While visiting Trentham Camp recently, I came across this old “Camp Fire Alarm Points” board, a quiet but telling reminder of how seriously fire protection was once treated within the camp.
The sign lists numbered fire alarm points positioned throughout Trentham Camp. The exact form of the alarm system is not entirely clear. It may have been a telephone-based circuit, a mechanical system, or something as simple and robust as a suspended shell case, all of which were common in military installations of the period. Regardless of the technology used, the critical function was the same: when an alarm was activated, the number transmitted or displayed would immediately identify the incident’s precise location, allowing the Trentham Camp fire brigade to respond without delay.
New Fire Engine and Ambulance, Trentham Camp C1925. Norm Lamont Collection
The list includes key sites such as:
Rangimaere Road
Store Compound
A & G Workshops Compound
Junctions of Liverpool, Anzac, Gallipoli, Marne, Messines, Somme, Bapaume and other roads
Gaba Tepe Road
Suvla Road
Prison Reserve
The road names themselves strongly reflect the First World War heritage of Trentham Camp, with many commemorating Gallipoli and major Western Front battlefields. They also provide a snapshot of the camp’s layout at a particular moment in time.
Upper Hutt City Library (31st Mar 2018). Trentham Camp 1920; aerial view looking east.. In Website Upper Hutt City Library. Retrieved 10th Oct 2020 15:04, from https://uhcl.recollect.co.nz/nodes/view/464
Since the Second World War, the evolving shape of Trentham Camp has seen several roads listed on this board disappear altogether, with some junctions and intersections ceasing to exist as the camp was reconfigured. Others were likely renamed during the post-war period as new facilities were constructed, older barracks were removed, and the camp’s overall footprint changed. As a result, this sign now serves not only as a fire safety artefact but also as a historical map of a long-altered landscape.
Operational Significance in the Inter-War Years
This sign was not merely administrative; it was critical infrastructure.
During the inter-war period, large quantities of New Zealand’s war material were not stored in purpose-built, fire-resistant depots. Instead, much of it remained in repurposed First World War barracks and accommodation blocks. These timber structures were highly vulnerable to fire. A rapid and accurate response was therefore essential to prevent catastrophic loss of equipment, ammunition, uniforms, and other defence stores.
A clearly numbered alarm system ensured:
Immediate identification of the fire location
Faster mobilisation of the camp fire brigade
Reduced confusion in a sprawling military installation
Protection of valuable and often irreplaceable stores
Fire and Security Routines
New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps Orders from the 1920s detail how Trentham Camp was divided into three patrol routes: A, B, and C. Junior Non-Commissioned Officers (JNCOs) were rostered onto these routes from:
1500 hrs on weekdays
1000 hrs on weekends
Those on duty were responsible not only for the physical security of buildings along their route but also for vigilance against fire hazards. In effect, they formed an early-warning system that supplemented the fixed alarm points listed on the board.
This layered approach, alarm points, roving security personnel, and a dedicated camp fire brigade, reflected the serious risk posed by fire in a predominantly timber military camp storing significant quantities of defence materiel.
In short, this board is a practical and vital element of Trentham’s internal defence system, a reminder that, in the years between the wars and during the wars, safeguarding stores from fire was as important as guarding them from theft or sabotage.
As the international security environment grows darker and more uncertain, the question of compulsory military service has begun to re-emerge in public debate overseas. Across parts of Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom, there is renewed discussion of the possible reintroduction of National Service as governments confront shrinking armed forces and the prospect of future conflict, most notably with Russia. While compulsory service is not currently part of mainstream political debate in New Zealand, these developments highlight the enduring relevance of New Zealand’s own experience with Compulsory Military Training (CMT).
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the future of CMT became a major political issue in New Zealand. On 25 May 1949, Prime Minister Peter Fraser announced that a national referendum would be held to determine whether CMT should be reintroduced.
Poster advocating the New Zealand Compulsory Military Training Act was introduced in 1949 during the early stages of the Cold War
The referendum took place on 3 August 1949 and produced a decisive result. Of the 729,245 votes cast, 77.9 percent were in favour and 22.1 percent against, with a turnout of 63.5 percent. This strong mandate reflected widespread public concern about national defence in the emerging Cold War environment.
Following the referendum, Parliament passed the Military Training Act 1949, which came into force in 1950. Under the Act, all males became liable for military service at the age of 18. After registering with the Department of Labour and Employment, those not exempted for medical, compassionate, or conscientious objection reasons were required to complete:
14 weeks of full-time initial training
3 years of part-time service
6 years in the Reserve
Conscripts could serve in the Royal New Zealand Navy, the New Zealand Army, or the Royal New Zealand Air Force. Between 1950 and 1958, a total of 63,033 men were trained under this system.
By 1953, CMT had been operating for three years. That year alone saw four intakes, with approximately 10,996 young men completing their training. I have been fortunate to receive a DVD of a 1953 CMT passing-out parade at Papakura, originally filmed by Norm Blackie. The footage captures a seldom-seen aspect of CMT and provides a rare visual record of how the system was presented to the public and to the families of those serving.
The film shows graduating recruits demonstrating the weapons and equipment they had been trained on, observed by a large gathering of family members and friends. Equipment on display included the then-new Land Rovers, 25-pounder guns with quads and limbers, 4.2-inch mortars, 5.5-inch medium guns, 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns, an improvised mobile field kitchen, a Light Aid Detachment (LAD) conducting a vehicle lift, Vickers medium machine guns, 3-inch mortars, the Wasp variant of the Universal (Bren) Carrier, and 6-pounder anti-tank guns towed by Universal Carriers. Notably, some of this equipment, including the 25-pounders of 16 Field Regiment, was at that time still in active service in the Korean War.
While it could be argued that much of this equipment was “Second World War vintage”, that description is misleading when viewed in its proper historical context. In 1953, most of the equipment on display was in reality less than a decade old, much of it introduced from 1942 onwards. In contemporary terms, this was relatively modern equipment, consistent with what was being fielded by peer armies to which New Zealand would have contributed a division if required. Several systems, including the 4.2-inch mortars, 5.5-inch guns, and Land Rovers, were either new acquisitions or at the leading edge of post-war standardisation. Within only a few years, New Zealand would further modernise its forces for jungle operations in South-East Asia and, following British adoption, introduce the L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle. Far from being an obsolete conscript army equipped with outdated weapons, CMT-era forces were broadly comparable in organisation and equipment to those of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
In 1958, a Labour Government replaced the scheme with the National Service Registration Act. This was further modified in 1961 by the National Party Government under Keith Holyoake, which introduced the National Military Service Act 1961. Automatic registration at 18 was ended, and instead all males were required to register at age 20. Selection for service was determined by ballot, with those chosen undertaking three months of full-time training followed by three years of annual part-time training.
During the 1960s, compulsory service became increasingly controversial, particularly as New Zealand committed combat forces to the Vietnam War. Although only regular soldiers were deployed overseas, opposition to CMT grew. Protest groups such as the Organisation to Halt Military Service (OHMS) mounted campaigns of civil disobedience, with some members refusing service or deserting camps.
The issue was finally resolved in 1972, when the newly elected Labour Government under Norman Kirk abolished National Service, bringing compulsory military training in New Zealand to an end.
Viewed against today’s international uncertainty, New Zealand’s experience with CMT serves as a reminder that compulsory service is not merely a theoretical policy option but a system with significant social, political, and military consequences. As other nations revisit the concept in response to deteriorating security conditions, understanding how and why New Zealand once embraced, adapted, and ultimately abandoned compulsory training remains both relevant and instructive.
As New Zealand enters 2026, it does so in a year rich with institutional anniversaries. It marks thirty years since the disestablishment of the New Zealand Army’s historic logistics corps, the RNZCT, RNZAOC, and RNZEME, and their consolidation into a single regiment, the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment. Anniversaries invite celebration, but they also invite reflection, not just on what was created, but on what was lost, and on the much longer lineage that sits beneath the surface of organisational change.
The reforms of 1996 were significant. They ended corps identities that had carried generations of professional pride, technical mastery, and quiet service. Many mourned their passing, and some still do. Even today, some yearn for the return of the old names and badges, not because the RNZALR has failed, but because institutional memory runs deep. Corps were not merely administrative groupings; they were how logisticians understood who they were, how they trained, and how their contribution fitted into the wider Army.
Yet 1996 was not a rupture with history. It was a consolidation, and one with deep roots. To understand that, we need to look well beyond the twentieth century, to the origin point of New Zealand military logistics.
That origin lies in 1865–66.
The New Zealand Wars forced the colony to confront a complex reality; sustained military operations could not be supported by improvisation alone. By the mid-1860s, logistics in New Zealand had ceased to be an ad hoc wartime expedient. It had become a permanent, budgeted function of government, an organised system of stores, depots, magazines, armouries, transport, and technical repair. Defence supply was no longer episodic or reactive. It was planned, funded, audited, and constitutionally controlled.
At the core of this early system were three essential functions. Stores managed the procurement, custody, and issue of clothing, equipment, tools, and general military matériel. Ammunition was centrally controlled, stored in secure magazines, and accounted for with increasing precision. Alongside both sat the work of armourers, whose inspection, repair, and maintenance of weapons proved decisive in sustaining operational capability in New Zealand’s wet and demanding conditions. Together, these functions formed the practical backbone of military effectiveness, long before later corps identities existed.
This transformation did not occur in isolation. Internationally, 1865–66 marked a broader turning point in how war was fought and sustained.
In the United States, 1865 marked the end of the Civil War, but not the end of the logistical challenge. Victory created the enormous task of demobilisation, redistribution, and accounting. Vast depot systems, rail networks, river transport fleets, and arsenals built to sustain mass armies now had to be wound down, repurposed, or maintained at peacetime scale. The lesson was stark; logistics did not end with combat. It simply shifted from supplying battle to closing war, managing matériel, and sustaining a standing military establishment. This experience permanently embedded logistics as a core state function rather than a wartime improvisation.
In Prussia, the Austro–Prussian War of 1866 demonstrated that logistics could decide a campaign outright. Prussia’s victory rested not only on tactics or weapons, but on meticulous rail mobilisation planning, staff coordination, and the ability to concentrate forces faster than an opponent. Railways, timetables, loading plans, and supply throughput became operational weapons in their own right. This was a decisive moment in the emergence of logistics as an integrated element of strategy rather than a background service.
