Between 1939 and 1944, the New Zealand Army’s home-front logistics functions undertook a monumental task. They faced significant obstacles in maintaining accurate record-keeping and inventory control, dealing with challenges such as limited storage capacity, a shortage of experienced personnel, and high turnover rates. At the peak of this period, nearly 200,000 regular, Territorial, and Home Guard troops were mobilised and dispersed in numerous units across New Zealand and the Pacific, all in need of weapons, ammunition, clothing, and equipment. The scale of their operation was immense, and their efforts were crucial to the war effort. Supplying and maintaining this force, especially as they were dispersed and many required specialised and technical resources, was a testament to the dedication and resourcefulness of the personnel tasked with stores accounting.
With allied forces unable to stem the Japanese offensive in Asia and the Pacific and invasion likely, the situation’s urgency demanded swift and efficient mobilisation. However, the constant reshuffling of personnel and frequent transfers of equipment and ammunition between units added further complexity. Organisational changes and equipment shortfalls were frequent, compounding the difficulty of building up and sustaining military readiness at home while supporting New Zealand’s deployed forces overseas. Despite these hurdles, the New Zealand Army’s logistics efforts achieved significant milestones. Their resilience and adaptability in the face of immense national and global pressure are a source of admiration.
The Accounting System
Like the armies of Canada and Australia, the New Zealand Army was organised and equipped in line with British doctrine, with the New Zealand Army General Staff determining the Army’s organisation with local modifications to fit New Zealand’s unique requirements. These organisational structures were formalised through three main types of documents:
The Order of Battle (ORBAT): This outlined the number and composition of formations, detailing the units they commanded following the General Staff’s policy decisions.
The War Establishment (WE): This document specified each unit’s authorised staffing and structure, which were, in most cases, identical to the British Army war establishments.
The Unit Equipment Table (Form NZ 483): These defined each unit’s authorised stores and equipment. Examples of Equipment Tables approved from July 1939 were:[1][2]
Form NZ 483-2: – HQ of a Mounted Rifle Brigade
Form NZ 483-3: – HQ of Infantry Brigade
Form NZ 483-5: – HQ of Infantry Brigade and Attached Troops
Form NZ 483-6: – HQ of a Medium Regiment, NZ
Form NZ 483-21: – A Mounted Rifle Regiment (Horse)
Form NZ 483-22: – A Mounted Rifle Squadron (Motorised)
Form NZ 483-23: – An Independent Mounted Rifle Squadron
Form NZ 483-24: – A Motor Regiment
Form NZ 483-32: – A Medium Battery
Form NZ 483-52: – A Field Company, RNZE
Form NZ 483-61: (a) – HQ of a District Signals Company
Form NZ 483-61: (b) – No 1 Sect, A District Signals Company
Form NZ 483-61: (c) – No 2 (M.R Brigaded Section) A District Sigs Coy
Form NZ 483-61: (d) – No 3 (Fd Arty Bde Sect) A District Sigs Coy
Form NZ 483-61: (e) – No 4 (Med Arty Bde Sect) A District Sig Coy
Form NZ 483-61: (f) – No 5 (Inf Bde Sect) A District Sig Coy
Form NZ 483-71: – An Infantry (Mixed) Battalion
Form NZ 483-72: – An Infantry (Mixed) Battalion (Fortress)
Form NZ 483-73: – No 2a (LMG) Platoon, for a Fortress Bn
Form NZ 483-76: – A Detached Rifle Company, National Military Reserve
Form NZ 483-81: – A Composite Company, ASC
Form NZ 483-82: – A Reserve MT Company, ASC
Form NZ 483-83: – A Composite Company, AHQ Reserve Group
Form NZ 483-91: – A Field Ambulance (Mechanised)
Form NZ 483-101: – A Light Aid Detachment, NZAOC
Changes to the unit organisation often stemmed from General Staff policy decisions regarding equipment scales—such as weapons, vehicles, and wirelesses—resulting in corresponding amendments to the War Establishments and Unit Equipment Table Form NZ 483 tables.
Each unit maintained both ‘peace’ and ‘war’ establishments. While the peace establishment included reduced personnel and resources for peacetime training, the war establishment detailed the full complement of men and equipment needed for active service. From 1939, regular and territorial units in New Zealand began mobilising to war strength with reservists, integrating the Territorial Force and recruits through the New Zealand Temporary Staff (NZTS), marking the shift to a wartime footing.
With an established table of what stores they should hold, A unit or sub-unit knew exactly what equipment they were responsible for, including spades, shovels, axes, etc. They would also have items of controlled stores usually identified with a serial number – the controlled stores would include compasses, binoculars, wristwatches, etc., which, when issued, would be signed for. When losing a controlled item, a Board of Inquiry was conducted to establish the circumstances of loss and determine who (usually the soldier) should pay for it.
The Company Quartermaster Sergeant (CQMS), whose rank could be Sergeant, Staff Sergeant of Warrant Officer Class Two, or, of course, the Company Commander, was responsible for the accountability of the unit or sub-unit stores. Standards of accountability for unit stores varied, with some units conducting regular kit checks and publishing lists of soldiers with deficiencies and the amount they owed in unit routine orders.
Manual Systems and Administrative Burden
The Army stores accounting system applied to all units of the New Zealand Army. It was based on a unit ledger, supported by inventories, vouchers, schedules, and scales of issue, which recorded all store items and transactions in the unit. All entries in ledgers were to be supported by a voucher, and all vouchers were cleared by posting to the ledger or annotated with a reference to another voucher or to the point of issue. Stores could only be struck off charge by one of the following:
An Issue Voucher, signed by the recipient of the stores
A Certificate Issue Voucher, where the recipient was not required to sign for the stores
A Board of Survey or Certificate of Condemnation
By an application to write of Army Stores
Units such as NZAOC depots, MT Branch depots, mobilisation units and Camp Quartermaster Stores were classed as accounting units. They managed their stocks with a ledger card system using the NZ161 Ledger card.[3]
Field Force units maintained their NZ Equipment Table as the main ledger, recording all items issued to the unit and their distribution.
Photograph of World War II servicewomen unloading pillows. Ref: PAColl-8846. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22327559
While effective, the system was inflexible compared to today’s digital Inventory Management systems. Under the pressures of wartime, maintaining rigorous documentation proved challenging, and adherence to procedural norms was sometimes relaxed to expedite supply to forces in the Pacific and Home Defence.
Mobilisation and Training Impact
In 1941, brigade and district manoeuvres escalated the army’s activity tempo, and early in 1942, the entire Territorial Force was mobilised, and tactical responsibilities with the Home Guard were formalised. Many units operated in active service conditions, with newly trained Quartermasters and staff often lacking prior military store management experience. The potential threat of invasion by Japanese forces added a sense of urgency and pressure, making training and equipping all available troops the top priority, even if it meant sacrificing strict clerical accuracy.[4]
Members of the New Zealand Home Guard receiving equipment. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch:Photographs relating to World War 1939-1945. Ref: DA-00477. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22871820
Before total mobilisation, many of the Regular and Territorial Force personnel and civilian staff skilled in stores accounting had deployed overseas with the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) in the Middle East or with the Brigade Group in Fiji. This left domestic units staffed by officers and NCOs with limited military stores experience, often stationed in field locations without adequate storage facilities. Despite these challenges, the dedication and commitment of these officers and NCOs were unwavering, even as ongoing personnel rotation severely hindered inventory management.
Progress in Accounting Practices
By late 1943, the strategic situation had stabilised, and the threat of invasion was removed, with the demobilisation of the Home Guard and Territorial Force underway by early 1944. As part of this process, comprehensive audits of unit accounts were conducted. Despite some losses due to unrecorded stores, the overall value of missing inventory remained relatively low compared to the total volume managed. The following table presents the total amount written off from April 1939 to March 1944, which was £259,200 (equivalent to $28,119,860 in 2024).
Note that “Deficiencies” – representing faulty accounting – contributed £84,710 ($9,165,191.67 in 2024). Including estimates for undetailed years, this figure suggests that deficiencies represented less than 40% of the total write-offs.[5]
Reflecting on Wartime Logistics and Accountability
During the peak demand period of 1942 and early 1943, stores accounting took a secondary role to the urgent need to supply the mobilised units efficiently. The New Zealand Army was not only receiving large shipments of war material from the United Kingdom and North America but also managing the distribution of substantial volumes of the same equipment for both Pacific deployments and Home Defence, prioritising speed over strict procedural adherence. While this approach led to some irregularities, major scandals were avoided, and only minor cases of misappropriation occurred. This flexibility demonstrates the staff’s pragmatic approach to balancing efficiency and accountability under extreme conditions, ensuring operational needs were met without compromising integrity.
Lessons for Contemporary Military Stores Accounting
This analysis provides a perspective for modern logistics professionals, especially when using contemporary data management systems. Despite the sophisticated features of these platforms—like precise tracking and real-time reporting—the effectiveness of these tools is often linked to the skills and judgment of the personnel who operate them. The lessons from the New Zealand Army’s wartime experiences demonstrate that the strategic use and flexibility in stores accounting can be crucial in emergencies. However, suppose the benefits of the modern systems are not being fully realised. The root cause likely lies in the organisation’s skill sets for managing and leveraging these resources.
Rigidly following procedures can sometimes hinder progress, just as it did in the past when wartime conditions demanded quick and adaptable responses. For today’s logistics leaders, the real challenge is recognising when to exploit the flexibility offered by modern data systems and when to relax procedural controls. Balancing this requires training and experience, especially in crises where the pressure to deliver supplies efficiently can tempt managers to bypass standard processes. While this may be necessary temporarily, the quick restoration of standard procedures is essential to maintaining accountability and data quality.
The key is adaptability, but only to the extent that it does not lead to long-term compromises in record-keeping and operational integrity. If modern data management tools are underperforming, investing in staff training and developing the necessary expertise could ensure these advanced systems are used to their full potential.
Notes
[1] “New Zealand Equipment Tables -Provisional,” New Zealand Army Order 164 (1 July 1939).
[2] “New Zealand Equipment Tables -Provisional,” New Zealand Army Order 216 (1 October 1941).
[3] “FORMS AND BOOKS: Forms adopted,” New Zealand Army Order 266 (1 October 1939).
[4] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150 (1944).
[5] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541151 (30 June 1944).
Since 1940, New Zealand played a pivotal role in the Pacific theatre, initially maintaining a brigade group in Fiji from 1940 to 1942. After a brief reorganisation and training back home, this brigade group was reformed in 1943 as the 3rd New Zealand Division, the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific (NZEF IP). Well-equipped with thousands of vehicles, tanks, and an extensive supply of ammunition and ordnance stores, the division conducted several successful amphibious combat operations. However, by 1944, sustaining this division became untenable. This led to one of the most remarkable reverse logistics operations in New Zealand’s military history: the withdrawal and redeployment of the 3rd New Zealand Division back to New Zealand. This colossal effort faced unprecedented challenges, including the lack of modern material handling equipment (MHE) and the absence of information technology (IT) systems.
New Zealand World War II soldiers loading stores into infantry landing craft, Vella Lavella, Solomon Islands. Ref: 1/2-044734-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22411372
The Deployment and Its Challenges
After reorganising in New Zealand, the 3rd New Zealand Division was deployed to the Solomon Islands, with its primary base in New Caledonia. By 1944, it became evident that New Zealand could no longer support this division due to the demands of both the Pacific and European theatres.[1] The decision was made to withdraw, with personnel either demobilised or redeployed to reinforce the 2nd New Zealand Division fighting in Italy. This withdrawal initiated a significant reverse logistics operation—one of the most remarkable in New Zealand’s military history.
Military reverse logistics involves returning equipment, supplies, and personnel from forward operational areas to home bases or depots. It encompasses transportation and the recovery, inspection, refurbishment, and redistribution of materials. This inherently complex task demands meticulous coordination to ensure that every piece of equipment and supply is accounted for.[2]
Despite its importance, many modern militaries do not sufficiently train for or practise reverse logistics, often leading to significant delays in regenerating forces after deployment. The lack of emphasis on these tasks can slow down the redeployment and recovery of operational capabilities, as critical items may be lost, damaged, or delayed in transit.
Moreover, reverse logistics involves disposing of or recycling obsolete or damaged equipment, adding another layer of complexity. The pressure to quickly remove materials from operational theatres often conflicts with the need for thorough inspection and assessment. Without proper planning and execution, militaries may be unable to effectively reconstitute their forces for future missions, resulting in decreased readiness and prolonged downtime.
Between August 1944 and July 1945, New Zealand undertook the monumental task of returning all equipment from the Pacific to its depots. This operation involved over 50,000 items held by the NZEFIP Ordnance depots, 3,274 vehicles, 25 tanks, and tonnes of ammunition and New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) supplies. Despite the vast scale of this effort, the return of the 3rd New Zealand Division has largely faded from memory. Nevertheless, it stands as a remarkable logistical achievement, showcasing the adaptability and efficiency of New Zealand’s military personnel under demanding conditions. Incorporating reverse logistics into military training and planning is vital for improving operational efficiency, reducing delays, and maintaining readiness—a challenge many modern forces still struggle to address fully.
Infrastructure and Manual Labour as the Backbone
The success of this operation heavily relied on the infrastructure at Mangere Crossing Camp in Auckland. Initially built for United States forces and known as Camp Euart, the camp was named in honour of Captain Elwood J. Euart of the United States Army Field Artillery. Captain Euart heroically lost his life while saving others during the sinking of the U.S. Army Transport President Coolidge due to striking a Japanese mine off the Island of Espiritu Santo, Vanuatu. Upon learning that soldiers were trapped in the ship’s infirmary, he re-entered the sinking vessel to assist them. Tying himself to the lower end of a rope, he held it steady enough for the trapped men to climb to safety despite the ship’s heavy listing. Tragically, when Euart attempted to climb the rope himself, the vessel suddenly careened and sank, preventing his escape. His selfless courage and devotion to duty cost him his life.[3]
Camp Euart began hosting US forces in September 1942 and, at its peak, accommodated 5,000 troops—nearly equal to the entire population of Otahuhu at the time.[4] The camp remained under U.S. control until 1944, when it was vacated and handed over to the New Zealand forces. In August 1944, it became the Mangere Stores Sub Depot of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) Main Ordnance Depot (MOD), designated to receive supplies and equipment returned from the Pacific by the 3rd New Zealand Division, which established its advanced base headquarters at what became known as Mangere Crossing Camp.
Strategically located near key rail and road networks, the 80-acre site became a central hub for processing vast quantities of war material. Although optimised for storage and handling, the logistics teams relied on manual labour, as no modern MHE was available then.
The camp featured five warehouses designed for large-scale equipment storage:
Two warehouses, each measuring 300 by 120 feet (91 by 36 metres)
One warehouse measuring 300 by 60 feet (91 by 18 metres)
One warehouse measuring 360 by 120 feet (109 by 36 metres)
One warehouse measuring 200 by 240 feet (60 by 73 metres)
These warehouses provided 190,200 square feet (17,670 square metres) of storage space. Adding three ancillary buildings increased the total space to 207,600 square feet (19,287 square metres). Each warehouse had concrete floors, wooden framing, and fibrolite walls and roofs, ensuring durability and protection from the elements.[5]
An aerial view of the World War II US military camp, known as Camp Euart, and the supply depot at Mangere Crossing, 1944. Manukau Research Library, PAP: IV, Footprints 02152. Papatoetoe Historical Society.
New housing beside industrial area in Otahuhu, Auckland 1949. Whites Aviation Ltd: Photographs. Ref: WA-19438-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22322624
A key logistical advantage of the camp was its railway siding, which extended directly into the warehouse block. This allowed trains to deliver supplies straight into the camp, reducing handling time and labour demands. Integrating transport and storage was vital for managing the massive flow of materials—including 10,000 tonnes of mixed stores and 3,000 vehicles—that arrived over three months starting in August 1944.[6]
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944. Alexander Turnbull Library
Without modern IT systems for inventory tracking or automated equipment for loading and unloading, work parties manually handled over 250,000 packages, each averaging 100 pounds (45 kilograms).[7]
The Ordeal of the Quartermasters
One of the most remarkable aspects of this operation was the work of the quartermasters. Many of these men were not professional logisticians but wartime soldiers who had learned logistics and planning over the previous four years. The quartermasters from the 3rd Division, overseeing 90 accounting units, ensured every piece of equipment was meticulously accounted for and documented before leaving New Caledonia.
Once the shipments arrived in New Zealand, their responsibilities intensified. They had to navigate shipping schedules, locate and verify their units’ equipment, and secure space for inspection—a massive logistical challenge requiring precision under pressure.
Their task did not end with verification. Each item had to be cleaned, repaired if necessary, and repacked, all while passing rigorous inspections by the MOD staff and Defence Auditors. These inspectors refused to accept any equipment in less-than-perfect condition, leading to a detailed audit process. Quartermasters had to account for every lost or damaged item, often relying on incomplete records, while facing auditors who were relentless in spotting discrepancies. Clearance was only granted when the records were flawless, adding immense pressure to a demanding job.
