bedford QL GS 
Bedford QLB Light Anti-Aircraft Tractor 
Chevrolet C60 Wireless Truck 
Chevrolet C60L 4 x 4 Wrecker 
Chevrolet C8AX  Compressor 
Chevrolet C8AX Ambulance 
Chevrolet C8AX GS 
Chevrolet C8AX Water Truck 
Chevrolet C8AX Wireless 
Chevrolet Field Artillery Tractor 
Diamond T 968 4-ton 6×6 
Diamond T 969A Recovery 
Diamond T 980 12-ton 6×4 
Federal 6×4+4 20-ton Transporter 
Ford F30 4×4 30-cwt Fire Appliance 
Ford F30 4×4 30-cwt GS 
Ford F30 4×4 30-cwt Tipper 
Ford F30 4×4 30-cwt Wireless 
Ford F61-L LWB Recovery Vehicle/Holmes 
GMC 6×4 CCW Binned Stores 
GMC 6×4 CCW GS 
GMC 6×4 CCW Shower 
GMC 6×4 CCW-353 GS 
GMC 6×4 CCW-353 Tipper 
Guy FPAX 
Leyland Retriever, 6×4  Searchlight 
Leyland Retriever, 6×4 Breakdown Gantry 
Leyland Retriever, 6×4, Machinery, Type A 
Leyland Retriever, 6×4, Machinery, Type Z 
Scammell Pioneer R100 Artillery Tractor 
Scammell Pioneer SV2S Heavy Recovery Vehicle 
Ward La France M1A1 Recovery Vehicle 
Trailer 15KVA Lister Generator 
Trailer Dental 
Trailer FBE (Folding Boat Equipment) 
Trailer Recovery 6 Ton 6 Wheel No1 Mk11 
Trailer Water Purification 
B. Platoon, Royal New Zealand Army Service Corp, 14th Intake, Central District Training Depot, Linton – Elmar Studios, 459 Main Street, Palmerston North Attribution + NonCommercial https://manawatuheritage.pncc.govt.nz/item/ffc2f263-a7d8-4991-9235-df0ed9ea9ee4

Painting of Equipment and Vehicles

In the interest of smart turnout, weather protection and economy, all mobile artillery equipment and trailers and all “B” and “C” vehicles were in peacetime painted to a glossy finish using Paint, PFU, Deep Bronze Green, High Gloss.

All “A” Vehicles and non-mobile artillery equipment, searchlights, etc,  were painted to a matt finish using Paint, PFU, Deep Bronze Green, Matt Finish.[8]

Rationing

The RNZASC was responsible for overseeing all catering operations within the army. This included managing ration scales and supply organisation, including ration stores, cold stores, and butcher shops. Additionally, the RNZASC coordinated the activities of cooks and stewards stationed in camp and field kitchens. Bulk stocks of rations received from civilian suppliers were held in Supply Platoons and divided into ration breaks tailored to the needs of individual kitchens, depending on the strength of dependent units. Bulk field feeding was facilitated by RNZASC field kitchens, which provided essential sustenance in various operational settings. Unlike other contemporary military forces, the New Zealand Army did not utilise ration packs. Instead, units were supplied with canned or fresh food from the existing ration scale, allowing units to prepare meals while in the Field for shorter periods, ensuring flexibility and adaptability to different operational demands.

Specialised RNZASC Field Catering equipment included.

  • Cookers Portable No 1
  • Cookers Portable No 2
  • Cookers Portable No 3
  • Wiles’ Junior’ Mobile Cooker trailer
  • Wiles’ Senior’ Mobile Cooker trailer
  • Portable Field Cookhouse
  • Portable Mess Kit Wash up Kit.
  • Portable Meat Safe
School of Cookery, 15th Intake, Central District Training Depot, Linton – Elmar Studios, 459 Main Street, Palmerston North Attribution + NonCommercial https://manawatuheritage.pncc.govt.nz/item/70f9084d-362c-48ea-aeb4-0a048790d5be

Clothing and Personal Equipment

Following World War Two, with Ordnance Stores well stocked and NZ industry well positioned to support any surge in demand, the NZ army retained the familiar combination of woollen serge Battle Dress (BD) and Khaki Drill (KD) and Demin range of uniforms that had served it well during the war years. However, by 1955, the high tempo of training required to maintain a division supported by CMT, operations in Korea, and a likely commitment to ongoing operations in Southeast Asia highlighted deficiencies of the current ranger of uniforms. While the BD uniforms remained suitable for use in temperate and colder climates, the Army Clothing Committee identified a requirement to develop a summer training dress for use in NZ that would also be satisfactory for jungle operations, in response to the Army Dress Committee, Captain J.A Dixie of the Defence Scientific Corps of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) provided a comprehensive report on Tropical Clothing. Reviewing World War Two and post-war scientific research on the problem of tropical clothing by the United States and Commonwealth, Dixie’s report provided the principles that guided the selection of a suitable NZ Army range of tropical uniforms and equipment.[9]

In December 1955, the Army Board approved the transition of uniforms with BDs retained as winter dress in NZ and KDs to be phased out in favour of uniforms manufactured in Drill Green (DG) for summer and working dress.