For France, the mid-1860s underscored a different logistical reality. French forces were still tied to overseas commitments, most notably in Mexico, where long supply lines, limited shipping capacity, disease, and political uncertainty placed enormous strain on sustainment. At the same time, France’s expanding footprint in Africa and its newly established position in Indochina reinforced that expeditionary and colonial warfare was rarely decided by manoeuvre alone. It was decided by whether men could be fed, paid, reinforced, and kept operational, whether weapons and ammunition arrived on time and in serviceable condition, whether animals, carts, river craft, and coastal shipping could keep moving, and whether small garrisons could be maintained in hostile climates with fragile local infrastructure.
Even as continental Europe moved towards rail-enabled mass warfare, France was repeatedly reminded that most imperial operations still ran at the speed of ports, rivers, roads, and pack transport. In West Africa and the Saharan fringe, the calendar, water, and disease environment often dictated what a column could carry and how long it could remain in the field, in Indochina, control of waterways, coastal routes, and depots mattered as much as any engagement, with campaigning shaped by monsoons, river levels, tropical attrition, and the constant administrative grind of occupying, policing, and provisioning new holdings. The lesson was blunt; logistics, not battlefield brilliance, increasingly determined what was possible and what was sustainable.
Across the British Empire, the nature of conflict was changing. Britain was still engaged in multiple colonial and imperial wars. Still, large expeditionary campaigns were giving way to more minor, politically sensitive conflicts tied to colonial governance, frontier control, and the gradual withdrawal of regular British troops. In New Zealand, 1865–66 marked the beginning of handover from Imperial to colonial responsibility, with British regiments departing while conflict continued, forcing the colonial government to assume full responsibility for defence, finance, and logistics.
The same pattern could be seen elsewhere. In West Africa, British forces remained tied down in the aftermath of fighting with the Ashanti, conducting garrison duties, punitive expeditions, and supply-intensive operations under challenging environments. On the Indian North-West Frontier, Britain relied on locally raised forces engaged in constant low-intensity warfare, sustained by permanent logistical systems rather than metropolitan armies. In Jamaica, the suppression of the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865 triggered political backlash in Britain, highlighting growing scrutiny over the use of military force in colonial governance. In Burma, military activity had shifted from campaigning to long-term occupation and pacification, operations dominated not by battle but by administration, supply, and sustainment.
Across the empire, a strategic pattern was emerging. Britain was reducing large Imperial expeditions, withdrawing regular troops from settler colonies, and shifting the burden of security onto colonial governments and locally raised forces, supported by permanent, budgeted defence organisations. What occurred in New Zealand in 1865–66 was not exceptional. It was part of a wider imperial transition towards colonial self-reliance, particularly in logistics, supply, ammunition, and maintenance.
By 1866 in New Zealand, logistics appeared clearly in government accounts, absorbed a share of colonial expenditure, and was brought under strict audit and warrant controls. It acquired not just physical form, depots, magazines, and workshops, but constitutional life. Sustaining armed force was no longer an emergency response. It was a standing responsibility of the state.
Seen in this light, the creation of the RNZALR in 1996 sits comfortably within a long historical pattern. The Defence Stores arrangements of the 1860s were the first recognisable ancestor of modern New Zealand Army logistics. The consolidation of the 1990s was another moment where structure was realigned to reflect how logistics actually works, integrated, interdependent, and accountable.
That does not diminish the sense of loss felt by many in 1996, nor should it. Mourning the passing of the old corps is not nostalgia for its own sake. It is evidence of strong professional identity and a lineage worth remembering. But history offers a valuable corrective. In 1865–66, as in 1996, change was driven not by sentiment but by necessity.
As the RNZALR marks its thirtieth anniversary, it is worth remembering that it is not celebrating the birth of New Zealand military logistics; rather, it is the continuation of a tradition forged more than 160 years ago. Corps names may change, structures may merge, but the central truth endures. Logistics, when fragmented, fails quietly. When organised properly, everything else becomes possible.
2026, then, is not just a year to look back three decades. It is a moment to recognise the long logistics line that runs from the armouries and magazines of the 1860s to the integrated sustainment system of today, and to reflect on the quiet, enduring importance of getting logistics right.
Visiting the Lao National Museum in Vientiane, I was stopped in my tracks by one particularly bizarre firearm on display. At first glance, it appeared familiar, yet profoundly wrong, as if two different weapons from different eras had been forcibly merged. The receiver and trigger group were clearly from a Sten submachine gun, the famous British wartime “tube gun”, but protruding from it was a heavy barrel with an attached bipod more commonly associated with the U.S. M60 machine gun.
The result is best described as a “Frankensten”, a Sten-based hybrid weapon assembled from mismatched components drawn from different weapons, periods, and supply chains. In this case, the visual dissonance is striking, a Second World War-era submachine gun foundation married to hardware more at home in the jungles of the Vietnam War.
The museum case label adds another layer of intrigue. It describes the exhibit as:
“Firearms use by French soldiers fighting with the Lao people in 1945–1954”,
and identifies the weapon as an “M19 Gun”.
That caption is a valuable starting point, but technically, it does not sit comfortably with what is physically in the case.
The Problem with the Label
There is no standard or widely recognised small arm designated “M19” that corresponds to the weapon on display, particularly within the historical and technical context of the First Indochina War. The term may represent a shorthand or mistranscription, possibly a loose reference to the Browning M1919, a machine gun known to have been employed by French forces in Indochina. Equally, it may reflect later cataloguing assumptions applied to an object that resisted straightforward classification.
The label’s chronological framing also warrants scrutiny. While the Sten submachine gun component of the hybrid could plausibly date to the late 1940s or early 1950s, the weapon’s present configuration does not align cleanly with the 1945–1954 period cited. The presence of components associated with later U.S. service suggests that the firearm, as currently constituted, represents a form assembled or modified after that timeframe. This indicates that the label is likely intended to situate the object within a broader historical narrative rather than to identify the moment when the weapon acquired its present form.
Further uncertainty arises from how the firearm is displayed. On Sten submachine guns, identifying markings, including model designation, manufacturer, and serial number, are typically located on the receiver around the magazine housing, the buttstock, and occasionally on internal components such as the bolt or barrel. In this instance, those critical areas are obscured by the mounting of the exhibit, preventing verification of manufacturing details solely through visual inspection. The absence of a visible British broad arrow proof mark further constrains confident attribution.
Taken together, these factors suggest that the museum label should be interpreted as a contextual narrative marker, rather than as a precise technical identification. The object itself appears to encapsulate multiple phases of Laos’s twentieth-century conflicts, rather than belonging neatly to a single war, date range, or designation.
There is, however, one further possibility that warrants consideration. The object on display may not represent a weapon that ever existed in this exact configuration as a functional field arm, but instead a composite or interpretive assemblage created for exhibition purposes.
In museum practice, particularly where collections are incomplete or provenance is fragmentary, it is not unusual for displays to include reconstructed or composite objects. Such assemblages are often used to illustrate broader historical themes, to convey the character of conflict-era matériel, or to fill interpretive gaps where complete artefacts are unavailable. In these circumstances, curatorial intent is typically illustrative rather than technical, prioritising narrative clarity and visual communication over strict artefact taxonomy.
If this interpretation applies here, the Frankensten may function as a representational object, combining recognisable elements from different phases of Laos’s twentieth-century conflicts to communicate themes of improvisation, scarcity, and the long overlap of colonial and Cold War warfare. This would help explain both the weapon’s unusual configuration and the imprecision of its labelling, as well as the absence of verifiable manufacturing or proof marks.
Significantly, this possibility does not diminish the historical value of the exhibit. Even as a constructed or partially reconstructed object, it reflects a genuine aspect of the Lao wartime experience, namely the continual recycling, adaptation, and repurposing of weapons across decades of conflict.
Systemic labelling issues in the display case
The hybrid Sten–M60 is not an isolated case within the display. Several other firearms in the same case appear to be imprecisely identified or simplistically described, indicating that the captions prioritise narrative clarity over technical specificity.
Based on visual assessment:
Item 1 is labelled as an “M1936 Rifle”, but appears to be a MAS-36 LG48, the MAS-36 configured for rifle-grenade launching.
MAS-36 LG48
Item 2, also labelled “M1936 Rifle”, is more accurately identified as a MAS-36/CR39 paratrooper rifle, distinguishable by its folding aluminium stock.
MAS-36/CR39 paratrooper rifle
Item 3, the subject of this article, is labelled an “M19 Gun”, despite clearly being a Sten-pattern submachine gun in a highly unconventional hybrid configuration.
Item 4 appears to be a Sten Mk II fitted with a wire stock, yet is labelled as an “M37 Gun”.
Item 5 is a M1917/P14 rifle, labelled as a “Winchester 59959 Gun”, apparently substituting a manufacturer or serial reference for a formal model designation.
Collectively, these discrepancies suggest that the display labels were likely derived from secondary documentation, translated sources, or legacy inventories, rather than from systematic technical examination of each artefact.
A Short Backstory, Laos 1945 to 1975
Most readers will not have the Lao conflict context in mind, so here is a brief run-through of how Laos moved from colonial-era turbulence to a Cold War battlefield.
1945 to 1954, the end of empire and the Indochina War
1945: Japan’s defeat ends the wartime occupation of French Indochina. In the power vacuum, Lao political movements push for greater autonomy. French authority returns unevenly, and the region is unstable.
1946–1954: The First Indochina War is fought primarily in Vietnam, but Laos is part of the same theatre of decolonisation and revolution. Communist-aligned movements, including the Pathet Lao, formed and gained momentum, supported by Vietnamese communist networks.
Weapons context: Arms in circulation are a patchwork, French issue, British and American wartime surplus, captured Japanese stocks, and locally repaired or improvised weapons. This is a key reason why a WWII-era design like the Sten could plausibly show up in Lao hands.
1954 to the early 1960s, independence and a fragile political settlement
1954: The Geneva settlement reshapes the region after the French defeat. Laos becomes formally independent but politically fragile. The Pathet Lao retains influence and armed capacity in parts of the country.
Late 1950s: Coalition arrangements and political compromises repeatedly break down. Laos becomes a Cold War pressure point, with external support flowing to competing Lao factions.
1960s to 1975, the Laotian Civil War and the “Secret War”
1960–1975: Laos is pulled into the wider Vietnam War. The conflict is commonly called the Laotian Civil War, but it is also inseparable from North Vietnamese strategy and U.S. counter-efforts.
North Vietnamese role: North Vietnamese forces use Lao territory as part of the broader logistics and manoeuvre system supporting the war in Vietnam. This brings sustained fighting and external military presence.