The success of this operation is even more impressive, considering these men were not trained logisticians. Their ability to plan, organise, and execute such a complex task highlights their adaptability and determination.
A Triumph Despite the Odds
By July 1945, the reverse logistics operation had been successfully completed. Equipment had either been returned to New Zealand’s MOD at Trentham or the Northern District Ordnance Depot at Hopuhopu, with many vehicles transferred to Sylvia Park, a former US stores depot repurposed for New Zealand military use. Equipment deemed damaged beyond repair or surplus was either sold through the War Assets Realisation Board or disposed of by public auction.
Despite the absence of modern tools and systems, this operation was a remarkable achievement in New Zealand military logistics, unmatched today. While the infrastructure at Mangere Crossing Camp played a crucial role, the determination and resilience of New Zealand’s military personnel ensured the successful completion of this massive logistical effort.
Conclusion
The withdrawal of the 3rd New Zealand Division from the Pacific was not merely a redeployment after successful combat operations but a logistical achievement of remarkable scale. Conducted under extreme conditions, without the advantages of modern MHE or IT systems, the operation relied heavily on the strategic utilisation of available infrastructure, such as Mangere Crossing Camp, and the dedication of New Zealand’s military personnel. The meticulous coordination required to recover, sort, inspect, and redistribute thousands of items, vehicles, and stores showcased the exceptional adaptability of New Zealand’s logistics teams. This operation—the most significant reverse logistics effort in the nation’s military history—remains a powerful testament to the skill, resourcefulness, and perseverance of those who brought the 3rd New Zealand Division home under incredibly demanding circumstances. Though often overlooked, it is a crucial chapter in New Zealand’s military logistics legacy.
Notes
[1] Matthew Wright, Pacific War: New Zealand and Japan 1941-45 (Auckland, N.Z.: Reed, 2003, 2003), Bibliographies, Non-fiction.
[2] Kristin F. Lynch, John G. Drew, Robert S. Tripp, and C. Robert Roll., Sustaining Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Major Findings on the Experience of Army Logistics in the Field (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006).
[5] F Grattan, Official War History of the Public Works Department (PWD, 1948), 687.
[6] E.V Sale, Base Wallahs: Story of the units of the Nase Organisation, NZEF IP (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 254-56.
[7] P.P Henley, Ordnance: The unofficial history of the New Zeland Ordnance Corps in the Pacific from 1940 until the third division was disbanded in 1944 (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 225.
Occasionally, photos emerge on various internet forums, capturing a striking scene: a vast lineup of vehicles at the Mangere Ordnance Sub Bulk Depot, freshly returned from New Zealand’s 3rd Division after its service in the Pacific. These images display Bren Gun Carriers, trucks, and tanks awaiting inspection, repair, redistribution, or disposal. However, these powerful visuals often come with little context, typically identified only as vehicles from the 3rd New Zealand Division with no connection to the broader motorisation of the New Zealand Military between 1939 and 1944.
This article delves into the remarkable expansion of New Zealand’s military vehicle fleet between 1939 and 1944—a fleet that grew from a mere 62 vehicles in September 1939 to a staggering 22,190 by March 1944. The vehicles captured in the Mangere photos represent about 11% of this massive expansion, marking a crucial chapter in New Zealand’s military history.
3 NZ Division vehicles parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Sub Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944 (Colourised). Alexander Turnbull Library
Prelude to War
A prevailing myth suggests that New Zealand allowed its military to shrink during the interwar period, leaving the country ill-prepared for the outbreak of war in 1939. Contemporary studies echo this sentiment, claiming that New Zealanders were no better equipped for war than their fathers had been during the First World War. While there is some truth to this narrative, a closer examination of the broader activities of the New Zealand Army from 1934 to 1939 reveals a more nuanced story.
Despite material and personnel deficiencies, the New Zealand Army demonstrated a keen awareness of global events and the changing nature of warfare. This awareness, combined with meticulous and thorough updates to military doctrines and preparations, ensured that New Zealand could swiftly mobilise the basic framework of an expeditionary force and the necessary resources to sustain it in the long term, should war break out. The Army’s profound understanding of the international situation provided a sense of security and confidence in its ability to respond effectively.
From the mid-1930s, the New Zealand military closely observed the mechanisation efforts of the British Army, which had been updating its doctrines throughout the decade. The British military had transformed into a mechanised force with some of the era’s most advanced weapons and equipment. The Field Service Regulations (FSR), the tactical bible of British Commonwealth armies, underwent several revisions, reflecting the British Army’s commitment to learning from past mistakes.[1] Following the British lead, the New Zealand Army endeavoured to stay abreast of these developments, demonstrating its commitment to strategic planning and learning from history.
Initial Mechanisation
When war was declared in September 1939, the New Zealand Military Forces possessed a total of 62 vehicles, consisting of:
Six motorcycles
Two cars
54 trucks and tractors
These were not outdated relics from the First World War but the latest military models imported from the United Kingdom in the late 1930s. This modest re-equipment initiative, which began in 1934, aimed to align New Zealand’s military hardware with that of peer forces in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.
With a clear understanding of the demands of mechanised warfare, a significant inventory of vehicles for impressment in times of national emergency was compiled in 1935. These vehicles were categorised by type, carrying capacity, and horsepower. A total of 20 types of vehicles were identified, including
10,818 Fords,
5,915 Chevrolets,
1,654 Dodges, and
1,466 Morris’s
culminating in a record of 26,839 trucks, trailers, tractors, and omnibuses. [2]
The Organisation of National Security (ONS) convened the Transport Industry (Supply) Subcommittee to organise and implement the impressment scheme. This subcommittee drafted the first version of the Motor-Vehicle Impressment Emergency Regulations in May 1939, followed by a second draft in August. Although these regulations were enacted on 4 September 1939, impressment did not commence immediately due to a lack of immediate need for a mobile home defence force. The Transport Legislation Emergency Regulations 1940 further allowed suspending any transport-related legislation necessary to prosecute the war.
Supported by this legislative framework, the New Zealand Military Forces implemented plans to requisition and purchase vehicles from New Zealand’s motor assembly factories and retailers. Between September 1939 and March 1944, 9,879 vehicles were put into service with the New Zealand Military Forces. These vehicles were then supplemented with additional purchases from New Zealand distributors and suppliers to ensure the expanding military forces were adequately equipped.[3]
Table 1 – Impressed and New MT Vehicles purchased in NZ from Distributors up to 31 March 1944
Chevrolet 4×4 truck used by the army circa 1940. Ref: 1/2-036839-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22809745
Cooperation with Allies
With remarkable speed, New Zealand transitioned its economy from peacetime to wartime, focusing on ensuring it could support its deployed forces and contribute effectively to the global war effort. The Government implemented initiatives to provide security in international trade and commerce. In July 1940, the New Zealand Minister of Supply and a small delegation of officials engaged in talks with their Australian counterparts to strengthen cooperation between the two nations. [4]
In October 1940, the Eastern Group Conference convened in Delhi with the primary objective of coordinating a joint war supply policy for the United Kingdom, Australia, India, South Africa, New Zealand, and other territories including East Africa, Palestine, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, and Hong Kong, with the Government of the Netherlands East Indies attending as observers. This conference led to the formation of the Eastern Group Supply Council (EGSC) in Delhi, tasked with coordinating and optimising the production and distribution of war materials across the British colonies and dominions in the Eastern Hemisphere. [5]
New Zealand contributed four Government officials and two officers from the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC). Concurrently, in New Zealand, the War Cabinet approved the establishment of the New Zealand Defence Services Provision Officer (DSPO) to facilitate coordination between the EGSC and New Zealand.
In March 1941, the United States passed the Lend-Lease Act, under which New Zealand became eligible to trade in November 1941. A New Zealand Supply Mission was established in Washington, DC, to manage Lend-Lease agreements and cash requisitions. Upon the United States’ entry into the war, a Joint Purchasing Board was set up in New Zealand, streamlining processes and reducing delays by liaising directly with the New Zealand Commissioner of Supply and pre-screening eligibility and priority requirements through an Allied Committee in Washington, DC.
Full Military Mechanisation
As the war progressed, New Zealand’s motor industry proved its ability to adapt to wartime demands by shifting production to essential materials such as grenade bodies, mortars, and 560 Bren gun carriers manufactured by General Motors. This adaptability underscored New Zealand’s resourcefulness in times of conflict.
By March 1944, in addition to the vehicles impressed and purchased since 1939, an additional 15,097 different types of vehicles were acquired by cash purchases or through the Lend-Lease programme. While some arrived in New Zealand as complete vehicles, 11,797 were received as knocked-down kits to conserve shipping space and assembled locally.
Table 2 – MT Vehicles Assembled in New Zealand
Many vehicles arrived as bare chassis with specialist bodies to allow them to perform the vast array of functions required by the military. By 1940, the New Zealand Railway Workshops had constructed speciality Breakdown and Workshop bodies, with the broader New Zealand industrial base constructing 11,703 load-carrying and specialist bodies tailored to New Zealand’s needs by March 1944.
11,321 specialist bodies were manufactured for the Army, 275 for the RNZAF, one for the Navy, and 106 for the United States Forces.
Table 3 – Bodies built in New Zealand for MT Vehicles
Inside the factory of Standard Motors (probably Standard Motor Bodies Ltd), Wellington, during World War II, showing workers stretching sheet metal that will form bodywork on an army truck. Photograph taken between 1939 and 1945 by the National Publicity Studios. New Zealand. Ref: PAColl-0783-2-0431. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23114774
Table 4 – Total purchases of new vehicles by manufacturer and country of origin up to 31 March 1944 (Includes new Vehicles purchased directly from distributors in NZ (5089) and from United States Forces (145)
Pacific Garrisons
From 1940, New Zealand established garrisons in Tonga, Fiji, and Norfolk Island. In 1943, the 3 (NZ) Division was deployed to New Caledonia, conducting amphibious operations in the Solomon Islands. These deployments included 3,630 vehicles, ranging from motorcycles to tanks. To address shortages, 145 vehicles were taken over from United States Forces. Over time, 730 vehicles were returned to New Zealand, 23 were transferred to the RNZAF, and 467 were sold to local forces. By March 1944, New Zealand forces in the Pacific retained 2,604 vehicles.
Table 5 – MT Vehicles supplied to, received by and on hand with 3 NZ Division 31 March 1944
Table 6 – MT Vehicles supplied to, received by and on hand with Tonga Force, 31 March 1944
Table 7 – MT Vehicles supplied to, received by and on hand with Fiji Force, 31 March 1944
Table 8 – MT Vehicles supplied to, received by and on hand with Norfolk Force, 31 March 1944
Between 1939 and 1944, the vehicles received by the New Zealand Army at home and in the Pacific were not exclusively retained. By March 1944, 8,108 vehicles had either been transferred to the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Middle East, RNZAF, and Navy or sold to the United States Forces, foreign governments, other government departments, or private owners. Surprisingly, only 83 vehicles were written off charge.
Table 9- Schedule showing all transactions in MT Vehicles – Sept 1939 to 31 March 1944
The Mechanical Transport Branch
Recognising the urgent need to expand and manage the Army’s Mechanical Transport fleet, the Quartermaster General (QMG) Colonel Henry Esau Avery established a separate Mechanical Transport Branch (MT Branch). This move allowed the NZAOC to focus on its core responsibilities, with the MT Branch managing and maintaining the multitude of purchased or impressed vehicles required by the military. Drawing from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) experience in the United Kingdom, the MT Branch wisely recruited extensively from New Zealand’s motor industry into the New Zealand Temporary Staff (NZTS), ensuring a wealth of specialised knowledge and experience was brought to the forefront of this critical military function.
In December 1942, the MT Branch consisted of:
MT Workshops:
1 MT Workshop, Trentham
2 MT Workshop, Waiouru
3 MT Workshop, Papakura
4 MT Workshop, Whangarei
5 MT Workshop, Palmerston North
6 MT Workshop, Wellington
7 MT Workshop, Blenheim
8 MT Workshop, Burnham
9 MT Workshop, Dunedin
MT Depots, which provided pools of vehicles:
1 MT Depot, Auckland
2 MT Depot, Hamilton
3 MT Depot, Napier
4 MT Depot, Wanganui
5 MT Depot, Christchurch
MT Stores Depots, supplying MT spares, tools, and equipment for MT Workshops and Depots:
1 Base MT Stores Depot, Wellington
2 MT Stores Depot, Auckland
3 MT Stores Depot, Wellington
4 MT Stores Depot, Christchurch
7 MT Stores Depot, Blenheim
By March 1944, with reduced military activity in New Zealand and the demobilisation of home defence units established in 1941/42 to counter potential invasion, the MT Branch underwent reorganisation into a streamlined structure, which included Stores and Equipment Sections, Workshops, Vehicle Holding Parks, and Vehicle Reception Depots. However, wartime personnel shortages meant that the MT Branch could only muster 1,255 officers and soldiers, approximately 75% of its authorised capacity of 1,674 officers and soldiers.
Parts and Spares
Up to 31 March 1944, the MT Stores Depots had handled the following quantities of tyres and MT Parts and spares:
Tyres
180 different sizes of tyres
Purchased from overseas – 83,174
Purchased in New Zealand – 12,534
Total Purchased – 95,708
Transferred to Supply Department – 11,018
Other issues – 28,700
In stock 31/3/1944 – 55,990
Used tyres recapped and re-treaded – 9,983
Reconditioned tyres reissued – 7,301
Reconditioned tyres in stock 31 March 1944 – 2,682
MT Parts (Not including body-building material)
Received from overseas (Total of 9,182 Tons)
Wheeled vehicles, parts- 20,472 Packages
Tracked vehicles and parts – 39,408 Packages
Tracked vehicles, tracks – 8,280 Bundled
Packages broken down and binned – 23,895
Packages transferred to United States Forces – 1,050
Packages in Bulk Store – 43,215
Shipments of MT Parts and Tyres to the Pacific
3 Division – 1,149 Tons
Fiji – 406 Tons
Tonga – 112 Tons
Norfolk – 30 Tons
Conclusion and Lessons Learned
This article explores the dramatic expansion of New Zealand’s military vehicle fleet during World War II, highlighting the country’s transition from a small force with only 62 vehicles in 1939 to an impressive 22,190 vehicles by 1944. This growth was crucial to New Zealand’s military preparedness and response during the war, reflecting a strategic adaptation to the demands of mechanised warfare.
A common misconception persists that New Zealand was ill-prepared for World War II due to the neglect of military readiness during the interwar period. However, this article argues that the New Zealand military was, in fact, acutely aware of global military developments and took proactive steps to modernise its forces in anticipation of potential conflict. By closely following the mechanisation efforts of the British Army, New Zealand updated its doctrines and prepared for the rapid mobilisation of resources.
At the outbreak of war, the New Zealand Military Forces possessed a modest but modern fleet of vehicles, which was quickly expanded through impressment (the requisition of civilian vehicles) and new purchases. A comprehensive inventory of potential impressment vehicles was compiled in the mid-1930s, and by 1939, regulations were in place to facilitate the requisition of vehicles as needed.
Cooperative efforts between New Zealand and its allies, primarily through the Eastern Group Supply Council and the Lend-Lease Act, allowed the country to acquire additional vehicles and equipment. New Zealand’s motor industry also adapted to wartime demands, producing essential military vehicles and parts, including 560 Bren gun carriers.
By 1944, New Zealand’s military vehicle fleet had grown substantially, with vehicles serving both at home and in various Pacific garrisons. This expansion was managed by the MT Branch, a specialised unit within the military that oversaw the maintenance and distribution of vehicles. Despite challenges such as personnel shortages, the branch effectively supported New Zealand’s military operations throughout the war.
Lessons Learned:
Strategic foresight and adaptation played a pivotal role in the New Zealand military’s preparedness and effectiveness during World War II, as it anticipated and responded to the demands of mechanised warfare through meticulous strategic planning and doctrinal updates.
The establishment of the MT Branch, alongside a comprehensive logistical framework, ensured that the military could efficiently manage and sustain its rapidly expanded vehicle fleet. New Zealand’s success in acquiring and managing military vehicles was further bolstered by close cooperation with allies, mainly through initiatives like the Lend-Lease Act and the Eastern Group Supply Council.
The adaptability of New Zealand’s motor industry to wartime production needs highlights the critical importance of a robust domestic industrial base in supporting military efforts. Additionally, pre-emptive planning and detailed inventory management, including a comprehensive record of potential impressment vehicles, enabled New Zealand to mobilise and sustain its military forces rapidly. The effective distribution and redistribution of vehicles across different operational theatres underscored the importance of flexibility in resource allocation during wartime.
In conclusion, the mechanisation of New Zealand’s military during World War II was a significant achievement that contributed to the country’s wartime efforts and provided valuable lessons for contemporary military logistics and strategic planning.
Table 11 – MT Vehicles by type in possession of Army in New Zealand and Pacific – 31 March 1944
Notes
[2] “Supply – Munitions and Equipment – Supply of defence vehicles from local sources,” Archives New Zealand Item No R18872527 (1934-1945).
[3] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541151 (30 June 1944), .