Detailed below are the uniform scales of issues that were to be affected by the most significant uniform transition since 1940.

1955 Scales of Uniform issue.

Scale 1Regular Soldiers, including Regular Force Cadets.
Scale 2Regular Physical Training Instructors.
Scale 3Regular Officers.
Scale 4Regular Officers and Soldiers of the NZWRAC.
Scale 5Regular soldiers of the NZANS.
Scale 6Territorial Recruits.
Scale 7Territorial soldiers.
Scale 8Territorial Officers.
Scale 9Territorial Officers and Soldiers of the NZWRAC.
Scale 10Territorial Soldiers of the NZANS.
Scale 11Territorial Officers of the NZANS.
Scale 12Cadets of the Cadet Corps.
Scale 13Cadet Corps Officers.
Scale 14Special Clothing.
Scale 15Camp Necessities: Supplementary scales.
Scale 16Welfare Workers in Army Camps.
Scale 17Canteen Council Employees.
Scale 18Individual Provision: Women’s Services.
Scale 19Clothing and Necessaries to be in Possession of Soldiers Committed to Detention Barracks.
Scale 20Hospital Patients.

Headdress

Blue berets were designated for Physical Training Instructors. Additionally, officers (excluding RNZAC) were issued blue berets to be worn with Uniform Blue No 1.

The introduction of the Cap Battledress (Cap BD), commonly known as the Ski Cap, commenced in 1954 as a replacement for the Cap GS (Lemon squeezer). Members of the RNZAC were not required to wear the Cap BD, as they retained the Black Beret adopted in 1942 as their headdress.

The standard combat helmet was the Helmet, Steel, Mark II (Brodie), with special helmets for motorcycle riders and armoured crew members.

On Parade Nov 1954, 14th Intake, Central District Training Depot, Linton – Elmar Studios, 459 Main Street, Palmerston North Attribution + NonCommercial https://manawatuheritage.pncc.govt.nz/item/69e57e1d-e1c1-4bb8-ab5f-0366a915b787

Battle Dress

The 37 Pattern Battle Dress (BD) served as New Zealand soldiers’ standard winter uniform and walking-out attire during World War II and subsequent years. This uniform, featured the following  key components:

  • Blouse: Fashioned from durable wool serge fabric, the blouse featured a buttoned front with concealed buttons. It boasted two breast pockets and two internal pockets, while the straight sleeves typically came with adjustable cuffs for added comfort and versatility.
  • Trousers: Crafted from the same resilient wool serge material as the blouse, the trousers boasted a practical button-fly design. They were equipped with two internal pockets, one rear pocket and a map pocket on the left leg. Adjustable side tabs on the waistband ensured a personalised fit for each wearer.
  • Web Anklets: Designed to keep the trouser bottoms securely in place, the web anklets prevented them from riding up or becoming loose during movement. This maintained a tidy and uniform appearance and offered protection against debris and insects entering the footwear.
  • BD Skirts were provided for female soldiers of the NZWRAC and NZANS

An upgraded pattern of Battle Dress was introduced in New Zealand known as the Pattern 52 BD, however from 1956, due to the considerable number of older patterns in circulation, the issue of the 52-Patt BDs was limited to regular soldiers and officers until stocks of the older pattern were wasted out.

Khaki Drill

During summer months, the woollen BD uniform proved impractical, leading to the issuance of Khaki drill attire. This summer uniform comprised:

  • Shirt, drill, Khaki
  • Shirt, Bush, OR, No 1 or No 2
  • Shirt, Officers, Khaki
  • Shorts, drill, Khaki
  • Trouser, drill, Khaki
  • Hosetops, Khaki, and Puttees, Short
  • Skirts, Khaki (NZWRAC and NZANS)

Working Dress

Recognising the unsuitability of both the BD and Khaki Drill uniforms for rigorous activities, a Denim working dress was provided. This ensemble included:

  • Jacket, Denim
  • Trousers, Denim

These garments were intended to withstand the demands of heavy-duty work while maintaining functionality and durability for soldiers in various tasks and environments, with overalls issued in addition to denims for tradesmen.