U.S. involvement: The United States supports anti-communist forces, including the Royal Lao Government and allied irregular formations, much of it covertly, which is why the period is often referred to as the “Secret War”. U.S.-supplied weapons circulate widely and are also captured, traded, and re-used.
Air war and bombardment: Laos becomes one of the most heavily bombed countries in the world during this period, with long-term humanitarian and political consequences.
1975: The conflict ends with communist victory and the establishment of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
Why does this matter for the museum’s weapon?
This three-decade arc explains why a Lao museum can plausibly contain, side by side, weapons from the French colonial period and from the later U.S.-supplied Vietnam era, sometimes even combined in the same artefact. It also explains why tidy labels can struggle; the underlying history was not tidy either.
France’s Mixed Arsenal, and New Zealand’s Quiet Link
French forces in Indochina did not rely on a single, tidy supply chain. Their arsenals were a patchwork of wartime leftovers, U.S. aid, and equipment sourced from allied and partner nations.
Between 1952 and 1954, New Zealand provided surplus military aid to French forces in Indochina, contributing to this mixed equipment landscape. That programme is examined in detail here:
It is also worth clarifying a common point of confusion. During the Second World War, New Zealand manufactured approximately 10,000 Sten submachine guns as part of its domestic wartime production programme. These weapons were produced to meet New Zealand’s own defence requirements in the Pacific and to supplement British and American-pattern small arms already in service.
However, New Zealand-manufactured Stens were not part of the consignments sent to French Indochina in 1952–1954. The documented New Zealand aid provided to France consisted primarily of American-origin weapons, ammunition, and equipment held in RNZAOC depots as post-war surplus. This distinction matters, as it avoids conflating New Zealand’s wartime manufacturing effort with its later Cold War-era military aid.
The M60 Barrel, a Later Chapter
The weapon’s front end clearly points to a later period. The United States adopted the M60 machine gun in the late 1950s and became iconic during the Vietnam War. By the 1960s and early 1970s, during the so-called “Secret War” in Laos, M60S were standard issue for U.S. forces and were supplied to American allies, including the Royal Lao Army and CIA-backed irregular units. Unsurprisingly, some were captured, damaged, or cannibalised.
The heavy barrel and bipod on the museum weapon are entirely consistent with an M60 assembly. Attaching such a barrel to a Sten receiver is an odd marriage, but not an implausible one in a region where battlefield salvage and improvisation were commonplace.
Why Build Something Like This?
Assuming this is genuinely a Sten receiver combined with M60 components, several plausible explanations present themselves:
a damaged or worn Sten kept in service by fitting whatever usable barrel was available,
an attempt to create a steadier, more controllable automatic weapon using a bipod and a heavier barrel,
or simple workshop pragmatism, keeping something functional when the correct parts were unavailable.
Throughout the Indochina and Laotian conflicts, weapons were routinely modified, re-barrelled, or adapted to suit ammunition availability and operational needs. Orthodoxy mattered far less than whether a weapon worked.
Forgotten Weapons and the Chinese Sten Connection
There is, however, an important additional layer of context that significantly broadens the range of plausible explanations for the Sten portion of this weapon, and it comes from Forgotten Weapons.
Ian McCollum is a firearms historian, researcher, and presenter best known as the founder of the Forgotten Weapons project. Through a combination of detailed technical examination, archival research, and hands-on access to museum and private collections worldwide, McCollum has become one of the most widely respected independent authorities on historic small arms. His work focuses particularly on obscure, experimental, improvised, and transitional weapons that fall outside standard service patterns, precisely the sort of firearm represented by the Lao museum hybrid.
Because his research frequently traces weapons across borders, conflicts, and post-war modification programmes, his analysis of Asian Sten variants and conversions provides a beneficial framework for understanding how a Sten-pattern weapon could evolve into something as unconventional as the example on display in Laos.
In May 2020, Ian McCollum published “Chinese 7.62 mm Sten Gun”, documenting a little-known but highly relevant chapter in Sten history. During the Second World War, Canada supplied approximately 73,000 Sten Mk II submachine guns, manufactured at the Long Branch arsenal, to Chinese Nationalist forces to support their fight against Japan. These were originally standard 9×19 mm Stens.
After the Chinese Civil War, many of these weapons were converted to 7.62×25 mm Tokarev, particularly following the Communist victory. The conversion pattern is recognisable and included:
fitting a new 7.62 mm barrel, often longer than the original Sten barrel,
replacing the magazine system, commonly using PPS-43 magazines,
either installing a magazine adapter into the original Sten magazine well, or cutting it off entirely and welding on a new magazine housing.
In addition to conversions, Sten-pattern submachine guns were also manufactured domestically in China, in both 9 mm and 7.62 mm Tokarev. The popularity of the Tokarev cartridge was reinforced by China’s long familiarity with the dimensionally similar 7.63 mm Mauser cartridge used in C96 pistols.
This Forgotten Weapons context is critical. It demonstrates a well-documented pathway by which long-barrelled Sten-pattern weapons already existed in Asia, independent of British or Commonwealth post-war supply. Such weapons could plausibly have entered Southeast Asia through Chinese supply routes, battlefield capture, or secondary transfer during the Indochina and Laotian conflicts.
Seen in this light, the Lao museum example may represent not just a Sten modified with later U.S. components, but a multi-stage hybrid: a Sten-pattern weapon already altered in Asia, later further modified using whatever parts were locally available, including M60 barrels, bipods, and sights.
The Only Other Trail, a Reddit Thread
What is striking is how little public discussion of this weapon exists. The only substantial online discussion I have been able to find is a five-year-old Reddit thread on r/ForgottenWeapons, titled:
“Sten 60 or Frankensten – a weird hybrid I found and photographed a few years ago in a museum in Laos!”
The comments mirror many of the same observations: identification of a Sten base, recognition of M60 components, speculation about calibre conversion, and debate over how and where such a weapon might have been assembled. While informal, the discussion reinforces the sense that this is a genuine, unusual artefact rather than a modern fabrication.
Likely Origin Scenarios
Based on the physical features of the weapon, documented supply routes, and comparable examples, several plausible origin pathways emerge:
British Sten → Indochina → Later U.S.-era modification A genuine WWII-era Sten enters the region via wartime or immediate post-war channels, is later captured or retained in Laos, and subsequently modified during the Vietnam-era conflict using salvaged U.S. M60 components.
Chinese Sten (7.62 mm Tokarev) → Regional circulation → Further modification A Sten-pattern weapon supplied to China during WWII, or domestically produced there, is converted to 7.62×25 mm Tokarev with a longer barrel, then later further adapted in Laos using available M60 parts, creating a multi-stage hybrid.
Multiple rebuilds across decades Rather than a single conversion, the weapon may reflect successive modifications over time, incorporating parts from different conflicts as availability dictated, resulting in the unusual configuration seen today.
In all cases, the weapon’s current form likely postdates the 1945–1954 period cited on the museum label, which appears to describe the historical context of the conflict rather than the exact moment of modification.
What This Weapon Really Represents
Taken together, these factors suggest that the museum label should be interpreted as a contextual narrative marker, rather than as a precise technical identification. The object itself appears to embody multiple phases of Laos’s twentieth-century conflicts, rather than cleanly fitting into a single war, date range, or designation.
There is, however, one further possibility that warrants consideration. The object on display may not represent a weapon that ever existed in this exact configuration as a functional field arm, but instead a composite or interpretive assemblage created for exhibition purposes.
In museum practice, particularly where collections are incomplete or provenance is fragmentary, it is not unusual for displays to include reconstructed or composite objects. Such assemblages are often used to illustrate broader historical themes, to convey the character of conflict-era matériel, or to fill interpretive gaps where complete artefacts are unavailable. In these circumstances, curatorial intent is typically illustrative rather than technical, prioritising narrative clarity and visual communication over strict artefact taxonomy.
If this interpretation applies here, the Frankensten may function as a representational object, combining recognisable elements from different phases of Laos’s twentieth-century conflicts to communicate themes of improvisation, scarcity, and the long overlap of colonial and Cold War warfare. This would help explain both the weapon’s unusual configuration and the imprecision of its labelling, as well as the absence of verifiable manufacturing or proof marks.
Significantly, this possibility does not diminish the historical value of the exhibit. Even as a constructed or partially reconstructed object, it reflects a genuine aspect of the Lao wartime experience, namely the continual recycling, adaptation, and repurposing of weapons across decades of conflict. What it does suggest is that the object should be approached primarily as a representational artefact, rather than as definitive evidence of a formally issued weapon or a fixed moment in time.
Rather than viewing the Frankensten simply as a mislabelled object, it is more productive to understand it as a material record of overlapping conflicts. Laos experienced war not as a series of neatly separated episodes, but as a prolonged period in which colonial conflict bled into Cold War confrontation.
This Frankensten embodies that continuity. A Second World War-era design meets later Asian conversions and Vietnam-era U.S. components, shaped by capture, reuse, and local ingenuity. The museum label tells one story, but the metal tells a far more complicated one.
Closing Thought
The “M19 Gun” label may not stand up to close technical scrutiny, but the Frankensten itself is no less valuable for that. In fact, its ambiguity is precisely what makes it interesting. It forces us to think about how weapons move across borders, how they outlive the wars that produced them, and how museums sometimes prioritise narrative clarity over mechanical precision.
If history is messy, this weapon is a perfect reflection of that mess, and of Laos’s long, entangled experience of twentieth-century war.
Anyone who has served in a Commonwealth military will remember the Figure 11 and Figure 12 targets. They were fixtures of range days, instantly recognisable, unforgiving, and oddly memorable. From early-morning details to hot afternoons on dusty butts, generations of soldiers learned their craft by trying to hit those stark silhouettes advancing from as far as 300 metres, often with nothing more than iron sights, steady breathing, and discipline drilled into muscle memory.
The figures themselves were deliberately generic. Across British and Commonwealth forces, the enemy on the range was rarely given a name or nationality. Instead, the targets presented a stylised armed figure, frequently with a vaguely German or Soviet look, a helmet pulled low, a rifle clutched across the chest, advancing directly toward the firer. The intent was clear: to remove individuality, to create a neutral and repeatable representation of threat, and to focus the shooter on fundamentals rather than identity.
For many, the challenge was as much psychological as technical. Watching those figures appear, advance, or snap into view, the shooter had seconds to judge range, align sights, and fire accurately. Hits were counted, misses remembered, and lessons learned the hard way. These targets were not just pieces of card or board; they were tools that shaped confidence, competence, and trust in one’s weapon.