Largely forgotten today, the early 1930s marked a tumultuous period for the New Zealand military which was profoundly impacted by the Great Depression. In 1931, facing unprecedented economic pressures, the military was compelled to enact severe cutbacks and reductions. The lessons drawn from these pivotal events offer invaluable insights into fortifying the resilience and adaptability of today’s military forces amidst contemporary strategic and economic uncertainties.
Establishment and Early Developments
Established in 1917, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) quickly became integral to the country’s Permanent Military Forces. However, the onset of the global economic depression triggered substantial changes in New Zealand’s military funding and organisational structure. As the worldwide economic downturn took hold, austerity measures and restructuring became unavoidable, necessitating a comprehensive overhaul of the NZAOC to align with the new economic realities.
Badges of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 1917 -1937. Robert McKie Collection
Established in 1917, the intervening years had seen the NZAOC decline in personnel from its peak strength of 493 in 1919 to an average of 118 officers and other ranks between 1920 and 1930. Despite this reduction, significant infrastructural advancements replaced the colonial-era facilities with modern buildings across various locations. Key NZAOC establishments included:
Northern Military District:
Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Waikato Camp in Hopuhopu, constructed in 1928.
Ordnance Workshop at Devonport’s artillery yard (now the RNZN Museum).
Small Arms Ammunition Testing Staff stationed at the Colonial Ammunition Company factory in Mount Eden, Auckland.
Central Military District:
The Main Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Trentham was established as a permanent camp in 1915.
The Ammunition Section at Fort Balance.
Southern Military District:
The Ordnance Depot and Workshop at Burnham Camp was established in 1921 with the ongoing construction of new infrastructure.
These developments underscored the NZAOC’s strategic presence in the Northern, Central, and Southern Military Districts.
1938 Military Camp, Hopuhopu, Waikato. Whites Aviation Ltd: Photographs. Ref: WA-55972-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23181165
Economic Downturn and Military Reorganisation
The economic downturn of the early 1930s necessitated severe cuts to government expenditure, compelling the New Zealand military to undergo substantial reorganisation. In 1930, the military’s strength stood at 555 regulars and 16,990 Territorials. By 1931, this was reduced to 349 regulars and 3,655 Territorials. These reductions were implemented under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1930 (No. 2), which facilitated compulsory retirements and transfers to civilian roles for many NZAOC personnel.
The Act authorised the retirement on superannuation of any member of the Permanent Force or the Permanent Staff under the Defence Act, 1909, or of the clerical staff of the Defence Department whose age or length of service was such that if five years had been added they would have been enabled as of right or with the consent of the Minister of Defence to have given notice to retire voluntarily. Compulsory retirement under this Act was facilitated in two tranches:
Tranche 1: Personnel Retired without Superannuation:
Servicemen eligible for retirement under the provision of the Act who were not contributing to the superannuation scheme were notified on 13 December 1930 of their impending release. They were granted six weeks of special leave, effective 31 December 1930, with their final release scheduled for 11 February 1931 after completing their notice period.
Tranche 2: Personnel Retired with Superannuation:
Servicemen eligible for retirement under the provision of the Act who were contributing to the superannuation scheme received notification on 13 December 1930. Their salary continued until 31 March 1931, with superannuation benefits commencing in April. Accrued leave entitlements were taken concurrently during this notice period, resulting in much leave accrued forfeited.
These tranches included Ordnance soldiers who had joined the NZAOC since its formation in 1917. Some had transferred directly from the Defence Stores, while others had served in the pre-war Permanent Forces or had active service with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF). Their compulsory retirement represented a significant loss of knowledge and experience for the New Zealand military. Under the provisions of section 39 of the Finance Act, 1930 (No. 2), 44 members of the NZAOC were placed on compulsory retirement, including the following personnel who have so far been identified.
Northern Military District
948. Lieutenant Michael Joseph Lyons, MSM
968 Sergeant Thomas Alexander Hunter, MSM
62 Private Frank Jewiss
166 Sergeant William John Rabbidge
268 Staff Quartermaster Sergeant James Alexander Kenning
Captain Frank Edwin Ford
Central Military District
19 Sergeant Alfred Charles Butler
39 Corporal Simon Alexander Fraser
64 Gunner Maurice Francis Johnstone
111 Corporal John Sawyer
920 Corporal Gordon James Francis Arenas
941 Sergeant William Hans McIlraith
956 Staff Sergeant Saddler George Alexander Carter, MSM
960 Sergeant Frank William Ching
965 Corporal Philip Alexander MacKay MSM
976 Private William Valentine Wood MSM
978 Corporal Earnest John Williams MSM
1018 Sargeant Major James Oliver Pringle Southgate
1024 Armament-Artificer Eric Wallace Jepson
Lieutenant L.A Clement
Captain Alfred William Baldwin
Captain William Moody Bell
55 Staff Quartermaster Sergeant John Francis Hunter MSM
143 Armament Sergeant Major (WO1) Joseph Warren
995 Staff Sergeant Wilfred Robert White
Southern Military District
2 Armament Staff Quartermaster Sergeant John Alexander Adamson MSM
1006 Lance Corporal Norman William Wilkie
Corporal Cecil John Knight
Captain Arthur Rumbold Carter White
966 Lance Corporal William Terrington Popple, MSM
Transition to Civilian Roles
To achieve further cost savings, 74 NZAOC soldiers received notifications in December 1930 that their positions would be retained but transferred to civilian roles with civilian pay rates. This transition took effect in February 1931, causing significant disruption for those affected, including the loss of accumulated leave and adjustment to civilian life..
Some of these soldiers were transferred to other departments within the defence establishment, while the majority remained in their current roles within the NZAOC Ordnance Depots and workshops. They transitioned overnight from wearing uniforms to civilian clothes, with significantly reduced rates of pay and civil service conditions of service. The following personnel have so far been identified as being transferred to the Civil Staff.
Northern Military District
967 Corporal Robert John Gamble
974 Corporal Henry William Le Comte
983 Sergeant Clifford Verne Little
996 Lance Corporal Athol Gilroy McCurdy
202 Lance Corporal Arthur Graham Munday
Central Military District
972 Private John Dennis Anderson
35 Lance Corporal Harry Harper Ekins
1061 Lance Corporal Earnest Fenton
4 Sergeant Kenneth Olaf John Andersen
699 Corporal Oliver Avis, MM
889 Staff Sergeant George Bagnell
1004 Lance Corporal James Johnston Bolt
961 Lance Corporal Edgar Charles Boult
1000 Private George Cumming Bremner
1027 Artificer William Cowan Brizzle
1003 Lance Corporal Ernest Carr
1012 Lance Corporal Charles Fred Ecob
864 Corporal William Charles Francis
1025 Tent-Repairer-Artificer Herbert Roy Griffin
714 Lance Corporal Kenneth Hoare
1016 Private Ernest William Hughes
989 Corporal Percy Reuben Hunter
213 Lance Corporal William Saul Keegan
1019 Private Edward Gavin Lake
342 Corporal Allen Charles Leighton
998 Lance Corporal Allen Dudley Leighton
1011 Lance Corporal Geoffrey Charles Leighton
363 Staff Sergeant David Llewellyn Lewis, MSM
1007 Lance Corporal Thomas James Mclaughlin
1020 Private John Douglas Melville
894 SQMS (WO2) James Moroney Sergeant David Nicol]
1023 Lance Corporal John Nixon
467 Corporal George Wantford Pamment
1013 Private Francis Reid
1022 Private Henry McKenzie Reid
1014 Wheeler-Artificer Robert Stacey Vincent Rowe
665 Private William Alexander Sammons
927 Private Leonard William Sanders
963 Corporal Albert Edward Shadbolt
138 Lance Corporal David Henry Strickland
1017 Private Lionel Herbert Stroud
Southern Military District
970 Sergeant Edward Vincent Coleman
1028 Private Percival Nowell Erridge
959 Sergeant Charles Edward Gleeson
1276 Private Lewis Haslett
885 Corporal Charles James Johnston Storie
728 Private William Sampson Valentine
Impact on Military Preparedness and Social Consequences
The compulsory retirements and transfers to civilian roles led to a reduction in the NZAOC’s military strength, impacting its preparedness during subsequent years. However, beginning in 1934, improved government finances allowed for an increase in the army’s training tempo, despite global events hinting at looming conflict. The following personnel who have so far been identified as been retained:
Northern Military District
984 Staff Sergeant Thomas Joseph Holliday
1260 Armament Staff Quartermaster Sergeant Samuel Thomson MSM
915 Armament Staff Sergeant Eric John Hunter
141 Armourer Corporal Reginald Samuel Henry Lyons
Central Military District
14 Armament Sergeant Major Bertram Buckley
992 Armament Corporal Hilliard Charles Cooper
1029 Artificer James Dabney
964 Warrant Officer Class 1 John William Dalton
1032 Armourer Staff Sergeant Frederick Henry Dew
979 Armourer Staff Sergeant John William Evers
1026 Armament Sergeant Leo Stanley Jefcoate
Major Thomas Joseph King
945 WO2 Armament SQMS Henry Albert Wiliam Pierard
1021 Armament Staff Sergeant Arthur Sydney Richardson
1010 Lance Corporal George Frederick Robert Ware
Southern Military District
7 Corporal Percey Charles Austin
25 Armourer Staff Sargeant Francis Augustus Clapshaw
Lieutenant Henry Erridge Erridge
The reduction in the Territorial Force in 1931 resulted in decreased activity in subsequent years. However, beginning in 1934, improved government finances allowed for an increase in the army’s training tempo. Concurrently, global events in China, Ethiopia, and Germany hinted at looming conflict, prompting a gradual shift towards preparing for future mobilisation. Under the leadership of Major Thomas Joseph King, who served as Director of Ordnance Services (DOS) since 1924, the NZAOC worked diligently within its means to enhance readiness, including designing a new system of stores accounting for the emerging Royal New Zealand Air Force.
The new NZAOC Badge was approved in 1937. Robert McKie Collection
King focused on recruiting new personnel and leveraging his civilian staff, who were former NZAOC soldiers, to reenlist experienced individuals into key leadership roles at Trentham, Hopuhopu, and Burnham. When war was declared in September 1939, King successfully mobilised his small military and civilian team to form the rump of the New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC) within the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF).
During the 1938-45 war, nearly all NZAOC soldiers who had been transferred to civilian roles in 1931 found themselves back in uniform, restarting their military careers as Ordnance Officers, Warrant Officers, and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) alongside their peers who had been retained. Many from this group continued to provide leadership within the RNZAOC and Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RNZEME) up to the 1960s, with several even holding the prestigious position of DOS in the post-war army.
Lieutenant Colonel Francis Reid handed over the position of DOS to his brother, Lieutenant Colonel Henry McKenzie Reid, on 31 March 1957. Both brothers joined the NZAOC as soldiers in the late 1920s, only to be transferred to the civilian staff in 1931. Commissioned during WW2, both served with distinction throughout the war.
Negative Effects and Lessons Learned
The 1931 reductions in the New Zealand military, driven by the economic pressures of the Great Depression, had profound and lasting negative effects, both socially and in terms of military preparedness. Socially, the abrupt compulsory retirements and transitions to civilian roles caused significant upheaval for the affected soldiers and their families. The loss of accumulated leave and the sudden shift from military to civilian life resulted in considerable stress and financial strain.
In terms of military preparedness, the reductions led to a substantial loss of experienced personnel and institutional knowledge. The drastic decrease in the Territorial Force and overall military strength severely hampered the country’s ability to maintain an effective and ready military force. The reduced activity and training during the early 1930s left the military less prepared for the impending global conflicts of the late 1930s and early 1940s than in 1914. This lack of preparedness could have had dire consequences had international tensions escalated more quickly.
However, subsequent efforts to rebuild, modernise, and mobilise the military demonstrated the resilience and adaptability of the New Zealand military. Starting in 1934 under the leadership of Major Thomas Joseph King, the NZAOC enhanced its readiness by recruiting new personnel and reenlisting former soldiers from the civilian staff. The return of nearly all NZAOC soldiers to uniformed service during the 1939-1945 war showcased their dedication and the critical role of experienced personnel in maintaining military effectiveness.
The 1931 reductions’ experiences highlight the importance of balancing economic constraints and the need for a capable and prepared military force. These lessons remain relevant today as modern military forces navigate similar challenges amidst strategic and economic uncertainties. Ensuring that reductions do not compromise long-term readiness and resilience is crucial for the effective functioning of any military organisation.
Notes
[1] (1930). “H-19 Defence Forces of New Zealand, Annual report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces.” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives.
[2] (1931). “H-19 Defence Forces of New Zealand, Annual report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces June 1930 to May 1931.” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1 January 1941.
[3] (1914). King, Thomas Joseph. Personal File, Archives New Zealand. Wellington.
“If you were an army cook on leave and met some of the troops accompanied by their girlfriends, wives or mothers, which would you rather hear them say: “There’s the chap who turns out the great meals I’ve told you about”; or, “That’s the bloke who murders good food?”
Question placed to trainee cooks by Sergeant-Cook Instructor Bourke (Paddy to all the camp) at Waikato Camp, 1942
Over the last two hundred years, the adage attributed to Napoleon, “An army marches on its stomach,” underscored the paramount importance of sustenance in military operations. In the annals of the New Zealand army, this principle has been diligently upheld, with meticulous attention paid to ensuring soldiers are well-fed, notwithstanding the challenges posed by varying locations and conditions. Establishing the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) units during the tumultuous periods of the First and Second World Wars is a testament to this commitment. NZASC units were principally charged with baking bread, butchering meat, and procuring and distributing fresh and packaged provisions to frontline units, playing a pivotal role in sustaining the morale and effectiveness of New Zealand forces during these conflicts. Even in more recent conflicts, such as those in Southeast Asia during the 1950s and 60s, New Zealand troops operated on ration scales notably more generous than their British counterparts, a testament to the nation’s dedication to the well-being of its service members. However, despite the recognition of logistical efforts in military history, a notable gap remains in the literature concerning the contributions of New Zealand Army cooks. While Julia Millen’s comprehensive work, Salute to Service: A History of the Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport, acknowledges the significance of Cooks from when they became part of the RNZASC in 1948, scant attention has been paid to the preceding 103 years, from 1865 to 1948.
This article draws upon primary sources and aims to redress this oversight by delving into the hitherto unexplored realm of New Zealand Army catering. By shedding light on the endeavours of these unsung culinary heroes, it seeks to enrich our understanding of the multifaceted efforts required to sustain a fighting force, thereby honouring their indispensable contributions to New Zealand’s military heritage.
Since the first New Zealand Militias were created in 1845, there was always a need to feed the militias when called out for service. Given the nature of Militia service and the fact that they would not serve far from their home location, their messing requirements would have been minimal. Some individuals would likely have been selected from within the ranks to collect any rations provided and prepare meals.
With the advent of the volunteer era in 1858, the New Zealand military became a mixed force of Infantry, Cavalry and artillery who, on occasion, would assemble for annual camps where units within a district would assemble and conduct combined training. While rations were paid through District Headquarters and Defence Stores, messing arrangements would be rudimentary, with men selected from within the ranks preparing the meals from the rations sourced from local vendors. This situation was mirrored in the Permanent Militia, which had staffed coastal defence forts and the military depot at Mount Cook in Wellington since the 1880s.
During New Zealand’s involvement in the war in South Africa, the issue of messing arose as large numbers of mobilising men were stationed in camps. Messing arrangements involved a combination of civilian contractors and regimental cooks. However, an inquiry into soldiers’ comfort, housing, and victualling at the Newtown Park Camp and Volunteer Billets revealed widespread dissatisfaction. Numerous complaints were lodged regarding the quality and quantity of rations provided, the low standard, and, at times, the lack of meals prepared by contractors and regimental cooks.[1] In South Africa, rations, following the British scale, were supplied by the British Army Service Corps (ASC), supplemented by fresh mutton acquired from the enemy and cooked by members of the contingent.[2]
After the conclusion of the South Africa War, interest in the military surged, prompting a reorganisation of the volunteer movement into a more robust and structured system of regiments and battalions. Despite discussions in 1904 regarding establishing a New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC), no decision was indicated in the Commandant of the Forces’ annual report on its formation.[3]
Further reorganisation in 1908 saw the ASC matter addressed by the Adjutant General, with discussions continuing into 1909. The Defence Act of 1909 disbanded volunteer forces and established the Territorial Force, supported by conscription. Major General Alexander Godley’s appointment as Commandant of the New Zealand Military Forces in December 1910 provided momentum for reform. In his first year, Godley revitalised the military’s organisational structure, made crucial command and staff appointments, and laid plans to develop the NZASC, which, though officially designated in May 1910, remained only a force on paper.[4]
Despite the Defence Stores Department’s existence since 1869, an ASC nucleus was lacking for forming new units. The proposed NZASC envisioned eight Transport and Supply Columns, divided into Mounted and Mixed Brigade units allocated to each of New Zealand’s four Military Districts and was to be organised by British ASC officer Henry Owen Knox, who arrived in New Zealand in June 1911 and later supported by four ASC officers and Warrant Offices from early 1913. While the NZASC would handle the procurement and distribution of rations, receipt and cooking remained a Regimental responsibility.