Camouflage

In 1952,  1500 sets of Khaki Drill Jackets and Trousers were dyed green and issued to the three military districts (250 sets per district) and NZ Division (750 sets) as camouflage clothing for training. The status of these by 1956 is unknown.

Footwear

Boots

Boots were ankle-high, lace-up ammo boots consisting of

  • Boots, ankle, Rank and File R&F, IP (or NZ). These boots had pebble-grained leather uppers with leather soles fitted with heel plates, toe plates and sole studs (hobnails).
  • Boots, ankle, officers, black. Officers’ boots had heel plates, but lacked the sole studs and toe plates because they could afford to replace the soles.

Other footwear

  • Shoes, canvas, rubber sole.
  • Shoes, officers, black, heavy.
  • Shoes, officers, black, light.
  • Shoes, NZWRAC, tan
  • Boots, Motorcyclists
  • Sandals, leather
  • Overshoes – issued to personnel employed in Magazines, Cookhouses at Ordnance Stores with concrete floors.

Wet and cold weather clothing

  • Issued to Soldiers
    • Coats, waterproof, Other Ranks
    • Gloves Woolen
    • Greatcoat, dismounted, 1940-patt.
    • Jersey, pullover, Type A
    • Jersey, pullover, Type B
  • Issued to Officers
    • Caps Comforter
    • Cardigan
    • Coats, trench or waterproof
    • Gloves, leather, brown, lined.
    • Gloves, leather, brown, unlined
    • Greatcoats
    • Jersey, pullover, Type A
    • Scarves , Khaki
  • Special Clothing issue
    • Boots, rubber knee
    • Capes, waterproof
    • Coats, oilskin
    • Hats, oilskin
    • Jackets, oilskin
    • Jerkin, Sleeveless Leather

Badges

  • Arm and appointment badges
    • Brass or Worsted SD
    • Cap & Collar
      • Other Ranks – brass
      • Officers – gilt
    • Rank
      • Worsted SD (Other Ranks)
      • Brass on Bands, wrist, KD, WO
      • Shoulder, worsted of gilt (Stars or Crowns)

    Web Equipment

    While New Zealand received substantial information regarding research and development efforts by the British Army aimed at enhancing web equipment, many of the new British designs were still in the development phase and not yet ready for deployment. [10]  However, with over 60,000 sets of the 37-Pattern equipment in circulation in New Zealand, supplemented by older items like the 08 Pattern pack, it was ensured that this equipment would remain in service for the foreseeable future.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion 1956 marked a crucial juncture for the New Zealand Army, necessitating strategic adaptations in response to evolving global conflicts. The army transitioned from its traditional role supporting British forces in the Middle East to engaging in operations in Southeast Asia. This shift prompted organisational restructuring, equipment modernisation, and adjustments to clothing and logistical operations. By aligning itself with the United Kingdom and Australia, the New Zealand Army was positioned to meet the challenges of the battlefields of the 1960s.


    Notes

    [1] Damien Fenton, A False Sense of Security: The Force Structure of the New Zealand Army 1946-1978, Occasional Paper / Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand: No. 1 (Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Victoria University of Wellington, 1998), 49.

    [2] “Military Forces of New Zealand Annual Report of the General Officer Commanding, for Period 1 April 1955 to 31 March 1956,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1956 Session I, H-19  (1956).

    [3] “Composition of the New Zealand Army,” New Zealand Army Order 26-27/56, 9 May 1956.

    [4] “H-19 Defence Forces of New Zealand, Annual Report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives  (1920): 11.

    [5] “H-19 Military Forces of New Zealand, Annual Report of the Chief of the General Staff,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, (1939).

    [6] “H-19 Military Forces of New Zealand Annual Report of the General Officer Commanding, for Period 1 June 1950 to 31 March 1951,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives  (1951).

    [7] “Appendices to Report on Qmg (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541151  (1944).

    [8] “Vehicles and Artillery Equipments, Painiting Of,” New Zealand Army Order 75/50, 9 May 1950.

    [9] Army 213/1/92 DSIR Tropical Clothing Dated 3 October 1955. “Clothing – Tropical Clothing and Personal Equipment, ”Clothing.

    [10]  86/Dev/54 (SWV1) Instructions for Troop trials of Z2 Experimental Load Carrying Equipment, 1954;”Cookers – Web Equipment: New Pattern,” Archives New Zealand No R17189098  (1944 -1966).