Against that familiar backdrop, the Malaysian Figure 12/59 target stands out as something more personal and more revealing of its historical context. While it follows the same Commonwealth tradition of silhouette training targets, its imagery departs from the deliberately anonymous style seen elsewhere.
Rather than a faceless or neutral opponent, the Malaysian target presents a distinctly stylised image of a Malayan Communist Party guerrilla. The figure wears a cap marked with a star, carries a rifle in a confrontational posture, and is given an exaggerated, angry, almost ferocious expression. The face is not neutral. It is antagonistic, emotive, and unmistakably hostile.
This reflects the environment in which the target was conceived. During the Malayan Emergency and its long aftermath, the threat was not abstract. It was internal, insurgent, and personal. The enemy was known, named, and encountered in jungles, villages, and patrol bases. Training aids reflected that reality. The target was not just something to shoot at; it was a visual reminder of a very real adversary faced by Malaysian security forces.
In this way, the Figure 12/59 target bridges two traditions. It sits firmly within the shared Commonwealth range culture familiar to soldiers from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and beyond, yet it also carries the imprint of a uniquely Malaysian conflict. It demonstrates how even something as mundane as a range target can reveal more profound truths about history, threat perception, and the lived experience of soldiers.
For veterans, seeing such a target today can be unexpectedly evocative. It recalls the crack of rifles, shouted orders, and the quiet satisfaction of a well-placed shot. But it also reminds us that behind every silhouette, generic or otherwise, lies a specific story shaped by geography, politics, and conflict.
In that sense, the Figure 12 and Figure 11 targets may be universal, but the Malaysian Figure 12/59 tells a story that is distinctly its own.
On 4 December each year, soldiers, gunners, and explosive specialists around the world pause to mark Saint Barbara’s Day. For New Zealand’s military ammunition community, the day has a special resonance. Saint Barbara was the patron saint of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC). Although the Corps was disestablished in 1996, she remains the spiritual patron of those whose work brings them closest to explosive risk, especially the current generation of Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment (RNZALR) Ammunition Technicians.
This commemoration is not about imposing religious belief or expecting devotion in a modern, pluralist Army. Instead, it is about recognising shared values. Saint Barbara’s story, whether read as faith, legend, or metaphor, offers a powerful way of talking about courage, duty of care, and professionalism in dangerous work.
From Heliopolis to the Ordnance Corps
According to tradition, Barbara lived in the late Roman Empire at Heliopolis in Phoenicia, now associated with Baalbek in modern Lebanon. Born into a wealthy pagan household, she questioned the gods she had been taught to worship when she looked out from the tower in which her father kept her secluded and reflected on the ordered beauty of the world around her. In time, she converted to Christianity in secret. When her father discovered this, he handed her over to the authorities and ultimately carried out her execution himself.
Her refusal to renounce her convictions, even under torture, and the lightning that, according to legend, later killed her father and the official who condemned her, led to Barbara being associated with sudden death, lightning, and fire. As warfare evolved and gunpowder weapons became central to battle, she was adopted as patroness of artillerymen, armourers, military engineers, miners, tunnellers, and anyone whose livelihood involved explosives and the possibility of instant, catastrophic harm. The Legend of Saint Barbara
When the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) adopted Saint Barbara as its patron, that tradition passed into the wider family of Commonwealth ordnance corps. The RNZAOC, with its own responsibility for ammunition supply, storage, and maintenance in New Zealand, in turn adopted her as patron saint.
Beyond 1996: Saint Barbara and the RNZALR
The disestablishment of the RNZAOC in 1996 and the formation of the RNZALR did not diminish Saint Barbara’s relevance to New Zealand soldiers. The work did not change; only the cap badge did. Ammunition Technicians, in particular, continue to live daily with the realities that made Barbara a symbolic figure in the first place: sudden danger, technical complexity, and the need for calm, disciplined action when things go wrong.
On paper, Saint Barbara is a figure from late antiquity. In practice, her patronage captures something very contemporary about the RNZALR Ammunition Technician trade:
Technical mastery under pressure – handling, inspecting, and disposing of explosive ordnance where a single lapse can have irreversible consequences.
Quiet, unshowy bravery – the kind that rarely makes headlines but underpins every live-fire activity, every range practice, and every deployment where ammunition is moved, stored, or rendered safe.
Duty of care to others – ensuring that everyone else can train and fight in relative safety because someone has accepted responsibility for the dangerous end of the supply chain.
In that sense, Saint Barbara’s Day is as much about the living as it is about any distant martyr. It is an opportunity for the wider Army to pause and acknowledge that the safe availability of ammunition, which is often taken for granted, depends on a small community of specialists and their support teams.
A Day Of Tradition, Not Testimony
In a modern New Zealand Army, not everyone is religious, and fewer still are likely to be familiar with the details of early Christian hagiography. That is not the point. Commemorations like Saint Barbara’s Day function as regimental and professional traditions, not as tests of personal belief.
Marking the day can mean different things to different people:
For some, it may be a genuine act of faith, honouring a saint whose story inspires them.
For others, it is a way of respecting the heritage of their trade and the generations of RNZAOC and now RNZALR personnel who have done this work before them.
For many, it is simply a moment to reflect on the risks inherent in explosive work, to remember colleagues injured or killed in training and operations, and to recommit to doing the job as safely and professionally as possible.
In that sense, the story’s religious origins are less important than the shared meaning it has acquired over time. Saint Barbara becomes a symbol of the values that matter in ammunition work: integrity, courage, vigilance, and loyalty to those you serve alongside.
Contemporary Relevance: Commitment In A Dangerous Trade
In the modern world, the management of ammunition and explosives is governed by detailed regulations, sophisticated science, and digital systems, ranging from hazard classifications and compatibility groups to electronic inventory control and safety management frameworks. Yet, at its core, it still depends on human judgment and ethical commitment.
Saint Barbara’s Day offers a valuable lens for talking about that commitment:
Commitment to safety – understanding procedures not as bureaucracy, but as the accumulated lessons, sometimes paid for in blood, of those who went before.
Commitment to team – recognising that no Ammunition Technician works alone, and that a strong safety culture depends on everyone feeling empowered to speak up, check, and challenge.
Commitment to service – remembering that, whether in training at home or on operations overseas, the work is ultimately about enabling others to succeed and come home alive.
When Ammunition Technicians and their colleagues mark Saint Barbara’s Day, they are not stepping out of the modern world into a medieval one. They are taking a moment within a busy, technologically advanced, secular military environment to acknowledge that some fundamentals have not changed: courage, conscience, and care for others still matter.
Keeping The Flame Alive
Although the RNZAOC passed into history in 1996, its traditions did not vanish. They were carried forward into the RNZALR and live on in the customs, stories, and professional identities of those who wear the uniform today. Saint Barbara is one of those enduring threads.
On 4 December, when a small group gathers in an Ammuniton depot, unit lines, a mess, or a deployed location to raise a glass or share a few words in her honour, they are standing in continuity with generations of ordnance soldiers, armourers, gunners, and explosive specialists across time and across the Commonwealth. They are also quietly affirming something vital about themselves.
In the end, Saint Barbara’s Day is less about religion and more about recognition: recognition of a demanding craft, of the people who practise it, and of the responsibility they carry on behalf of the wider Army. For the RNZALR Ammunition Technicians of today, as for the RNZAOC of yesterday, she remains a fitting patron for those who work, quite literally, at the explosive edge of military service.
On this 1 December, as we mark Saint Eligius’s Day and salute the enduring legacy of the Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RNZEME), we commemorate more than seven decades of service under that name, and more than 150 years of New Zealand’s ordnance, mechanical and logistical tradition. Saint Eligius, long regarded as the patron of metalworkers and armourers, provides a fitting focus for honouring the craftsmen and technicians whose skill has kept New Zealand’s soldiers equipped and mobile in peace and war..
From Defence Stores to RNZEME, a long heritage
The roots of RNZEME extend deep into the nineteenth century, when the fledgling New Zealand forces began assuming responsibility for their own military stores and maintenance. The New Zealand Defence Stores Department, successor to Imperial supply and maintenance arrangements, was established in the 1860s and, by 1869, had depots in Wellington at Mount Cook and in Auckland at Albert Barracks.
Within that organisation, a small but increasingly professional cadre of armourers and artificers emerged. Between the 1860s and 1900, New Zealand’s military armourers evolved from civilian gunsmiths and part-time repairers into disciplined specialists who maintained an expanding array of weapons, from carbines and pistols to magazine rifles and early machine-guns such as the Gardner and Maxim. Their work underpinned the readiness of the colonial forces and set the technical and professional standard that later generations of ordnance and electrical and mechanical engineers would inherit.
Among these early figures, Walter Laurie Christie stands out. Serving for forty-five years in the Defence Stores Department and as a soldier during the New Zealand Wars, Christie embodied the blend of military service, technical mastery and administrative reliability that became a hallmark of New Zealand’s ordnance and maintenance tradition.
From those armourers and artisans came the artificers of the Permanent Militia in the 1880s, from which grew a tradition of maintenance and repair that would carry New Zealand forces through decades of change. By the time of the First World War, this heritage had matured into the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC), gazetted on 1 February 1917, responsible for arming, equipping and maintaining New Zealand’s forces at home and abroad.
During the Great War, armourers of the NZAOC and the mechanics of the new Mechanical Transport Sections of the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) worked tirelessly behind the lines to keep weapons, vehicles and equipment in service, ensuring the steady flow of matériel to the front.
Between the wars and into the Second World War, the NZAOC and the NZASC remained the heart of New Zealand’s supply and transport capability. Yet the increasing complexity of weapons, instruments, communications equipment and mechanical transport demanded a broader, more specialised technical arm.
Mechanised mobilisation and the MT Branch
The Second World War brought that challenge into sharp focus. From September 1939 to March 1944, New Zealand’s military vehicle fleet exploded from just 62 vehicles to 22,190, a transformation that turned a largely foot-bound force into a fully motorised army in a few short years.
To manage this rapid mechanisation at home, the Mechanical Transport (MT) Branch was created within the Army system to complement the existing Ordnance Workshops. The MT Branch, working closely with the NZAOC, took responsibility for the provision, storage and issue of all classes of vehicles and spare parts, as well as the repair of those vehicles. From 1939 to 1963, MT Stores were developed and managed as a distinct but tightly integrated function, ensuring that everything from staff cars to heavy trucks and specialist vehicles could be procured, held, accounted for and kept on the road.
In parallel, New Zealand Ordnance Corps Light Aid Detachments (LADs) were established to provide first-line repair to units both overseas and in home defence roles. These small detachments, working alongside Ordnance Workshops and MT Branch organisations, formed the backbone of New Zealand’s repair and maintenance capability during the war.