Under Godley’s command, the Territorial Army underwent rapid organisation, culminating in the inaugural brigade camps held in 1913. During these camps, the newly established NZASC established its initial depots, receiving supplies previously ordered by the Quartermaster General based on expected strength states and ration scales.
Forty-seven candidates across the Territorial Army were selected in October 1912 to undergo a comprehensive month-long training at Trentham. This pioneering catering course encompassed kitchen work and cooking techniques for field conditions, including practical exercises such as constructing and operating field ovens, fry pans, 8 and 20-gallon boilers and camp kettles.
Of the initial candidates, thirty-eight successfully qualified to supervise cooking for a regiment, with an additional seven attaining certification as company cooks. Unfortunately, two candidates were unable to qualify due to illness. For the 1913 camp, the establishment allowed for a Sergeant Cook per regiment, each granted an additional allowance of 1 Shilling 6 Pence a day (equivalent to 2024 NZD $16.16), while qualified company cooks received 1 Shilling a day (equivalent to 2024 NZD $10.10). Those who served as cooks during the camps were excused from further military training for the rest of the year.[5]
At Trentham, an additional course of instruction was conducted in October 1913, attended by sixty-two territorial soldiers. Thirty-two qualified as competent to supervise cooking for a regiment, making them eligible for appointment as sergeant cooks if vacancies existed within their units. Twenty-seven soldiers qualified as assistant or company cooks; unfortunately, three did not meet the qualifications.
By the end of 1913, this initiative provided the New Zealand Military with a potential pool of 104 trained cooks. However, it was recognised that further efforts were necessary to ensure a sufficient number of cooks would be available to meet the messing needs of the Territorial Force in the event of mobilisation.[6]
A System Under Strain, Lessons Unlearned in the Interwar Years
By the late 1930s, nearly two decades after the end of the First World War, there remained a persistent unease about the Army’s ability to feed its soldiers effectively. While institutional reforms had begun, contemporary commentary suggests that many of the fundamental issues experienced during the war had not yet been fully resolved.
A 1937 article in the Auckland Star, written by W. Revell Reynolds, provides a stark and unvarnished account of army catering during the First World War. Drawing on personal experience across training camps, Egypt, and Gallipoli, Reynolds described a system characterised not by scarcity, but by failure in execution.
Food, he noted, was often adequate at the point of issue, but was rendered unpalatable or even inedible through poor preparation. Cooks were frequently untrained and, in many cases, selected from those seeking to avoid frontline duties rather than for any culinary competence. Officers, for their part, were described as largely ignorant of catering and nutrition, with institutional focus placed elsewhere.
More concerning were allegations of systemic weaknesses in control and accountability. Reynolds pointed to instances of misappropriated allowances, questionable quality of supplied goods, and the hoarding or misallocation of rations. Whether exaggerated or not, such perceptions highlight a broader lack of confidence in the integrity of the supply and catering system at the time.
Perhaps most significantly, Reynolds drew a direct connection between poor nutrition and operational effectiveness. The absence of basic dietary components such as fresh vegetables, fats, and stimulants was linked to widespread illness, particularly dysentery and other gastrointestinal conditions, which were endemic in theatres such as Gallipoli. In this sense, catering was not merely a matter of comfort, but of survival.
Reynolds’ account suggests that the issue was not supply alone, but the absence of a professional system capable of turning rations into effective sustainment.
His concluding concern was forward-looking. Writing in 1937, Reynolds questioned how the Army intended to feed its soldiers in any future conflict, suggesting that without meaningful reform, the same deficiencies would re-emerge under the pressures of mobilisation.
The outbreak of the Second World War would force that reform. Under the pressures of mobilisation, the Army moved decisively toward a more professional, standardised, and controlled system of catering and supply, laying the foundations for the modern military catering capability.
The declaration of war and subsequent mobilisation halted any plans for further peacetime training of cooks, as all efforts shifted towards providing trained personnel for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. The NZASC expanded its role at home and as part of the NZEF, taking on responsibility for bakeries and butcheries. However, despite ensuring the provision of necessary food items to units, cooking remained the responsibility of each unit. Cooks were trained at the Army School of Instruction at Trentham, with further training conducted at NZEF camps in the United Kingdom.In New Zealand, military and civilian cooks fulfilled the necessary messing functions at various mobilisation and Territorial Camps, while unit cooks supported units in the field.
Cooks with first frozen mutton received in the desert during WWI. Hood, D : Photographs relating to World War I and II. Ref: 1/2-067444-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23212994
Wellington Regiment cooker, and men, within 1000 yards of the front line, Colincamps, France. Royal New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association :New Zealand official negatives, World War 1914-1918. Ref: 1/2-013209-G. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22604005
During the interbellum period, the Army School of Instruction in Trentham ceased operations in 1921, with few records of formal training for Army cooks until 1938.
In 1937, the Special Reserve Scheme was introduced to provide personnel for the coast defence batteries and three infantry battalions of Fortress troops. Under this scheme, single soldiers underwent three months of continuous training, followed by a three-year commitment to attend training for 10 days annually, with an obligation to report for service within New Zealand in the event of a national emergency. During their three months of training, they were also allowed to attend technical college, free of charge, on a course of their choice. Facilitating the necessary training, the Army School of Instruction (ASI) was re-established at Trentham, supported by District Schools of Instruction (DSI) at Narrow Neck, Trentham, and Burnham.[7]
The first account of cooks participating in this training scheme saw a batch of seventy-two, nine of whom were cooks, enter Trentham in August 1938 for their initial military training, beginning their vocational training in January 1939 with three of the cooks going to Narrow Neck in Auckland and the other six to Fort Dorset.[8] Reviewing the work of the officers and men under his command, the Officer Command the Central Military District, Colonel E Puttick, commented in April 1939 that “there had never been any complaint about the food, and it was clear that the special reservists who had taken cookery training as their vocational course in the Army Training School at Trentham had received excellent instruction”.[9]
While Colonel Puttick may have been satisfied with the catering arrangements in his district, there was dissatisfaction with the quality of rations and cooks in the northern and Southern Districts. In May 1939, reports of sub-standard rations, the performance of civilian cooks at territorial Camps resulting in their packing up and walking out mid camp and the refusals of Territorial soldiers to work on mess fatigue parties led the District Commander, Colonel P.H Bell to call an all-day conference with his Quartermaster and Quartermaster Sergeants to consider the Army’s food problems, including the quality of rations and most importantly how to resolve the fundamental problem that the Army had no cooks of its own, engaging civilians for the period of camps. [10] In the Northern District, a deputation of civilian cooks led by Mr W. R Connolly, a cook with 37 years’ experience of cooking in military camps, went directly to the officer of the Star Newspaper with their grievances following a ten-day camp with A Squadron of the 4th Mounted Regiment. Joining the squadron on 3 May at Cambridge, they deployed to Rotorua, Tauranga, and Paeroa, finishing up at Narrow Neck on 12 May. The cook’s issue was that they were civilians contracted to work in a fixed camp and not on the march, and they were at much reduced rates than they had received before the depression.[11]
Despite these challenges, the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 prompted a renewed focus on army catering. On the declaration of war, it was decided that New Zealand would contribute an Expeditionary Force. Initially, a “Special Force” was planned, with one battalion in each of the three military districts. The Special Force was later expanded into the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2 NZEF).
Three weeks before the Special Force encamped at Trentham, Acting Prime Minister Mr Peter Fraser and Minister of Defence Mr Frederick Jones visited the site to inspect preparations for the new mobilisation camp. During their visit, the Commandant of the ASI, Major J I Brook, hosted them for lunch. Impressed by the meal, they specifically requested the Regular Force Mess diet sheet and received positive feedback from regular soldiers on the meal quality. The Ministers inquired about the possibility of providing similar meals to the men of the Special Force. In response, Major Brook suggested that providing the same meals to the Special Force could be achieved if cooks were available and ample rations were provided. Following this discussion, permission was granted to establish an Army School of Cookery under the ASI.[12]
By December 1939, under the tutelage of a fully qualified army cookery instructor, the first batch of thirty-two men had completed their training at the Army School of Cookery, with a second batch completing their training on 8 December. Initial training was on the standard equipment found in any camp, typically three ovens able to bake for 120 men. Once qualified in the basics of camp cooking, training on the Portable Cooker No. 1 and other field cookery followed.[13]
As the 2NZEF established itself in Egypt, the significance of quality cooking was duly recognised. Although the Cooks selected for the First Echelon underwent training courses at the Trentham School of Cookery, they were not qualified cooks under Middle East conditions. They required instruction on breaking down bulk rations and handling food in the field, so arrangements were made to train New Zealand cooks at the Army School of Cookery in Cairo. Additionally, the services of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) from the 7th British Armoured Division was enlisted as an instructor to the 2 NZEF under the supervision of the Divisional Supply Column officer. With the second Echelon diverted to England, General Freyberg consulted the manager of the Lyons chain of restaurants, who was an adviser to the War Office on army catering, with arrangements made with the War Office in London for the secondment of four NCOs to the 2 NZEF to form the nucleus of the 2 NZEF cookery school. These NCOs accompanied the Second Echelon troops from England to Egypt.[14]
A typical New Zealand field cookhouse in the desert during World War II. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch :Photographs relating to World War 1914-1918, World War 1939-1945, occupation of Japan, Korean War, and Malayan Emergency. Ref: DA-00798-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23050225
With this reorganisation and expansion, the NZEF cookery school conducted thorough training and testing for cooks. Starting from February 1941, all cooks were required to be qualified either at the NZEF school or the Middle East school before being eligible for extra-duty pay.[15]
As the war progressed, the Army School of Cookery at Trentham continued to run regular courses. However, the demand for cooks necessitated the DSIs to conduct cookery instruction to train men as they were called up for the NZEF and Home Defence. In addition to male soldiers training as cooks, from 1939, the first females from Auckland Womans Service Corps were employed as cooks in Papakura Camp to supplement the civilian and military cooks. Although on the Army payroll, the initial female cooks were not considered serving soldiers. By June 1941, fifteen female cooks were working across all the Military districts. However, it was not until July 1942 that approval was given for the New Zealand Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) in New Zealand, formally establishing these female cooks as part of the military establishment.[16]
Cook from the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps putting meat in an oven to roast, for men at a World War II military camp in New Zealand. New Zealand Free Lance : Photographic prints and negatives. Ref: PAColl-8602-40. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22895614
By October 1942, three hundred men of the Territorial Force had received training at Ngawahiwaha Camp. The established ratio for cooks to troops was one cook for every 50 men, two for 100, three for 150, and an additional cook for every 100 additional men. Throughout the Army, the standard of cooking, in terms of variety and quality, had seen significant improvement. It was widely acknowledged that a properly trained army cook could secure employment in a civilian hotel or restaurant upon demobilisation.[17]
Sergeant “Paddy” Bourke, veteran army cook, turns the roast. He was in Egypt with the Expeditionary Force of a generation ago; (Evening Post, 13 April 1940). Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/17717327
In May 1944, the use of WACs as cooks had become a normalised and essential function of the war effort, with an article in the Dominion newspaper detailing the work of the 65 WAACs on the messing staff of Trentham Camp and providing details of the training of the latest batch of eighteen female cooks who had just completed a three-week cooking course the Trentham ASI.[18]It’s essential to recognise that New Zealand was not operating in isolation but rather observing developments across the armies of the British Empire as they transitioned from the regimental cook system to a more centralised and professional model. In the United Kingdom, the Cook trade was under the control of the Army Catering Corps (ACC) upon its creation in March 1941, forming as a subsidiary element of the Royal Army Service Corps Supply Branch. Australia followed suit in 1943, establishing the Australian Army Catering Corps. Canada took a similar approach, forming the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC) Catering Wing at No. 1 Reinforcement Unit in Britain in August 1942 to train cooks for the Army.
A cook with the 22 New Zealand Battalion, stokes up his fire in the forward areas near Rimini, Italy, 21 September 1944 during World War II. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch
The Canadian Army’s experience was that many cooks had previously been members of their unit. However, experience revealed that they were not necessarily skilled soldiers and often functioned as poor cooks tasked with feeding their comrades. Consequently, starting in 1942, all cooks were transferred to the RCASC, which then assigned them to the various units they were to serve. This change resulted in a rapid improvement in cooking standards.[19] Although New Zealand had adopted other British logistical organisational changes, such as the formation of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, with enthusiasm, it was more reserved about any changes to its cooks, combining cooks into a single corps was not a wartime priority.
In 1944, New Zealand commenced the demobilisation process, which included disbanding the Home Guard and the standing down of elements of the Territorial Force. By the war’s conclusion in 1945, most of the forces stationed at home underwent rapid demobilisation. The 2NZEF was disbanded by 1946, aligning with the downsizing trend seen in many Western militaries. However, despite this size reduction, the Government and the Army hesitated to revert the military to its pre-war dimensions and structure. Instead, they opted to reorganise it into what became known as the Interim Army.
New Zeland Army Order 60/1947 of 1 August 1947 detailed the trade classification and promotion requirements of the Regular Force. This order retained cooks as two specific All Arms trades;
Cooks, Hospital. A Group A trade applicable to All Arms, including the New Zealand Army Nursing Service (NZANS)
Cooks (other than hospital cook). A Group B trade applicable to All Arms, including the NZWAAC
The Commandant of the ASI set the syllabus for the Cooks, hospital, and Cooks (other than hospital cooks). During his period, there was no steward’s trade.[20]
In 1947, three officers and four NCOs were brought out from Britain to raise the standards of catering in the New Zealand Army. This task included providing training and instruction in cooking and catering and guidance on ration scales and meal planning. With the New Zealand Army perceived as too small for a stand-alone Catering Corps, considering that the NZASC was responsible for the Supply function, Butchers and Bakers, it made sense to emulate the Canadian model and bring all cooks under the umbrella of the RNZASC.
To facilitate this transition, the Army Board approved the formation of a Catering Group as a section of the RNZASC. It issued New Zealand Army Instruction (NZAI) 2049 on 15 February 1948 detailing the Supplies and Transport Catering Group (STCG) formation. Initially, the STCG comprised of;
A Staff Officer (Catering) in the Directorate of Supplies and Transport at Army Headquarters.
District Catering advisers (NC0s) on the staff of the Districts Assistant Director Supply and Transport (ADST)
Instructors on the staff of the Army School of Instruction to operate a Catering Wing.
Cooks and kitchenhands on unit peace establishments.
The function of the STCG was to
To train and provide unit cooks and kitchen hands.
Instruction in and supervision of the management of the Army ration scale.
Improvement of standard of food preparation and cooking.
Advice on the installation and instruction in the operation of cooking appliances and kitchen equipment.
Despite NZAI 2049 bringing all army catering services under the jurisdiction of the RNZASC, the Cooks trade remained dispersed among various units. However, this issue was addressed with the implementation of NZAI 2147 in September 1948.[22]
No 2147. SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT CATERING GROUP, RNZASC NZAI 1319 and 2049 are hereby cancelled.
Approval has been given for the formation of a catering Group in RNZASC. This group will be known as the Supplies and Transport Catering Group (abbreviated title STCG).
The functions of the STCG are – a. To train and provide unit, &c, cooks and messing staffs. b. Instruction in and supervision of the management of the Army Ration Scale. c. The preparation, cooking and serving of all rations. d. Advise on the installation and instruction in the operation of cooking appliances and kitchen equipment. e. Advise on the layout of mess buildings.
Initially the STCG will comprise- a. A Staff Officer (Catering) on the Directorate of Supplies and Transport at Army HQ. b. District catering advisers (NCOs) on the staff of ADs ST District. c. Instructors on the staff of ASI to operate a “Catering Wing”. d. Messing Staff of all units
In order to implement para 3 above, the following action will be taken:- a. From the date of publication of this instruction soldiers classified as “kitchen hands” or “Mess Orderly” will be classified as “probationer cook” or “mess steward” respectively. The terms “kitchen hands” or “mess orderly” will no longer be used. NOTES: – (i) For star classification purposes “probationer cooks” will form the “learner: class of the group “B” trade of cook and will be treated as Group “D” tradesmen (ii) Whenever the term “messing staffs” is used in this instruction, it will included “cooks,” “probationary cooks,” and “mess stewards” b. All cooks, probationer cooks, and mess stewards, other than of the NZWAC, will be posted to RNZASC. c. All messing staffs. including NZWAC messing staffs, in districts will be carried on the establishments of district ASC Coys under the sub heading of STCG. d. OsC Districts will allot messing staffs to units on the recommendations of DA DsST. e. Messing staffs, including NZWAC messing staffs, of Army HQ units will be carried on the establishments of the respective units under the sub heading STCG.