The consolidated register of 2NZEF logistics units shows just how extensive this support system became, with New Zealand logistics formations sustaining the force in North Africa, the Middle East, Greece, Crete and Italy. Together, the MT Branch, MT Stores system, Ordnance Workshops and LADs created a sophisticated, layered maintenance and repair network that anticipated the later integration of these functions under NZEME and, ultimately, RNZEME.
Wartime evolution, the birth of NZEME and RNZEME
As the Second World War engulfed the globe and New Zealand raised the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) for overseas service, the need for dedicated mechanical and electrical maintenance became pressing. In the Middle East in 1942, New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NZEME) was formed within 2NZEF to align the organisation with British practice and to bring armourers, instrument repairers, vehicle mechanics and other specialists into a single technical corps.
At war’s end, in New Zealand, these arrangements were mirrored at home. On 1 September 1946, workshops and many mechanical transport functions were formally separated from the NZAOC and placed under NZEME, under the control of the Director of Mechanical Engineering, though some MT stores remained under ordnance control. In recognition of their wartime service and importance, the Royal prefix was granted in 1947, creating the Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, RNZEME.
The motto adopted by RNZEME, Arte et Marte – “By Skill and Fighting”, or “By Craft and Combat”, captures perfectly the dual calling of its tradespeople as skilled craftsmen and soldiers in uniform.
RNZEME’s role, Light Aid Detachments, workshops and beyond
Throughout its existence, RNZEME provided vital support across a broad spectrum of New Zealand Army operations. Its personnel were attached to combat units as Light Aid Detachments, backed by field workshops and, at the national level, by base workshops at Trentham. Between them, they ensured that everything from small arms and radios to trucks, armoured vehicles and heavy plant could be maintained, repaired or rebuilt when needed.
Whether on operations overseas, on exercises, or in daily training, RNZEME craftsmen stood ready, ensuring that New Zealand’s soldiers remained equipped, mobile and operational.
The legacy continues, from RNZEME to RNZALR
In 1996, the New Zealand Army undertook a significant reorganisation of its logistics and support corps. The RNZEME, the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and the Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport, along with Quartermaster functions, were amalgamated into the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment, RNZALR.
Although RNZEME no longer exists as a separate corps, its traditions of mechanical skill, repair, readiness and technical leadership live on in every RNZALR Maintainer, in every workshop and unit, and through the repair chain that sustains the New Zealand Defence Force today.
Honour and remember
On this RNZEME Day, we recall with gratitude every craftsman-soldier, artisan-mechanic, armourer and artificer whose steady hands and often unsung labour have underpinned New Zealand’s military capability, from the Defence Stores armourers of the 1860s, through two world wars, to the modern era of integrated logistics.
We remember the nineteenth-century armourers who mastered each new generation of weapon, the long-serving servants of the Defence Stores Department, the armourers and artificers of the Permanent Militia, the NZAOC workshop staff, the mechanics of the NZASC, the MT Branch and MT Stores personnel who managed the vast wartime vehicle fleet, the NZOC Light Aid Detachments that kept front-line units moving, and the workshops and LADs of NZEME and RNZEME, which carried that tradition into the late twentieth century.
Their legacy is not only in the weapons maintained, the vehicles repaired, or the radios restored, but in the very capacity of New Zealand’s soldiers to fight, move and endure. On this day, we salute their craftsmanship, quiet dedication, and ongoing contribution to the security and strength of this nation.
Arte et Marte – by skill and by fighting, past, present and future.
The Honourable and Ancient Appointment of Conductor
The appointment of Conductor stands as one of the oldest and most esteemed roles in military history, dating back to its first mention in the Statute of Westminster of 1327. Originally, Conductors were responsible for guiding soldiers to assembly points, ensuring order and efficiency during the mass movement of medieval armies. Over subsequent centuries, the role evolved significantly, becoming a cornerstone of military logistics.
By the mid-16th century, “Conductors of Ordnance” were formally recorded during the siege of Boulogne in 1544, tasked with overseeing the movement and management of vital military stores. Through the 17th and 18th centuries, Conductors increasingly specialised in the handling and distribution of military supplies, acting as assistants to senior commissaries and ordnance officers.
The critical importance of Conductors to military operations was formally recognised by the Royal Warrant of 11 January 1879, which established Conductors of Supplies (Army Service Corps) and Conductors of Stores (Ordnance Stores Branch) as senior Warrant Officers, ranked above all Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). This recognition underscored their profound expertise, trustworthiness, and leadership within military logistics.
New Zealand’s connection to the appointment began during the New Zealand Wars (1860s), when Conductors accompanied British Imperial forces in support roles. However, it was not until the First World War that New Zealand formally adopted the Conductor appointment within its forces. During this period, Conductors played a pivotal role in rectifying earlier logistical failings and ensuring New Zealand’s forces remained among the best-equipped in the British Empire.
Throughout the 20th century, Conductors became central figures in the New Zealand Army’s logistics operations, exemplifying technical mastery and professional leadership. Despite periods of dormancy, the appointment was revived several times: first in the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC) in 1977, and most recently, in 2025, when the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment (RNZALR) reintroduced the Conductor appointment to restore professional excellence and mentorship within the Logistic Specialist and Ammunition Technician Trades.
The Evolution of the Conductor Appointment
The role of Conductor reflects an unbroken lineage of logistics leadership stretching across nearly seven centuries:
Year
Milestone
Description
1327
Statute of Westminster
First formal mention of Conductors responsible for assembling soldiers.
1544
Siege of Boulogne
“Conductors of Ordnance” recorded managing stores and ammunition.
17th–18th centuries
Expansion of Duties
Conductors served as assistants to the Commissary of Stores and Field Train Departments.
19th century
New Zealand Wars
Conductors supported British forces in colonial campaigns in New Zealand.
11 January 1879
Royal Warrant
Official establishment of Conductors in the British Army as senior Warrant Officers, ranking above all NCOs. Conductors of Supplies and Conductors of Stores are recognised separately.
1892
Rationalisation
Conductors of Supplies phased out; Conductors of Stores retained within the Army Ordnance Corps.
1915–1916
NZEF Formation
New Zealand formally adopts Conductors and Sub-Conductors into the NZEF NZAOC.
1917
Home Service NZAOC
Conductors were integrated into the newly established NZAOC for home service.
Post-1918
Decline
Following post-war cutbacks, the appointment was last filled in 1931 and was formally removed from New Zealand Army regulations in 1949.
1977
RNZAOC Reintroduction
Appointment revived within the RNZAOC, with up to five senior WO1s appointed as Conductors.
1996
RNZALR Formation
The conductor appointment was discontinued to encourage unity in the newly amalgamated RNZALR.
2024
RNZALR Reintroduction
Conductors were reintroduced into the RNZALR Logistic Specialist and Ammunition Technician Trade, restoring a prestigious leadership and mentorship role.
International Comparisons
The importance and prestige of the Conductor appointment are affirmed by its continued use and recognition within allied forces:
British Royal Logistic Corps (RLC): Conductors remain a senior appointment across key trades, including Supply, Transport, and Catering. Each major trade maintains at least one serving Conductor as a symbol of professional mastery.
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps (RAAOC): The conductor appointment was reintroduced in 2005 after a lapse since the Second World War. In the RAAOC, Conductors serve as Senior Trade Mentors (STM) and Subject Matter Advisors (SMA), providing expert advice to Corps leadership and upholding trade standards.
New Zealand’s recent decision to reintroduce the Conductor appointment ensures parity with its closest military allies and reflects an enduring commitment to leadership, expertise, and regimental tradition.
Conductors of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, 1916–1920
Establishing a Professional Ordnance Corps
At the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, New Zealand possessed no dedicated Ordnance Corps to manage the vast logistical demands of expeditionary operations. Early experiences, particularly the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915, exposed significant deficiencies in supply management, prompting urgent reforms.
In response, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) was hastily formed within the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) in late 1915, with formal recognition granted in January 1916. Modelled closely on British Army practices, the NZEF NZAOC immediately adopted the appointments of Conductor and Sub-Conductor — senior Warrant Officer Class One roles — to provide technical leadership, accountability, and management of stores, munitions, and equipment.
The introduction of these appointments marked a critical transformation in New Zealand’s military logistics, laying the foundation for a structured and professional supply system on the battlefield.
The Role and Importance of Conductors
Within the NZEF, Conductors and Sub-Conductors were responsible for:
Supervising the receipt, storage, accounting, and distribution of ordnance supplies.
Advising senior commanders on the status and requirements of stores.
Ensuring the maintenance of logistic support lines from depots to the frontlines.
These senior Warrant Officers provided the vital backbone of supply chains across multiple theatres, including Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, France, and Belgium. Their leadership directly addressed the failures experienced at Gallipoli and elevated New Zealand’s forces to be among the best-equipped and administratively supported units within the wider British Empire forces.
The Conductors’ role demanded technical competence, leadership, innovation, and resilience under the demanding conditions of modern warfare.
Notable Conductors and Their Contributions
Mainly drawn from veterans of Gallipoli and experienced military personnel, NZEF Conductors set a standard of excellence. Many were later recognised for their distinguished service through awards and promotions.
Prominent NZEF Conductors included:
William Coltman: The first New Zealand Conductor; later commissioned as an officer.
Charles Gossage: Promoted to Conductor in 1916; ultimately rose to the rank of Major.
Arthur Gilmore (MSM): Awarded the Meritorious Service Medal for distinguished service.
Walter Geard: Provided critical ordnance support in multiple campaigns.
William Simmons (MSM): Served for the duration of the war from the Samoa Advance party in 1914 to the NZEF rear details in late 1920.
Clarence Seay: Died of influenza while serving as a Conductor in 1919.
Their leadership underpinned the logistical success of New Zealand forces during the war and played a vital role in sustaining combat operations across multiple fronts.
Detailed Roll of NZEF NZAOC Conductors and Sub-Conductors
Appointment
Name
Dates as Conductor
Notes
Acting Sub-Conductor
William Coltman
Feb 1916 – Mar 1917
Later commissioned
Conductor
Charles Gossage
24 Jul 1916 – 24 Jan 1917
Later Major
Conductor
Arthur Gilmore, MSM
Dec 1916 – Feb 1919
Awarded MSM
Conductor
Walter Geard
1 Jan 1917 – 20 Jun 1917
Conductor
William Simmons, MSM
1 Jan 1917 – Jun 1917
Awarded MSM
Conductor
Clarence Seay
23 Mar 1917 – 20 Feb 1919
Died of Influenza
Conductor
Walter Smiley
23 Apr 1917 – Oct 1919
Sub-Conductor
Frank Hutton
1 Dec 1917 – Sep 1919
Conductor
Edward Little
15 Apr 1917 – Oct 1919
Conductor
John Goutenoire O’Brien, MSM
18 Oct 1918 – Mar 1920
Awarded MSM
Sub-Conductor
Edwin Green
20 Oct 1918 – Dec 1919
Conductor
Charles Slattery
6 Jan 1919 – 25 Feb 1919
Died of Influenza
Sub-Conductor
Harold Hill
21 Feb 1919 – Oct 1919
Acting Sub-Conductor
Arthur Richardson
3 Feb 1919 – 13 Feb 1919
Acting Sub-Conductor
Hubert Wilson, MM
3 Mar 1919 – May 1920
Awarded MM
Warrant Officer Class One, Conductor Badge 1915-1918. Robert McKie Collection
Legacy and Influence
The professionalism and leadership demonstrated by the NZEF Conductors had a profound influence on the future of New Zealand military logistics:
They established the core standards for accountability, efficiency, and resilience in military supply chains.
Their model would be replicated in the home service NZAOC (formed in 1917) and influence subsequent developments throughout the twentieth century.
Many Conductors continued to serve post-war, shaping the permanent New Zealand Army’s approach to logistics and ordnance.
Warrant Officer Class One, Sub-Conductor Badge. 1915-1919 Robert McKie Collection
Although other conflicts would later overshadow the First World War, the NZEF Conductors’ contributions to New Zealand’s military legacy remain pivotal. Their example continues to inspire modern logisticians within the New Zealand Defence Force.
Conductors of the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 1917–1930
Formation and Role
In response to the growing need for a permanent and professional logistics organisation to support the New Zealand Army, the NZAOC for home service was established on 1 February 1917. Building on the foundations laid by the Defence Stores Department, the NZAOC adopted British military practices to structure its personnel and appointments.
Key among these was the appointment of a Conductor, a prestigious senior Warrant Officer Class One position integrated into the Clerical and Stores Sections. Unlike its counterpart in the NZEF, the home service NZAOC exclusively employed the conductor’s appointment, with no provision for Sub-Conductors.
The Conductor was entrusted with critical responsibilities: managing stores, munitions, and military supplies; maintaining accountability and record-keeping standards; and leading and mentoring subordinate personnel. Their appointment symbolised the Corps’ commitment to expertise, precision, and integrity.
Early Conductors: A Foundation of Excellence
The first Conductors of the NZAOC were selected for their experience, professionalism, and leadership qualities. Many were veterans of the British Army, while others brought extensive service from New Zealand’s Defence Stores Department. Their expertise ensured the Corps’ rapid establishment as a reliable and efficient logistical support organisation.
Notable early Conductors included:
William Henry Manning: Former Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant, British Army; joined the NZ Defence Forces in 1915.
William Ramsay: British Army veteran, whose appointment at the age of 63 demonstrated the value placed on experience.
Their combined service represented a bridge between traditional British ordnance practices and the emerging logistical needs of New Zealand’s military forces.
Insignia and Status
The prestige of the Conductor appointment was formally recognised through the adoption of distinctive insignia. Following British Army Order 305 of 1918, New Zealand Conductors wore the Royal Arms within a Laurel Wreath, symbolising their authority and expertise. This insignia was incorporated into New Zealand Army Dress Regulations in 1923, and their seniority was codified in the 1927 Defence Regulations, confirming Conductors as ranking above all other Warrant Officers.
Warrant Officer Class One, Conductor Badge. Robert McKie Collection
The Conductor stood as a symbol of mastery in logistics, their appointment conveying both a mark of personal achievement and an assurance of professional excellence within the NZAOC.
Decline and Disuse
Despite the high standing of the Conductor appointment, wider economic and political pressures soon affected the NZAOC. The onset of the Great Depression forced significant reductions in military expenditure. In 1931, the government initiated the civilianisation of many military logistics functions, effectively ceasing new Conductor appointments.
Although technically remaining within regulations for some years, the appointment of Conductor fell into disuse after 1931. It was formally removed from the New Zealand Army’s rank structure in 1949, marking the end of this distinguished period of service.
NZAOC Conductors, 1917–1930
Name
Service Dates
Conductor
William Henry Manning
3 February 1917 – 4 July 1918
Conductor
William Ramsay
3 February 1917 – 4 July 1918
Conductor
James Murdoch Miller
1 July 1917 – 3 July 1918
Conductor
Eugene Key
5 July 1917 – 16 January 1918
Conductor
Donald McCaskill McIntyre
30 July 1917 – 10 July 1919
Conductor
George William Bulpitt Silvestre
1 November 1918 – 22 August 1920
Conductor
Mark Leonard Hathaway, MSM
1 November 1918 – 30 September 1919
Conductor
Henry Earnest Erridge
1 October 1919 – 31 July 1926
Conductor
Walter Edward Cook
1 November 1919 – 5 July 1920
Conductor
Michael Joseph Lyons, MSM
1 April 1922 – 1 July 1927
Conductor
Thomas Webster Page, MSM
1 August 1922 – 22 December 1925
Conductor
David Llewellyn Lewis
1 October 1928 – 31 March 1931
Each of these Conductors upheld the traditions of professionalism, leadership, and service that remain a benchmark for military logisticians today.
Conductors of the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps, 1977–1996
Revival of an Appointment
After nearly half a century of dormancy following the economic and structural cuts of the 1930s, the appointment of Conductor was reintroduced into the RNZAOC in 1977. This decision was championed by Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Campbell, then Director of Ordnance Services, who recognised the enduring value of the Conductor as a symbol of professional excellence, leadership, and logistical expertise.
Unlike earlier eras where the appointment was often tied to specific roles, the reintroduced Conductor appointment within the RNZAOC was awarded on merit, based on seniority, technical mastery, leadership ability, and unwavering loyalty to the Corps. Up to five Conductors could be appointed at any one time, maintaining the appointment’s exclusivity and prestige.
Conductors were distinguished by wearing the Warrant Officer Class One badge on a crimson backing, visually marking them as exemplars of the Corps’ highest professional standards.
RNZAOC Conductor Insingna 1977-1996. Robert McKie Collection
Early Appointments and Roles
The first three RNZAOC Conductors appointed under the 1977 reintroduction were:
Warrant Officer Class One George Thomas Dimmock (Chief Ammunition Technical Officer, 3 Supply Company, Burnham Camp)
Warrant Officer Class One Brian Arthur Gush (Regimental Sergeant Major, Ordnance School, Trentham)
Warrant Officer Class One Barry Stewart (Stores WO1, 1 Base Ordnance Depot, Trentham)
Their appointments demonstrated the broad applicability of the Conductor’s leadership role across different specialist areas within the Corps: ammunition, training, and stores management.
Roll of RNZAOC Conductors (1977–1996)
Throughout the period between 1977 and 1996, a total of 20 Warrant Officers held the esteemed appointment of Conductor within the RNZAOC:
Name
Service Notes
WO1 (Cdr)
Barry Stewart
Early appointee; Base Ordnance Depot
WO1 (Cdr)
George Thomas Dimmock
Ammunition expertise
WO1 (Cdr)
Brian Arthur Gush
Regimental Sergeant Major Ordnance School
WO1 (Cdr)
Robert James Plummer
WO1 (Cdr)
Brian Joseph Quinn
WO1 (Cdr)
Dennis Leslie Goldfinch
WO1 (Cdr)
Bryan Edward Jackson
WO1 (Cdr)
Roy Douglas Richardson
WO1 (Cdr)
David Andrew Orr
WO1 (Cdr)
John Christopher Goddard
WO1 (Cdr)
Karen Linda McPhee
One of the first female Conductors
WO1 (Cdr)
Kevin Robert Blackburn
WO1 (Cdr)
Brian William Calvey
WO1 (Cdr)
Philip Anthony Murphy
WO1 (Cdr)
Anthony Allen Thain
WO1 (Cdr)
Wilson Douglas Simonsen
WO1 (Cdr)
John Cornelius Lee
WO1 (Cdr)
Mark Melville Robinson
WO1 (Cdr)
Tony John Harding
WO1 (Cdr)
Gerald Shane Rolfe
These individuals stood as paragons of technical and professional mastery within the RNZAOC. Many of them served not just in administrative or supply roles but also as mentors and professional advisors within their units and across the Corps.
The End of an Era
The appointment of Conductor within the RNZAOC remained a cornerstone of professional identity and excellence until 1996, when the RNZAOC was amalgamated into the newly created RNZALR.
As part of efforts to break down perceived “tribalism” between the various antecedent Corps (the RNZAOC, RNZCT, and RNZEME), the decision was made to discontinue the Conductor appointment during the formation of the RNZALR. Existing Conductors retained the honour until their promotion, retirement, or discharge, but no new appointments were made after 1996.
While well-intentioned, the discontinuation had unintended long-term consequences, contributing to a gradual erosion of identity and professional pathways within the RNZALR Logistic Specialist Trade.
Legacy
The RNZAOC Conductors of 1977–1996 left a lasting legacy of:
Upholding the highest professional standards in military logistics.
Providing leadership and mentorship across a broad range of logistic functions.
Strengthening the Corps’ reputation both nationally and internationally.
Their service remains a model for future efforts to restore excellence and tradition within New Zealand’s military logistics community. Within this spirit, reintroducing the Conductor appointment in 2024 within the RNZALR seeks to draw inspiration, reaffirming the importance of senior Warrant Officers as custodians of professional mastery, leadership, and tradition.
The Reintroduction of the Conductor Appointment by the RNZALR, 2024
Background and Context
Following years of concern over the gradual erosion of professional standards, leadership pathways, and trade identity within the RNZALR Logistic Specialist and Ammunition Technician Trades, there was growing recognition that a strategic intervention was necessary. These concerns reflected trends noted in multiple trade reviews since the 1990s, highlighting that modern logistic soldier often lacked their predecessors’ professional mastery, trade cohesion, and leadership development pathways.
Drawing inspiration from international best practices — notably the continued success of the Conductor appointment in the British Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) and its reintroduction into the Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps (RAAOC) in 2005 — the RNZALR sought to realign with these standards.
In this context, a formal proposal to reintroduce the Conductor appointment within the RNZALR was submitted to the RNZALR Regimental Matters Conference on 30 October 2024.