STCG messing staff strengths will be assessed according to unit messing strengths as follows:- a. Unit messing strengths will be taken as establishment strength less 20 per cent (to allow for personnel Living out). b. Cooks. – Cooks will be allocated to units on the following scale: i. One cook per unit all ranks (or portion thereof) on unit messing strength up to a total of 650. ii. One extra cook p er 90 all ranks (or portion thereof) on unit messing strength in excess of 650. iii. One extra cook for each cookhouse in excess of one. iv. In addition, one chief cook (WO or NCO) for each unit. The rank of this WO or NCO shall be dependent on the strength of the messing staff serving in the unit concerned, in accordance with the scale laid down in para 6 below. c. Probationer Cooks:- i. Two probationer cooks to each kitchen where cooking is carried out for messing strength of 65 or under. ii. Four probationer cooks to each kitchen where cooking is carried out for messing strength in excess of 65 d. Mess Stewards: i. One mess steward for each 25 all ranks (or portion thereof) on unit messing strength. ii. In addition, one mess steward for each 6 officers (or portion thereof) on unit messing strength up to a total of 42 officers. iii. When the number of officers exceeds 42, one extra mess steward for each 9 officers ( or portion thereof) on unit strength in excess of 42). iv. Mess stewards in any mess to include at least one NCO, except when total number of mess stewards is less than 3.
In calculating ranks of messing staff, the following guide will be used: In every 69 messing staff OR’s carried on establishment under STCG there may be 21 NCOs from Corporal upwards on the following scale: One Warrant Officer. Two Staff Sergeants. Six Sergeants. Twelve Corporals.
The chief cook in any unit will rank as the senior member of the messing staff, irrespective of the rank of the senior mess steward. He will be responsible for: a. The proper functioning of the messing staff. b. Close co-operation with the unit messing officer. c. Training of probationer cooks.
Amended establishments will be issued shortly.
New Zealand Army Instruction 2147, 15 September 1948
With this new directive, New Zealand Army cooks (NZWAC cooks and stewards, which remained a separate corps but were under technical control of the RNZASC for catering purposes, until 1977 when they joined the RNZASC) were finally consolidated into a single corps, allowing for a standardised training syllabus. Additionally, to enhance the catering function and provide a comprehensive messing service, the Stewards trade was formalised as part of the RNZASC. By the end of 1948, the groundwork had been laid for the RNZASC Catering trade to support the evolving New Zealand army.
In conclusion, the evolution of Army catering in New Zealand from 1845 to 1948 reflects a journey marked by adaptability, innovation, and a commitment to sustaining the morale and effectiveness of New Zealand’s military forces. During this period, New Zealand’s military catering underwent a significant transformation from rudimentary messing arrangements in the early militia days. However, the importance of well-fed troops was consistently recognised, as evidenced by the efforts to improve messing arrangements, the establishment of training programs for cooks, and the integration of civilian and military personnel into the catering function. Despite challenges such as dissatisfaction with rations and the shortage of trained cooks, the New Zealand Army continually sought to enhance its catering capabilities, particularly in response to the demands of wartime mobilisation. The establishment of the Army School of Cookery, the integration of female cooks into the military establishment, and the adoption of international best practices, such as those observed in the British and Canadian armies, demonstrate New Zealand’s commitment to modernising its catering services and ensuring the provision of quality meals for its troops. By consolidating army catering services under the RNZASC umbrella and formalising the Cooks and Stewards trades, the New Zealand Army laid the groundwork for a more structured and professional catering function as the country transitioned into the post-war era. By 1948, the stage was set for the RNZASC Catering trade to play a pivotal role in supporting the evolving needs of the New Zealand army, reflecting a legacy of culinary excellence and dedication to service.
Notes
[1] “Newtown Park Camp (Inquiry into Conduct of),” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1901 Session I, H-19a (1901).
[2] “New Zealand Contingent (No 1): Extracts from Reports by Major Robin, Commanding New Zealand Contingent, to Officer Commanding Forces,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1900 Session I, H-06a (1900).
[3] J Babington, “Defence Forces of New Zealand (Report on the) by Major General J.M Babington, Commandant of the Forces.,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1904 Session I, H-19 (1904).
[4] Based on the British logistics system the NZASC was to be responsible for the Transport and the supply of forage, rations and fuel. The supply and maintenance of all small-arms, ammunition, accoutrements, clothing, and field equipment Stores was to remain a responsibility of the Defence Stores Department which in 1917 became the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps. Robert McKie, “Unappreciated Duty: The Forgotten Contribution of New Zealand’s Defence Stores Department in Mobilising the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in 1914: A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand” (Massey University, 2022).
[5] “H-19 Report on the Defence Forces of New Zealand for the Period 28 June 1912 to 20 June 1913,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives (1913).
[6] “Military Forces of New Zealand (Report by the Inspector General of Ther Overseas Forces on the),” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1914 Session I, H-19a (1914).
[7] “H-19 Military Forces of New Zealand, Annual Report of the Chief of the General Staff,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, (1938).
[8] “Vocational Training,” Wairarapa Times-Age, , 17 January 1939.
[9] “Military Camps,” Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 80, , 5 April 1939.
[11] “Walked out Army Cooks,” Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 114, , 17 May 1939.
[12] “Soldier Cooks,” King Country Chronicle, Volume XXXIII, Issue 4856,, 1 November 1939.
[13] “Diet for Troops,” King Country Chronicle, Volume XXXIII, Issue 4856,, 1 December 1939.
[14] William Graham McClymont, To Greece, vol. 4 (War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1959), 23.
[15] Thomas Duncan MacGregor Stout, New Zealand Medical Services in Middle East and Italy, vol. 12 (War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1956), 47.
[16] Iris Latham, The Waac Story (Wellington, New Zealand1986), 1-4.
[17] “Moral Builders NZ Army Cooks,” Bay of Plenty Times, Volume LXXI, Issue 13760,, 1 October 1942.
[18] “Waac’s New Role,” Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 207, , 30 May 1944.
[19] Arnold Warren, Wait for the Waggon: The Story of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (McClelland, 1961).
[20] “Special New Zealand Army Order 60/1947 – the Star Classification and Promotion of Other Ranks of Ther Regular Force,”(1947).
[21] “New Zealand Army Instruction 2049 – Supplies and Transport Catering Group, Rnzasc,”(1948).
[22] “New Zealand Army Instruction 2147 – Supplies and Transport Catering Group, Rnzasc,”(1948).
Brigadier Allan Huia Andrews, CBE, was born on 11 January 1912 in New Plymouth, New Zealand. His journey through life encompassed significant achievements and contributions to his country and the world of sports.
Education and Early Career
Andrews studied at Thames and New Plymouth Boys’ High School before pursuing higher education at Canterbury University. There, he successfully earned a Bachelor of Engineering degree. Alongside his academic pursuits, Andrews also displayed immense talent in rugby. He even earned the opportunity to represent Canterbury and was on the cusp of selection as an All-Black in 1934. However, he chose to prioritise his studies, making the difficult decision to forgo his promising rugby career and complete his degree.
Military Service
Brigadier Andrews embarked on his military journey on 7 April 1936, when he joined the New Zealand Army Permanent Force as a cadet. He was commissioned as a Lieutenant into the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) on 17 June 1936. Due to the absence of the Officer in Charge of the Ordnance Workshops, Lieutenant S.B. Wallace, who was on a course in England, Andrews took on the responsibility of leading the Ordnance Workshops. In September 1937, he was appointed Temporary Ordnance Mechanical Engineer (OME), holding this position until Wallace’s return in June 1938. Afterwards, Andrews assumed the role of Assistant Ordnance Officer at the Main Ordnance Depot (MOD), where he began work on updating equipment scales and developing plans to equip and support an expeditionary force.
On 11 December 1939, Andrews was seconded to the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) as the Senior OME (SOME) and promoted to Captain. That very day, he embarked on active service. His dedication led to promotions, with him becoming Deputy Assistant Director Ordnance Services (DADOS) for 2 NZEF in August 1940, followed by his appointment as Assistant Director Ordnance Services (ADOS) for 2 NZ Division in January 1941.
Upon Colonel King’s appointment as the Deputy Director of Ordnance Services (DDOS) Lines of Communication (L of C) for the 8th Army, Andrews took on the responsibilities of ADOS for 2 NZEF. When the New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NZEME) was formed as a unit of 2NZEF on 1 December 1942, Andrews was appointed as the Commander EME (CEME) for 2 NZ Division.
Returning to New Zealand in July 1943, Andrews was appointed Chief Ordnance Mechanical Engineer (COME) at MOD Trentham and promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. Drawing from his experience in the Middle East, he introduced All Arms Military training into the schedule of the MOD Ordnance Workshops.
Portrait of Lieutenant Colonel Allan Huia Andrews, Auckland Weekly News, 31 March 1943. Auckland Libraries Heritage Collections AWNS-19430331-19-2. Image has no known copyright restrictions.
In early 1944, Andrews undertook a tour of duty with 3 NZ Division in the Pacific, and in May of that year, he was once again posted back to 2NZEF (Middle East). There, he served as CEME for 2 NZ Division.
Management of The Kiwis Rugby Team
During the early stages of World War II, General Freyberg had handpicked Andrews to manage the 2nd NZEF Rugby Team after hostilities ceased.
In 1945, fulfilling General Freyberg’s vision and under Andrews’ adept leadership, a team was assembled, famously known as “The Kiwis.” This exceptional squad consisted of men who had completed active service in North Africa and Italy, with some having endured prolonged periods in prisoner-of-war camps in Italy, Austria and Germany.
“The Kiwis” embarked on a remarkable tour across the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, and France, where they participated in 33 matches. Their outstanding record included 29 victories, two draws, and only two losses. Their exceptional performance earned widespread recognition, as they triumphed over formidable international opponents, including England, Wales, and France. The complete tour results were:
07 October 1945 Swansea v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 22-6
30 October 1945 Llanelli v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 18-8
03 November 1945 Neath v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 22 – 15
10 November 1945 Northern Services v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 14-7
14 November 1945 Ulster v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 10-9
17 November 1945 Leinster v New Zealand Army – Draw 10-10
24 November 1945 England v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 18-3
01 December 1945 British Army v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 25-5
08 December 1945 RAF v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 11-0
15 December 1945 Royal Navy v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 6-3
22 December 1945 London Clubs v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 30-0
26 December 1945 Cardiff v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 3-0
29 December 1945 Newport v New Zealand Army – Draw 3-3
05 January 1946 Wales v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 11-3
12 January 1946 Combined Services v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 31-0
19 January 1946 Scotland v New Zealand Army – NZEF Loss 11-6
24 January 1946 Scottish Universities v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 57-3
26 January 1946 North Midlands v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 24-9
31 January 1946 East Midlands v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 14-0
02 February 1946 Northern Counties v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 25-8
09 February 1946 Lancs, Cheshire & Yorks v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 41-0
14 February 1946 Oxford University v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 31-9
16 February 1946 Devon & Cornwall v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 11-3
20 February 1946 Cambridge University v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 15-7
23 February 1946 Gloucs & Somerset v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 11-0
27 February 1946 Monmouthshire v New Zealand Army – NZEF Loss 0-15
02 March 1946 Aberavon v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 17-4
10 March 1946 France v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 14-9
13 March 1946 BAOR v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 12-0
16 March 1946 Combined Services v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 20-3
24 March 1946 France v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 13-10
27 March 1946 France A v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 38-9
31 March 1946 Ile De France v New Zealand Army – NZEF Win 24-13
Later Career and Retirement
Upon completing his role as The Kiwis’ manager, Andrews returned to New Zealand in July 1946 and took up the appointment of Chief Ordnance Officer (COO) at MOD Trentham. He was promoted to Colonel during this period. On 1 October 1947, Andrew was appointed as the first post-war Director of Ordnance Services (DOS). After relinquishing the DOS position on 11 November 1949, Andrews attended the Joint Services Command College (JSSC) in the United Kingdom.
Upon returning to New Zealand, he assumed the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General (DAQMG) role at Army HQ. His career continued to advance, and in 1953, he was posted to Waiouru as the Camp Commandant.
In 1955, Andrews was promoted to Brigadier and took up the position of Commander of the Central Military District. Subsequently, he embarked on another overseas assignment, becoming the Senior Army Liaison Officer at the New Zealand Embassy in London in late 1956. He returned to New Zealand in 1960 and was appointed Commander of the Southern Military District.
Wellington College cadet Corporal C A Beyer receiving the Berry Cup from Brigadier A H Andrews, OBE, for being the outstanding battalion shot. Photographed by an Evening Post staff photographer on 16 November 1955.
In January 1963, Andrews took up the position of Adjutant General at Army HQ, a role he held until his retirement in 1967. Following his retirement, he maintained a strong interest in the activities of the RNZAOC and authored his autobiography, “Allan Huia Andrews: A Distinguished Career,” in 2002.
Brigadier Allan Huia Andrews, CBE, passed away on 28 October 2002 and was laid to rest at Okato Cemetery, New Plymouth, New Zealand. Throughout his military career, he earned several accolades, including Mentioned in Dispatches while serving with 2 NZ Division and receiving the OBE in 1943. In the 1964 New Year’s honours, the CBE further recognised him for his exceptional contributions to the military and rugby.
Lt Col A.H Andrews. OBE, RNZAOC Director of Ordnance Services, 1 Oct 1947 – 11 Nov 1949. RNZAOC School
In the period between the world wars, Britain analysed the lessons of the Great War and, looking forward, realised that the next war was not to be one of attrition-based warfare but a war of speed, mobility and surprise utilising modern technologies such as armoured vehicles, motorised transport and communications. By 1939 the British Army had transformed from the horse-drawn army of the previous war into a modern motorised force fielding more vehicles than their potential opponents, the Germans. Britain’s modernisation was comprehensive with new weapons and equipment and robust and up-to-date doctrine, providing the foundation for the employment of the army. The modernisation of the British Army included Logistical services, with both the Army Service Corps and the Army Ordnance Corps on the path to becoming doctrinally prepared, equipped and organised for the upcoming conflict. New Zealand took Britain’s lead and, from the mid-1930s, began reorganising and reequipping New Zealand’s Military in tune with emerging British doctrine. New Zealand’s entry into the war in September 1939 initiated a massive transformation of New Zealand’s Ordnance Services with new units raised and personnel recruited to support New Zealand’s forces at home and overseas. In addition to Ordnance Deports and Workshops, the most numerous Ordnance unit was the Light Aid Detachments (LAD). Providing first-line repair to formations and Units, LADs provided the backbone of New Zealand repair and maintenance services keeping the critical material of war operational in often extreme conditions. This article provides background on the role and function of the LAD in overseas and home defence roles between 1939 and 1945.
Throughout the interwar years, the British Military establishment analysed the lessons of the previous war and interpreted contemporary developments. Updating doctrine throughout the 1930s, the British Military progressively transformed into a mechanised force armed with some of the era’s most advanced weapons and equipment. The tactical bible of British Commonwealth armies, the Field Service Regulations (FSR), was updated with at least four editions issued, proving that the British Army was willing to learn from the mistakes learned in the previous war.[1] Concurrent to the tactical doctrine of the FSR Anticipating, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) spent the 1930s creating the infrastructure and doctrine to support the mechanisation of the British Army by creating essential relationships with the British motor industry that smoothed the path to mobilisation.[2] In addition to the doctrine published in the FSRs, the wartime doctrine for the operation of British and Commonwealth Ordnance Services was detailed in the Ordnance Manual (War) 1939.
Authorised for use from 13 September 1939, the Ordnance Manual (War) 1939 was intended to “Guide all concerned and particularly to assist, at the beginning of a campaign, those who have no previous war experience of the duties that they are called upon to undertake.”[3] The Ordnance Manual (War) 1939 detailed all the responsibilities that were expected of the British and Commonwealth Ordnance Services, with the repair and maintenance responsibilities as follows;[4]
8. The organisation for carrying out, in the field, repairs (including replacement of component and complete assemblies) to units’ equipment (other than ammunition) consists of:- (a) Light aid detachments, which are attached to certain units and formations to advise and assist them with their
“first line” repair and recovery duties. (b) Mobile workshop units, equipped with machinery, breakdown and store lorries, which are allotted to certain
formations for carrying out “second line” repairs and recovery. (c) Stationary base ordnance workshops, which are established on a semi-permanent basis at, or adjacent to, the
base ordnance depot or depots. (d) Ordnance field parks from which replacement of components and complete assemblies can be effected. These
ordnance field parks also hold a proportion of replacement vehicles.
The Ordnance Manual (War) 1939 then details the role of the Light Aid Detachment:
2. In order to assist units with their first line repair and recovery work, and to provide- expert diagnosis and technical experience, light aid detachments are permanently attached to certain formations and units, for example: • Artillery regiments. • Cavalry regiments and Tank battalions, Royal Armoured Corps. • Infantry brigades. • Machine-gun battalions. • Tank battalions. • Royal Engineer field parks. • Divisional Signals. The LADs. attached to RE field parks and to divisional signals (whose establishments of vehicles are comparatively small) are required to look after other small mechanised units not provided with LADs.
3. The personnel of a LAD consists of an Ordnance Mechanical Officer (OME), an armament artificer (fitter), an electrician, and a few fitters, and the necessary storemen, driver mechanics, drivers, etc., for their vehicles. Its transport usually consists of two lorries (one store and one breakdown), a car and a motorcycle.