Decision and Implementation
The proposal was unanimously adopted, reflecting strong endorsement across the Regiment for restoring this prestigious and historically grounded appointment.
The key elements of the 2024 reintroduction included:
Designation of Three Positions: Three senior WO1 positions — two from the Logistic Specialist Trade and one from the Ammunition Technician Trade — were redesignated as Conductors.
Alignment with Allies: This structure aligned RNZALR practices with allied forces, notably the RLC and RAAOC, where Conductors serve as Senior Trade Mentors (STM) and Subject Matter Advisors (SMA).
Merit-Based Appointment: Selection was tied to professional mastery, leadership reputation, and commitment to the Regiment, ensuring only the most qualified WO1s could be considered.
Purpose of the Reintroduction
The reintroduction of the Conductor appointment was not a symbolic gesture. It was a deliberate, strategic action intended to strengthen the RNZALR’s core leadership and trade standards through four key purposes:
Leadership and Mentorship: Conductors serve as senior professional leaders, providing mentorship, technical guidance, and career development support to junior personnel. They represent the pinnacle of leadership within their trades.
Professional Standards: Conductors are tasked with upholding and enhancing professional, ethical, and technical standards across the Logistic Specialist and Ammunition Technician Trades, acting as role models and custodians of excellence.
Heritage and Pride: The appointment reconnects the RNZALR with its distinguished logistics heritage, honouring the contributions of generations of military logisticians and reinforcing regimental identity and esprit de corps.
International Alignment: The revival ensures New Zealand remains aligned with allied logistic forces, maintaining professional parity and strengthening New Zealand’s standing within the broader military logistics community.
Implementation in Practice
The reintroduced Conductors:
Are incorporated into leadership structures, such as the Senior Trade Advisory Board (STAB), ensuring their influence extends beyond their immediate appointments into broader trade development.
Act as formal Senior Mentors, providing a structured approach to leadership development across the RNZALR trades.
Significance and Strategic Impact
The 2024 reintroduction of the Conductor appointment is a pivotal milestone for the RNZALR. It:
Reaffirms the Regiment’s commitment to excellence, leadership, and professionalism.
Provides a tangible and visible career pinnacle for WO1s within the Supply and Ammunition trades.
Strengthens the identity, cohesion, and operational capability of the RNZALR’s logistic elements.
Ensures that the next generation of New Zealand’s military logisticians is mentored, developed, and inspired by the best the Regiment has to offer.
Parchment Presentation
On Wednesday, 12 November 2025, the reintroduction of the Conductor role in the RNZALR was marked with a parchment presentation ceremony at Buckle Street, Wellington, the historic home of Army logistics, where three RNZALR Warrant Officers were formally recognised and presented with their Conductor parchments. With effect from 30 October 2024,
D1000043 WO1 Te Whaea Edwards was appointed RNZALR Conductor Ammunition Technician,
D52351 WO1 David Alexander was appointed RNZALR Conductor Quartermaster, and
P56156 WO1 Terry McGeough was appointed RNZALR Conductor Supply Chain.
Looking Forward
By restoring this Honourable and Ancient Appointment, the RNZALR has taken a critical step towards safeguarding its future, ensuring that its logistic trades remain strong, professional, and capable amid the challenges of an evolving operational environment.
The Conductors of 2024 and beyond stand proudly in a tradition dating back nearly 700 years — a living testament to the enduring principles of leadership, professionalism, and service.
Conclusion
Across nearly seven centuries, the appointment of Conductor has stood as a symbol of the enduring principles that define military logistics: leadership, technical mastery, trust, and service. From its earliest mention in the Statute of Westminster of 1327, to its formal establishment within the British Army in 1879, and its adoption by New Zealand forces during the First World War, the Conductor appointment has continually evolved to meet the operational and professional needs of the military.
In New Zealand, Conductors became foundational figures during the First World War, ensuring the efficient and resilient supply chains that underpinned the success of New Zealand forces on the Western Front and beyond. Their influence continued into the interwar years, shaping the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps’ professional culture even as economic pressures forced the appointment’s dormancy. Revived in 1977 within the RNZAOC, Conductors again served as paragons of excellence until the mid-1990s, mentoring soldiers, maintaining high standards, and reinforcing the Corps’ operational effectiveness.
The disestablishment of the RNZAOC and the formation of the RNZALR in 1996 led to the unfortunate cessation of the Conductor appointment. While intended to foster unity within the newly amalgamated Regiment, this decision contributed to a gradual decline in the visible leadership pathways, professional mentorship, and trade identity that the Conductor role had previously upheld so effectively.
Recognising these challenges, reintroducing the Conductor appointment in 2024 marks a bold and necessary reaffirmation of the RNZALR’s commitment to leadership excellence, professional development, and honouring its regimental heritage. By realigning with international best practice and by elevating the most experienced and capable Warrant Officers into visible leadership roles, the RNZALR has taken a decisive step towards restoring pride, cohesion, and operational effectiveness within its logistic trades.
Today’s Conductors—and those who follow—are not merely a continuation of tradition but active leaders entrusted with shaping the future. They embody the lessons of history, the spirit of professionalism, and the vital role that skilled logisticians play in ensuring the success of military operations.
As the RNZALR moves forward in an increasingly complex and dynamic global environment, the reintroduced Conductors will ensure that New Zealand’s military logistics capability remains strong, adaptive, and anchored in a proud tradition of service — living proof that while times and technologies may change, the core values of leadership, stewardship, and excellence remain timeless.
In the long march from wool serge battledress and khaki drill to modern camouflage, New Zealand’s Army experimented with a family of tropical combat garments. Born from Australian design during the Vietnam era and trialled by New Zealand from 1967, these shirts and trousers promised a purpose-built, quick-drying, field-practical alternative to heavy drill greens. For a time, they looked set to become New Zealand’s standard warm-weather combat working dress, both at home and in the tropics. Then, almost as quickly, they receded, leaving a curious footprint in New Zealand’s uniform lineage and a handful of lessons that would shape the move to DPM in the late 1970s.
From BD and DG to tropical purpose
Post-war New Zealand soldiers continued to wear Battle Dress (BD) for temperate/cold conditions, and from the mid-1950s, drill green (DG) for summer and working wear. Operations in Southeast Asia exposed the obvious: heavy wool was miserable when wet and too slow to dry; DG was serviceable for training in New Zealand but never truly “tropical.” Australia, facing the same climate and operational pressures, led Commonwealth work on new tropical combat clothing. New Zealand followed those developments closely while sustaining its forces in Malaya and, later, in Vietnam through a pragmatic mix of UK, Australian, and NZ-manufactured items.
What, exactly, were “Pixie Greens”?
Australia’s Coat and Trousers, Man’s, Field Combat, Tropical, emerged in 1966–67, taking cues from contemporary US jungle fatigues, including slanted chest pockets, sleeve pockets for shell dressings, roomy cargo pockets, and lightweight, fast-drying green cloth. Troops dubbed the ensemble “pixie greens”—the nickname’s precise origin is debated, but the colour and cut likely did the christening. Alongside these sat Jungle Greens (JG) shirts and the distinctive “Gurkha”-closure trousers with side buckles, themselves evolutions of 1950s British tropical wear.
Australian Coat and Trousers, Man’s, Field Combat, Tropical “Pixi Greens”
New Zealand trials and the “NZ Pixie” variant (1967–69)
Seeking standardisation and to leverage Australian field experience, New Zealand drew forty prototype sets of Australian Pixie Greens for troop trials at Waiouru and the 1st Battalion Depot in Burnham in early 1967.[1] The results were promising enough that, in September 1967, New Zealand accepted the Australian design with modifications for domestic training and tropical operations.[2] Three decisions shaped the NZ variant:
Cloth: Use a UK-sourced drill-green material that proved acceptable in tropical conditions and a viable replacement for heavier NZ DG in summer training.
Cut: Adopt trousers with draw-cord cuffs and side-set cargo pockets (as opposed to front-set), and include a reinforced knee area, reflecting soldier feedback during trials in New Zealand and Vietnam.
Closure: Retain the crossover waist with side buckles (“Gurkha”-style) on the NZ pattern trousers, preserving the familiar, adjustable fastening preferred by troops.[3]
New Zealand, Trousers, Mens, Drill Green Field Combat, Tropical, (1967 Patt)
Sizing followed the Australian scale, simplifying production and interchangeability. New Zealand formalised specifications as Purchase Description No. 106 (4 January 1968) for the shirt and a companion description for the trousers (5 February 1968), essentially creating the NZ 1967 Pattern “pixie” shirt and trousers.[4][5]
Coat, Mans, Drill Green Field Combat, Tropical (1969 Patt)
Features, fixes and false starts
The trials were not without missteps. In a bid to modernise closures, an early NZ trouser run replaced waist buttons/buckles with Velcro. Pairs were shipped to the infantry in Vietnam for hard-use evaluation. The verdict was negative, Velcro clogged, wore poorly, and was noisy, and the idea was dropped.[6] Meanwhile, Australia transitioned from Mark 1 to Mark 2 (1968), expanding the size range and refining details, and New Zealand followed some of these changes by issuing a 1969 Pattern coat with twelve sizes.[7] Even so, colour shade variation, cloth strength inconsistencies, and user preferences would continue to plague the clothing throughout the next phase.[8]
Operational reality: mixed scales and supply pragmatism
Between 1957 and the early 1970s, New Zealand sustained forces in Malaya/Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam via a flexible “capitation” model: draw theatre-specific items from British (and later Australian) stocks, pay the bill, and top up with NZ-made kit where feasible. Between 1970 and 1974, as Britain withdrew east of Suez and Australia rationalised its supply, New Zealand matured its own catalogue. It maintained items in Singapore through the Australian/New Zealand 5 Advanced Ordnance Depot, often in parallel with Australian equivalents. Even then, soldiers frequently wore hybrid ensembles: British, Australian and NZ pieces intermixed by role, issue timing, and availability. The “pixie greens” were part of that mosaic, particularly for Vietnam-tasked contingents receiving substantial Australian clothing issues.
The turn homeward—and a change of heart (1971–74)
In 1971, New Zealand Army’s policy aimed to:
Replace DG with a summer/tropical combat uniform (where the NZ “pixie” patterns should have shone), and
Replace BD with a temperate/winter combat uniform.
A pilot at Papakura evaluated the 1967/69 “pixie” combat sets for garrison and training use in New Zealand. Results were mixed to poor: troops disliked the shade and texture variability, questioned durability, and preferred familiar DG for most warm-weather training tasks.