4. Its functions are: – (a) To advise units how best to keep their equipment and vehicles in a state of mechanical efficiency; to help them to
detect the causes of any failures or breakdowns, and to assist them in carrying out first line repairs up to their full
capacity. (b) To assist units with first-line recovery of breakdowns. (c) To maintain a close liaison between the unit and formation workshop.
During rest periods LADs may be able to carry out more extensive repairs. If the time is available, the necessary parts and material can be brought up from the ordnance field park to enable them to carry out jobs which would normally be beyond their capacity when on the move.
In such circumstances, repair detachments of recovery sections may be brought up to assist them).
5. LADs do not form part of the workshops in any sense. They are definitely an integral part of “B” echelon of the unit to which they are attached, and the OME. is directly under the orders of OC unit, in the same way as the regimental medical officer. The OC unit is the accounting officer for the vehicles and stores of the LAD. When an LAD serves more than one unit, as in the case of an infantry brigade, the OME. is the accounting officer for all purposes.
Members of 10 Light Aid Detachment, NZ Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, attached to 5 NZ Fd Park Coy, changing truck engine, probably at Burbeita. Man in peaked cap identified as Lt G D Pollock, later Col Pollock. Taken circa 1941 by an official photographer. Ref: DA-01035-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22485028
The New Zealand LADs
When New Zealand committed forces to the war effort in 1939, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, despite having the doctrinal foundations provided by the Ordnance Manual (War), did not have the Regular or Territorial Force personnel available to provide LADs immediately. Therefore, like the United Kingdom, New Zealand relied on its civilian motor industry to provide the bulk of the tradesmen for the LADs. However, despite the challenges in forming a specialised unit from scratch, the New Zealand Army raised fifty-six LADs in three distinct tranches between 1940 and 1943, consisting of
2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force – Ninteen LADs
2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific – Seven LADs
Home Defence – Thirty-One LADs
NZEF LADS
Created as part of the newly constituted 2NZEF in 1939, the 2NZEF NZOC was described in the Evening Post newspaper as consisting of “11 Light Aid Detachments of the New Zealand Ordnance Corps. These are numbered 9 to 19, and their part is to render assistance and effect repairs to mechanic transport and the anti-tank units”[5].
The was initially some confusion between the use of the designation NZAOC and NZOC in the context of the NZEF. This was clarified in NZEF Order 221 of March 1941, which set NZOC as the title of Ordnance in the NZEF.
1942 saw the separation of maintenance and repair functions from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) with the formation of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME) in the Brutish Army.[6] The New Zealand Division followed suit and formed the New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NZEME) on 1 December 1942, separating the repair, maintenance and ordnance stores functions of the NZOC.[7]
GMC CCKW Truck modelled with the Regimental Markings of 38 LAD, 18th Armoured Regiment. Craig Paddon
NZEF NZ Tank Brigade
Formation Sign 1 NZ Tank Brigade
The New Zealand Tank Brigade was an NZEF unit formed at Waiouru in October 1941 to be deployed to the Middle East after Training in New Zealand for six months. The entry of Japan into the war in December 1941 necessitated the rerolling of the NZ Tank Brigade into a home defence role. After reorganisations, the Brigade was ordered to be redeployed in April 1942, with its Headquarters and Battalions dispersed to the South Island, Northland, Manawatu and Pukekohe.
November 1942 saw further changes which saw the gradual disestablishment of the NZ Tank Brigade.[18]
No 1 Tank Battalion and 32 LAD remained in the home defence roll in the Auckland/Northland area.
No 2 Tank Battalion, the Army Tank Ordnance Workshop and Ordnance Field Park were dissolved and became part of the 3 NZ Division Independent Tank Battalion Group for service in the Pacific.
No 3 Tank Battalion and 33 LAD were deployed to the Middle East for service with the 2nd NZ Division, where it was dissolved, forming the nucleus of the 4th NZ Armoured brigade and 38, 39 and 40 LADs.
34 LAD was stationed with the Independent Tank Squadron at Harewood in the South Island.
By June 1943, the final units of the 1st NZ Army Tank Brigade, including 32 LAD and 34 LAD, were disbanded.
Army Tank Ordnance Workshops, OFP and LAD identifying patch. Malcolm Thomas Collection
NZEF in the Pacific
NZOC units also were formed for service with the NZEF in the Pacific (NZEFIP). Initially, 20 LAD was formed to support the 8 Infantry Brigade Group in Fiji in November 1940. 14 Infantry Brigade Group reinforced the force in Fiji with 36 and 37 LAD formed to provide additional support. With the redeployment of the New Zealand Brigade from Fiji in late 1942, 36 LAD remained as the LAD for the new Fiji Brigade that was about to be formed. In March 1943, eight members of 36 LAD deployed with the Fijian Brigade to Bougainville. On 1 May 1944, 36 LAD was renamed the Recovery Section, Brigade Mobile Workshops, Fiji Military Forces.[22]
The bulk of the NZEFIP was reorganised as the 3rd New Zealand Division, with the NZOC commitment expanding into 23 units and detachments, including six LADs serving in operations in New Caledonia, The Solomon Islands and Tonga.[22] The formation of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers in 1942 was not followed through in New Zealand and the Pacific, with repair and Maintenance functions remaining part of the Ordnance Corps for the duration of the war.
On concluding successful campaigns in the Solomon Islands in 1944, 3 NZ Division and its equipment were returned to New Zealand and formally disbanded on 20 October 1944. On return to New Zealand, many NZOC members were graded unfit due to the rigours of the tropical campaign and returned to their civilian occupations. Those fit enough were redeployed as reinforcements to 2NZEF in Italy, with the LAD men joining NZEME units.
With the NZAOC and the New Zealand Permanent Army Service Corps (NZPASC) existing as part of the Permanent Army, only the NZPASC had a Territorial Army component, known as the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC). From the 1930s, workshop sections had been included on the establishments of ASC unit for activation on mobilisation. With the onset of war in 1939 and the mobilisation of the Territorial Army in 1940, the Quartermaster General, Col H.E Avery, made the decision that LADs were an Ordnance responsibility, and the NZOC was established as the Ordnance Component of Territorial Army in December 1940.[29]
By late 1943 the mobilisation of the Territorial Forces had ceased to be necessary, and most units had been stood down and placed on care and maintenance status with a small RF Cadre. By 1 April 1944, all wartime home defence units had been disbanded.[30] Although not part of the pre-war Territorial Army, the NZOC remained on establishments. In 1946 a Reorganisation of New Zealand Military Forces removed the distinction between Regular and non-Regular soldiers, and the NZOC ceased to be a separate Corps with the supply functions amalgamated into the NZAOC and the Workshops functions, including the LADs (21, 23, 25, 28, 30 and 53) amalgamated into the NZEME.[31]
Photo of mechanics and motorcyclists repairing motorcycles at a field workshop during military manoeuvres in Northland.” Auckland Weekly News, 23 December 1942, p.14 Auckland Libraries Heritage Collections AWNS-19421223-14-03
[1] This compared with the two editions of German and French doctrine produced during the same period. Jonathan Fennell, Fighting the People’s War : The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War, Armies of the Second World War (Cambridge University Press, 2019), Non-fiction, 32.
[2] P.H. Williams, War on Wheels: The Mechanisation of the British Army in the Second World War (History Press Limited, 2016).
[3]Ordnance Manual (War), ed. The War Office (London: His Majestys Stationery Office, 1939), 9.
[22] Robert A. Howlett, The History of the Fiji Military Forces, 1939-1945 (Published by the Crown Agents for the Colonies on behalf of the Government of Fiji, 1948), Non-fiction, Government documents, 257-8.
[22] Oliver A. Gillespie, The Tanks : An Unofficial History of the Activities of the Third New Zealand Division Tank Squadron in the Pacific (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 137-227.
[23] Peter Cooke, Warrior Craftsmen, Rnzeme 1942-1996 (Wellington: Defense of New Zealand Study Group, 2017), 55.
[31] “H-19 Military Forces of New Zealand Annual Report of the General Officer Commanding, for Period 1 June 1949 to 31 March 1950 “, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives (1950).;”Reorganisation of the Territorial Force,” New Zealand Gazette No 55, 21 October 1948.
[32] “Formation of New Units, Changes in Designation, and Reorganization of Units of the Territorial Force. ,” New Zealand Gazette, No 127, 19 December 1940, 3738-39.
[34] 3 Light Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiment (Auckland East Coast Mounted Rifles) Plowman and Thomas, New Zealand Armour in the Pacific 1939-45, 5-7.
[35] “Formation of New Units and Disbandment of Uuits of the Territorial Force and National, Military Reserve. ,” New Zealand Gazette, No 8, 22 January 1942, 351.
[45] 2 Light Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiment (Queen Alexandra’s Mounted Rifles)Plowman and Thomas, New Zealand Armour in the Pacific 1939-45, 5-7.
[46] “Parts of the Defence Forces Called out for Military Service,” New Zealand Gazette, No 128, 19 December 1940, 3777.
[47] 9 Light Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiment (Wellington East Coast Mounted Rifles)Plowman and Thomas, New Zealand Armour in the Pacific 1939-45, 5-7.
[48] “Formation of New Units and Disbandment of Uuits of the Territorial Force and National, Military Reserve. ,” 351.
[49] 6 Light Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiment ( Manawatu Mounted Rifles)Plowman and Thomas, New Zealand Armour in the Pacific 1939-45, 5-7.
[50] “Formation of New Units and Disbandment of Uuits of the Territorial Force and National, Military Reserve. ,” 351.
[51] “Formation of New Units, Changes in Designation, and Reorganization of Units of the Territorial Force. ,” 3738-39.
[59] 10 Light Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiment ( Nelson Marlbough Mounted Rifles) Plowman and Thomas, New Zealand Armour in the Pacific 1939-45, 5-7.
[60] “Formation of New Units and Disbandment of Uuits of the Territorial Force and National, Military Reserve. ,” 351.
24 February is the Memorial Day, set aside as “Purple Poppy Day” the day on which we honour our war animals.
Complementing the traditional Red Poppy, which is worn on ANZAC and Remembrance Day, the Purple Poppy symbolises all animals who have served during times of conflict.
Thousands of animals have provided support to New Zealand’s Forces, either as working animals or as mascots and providing companionship and comfort to service personnel.
One of the most famous animals in New Zealand Military History is Ceaser, the bulldog who was awarded the Blue Cross Medal on 27 May 2019 for his service and bravery during the First World War.
Portrait of ‘Caesar’ (misspelt as Caeser) with ‘4th Battalion Mascot, NZ Rifle Brigade and ‘Oliver Varley, photo’ written on the photograph. Auckland War Memorial Museum – Tāmaki Paenga Hira. WW1 487.
Sergeant Two Bob
Like many other units of the 2nd New Zealand Division during the Second World War, the Divisional Ordnance Field Park (OFP) had its own mascot, a small dog. The dog had been purchased as a pup from a local vendor in Tripoli for two shillings and named “Sergeant Two Bob”.
The name “Sergeant Two Bob” was a play on the slang of the time where Bob was the common term for a shilling, with twelve shillings making up a pound, “Two Bob” equalled two shillings which at the time was a common light-hearted insult where one stated that something was worthless, in this case, it was a term of affection for a unit mascot.
Records indicate that “Sergeant Two Bob” moved with the OFP from North Africa to Italy in early 1944 and remained a member of that until the end of the war. As the NZ Division demobilised, New Zealand’s strict quarantine regulations forbade the return to New Zealand of “Sergeant Two Bob”, and it is assumed that he found a new home with some Italian owners.
Harry Gilbertson of the New Zealand Divisional Ordnance Field Park with the section mascot “Sergeant Two Bob” at Maddi September 1943. Photo H.J Gilbertson
Corporal Jenny
“Sergeant Two Bob” was not the only Ordnance Mascot during the Second World War. In the Pacific, Ordnance in the 3rd New Zealand Division adopted ‘Jenny the fawn’.
Orphaned as the result of a deer-hunting expedition, Jenny was hand-reared on a diet of powdered milk and guava leaves and soon promoted to the rank of substantive corporal.
Corporal Jenny’s duties included representing the Ordnance team at football matches, resplendent in its Khaki cover decorated in Ordnance colours and regulation corporal’s stripes. Later Jenny’s appetite extended to include tea leaves, the unit’s laundry and mail. On the NZ Divisions’ departure from New Caledonia in 1944 Jenny was presented to a local family.
Jenny the Fawn, 1943. War History Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library
The Second World War marked a period of immense growth for New Zealand’s Ordnance Services. Expanding from a strength of 6 Officers, 28 Permanent Other Ranks, and 113 Civilian Staff operating from limited infrastructure in Devonport, Hopuhopu, Trentham, and Burnham Camp in May 1939, New Zealand’s Ordnance Services had grown by 1944 into a diverse organisation supporting New Zealand’s forces both at home and abroad.
Armed with the 1939 Ordnance Manual (war), the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) Ordnance units were established and adapted for their specific theatres of operation. In the Middle East, New Zealand Ordnance integrated into the Ordnance Services of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps. However, with a Brigade Group based in Fiji from late 1940, the Ordnance Services in the Pacific faced the most significant challenges. As the NZ Brigade Group transitioned and expanded from its garrison duties in Fiji into a Division conducting amphibious combat operations in the Solomon Islands, the supporting Ordnance Services had to anticipate the Division’s needs up to six months in advance. They also relied on fragile lines of communication stretching back to New Zealand for everyday items and to the United Kingdom for much of the military hardware held by the Division. Additionally, the tropical climate and indigenous fauna encountered in the area of operations posed additional hurdles to overcome.
After a series of actions in the Solomons, the burden of maintaining two Divisions became unsustainable for the limited resources New Zealand could provide. By October 1944, the Pacific Division had been disestablished. Its men were either demobilised to fill critical civilian roles or retained in the Army as reinforcements for the Division in Italy. Many of the Ordnance men were absorbed into New Zealand Ordnance Depots to receive and refurbish the large amounts of equipment returned from the Pacific.
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944 (Colourised). Alexander Turnbull Library
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944(Colourised). Alexander Turnbull Library
Based on the experience gained in operating the Base Ordnance Depot in New Caledonia and the Advanced Ordnance Depot in Guadalcanal, two Ordnance Officers who had served in the Pacific since 1940, Henry McKenzie Reid and Stanley Arthur Knight, produced reports in 1945 summarising Ordnance operations in these locations. Both Knight and Reid had been civilians in the Ordnance Corps before the war—Reid at Trentham and Knight at Hopuhopu—before being commissioned as officers in 1940. They both served in the Base Ordnance Depot in Fiji and later as Chief Ordnance Officer in the Base Ordnance Depot in New Caledonia. Knight also became the final Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services (DADOS) of the 3rd NZ Division. After the war, both officers remained in the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC), with Reid becoming the Director of Ordnance Services from April 1957 to November 1960.
The reports produced by Reid and Knight are similar in overall content, covering various points on storage, packing of stores, personnel, and ammunition, though each officer provides varying degrees of detail. The combined purpose of these reports is not only to provide a historical record of this aspect of New Zealand’s Ordnance Services in the Pacific but also to serve as a resource for the New Zealand Ordnance Services, aiding in planning for future operations in the tropics.
OPERATIONS OF ORDNANCE DEPOTS IN PACIFIC OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF LIEUT-COL S.A.KNIGHT NZEFIP
Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Arthur Knight
FORWARD
I was appointed Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services immediately prior to the withdrawal of troops from forward areas to base areas in New Caledonia. Shortly after my arrival in Guadalcanal, units commenced preparations prior to evacuation, and my duties as D.A.D.O.S were not onerous since the demand for equipment had dropped to bare essentials. My observations must, therefore, be entirely concerned with an analysis of experiences gained while holding the appointment of Chief Ordnance Officer (COO), Base Ordnance Depot(BOD) New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific(NZEF IP).
ZONE OF OPERATIONS
The Base Ordnance Depor was established in New Caledonia at the beginning of the new year in 1943. Being situated some 30 miles for the port of Nepoui at which the bulk of our stores were unloaded and 100 miles from Noumea, fairly long hauls by road were necessitated.
In August of the same year, an Advanced Ordnance Depot was established in Guadalcanal, staffed by about 50% of the Base Ordnance Dept personnel. A few weeks later a Forward Ordnance Depot staffed by 2 officers and 25 ORs was established a Vella Lavella. The later depot was closed down and personnel withdrawn to Guadalcanal when Divisional Troops move forward to Green Island.
Due account must the taken of the type of operations to be undertaken, but it is my opinion that sub-division must be kept to a minimum. If the Base Depot is situated as close as possible to the fighting troops, then the necessity to establish Advanced Depots can be reduced to a minimum. Each time a Sub-Depot is established, additional personnel are required, and the total quantity of stores must necessarily be increased go provide working margins for each Depot.
STORAGE
It will be generally accepted that few if any permanent buildings will be available for the holding of ordnance store on Pacific Islands unless the Base is established at places such ad Noumea, Suva or Rabaul. Full provision must, therefore, be made for the temporary coverage to provide adequate protection for the initial shipments of stores when a Depot id being established.
Sufficient timber and tarpaulins for the erection of shelters should be forwarded with the first shipment of stores. Well constructed canvas shelters with good ventilation will give satisfactory accommodation for the storage, breaking down and issue of equipment for a period of 3 or 4 months. If the Depot is to remain in one site for a longer period, prefabricated buildings should be provided as early as possible if the loss of stores is to be kept to a minimum. Canvas coverings can only be considered a temporary measure as owing to the high humidity, together with tropical rain and cyclones, deterioration is very rapid.
The effects of a hurricane can be severe, and a poorly constructed Ordnance Depot might easily be completely wrecked with very heavy mortality to stores since hurricanes are usually accompanied by torrential downpours. I stress the fact that the best type of storage which can be procured, must go forward at the very earliest moment; otherwise, the Depot will be severely hampered, particularly in its infancy.
To meet the requirement of a Base Ordnance Depot serving a Division (including Ammunition) and to provide a small surplus for contingencies 2000 tarpaulins, preferably of the standard 180ft x 13-ft would be required.
In the initial stages of an operation, stores are usually carted to dumps from shops. Every effort should be made to provide dunnage for the stacks and tarpaulins should be arranged, allowing good air circulation.
Stacks of stores covered in this manner require constant attention. For instance, when a stack which has been properly covered allowing good air circulation, is partially broken down, the tarpaulin is allowed to drape on the ground. The air under the tarpaulin arranged in this manner is always saturated in a damp climate and rapid deterioration is the result. The same applies to tentage which should be properly erected, preferably with wooden floors, allowing free air circulation and the maximum benefit of dry sunny days used by removing and drying out damp walls.
Although 1200 Tarpaulins were placed on order for manufacture some weeks prior to the Divisions departure from New Zealand, only about 400 were to hand and available for use when the Ordnance Depot was established in New Caledonia. This number was insufficient to cover all Depot stocks and Ammunition with the result that much damage resulted. On instructions from the A.A. & Q.M.G, 80 tarpaulins had to be removed from ammunition stacks for the issue to A.S.C units. As a result of the Ammunition being exposed to heavy rains, considerable damage was done, and a repair party of 50 men was employed for many weeks at a later date, repairing and cleaning the Ammunition, while some had to be destroyed owing to its unserviceability.
When the Ammunition dump was established at Guadalcanal, every effort was made to provide the best possible storage. Ammunition was stacked on goof platforms with coconut poles for base and Tarpaulins were properly arranged, allowing free ait circulation. As a result, losses were negatable in a striking contrast to the losses in this Ammunition by U.S. Forces, who did not cover Ammunition stacks which were often in damp areas with no dunnage.
As it is not possible, without disastrous results, to open up and expose M.T parts, Signal Equipment and spares, Wireless Equipment and spares, M.G and S.A spares and certain Engineer Stores in other than dry storage, it is recommended that sufficient Stores wagons should be provided to house this equipment until such time s prefabricated buildings can be erected. It is estimated that not less than 24 well-appointed stores wagons would be required and theses should be stocked with spares, most likely to be in early demand.
I may appear to have dwelt on the question of storage, but when the Base Ordnance Depot commenced operations in NECAL, the only stores and office accommodation available in addition to Tarpau1ins, on which I have already documented were 8 I.P.P. Tents, being the balance of 110 shipped and 2 G.S Single Marquees. Although a considerable quantity of dunnage was unloaded from ships and made available to Units for camp construction, very little was made available for dunnage of stores. Timber ordered in NZ by B.O.D. for the dunnage of Ammunition was taken over by the Engineers and very little made available for Ammunition. By the same token, priority was given to the issue of I.P.P. tents for Messes, Orderly Rooms etc., 102 being used for this purpose, leaving a balance of 8 for use in our Depot as Stores and offices.
The construction of storage accommodation for Ordnance Depot should be the responsibility of the Works Construction Coy N.Z.E which in my opinion is an essential unit in any Army formation.
PERSONNEL
Personnel for an Ordnance Depot should be carefully selected to fill the various positions; the following are most suitable: –
Clerks: Men who have been clerks and accountants in civilian life are easily trained to carry out clerical duties in an Ordnance Depot. Qualified accountants are invaluable, and three or four of these in a Depot are worth their weight in gold.
Storeman-General: Men who have worked in retail stores and warehouses and who have good clerical training invariably make good storeman. Farm labourers and navvies are, almost with exception, useless as storemen and cannot be relied on to carry out other than labouring duties. It is agreed that there is a certain amount of labouring work in and Ordnance Depot, but this can be done very efficiently by an intelligent man, while on the other hand, a labourer cannot carry on with the onerous duties of a storeman, should the need arise.
Storeman-M.T: It is essential that M.T. Storeman should have had considerable experience at this trade in civilian life. It is desirable that Senior Storemen should have had at least 8 or 10 years experience in the handling of M.T spares.
Storeman-Wireless: Technical men who have a sound knowledge of wireless equipment appear to be very difficult to procure, but it is highly desirable that at least one very experienced man should be included in the staff of a Depot. It is likely that a Wireless Mechanic who could fill a storeman’s position would be more easily procured.
Storeman-Signals: Signal Storemen from the P&T Dept should prove the most suitable, but again these seem rare.
Storeman-Engineers, Arty & Armd: Key personnel to fill the positions of storemen in these sections should be from Ordnance Depots in NZ and should have some years’ experience. It is extremely unlikely that any suitable personnel could be obtained from other than Ordnance Depots to fill these positions in anything like a satisfactory manner.
The future Defence Policy of this country should include the training of men for Ordnance duties. Even if only an elementary training can be given, men so trained would he much more useful than those who had no training at all. It is also suggested that a good percentage of the men employed during peacetime in Ordnance Depots should be young men fit for Overseas Service should the need arise.
Care should be taken to ensure that the men selected for Ordnance Depots are trustworthy and of good character. It will be found that men who have filled positions of trust in civilian life can be depended upon to carry out their work in a satisfactory manner in the Army.
N.C.O.’s
Almost without exception, N. C. 0′ s are promoted on their technical ability, which naturally is of prime importance in an Ordnance Depot. Quite frequently, these N.C.O’s prove poor disciplinarians and have insufficient training in drill. It is highly desirable that all N.C.O’s should have a short course on discipline and drill, otherwise discipline within the Unit tends to become rather lax.
The importance is stressed, of making provision in the future for sufficient key personnel to be trained particularly in technical sections. In our Base Ordnance Depot with an establishment of 220 NCO’s and 0R’s, we did not have one storeman with any knowledge of Technical stores and had only two men with pre-war Ordnance training.
My experience has convinced me that No Ordnance Depot will function to its fullest capacity unless a D & E platoon is included in the establishment. This Section which should consist of 25 to 30 men including 2 carpenters, would be able to perform the following duties, Guards, Picquets, Camp Maintenance, Maintenance of Stores areas, General Fatigues, and providing working parties to relive pressure at rush periods. This would obviate the necessity of having to detail clerks and storemen, who are often key men, for such duties.
PACKING
The standard packing case used by Ordnance in New Zealand has proved quite satisfactory. A suggested improvement is that all cases should be constructed of tongue and groove timber.
Many of the cases, and in particular those constructed by Army contractors, proved unsatisfactory. Three-ply cases are poor for tropical conditions and should not be used. Cases carrying “every-ready” were not constructed stoutly enough to carry the weight packed in them, with the result that a high percentage arrived broken, with a resultant loss of the contents through pillage etc., which in some cases was very heavy. Old used cases should not be used for stores which may require many handlings. Timber used should not be less the ¾ inch, and in many cases, it is advisable to use 1-inch boards or heavier, if high weight – size ration is involved.
Waterproof lining for cases should be used wherever possible. In packing stores, it should be always born in mind that cases may have to withstand severe conditions during transit. Quite frequently during unloading of ships on beaches or in transit camps where no coverage is available, stores are subjected to torrential downpours of rain. The resultant damage is not always apparent from outside appearances when packages reach their final destinations. If not required for immediate use the total contents may be rendered unserviceable before being unpacked, perhaps some weeks later.
The use of packing such as wood-wool or straw, which retains moisture, causes rapid corrosion of metal articles, particularly if they have not been toughly treated with a rust preventive before packing. Stores packed out from Ordnance Depots in New Zealand, without any rust preventative have been received in an unserviceable condition owing to the ingress of water or moisture during transit. On occasions, the stores received unserviceable have been urgently required for maintenance. These remarks apply in the main to Artillery Stores, Small Arms parts, and tools.
The packing of Bubbles Spirt Glass, Thermometers and Artillery Packings, etc without protection from heavy articles in the same case, must be avoided at all costs. Fragile articles should be packed in a small wooden box before being included with heavy articles in a case. The use of straw or wool-wood as cushioning when packing instruments such as Binoculars, Telescopes, Periscopes, Rangefinders, etc., should be avoided. Any damage retained by such packing induces rapid mould growth.
STORES PROVISIONING
Having due regard to lines of communication, minimum require rents only should be carried forward and held until adequate storage can be arranged. This is of course entirely governed by lines of communication. During operations of 3 Div. the paucity of shipping, particularly during the first 9 months, made it essential that we should carry at least 6 months stock for all items. On some occasions, stores awaited shipment from N.Z. for 6 or 7 months owing principally to the higher priority placed on U.S. equipment.
It is recommended that in future operations where a full Division has to be maintained, consideration should be given to the chartering of a cargo ship solely for supplying such a force. A ship similar to the ‘Matua’ would do the job admirably. When making this recommendation, I am fully aware that there was a shortage of shipping during the period, but the position may not obtain on another occasion.
TENTS & TARPAULINS
Conditions in the Tropics made the lite of Tentage very short. I.P.P· and I.P. Tents were in general use and proved very suitable. However, due to the high humidity and heavy rainfall, the average life for the Outer Roof was only about 9 months and Inner Roof – 12 months. According to the location and care taken, there were variations. Tents pitched under trees were seldom, if ever, properly dried out and would be unserviceable in 6 months or less, while others pitched in dry exposed areas where the full benefit of drying breezes was obtained, would be serviceable for 12 months or even longer. In combat areas, subject to air attacks, full use has to be made of natural camouflage, and Tents have of necessity to be pitched under trees, where they are available.
Some G.S. Single Marquees which have only a single skin, were used for storage and these were not at all suitable. Besides being unbearably hot, they are not rainproof and should not be used in the Pacific.
The Pyramidal Tent, commonly used for housing troops, by the U.S. Forces is also unsuitable for the tropics, being unbearably hot.
The life of Tarpaulins is also considerably lessened, principally by the tropical heat. Waterproof dressing, which is normally wax bases, melts and runs out of the fabric with the result that frequent dressing is required.·
BOOTS
The Black R. & F. Boot used by the N.Z. Forces gave good service. Due to the conditions, wear on boots was very heavy and the average boot required re-soling every 3 or 4 weeks. Very little trouble was experienced with mould growth, except where boots had become damp during transit or through poor storage.
CLOTHING
Uniforms – Wear and tear on clothing was very heavy. In my opinion, the standard Khaki Drill shirt which can be worn with either shorts or long trousers is the most suitable. The Bush Shirt is not suitable for wear with the shorts and cannot be considered a utility garment such as the K.D. shirt is. The average soldier has to do his own laundering while on Active Service end Bush Shirts look very untidy unless they are well laundered.
Socks – Socks proved quite suitable and gave good service.
Hose, Footless – Footless Hose Proved most unsuitable being much too short and tight-fitting. Soldiers avoided wearing them whenever possible. If it is decided to continue the use of this article, liberal allowance should be made for shrinking.
Underclothing – Vests and Shorts Cotton Under gave good service, but it is suggested that for tropical use, these should be made lighter. The lighter weight garments as used by U.S. Forces are considered to be much more suitable.
Belts – A belt similar to that used by U.S. Forces for general purposes should be issued to each soldier.
Hats S.D – Due to the perspiration and rough conditions, the mortality was very high. However, this hat gave good service. The issue of a Tropical Sun Hat would be a more welcome addition to the kit of soldiers.
SMALL ARMS
I do not propose to report fully on the behaviour of S.A armament or other technical stores since a publication prepared by a Scientific Mission from Australia, who visited New Guinea, covers in detail all the difficulties which confront those who use Army Equipment in the tropics much more fully and scientifically than I could hope to do. I will refer to this publication at the conclusion of my report, but I desire to stress the heavy mortality inflicted on rifles, by the Mason Bee.
This small insect was responsible for the destruction of some hundreds of rifle barrels in the Division. The Mason. Bee will build a nest in a rifle overnight, and corrosion caused by acid immediately sets in and cannot be arrested.
To prevent the Bee entering the nuzzle of a rifle, a covering, preferably of mosquito netting or some such open texture material, should be used as this will allow breathing and thus not induce sweating of the barrel which will occur if it is completely sealed.
Mosquito netting was made available to Units in the Division, but in view of the heavy mortality, it is doubtful that the fullest use was made of this or the repeated warnings issued in Divisional Orders, rigidly enforced by all C.O’s.
LIFTING GEAR
The Depot was considerably handicapped by the total lack of lifting gear, until 3 months before the Depot closed, when a very useful Mobile Crane arrived from N.Z. This was in striking contrast to the U.S.Forces who always had an abundance of lifting gear of all types and sizes. The Depot staff had to manhandle such items as Speedway Stores weighing 1-ton and MT cases of assemblies weighing 1,100 lbs.
Every Ordnance Depot should have on its War Equipment Table three Finger Lifts and two Mobile Cranes. One of the latter should be capable of lifting 2-tons at least.
AMMUNITION
The use of other than steel boxes for the packing of Ammunition should be reduced to an absolute minimum. Wooden boxes, particularly those packed with 3.7 How. Shell and 25-pdr. Shell failed to stand up to the handling and transporting. This was mainly due of course to the deterioration caused to the woodwork by the damp, humid climate and accelerated in some instances by exposure to the weather when coverage was not available, but in any case, the life of wooden boxes is much less than that of steel boxes, which will withstand a good deal of rough handling.
AUTOMATIC MAINTENANCE
The principle of the supply of Automatic maintenance items is considered to be an excellent one. For conditions in the Pacific, there is no doubt that the scales would require a certain amount of revision but owing to the fact that supplies did not come to hand until some 6 months before the Division returned to N.Z, insufficient data was obtained, and time did not permit revision of the schedules. Had Automatic Maintenance been in operation during the whole period, some very valuable information would have been available.
LIASION WITH N.Z
It is considered that constant Liaison with N.Z. should be maintained. It is considered that an Ordnance Officer should visit the N.N Base from which supplies are drawn, every 3 or 4 months and that an Ordnance Officer from N.Z. should pay frequent visits to Depots overseas when they are so readily accessible by air transport.
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
It is desired to place on record the valuable assistance rendered to the Base Ordnance Depot by the Officer I/C Administration, (Brig. W. W. Dove) and his staff at his H.Q. ·what was a very difficult job was made considerably lighter by the friendly co-operation and help and advice given at all times. No reasonable request was ever refused, and everything possible was done to promote efficiency in. the Depot.
The Main Depot was divided into Sections as follows:
H.Q.
General Stores and Clothing.
Armament, Engrs and Signals.
M.T.
Ammunition.
Returned Stores.
HQ was controlled by the C.O.O, assisted by an Adjutant and each Section was controlled by an Ordnance Officer.
This arrangement proved quite satisfactory and could well be adopted in future for an Ordnance Depot set up under similar circumstances with the addition of a Provision and Statistical Section, controlled by an Officer.
CONCLUSION
Following a survey carried out in New Guinea by a Scientific Mission from Australia, a pamphlet entitled “Condition of Service Material under Tropical Conditions in New Guinea” was published.
This publication deals exhaustively with the effects of tropical. Conditions or equipment in all its phases and is, in my opinion, applicable to all Pacific Islands to a greater or lesser degree.
It is recommended that the fullest possible use should be made of this publication and no Ordnance Officer proceeding to the Pacific should fail to read this valuable Pamphlet.
(sgd) S.A. KNIGHT
OPERATIONAL REPORT BASE ORDNANCE DEPOT MAJOR H.McK. REID NZEFIP
Major Henry Mckenzie Reid
The problems of the receipt, custody and issue of Ordnance Stores in the Pacific Area, is much greater than is imagined by the layman, and it is hoped that the following remarks may prove helpful should the occasion ever arise when an Ordnance Depot is again established in the Pacific.
One of the greatest problems which has to be overcome is the time lag which occurs between the placing of an order and the receipt of the stores. It was soon found that estimates had to be prepared covering supplies sufficient for six months, as this was the period which we could expect would elapse before stores would arrive. This occasionally brought about very large shipments which were more difficult to handle than would have been the case had stores arrived, say, at monthly intervals. The problem of shipping is one which would greatly improve, and I would suggest, that with a full Division to be serviced, there would be sufficient cargo to warrant the chartering of a small ship which would be at the sole disposal of NEW ZEALAND Forces. I mention this, as on numerous occasions, stores which were urgently required by us, were short shipped owing to priorities being placed on US Equipment. I would again point out, that any Ordnance Depot operating in the Island areas, should carry not less than six months supplies. For the information of any Ordnance Officers concerned, I will attach to this report, a schedule giving some idea of the quantities of popular items used by this Force. This may prove of some value both in the initial provisioning of a Depot and also in the preparation of maintenance demands.