Regimental Sergeant Majors (RSMs) disliked them for their unsoldierly appearance. Minor redesigns and colour-control efforts followed, but confidence ebbed. In effect, New Zealand concluded that following Australia’s tropical path had not delivered a reliable, popular, all-round combat working dress for home conditions. Procurement was frozen pending a strategic reset.
Enter DPM—and the quiet sunset of Pixie Greens
While the “pixie” experiment stalled, New Zealand began formal trials (1974–75) of the UK 1968 Pattern Disruptive Pattern Material (DPM) for temperate wear. Troops rated it highly, finding it comfortable, warm, well-designed, and, crucially, it answered the immediate temperature-climate problem that BD and ad-hoc layers could not solve. Approval was granted in December 1975, with a phased introduction from 1977/78, and domestic manufacture was to utilise imported cloth.
The tropical dress was left in the legacy of JG/DG until the late 1980s, when lightweight DPM shirts and trousers finally arrived. In Singapore, proposals to fit NZFORSEA with tropical DPM were declined in 1980 on operational/technical grounds (including IR signature considerations), keeping JG in service a little longer. By then, “pixie greens” had largely faded from view: no longer a national standard, occasionally encountered in remnants and photos, but not the backbone working dress their early promise suggested.
What the “Pixie Greens” episode taught New Zealand
Design must match the use case A cut that excels in jungle operations is not automatically ideal for New Zealand training cycles, climates, and soldier expectations. Home-training suitability matters because that’s where troops spend most days.
Cloth quality and colour control are decisive “Green” is not a single thing. Shade, handle, drying time, abrasion resistance, and consistency across batches drive acceptance and longevity more than pattern geometry alone.
Iterate fast, but listen faster. Velcro closures sounded modern; field users quickly proved they were impractical. Embedding troops early, across climates, saves time and money.
Standardise sensibly, sustain pragmatically. The capitation era forced New Zealand to juggle UK, Australian, and NZ stock lines. The “pixie greens” story is also a supply-chain story: catalogue discipline, sizing alignment, and interchangeable specs reduce friction when allies withdraw or policies shift.
Legacy and memory
Ask a veteran of Southeast Asian training or service in Malaysia, and you may still hear about the “pixies”: light, practical, decent in the bush, yet never quite the right fit for New Zealand’s full spectrum of needs. Their real legacy is less sartorial than institutional. The trials, amendments, and eventual pivot to DPM matured New Zealand’s approach to combat clothing procurement: begin with a clear climate problem; test proven allied solutions; codify specifications tightly; privilege field feedback; and only then scale manufacture at home. The temperate DPM suite prospered under that discipline; tropical DPM followed once the case was equally strong. In that sense, the “pixie greens” were a necessary way-station, an experiment that taught New Zealand how to choose, not merely how to sew.
Size Range
Notes
[1] Army 246/78/5/Q(D) Trial Instructions Tropical Combat Dress (Aust) 11 January 1967. “Clothing – Clothing and Equipment Trials in Training,” Archives NZ No R9853144 (1966 – 1969).
[2] Army 213/1/106/Q(D) Tropical Combat Clothing Trial 11 September 1967. Ibid.
[3] Army 213/1/106/OS9 Trouser Combat Tropical Trial 4 January 1968.Ibid.
[4] NZ Army Purchase Description No 105 dated 4 January 1968. “Clothing – Men’s Drill Green Field Combat Tropical 1967 Pattern 1970-71,” Archives NZ No R24510756 (1970-71).
[5] NZ Army Purchase Description No 106 dated 5 February 1968. “Clothing – Trousers Men’s Drill Green Field Combat – Tropical 1967 Pattern,” Archives NZ No R24510754 (1968 -1968).
[6] Army 213/1/106/Q899 Trousers: Combat Tropical 28 March 1968
[7] NZ Army Purchase Description No 105A dated 23 October 1969. “Clothing – Men’s Drill Green Field Combat Tropical 1967 Pattern 1970-71.”
[8] Army 213/1/106/ord6 Trouser Combat Tropical 18 September 1968. “Clothing – Introduction of Combat Clothing Project.”
After five decades of tinkering with patterns, from Disruptive Pattern Material (DPM) in the 1970s through Desert DPM (DDPM), Multi-Terrain Camouflage Uniform (MCU), and New Zealand Multi-Terrain Pattern (NZMTP), New Zealand’s uniforms have too often drifted into brand management rather than capability. Our own history shows that print rarely delivers a universal advantage, and that fit, fabric and fieldcraft usually matter more than this year’s geometry.
Should New Zealand return to a single-colour combat uniform, such as a return to jungle-green, but in a modern cut? It would save money, simplify supply, suit our operating environment, and mark out a distinctly New Zealand identity, rather than chasing the camouflage fashion cycle.
Why is this argument timely
In an opinion article for Military.com on 29 October 2025, Robert Billard asks whether the US Marine Corps should “ditch the digis” and go back to a simple, single-colour utility uniform, such as coyote brown or olive drab, to cut cost and complexity and put practicality first.[1] The logic maps cleanly to a small force like ours.
Rethinking Marine Corps Camo (photo by Military.com)
International context, what our peers wear
Among New Zealand’s closest peers, camouflage is the standard field dress. The United Kingdom wears Multi-Terrain Pattern, Australia uses the Australian Multicam Camouflage Uniform, Canada fields CADPAT, and Ireland is moving from DPM to a modern multicam-style design. Austria, long a holdout in plain olive, is transitioning to camouflage across the force. The notable exception is Israel, which still issues olive or khaki fatigues at scale.
A return to a single-colour combat uniform would be unusual, but not without precedent. It would be a deliberate, outcomes-driven choice that prioritises fit, fabric, sustainment and fieldcraft over print. Interoperability would not be compromised by colour. What matters is near-IR compliance, armour and radio compatibility, female-inclusive sizing, hard-wearing fabrics, and weather layers in matching shades. Retaining a small, role-based camouflage pool for specialist concealment and specific deployments preserves the option where pattern brings a real advantage, while keeping the general issue simple, cheaper to sustain, and mission-first.
What our own history shows
New Zealand’s 1960s trials in Malaysia found that no single scheme was effective across all backgrounds. The Army Headquarters concluded that Jungle Greens would remain the standard clothing and that camouflage efforts should focus on field items, such as shelters and parkas.[2]
Comparison of FARELF Combat Clothing 1965 Left to Right: Shirts Tropical Combat, Shirt OG (UK).Indonesian Camouflage, Shirt KF, HQ FARELF Joint Services Public Relations PR/A/372/4 NZ Archived R17187760 Clothing Tropical Clothing and Personal Equipment 1955-67
DPM was adopted for temperate wear, not as a magic camouflage leap
By the early 1970s, the priority was a temperate-climate combat uniform. Formal trials of the UK 1968-pattern DPM led to adoption because it solved the temperate clothing problem and provided a well-designed ensemble, not because it delivered a universal concealment advantage.[3]
The NZ story, from DPM to DDPM, MCU and MTP
New Zealand’s combat uniform journey has been pragmatic, moving from DPM to DDPM, then MCU and finally NZMTP, with each step shaped by mission demands, supply efficiency, and improved fit.
DDPM for deployments, 2003. A New Zealand desert DPM variant entered service for Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa, tailored to arid theatres rather than New Zealand training areas.
March 2012, Multinational Force Observers, Sinai: Sergeant Clint Whitewood on deployment to the Sinai.
2008 ACU-style cut. The Army transitioned to a modern ripstop cut, produced in both NZDPM and NZDDPM, which improved pockets, wear, and integration with Velcro backed badges, while still reflecting theatre-driven needs.
2013 MCU. NZ consolidated to MCU across NZDF, a Ghostex-derived, ACU-style pattern with Crye-influenced trousers, aiming for one pattern to cover most conditions.
Royal New Zealand Soldiers with 161 Artillery Battalion, train and prepare for exercise SSang Yong in the Pohang Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine base, South Korea, Feb. 26, 2016. Exercise Ssang Yong 2016 is a biennial military exercise focused on strengthening the amphibious landing capabilities of the Republic of Korea, the U.S., New Zealand and Australia. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by MCIPAC Combat Camera Cpl. Allison Lotz/Released)
2019 NZMTP. NZDF adopted NZMTP, a local MTP/Multicam variant, reverting largely to the 2008 cut and citing supply, fit for women, and performance issues with MCU, plus compatibility with widely available off-the-shelf kit. Changeover completed by 2023.
NZ Army soldiers during Exercise Black Bayonet wearing NZMTP uniforms. New Zealand Defence Force
This arc shows a practical, theatre-led approach, not a fashion contest, and it underlines a core point: uniform colour and cut should serve the mission and the supply chain first.
The case for going back to Jungle Greens
Here is the case for returning to a single-colour Jungle Green combat uniform: it performs effectively across our training and probable Indo-Pacific operational environments, reduces cost and complexity, maintains interoperability, and gives New Zealand a clear identity rather than following a fashion trend.
Effectiveness that matches our training ground. A deep, slightly muted green blends acceptably across bush, scrub, pine, tussock and many built-up areas, especially after natural fade. Fieldcraft, movement discipline and signature control matter more than print geometry.
Supply and cost discipline. Solid dyeing is cheaper and faster to source, quality assurance is simpler, SKUs reduce, repair stocks are easier to manage, wastage falls, and garments live longer through straightforward patching.
Interoperability intact. Greens sit cleanly alongside coalition browns and greens on armour covers, pouches and packs. Radios, reporting and readiness make us interoperable, not a print.
Identity over imitation. Jungle green is recognisably ours, grounded in New Zealand conditions, not in a global pattern arms race.
Not a nostalgia trip, a modern uniform
Keep the colour single, keep the cut modern. One single-colour system with female-inclusive sizing, articulated knees and elbows, pocketing that works under armour, near-IR compliance, standard cloth for general issue with flame-retardant variants by task, and weather layers in matching shades. In short, a mission-first design that wears hard, fits well, integrates with armour and radios, and is cheaper and simpler to sustain.
Conclusion
Robert Billard’s case for abandoning digital camouflage in favour of a single solid utility colour to save money and streamline logistics fits New Zealand’s realities. Our own records indicate that there is no universal advantage to different camouflage prints, and that DPM was introduced primarily to address a problem with temperate clothing. Returning to a single-colour uniform, in a modern cut, provides a more cost-effective and sustainable solution with a distinctly New Zealand identity. This is not nostalgia; it is a mission-first choice that simplifies supply, preserves interoperability, and focuses training on fieldcraft and signature management, where the real gains are.