STORAGE
Early coverage of stores after receipt is one of the greatest importance. I fully appreciate the difficulty in providing permanent or pre-fabricated buildings, but I would emphasise the fact that this type of storage is essential if the Depot is to function for any length of time. The provision of a permanent building for the handling of M.T spares and other technical stores should be an urgent priority, as, in a humid climate such as rules in the Islands, it is essential to have some areas in which these stores can be opened and handled. Loss of M.T stores through decoration was relatively light in NECAL, but this could only be attributed to the acquiring of storage space at the Gendarmerie. However, until this building became available, we found it impossible to open and supply spare parts which were urgently required for the repair of trucks which were suffering heavy damage due to the atrocious condition of the road. I would recommend the use of stores wagons both for M.T. parts and Artillery, Engineer and Signal parts. These wagons could be parked in NEW ZEALAND with a selection of parts which it could be assumed would be required soon after landing. These stores would be available for immediate issue, and when permanent storage space was available, they could be used for the distribution of small stores to Divisional units. Temporary coverage should be available immediately stores are landed, and I would suggest the 2000, 18’x13’ tarpaulins, together with a supply of timber, should be made available for the erection of temporary shelters and for the coverage of ammunition. Prior to leaving NEW ZEALAND, 1200 tarpaulins were ordered, 400 of these were received with an early consignment of stores, but the balance took many months to arrive, due either to the difficulty in obtaining these in NEW ZEALAND and the lack of shipping at that stage. Owing to this short delivery of tarpaulins, quite a quantity of precious stores suffered untold damage. This position was further aggravated by an order from a very responsible officer for the issue of a number of tarpaulins to A.S.C. It was pointed out that the only tarpaulins available were covering ammunition, with the result the considerable damage was done. Heavy repairs were necessary, and a certain amount of unserviceable ammunition had to be dumped.
Dependent on the availability of timber at the site where ammunition is to be stored, I would suggest that a large quantity of heavy dunnage should be provided from NEW ZEALAND for the purpose of correctly storing ammunition clear of ground contact. This dunnage could easily be used for the securing of M.T Trucks during the shipment.
When the Ordnance Depot arrived in NECAL, it was expected to establish itself and commence functioning with as little loss of time as possible, with the result that the Ordnance Depot was not well constructed as possible and that the men had insufficient opportunity to make themselves reasonably comfortable. Owing to the shortage of manpower, it took many months to have the same amenities as other units had in a few days. I would consequently suggest that the site for an Ordnance Depot should be levelled and roads prepared by the engineers so that the ordnance personnel could get on with the establishment their Depot. Assistance should be given by the Engineers in the erection of temporary shelters such as I have previously mentioned.
PACKING OF STORES
The packing and marking of stores received from NEW ZEALAND caused much concern to B.O.D whilst in NECAL. Some cases were much too light for the type of stores which they contained. These were mainly packages received directly from Contractors. As an example, Ever-ready Batteries invariably arrived in a damaged condition owing to the fact that they were packed in light cases. The ideal type of case is that used by the NZAOC for the packing of clothing. This is a standard case in three sizes which proved very satisfactory. The use of this principle should be extended to all types of stores being shipped overseas. It may appear costly to have to provide this type of case, but the amount of stores lost and damaged would be reduced, and would compensate for the outlay. Much damage was done to valuable stores due to faulty packing. For instance, where metal stores are being packed, care should be taken to see that bright surfaces are greased. Quite a number of shipments arrived from NEW ZEALAND in which Small Arms parts, Arty parts and other small items had been just put in a box, with the result that they arrived resembling a heap of rusty metal. Small part such as these, should be greased and packed in greased paper. Glass items such as Spirt Bubbles, should be carefully packed and not be permitted to roll in cases. The use of straw or wood-wool should not be permitted where metal items are being packed, as both of these substances attract moisture, with the result that they become damp and stores begin to sweat.
The marking of stores caused a lot of heartaches to B.O.D, the codesign “P” in a circle, was parked on each side of cases but the scheduled marking was, in many in instances only placed on the top of the case. From an identification point, the local method of marking is for the scheduled mark to be put on both ends of the case. If possible, this could also go on the top. In order to minimise the chance of pillage, I would suggest that the practice of indicating the contents on the outside of the case should cease.
Code signs were used, but were much too obvious to be misunderstood.
Good Paint should be used in marking, as cheap paint or stencil inks fade under tropical conditions. The position was complained of to D.M.T WELLINGTON and was rectified after the visit of D.M.T’s Representatives. Things such as this may appear trivial, but really important to an Ordnance man for the easy identification of stores.
SUB-DIVISION OF B.O.D
Taking into account the type of operations to expected in the Pacific where forces are liable to land on different islands, I am of the opinion that B.O.D. should not establish more than one forward base. In order to provide an Ordnance Detachment with both the 8th and 14th Brigades and to have maintained an Advanced Ordnance Depot at GUADALCANAL, it would have been necessary if these establishments were to function efficiently, to have provided approximately twice the amount of stores and 80% more men. I am of the opinion that prior to leaving NEW ZEALAND, all units should be allowed to carry a reserve stock of, say, 10 to 20% of items such as Boots, Clothing, Camp Equipment and any items considered necessary. The ideal method of supply with an Amphibious Force would be to establish an Advanced Depot such as A.O.D GUADALCANAL. From then on, all units would work on their reserve stocks. This would allow units to requisition stores and still be able to provide the immediate needs of the man. This principle was tried by the Force in GREEN ISLAND and proved very successful. Units were permitted to carry forward this reserve and from then on submitted demands back to A.O.D GUADALCANAL, which was able to forward the stores required. Any time factor due to shipping was cared for by the reserve stores held by the unit. Regarding a move from NEW ZEALAND of a Force, no unit should move without being completely equipped. If for any reason units have to move without full equipment, then it is imperative that Ordnance stores and the Ordnance unit should be one of the first to move. During the move into NECAL, Ordnance received a huge quantity of stores which were landed prior to the arrival of the main body of B.O.D. This entailed many difficulties for the two officers and 30 O.R’s of B.O.D. who had preceded the Main Body. Their worries were increased by units arriving incompletely equipped and requesting the delivery of stores direct from the Dump in the NEPOUI VALLEY. Some units arrived with men short of even clothing, and this alone should back my suggestion that, either unit’s proceed fully equipped, or that the complete Ordnance unit be one of the earliest to move.
TRANSPORT & LIFTING GEAR
Only in the later months of B.O.D’s existence was ample transport available. This in itself is inclined to hamper the activities of a Depot, and I would recommend that transport should be allowed on a very liberal scale. I would also stress the necessity of having some heavy lifting equipment such as the Mobile Crane which arrived at B.O.D about three months prior to its return to NEW ZEALAND. Such items as Speedway Stoves, M.T Engines and other heavy equipment ranging from 3 or 4 cwt, had to be manhandled and this was much more apparent under the conditions in the islands. A mobile Crane should be one of the first items on any Ordnance Depots War Equipment Table.
INSPECTING ORDNANCE OFFICER
I would strongly recommend the appointment of an Inspecting Ordnance Officer whose duties would take him to every unit, where he should be given the right to inspect equipment and report on it. A check could thus be kept on the state in which a unit kept its equipment and also on the fact that they had no more or less entitled to them.
I would also recommend that the return of unserviceable items to B.O.D should discontinue and that a travelling Board of Survey should visit units at pre-arranged times. The I.O.O could function on this board as a permanent member. Items od no Salvage value could be destroyed on the spot whilst items for repair or salvage could be returned to Ordnance. This would obviate the necessity of carting over many miles, large quantities of material whose only fate could be to end in fire. This would minimise the work of the Salvage Section of B.O.D. They would then be in a position to do more repair work than was ever accomplished.
LIASION WITH NEW ZEALAND
Liaison with NEW ZEALAND or source of supply is an extremely desirable thing, but it is suggested that from an Ordnance point of view this can most successfully be carried out by someone conversant with Ordnance. Quite apart from the Divisional Liaison Officer who made several trips to NEW ZEALAND, I am of the opinion that Ordnance should have had closer contact with NEW ZEALAND. I would suggest that an Ordnance Officer should visit NEW ZEALAND or source of supply, at least every three months. I stipulate an Ordnance Officer, as he would be conversant with the general needs of the Depot. For our dealings with U.S. Forces both in NECAL and GUADALCANAL, use was made of two excellent Warrant Officers, and their appointment was more than warranted. Being in close contact with the U.S Forces, they were many times able to procure stores which were urgently required by our Forces.
D&E SECTION
Much working time is lost in an Ordnance Depot due to the necessity of guards and fatigues. I would recommend that a D & E Section should be incorporated in the establishment. This Section need not be officered, but could be administered by Headquarters Section. under the Adjutant. The ideal section would be about 25 to 30 men strong and should include a carpenter and general maintenance man. This would allow Storemen and Clerks to continue with their duties, but I would suggest that any relief for the D & E Section should come from the general personnel during off duty periods.
AMMUNITION
The type of boxes used for the packing of ammunition could be revised. It is common knowledge now, that timber suffers more than anything in the damp, humid conditions found in the islands. I would recommend that all types of ammunition should be packed in metal containers. Not only do wooden boxes deteriorate, but in the number of times they are handled, they cannot stand up to the hard conditions. This is amply demonstrated by the condition in which small arms ammunition in particular, and 3.7 How Shell and some 25 pr Shell arrived back into NEW ZEALAND. Hardly any of the small arms ammunition is in fit condition to travel again.
SELECTION OF PERSONNEL
The selection of personnel for an Ordnance Depot should be given the greatest thought, and every endeavour should be made to ensure that the right type of personnel should be available prior to the Depot’s departure from NEW ZEALAND. The provision of a number of men to make up the full establishment is of no use if personnel with a knowledge of the duties they are expected to carry out are not available. This is stressed particularly in the Technical Sections of a Depot – namely, M. T, Arty, Sigs; Engs and Ammunition. The necessary knowledge to successfully carry out these jobs cannot be gained quickly enough whilst overseas, and an endeavour should be made to see that the bulk of each of these sections should be trained Ordnance personnel. In addition, care should be taken to ensure that men posted to an Ordnance Depot should be of good character and behaviour, as much trust has to be, of necessity, placed in them.
TRAINING OF NCO’S
Of necessity, N.C.O’s in an Ordnance unit are promoted for their ability to carry out the work which they are doing. This will sometimes result in an N.C.O. being extremely efficient at his work, but being a very poor disciplinarian. I would consequently recommend that N. C. 0’s in Ordnance be given a short course solely on drill and discipline.
AUTOMATIC MAINTENANCE
The supply of spare parts under the system of Automatic Maintenance, is, in itself, an excellent idea. The scales, however, require a certain amount of modification, in that some items are provided for in either too large or too small quantities. Unfortunately, we did not operate the scales for a long enough period to be able to correct them, but in a new Force, this could quite easily be done after, say, six months’ service. In the main, the principle is right, and only minor alterations are necessary.
CONCLUSION
I have read carefully the pamphlet prepared by the Australian Army on the “Condition of Service Material under Tropical Conditions in New Guinea”. Everything contained in this pamphlet is applicable in a greater or lesser degree to conditions as found in NEW CALEDONIA and GUADALCANAL, and I would suggest that this pamphlet should be consulted and acted upon prior to any further Force leaving NEW ZEALAND for service in the tropics. This pamphlet was prepared by a Scientific Mission for the Scientific Liaison Bureau, Melbourne, Australia.
Released in 1959 and based on his book The songs we sang, musician Les Cleveland accompanied by his group the D Day Dodgers released this collection of often very irreverent songs that were sung by New Zealand Servicemen during the Second World War.
In World War Two, New Zealand sent two infantry divisions overseas and supplied a great many sailors and airmen for the Allied Forces. Though the war has been over for fifteen years, the songs are still with us. Many of us have half-forgotten them; others will have heard only a few of them and these in a variety of versions – but all will listen to them with new interest, conscious that the songs speak with unfading humour and sentiment of difficult days, conscious too that they occupy a unique place in New Zealand music and folk-lore. they are sings that deserve to live again.
One of the paradoxes of World War Two was that while at any given moment ferocious struggles would be raging at widely separated points on the combined fronts, there would be thousands and thousands of other men who were uncommitted, killing time in bivouacs, camps and garrisons anywhere from Siberia to the Campbell Islands. Singing was one of the ways to fight boredom and relieve nervous tension.
The New Zealand formation, always a clannish, high spirited lot, soon developed their own unit traditions. A great many ballads and choruses emerged. Some of the most popular have been used on this recording.
RED WHITE AND NAVY BLUE
This song was heard in units of the 3rd Divison who were stationed on the assorted Pacific Islands. At one stage their 8th Brigade Concert Party – a devoted group which, when not doing defence platoon duties, rattled around with a piano in a truck giving shows in the jungle – used this course as a theme, it was a wry denouement, for the Pacific troops were much given to irony and satire to relive and express the frustration and monotony of their duties.
“We’re the heroes of the night And we’d rather drink than fight! We’re the heroes of Bob Semple’s Fusiliers.”
Semple was a labour politician with a pungent, forthright turn of speech. He distinguished himself on the outbreak of the war by causing the Public Works Department, of which he was head to fabricate a tank out of some old steel plate and a crawler tractor. It took part in one military parade, broke down, and was never seen again.
AIWA SAIDA
A spirited and celebrated song, popular amongst all the troops in the Middle East, Especially the Kiwis.
MY AFRICA STAR
This is a satire base on one of the red-hot grievances of the New Zealand Division in the Middle East. The Eighth Army was formed in September 1941. To qualify for a small metal figure eight which was worn on the Africa Star ribbon, it was necessary to have served in the Eighth Army on or after October 23 1942. But the formation had been fighting for a year prior to that arbitrary date so that all these men who had been knocked out with wounds, invalided out with illness or transferred to non-operational units were denied this small nut significant award. Some of them were veterans of the first desert battles, and their remarks were often voluble and loud when they saw less-worthy soldiers – including girls serving ice-cream in army canteen and “those who were in Palestine” wearing “the eight”.
SAIDA BINT
Another sentimental song widely known and sung by troops in Egypt.
ROLLING WHEELS
A Maori Battalion song which mentions a few of the many places in which they campaigned. Ngarimu was the famous Maori Victora Cross awardee.
THE GOOD SHIP “VENUS
The adventures of the crew of this fabulous vessel constitute a saga with as many variations as there are singers and audiences.
MY A.25
A humorous piece about the hazard of deck landing on aircraft carriers. It was essentially a song of the Fleet Air Arm, the flying branch of the Royal Navy in which around 1000 New Zeland pilots and navigators served. The A.25 was an Admiralty form on which a pilot had to attempt to explain away the circumstances of the crash he had walked- or swum – away from.
Other technical terms;
Batsman, the deck landing signals officer who directed planes in to land. Goofers, a slang reference to a relatively safe vantage point from which it was possible to watch the sport of deck landing. Cut, the final signal from the batsman to a pilot making a landing. Barrier, a wire net to protect aircraft on the bow of the aircraft carrier from the over-enthusiastic efforts of pilots landing. Booster, an accelerator catapult. Supermarine, the firm of Vickers-Supermarine, makers of the Spitfire and Seafire aircraft. Wings, an abbreviated term for the senior flying officer on the carrier. Lee,Lee on Solent, wartime air station of the Fleet Air Arm.
A clever device combing light and a large curved mirror has now replaced the batsman- automation no less! With the advent of the angled deck, barriers are not normally required except in the event of a hook failure. They are now made of nylon.
THE ARMY IN FIJI
A song which reflects the bitter feelings of many members of the original Eight Brigade Group which was hastily sent to Fiji when it was thought that Japanese Forces might reach that far in their Pacific drive. This garrison force was none-too-well supplied, it saw no action, and most of the men in it were soon tired of existing miserably in the tropics. Some of the weapons that wnt to Fiji were very old and worn. In the early stages, there were shortages of ammunition and other necessities, the song describes a celebrated incident which many soldiers insist actually occurred- a box of ammunition was open and found to contain lead head nails.
THE FIGHTING KIWI, SIDE SIDE MONOWAI SIDE AND THIS IS MY STORY
A kiwi variation of a traditional theme which sailors and troops have applied to a long list of warships and troop carriers. This particular one – The Monawai- was a liner which was used a good deal during the war to move troops. Soldiers always hate being on troop-ships. The food is poor, quarters are crowded and stuffy and some starch old naval type is always apt to demand that mess decks be scrubbed, water rationed or kits stowed in a certain way. The troops invariably felt that the regulations were designed for their personal inconvenience rather than the safety of the ship of the general furtherance of the war effort. The fact that the troops were occasionally wrong in the warmth which they objected to this regimentation did not affect their vehemence.
