New Zealand’s military logisticians are more likely to be harmed by the conditions they create than by enemy fire, and the records often don’t exist when illness appears decades later.
Introduction
We have spent years teaching soldiers to look up and out for threats. For logisticians, the danger is just as often down in the ground they’re ordered to seize and make work at speed. Bomb‑damaged ports, airheads, railheads, fuel farms, hard standing, and battered warehouses are where supply chains are wrestled back to life. They are also where dust, residues, and fluids leave a lasting fingerprint on human health.
The uncomfortable truth is latency. Low‑to‑moderate exposures, taken in with every sweep of a broom, every cut of a disc, every lift of a drum, every hour around fuels and degreasers, rarely trigger an incident report. They build quietly under heat and exertion. The bill often arrives 10–40 years later as chronic respiratory disease, cardiovascular problems, or exposure‑associated cancers (including haematological malignancies). By then, units have disbanded, notebooks have been boxed or binned, and the link between a dusty floor in a shattered shed and a midlife diagnosis is far harder to prove.
Operational realities widen this gap. Operational tempo prioritises throughput over sampling; industrial hazards are treated as background noise; and protection is a general issue, not task-specific. In many theatres, the ethos was to get the job done. Keeping the lines moving eclipsed health and safety. The result? Too many logisticians carry “silent” injuries, not the wounds of a firefight, but the legacy of the estate underfoot.
Latency‑linked conditions to flag (illustrative, not exhaustive)
Sarcoidosis (months–years; sometimes later): an inflammatory granulomatous disease with recognised associations to inhaled particulates and combustion by-products (e.g., burn-pit smoke, fuel/solvent aerosols, mineral/metallic dusts, silica). In military logistics contexts, credible exposure pathways include routine work around burn pits, JP-8/Avtur/Avgas combustion products, and dust-rich industrial sites.
Solvents & fuels (5–25 yrs): Benzene and organic solvents are associated with haematological malignancies (e.g., AML, MDS, NHL); some degreasers are linked in studies to kidney/liver effects.
PCBs/dioxins (incl. Agent Orange/TCDD) (5–30+ yrs): non‑Hodgkin lymphoma, some soft‑tissue sarcomas, type 2 diabetes, chloracne.
Metals (varies): chromium VI → lung cancer; lead → neurological/haematological effects; cadmium → renal dysfunction and some cancers.
These are associations, not diagnoses. Individual risk depends on dose, duration, task and personal factors. The point is to signpost credible possibilities so exposure logging and follow‑up aren’t dismissed as “speculative”.
Illustrative exposure pathways reported by NZ logisticians
JP-8/Avtur/Avgas used to burn excrement (latrine waste disposal) → mixed hydrocarbon and particulate inhalation.
Proximity to burn pits for waste/rubbish disposal → complex combustion plume with fine particulates and mixed toxicants.
Asbestos exposure in damaged facilities — notably Somalia and Timor-Leste.
Pyrethrin-based insecticide ‘fogging’ for mosquitoes — operators in PPE while nearby logisticians worked without task-specific respiratory protection.
Silica and heavy dusts from industrial sites — e.g., Bougainville, living/working inside a large copper-mine building.
Somalia shows how routine logistics create hidden exposures
From late 1992 to July 1994, New Zealand rotated a dedicated Supply Platoon (43-strong, with an attached infantry section) through Mogadishu. The job was prosaic and relentless: a warehouse on the airport’s north ramp, a standing stores presence inside the port, and long days pushing relief tonnage through shattered infrastructure, at one point over 1,000 tonnes in a single month.
The ground itself told the story. Movements threaded past the ruins of an oil depot and fuel farms; across coral-sand and concrete dust; through mixed cargo residues (fertiliser, cement) laminated with marine oils and solvents; past derelict aircraft still weeping fluids, plus the familiar companions of collapse: metals, asbestos fragments, and sewage-affected water.
Protection was largely standard kit, helmets, frag vests, uniforms, rather than any specialist respiratory or dermal protection you’d expect in an industrial clean-up. The then-issue light fragmentation vest was widely regarded as unsuitable for the operating environment: confidence-boosting, yes; protective against chronic industrial exposures, no. Dress and load carriage reflected the heat and tempo more than hazard control (UN blue caps/baseball caps, PASGT helmets variably covered; relaxed working dress; webbing often set aside to work in vehicles and warehouses).
That is why ordinary tasks, sweeping bays, slinging pallets, cutting and rigging, refuelling, and marshalling MHE on contaminated hard-standing, can have extraordinary consequences years later when no one records what’s in the dust.
A recurring pattern across theatres
This is not an anomaly; it is a template visible across a century of New Zealand service:
World Wars — depots, docks, railheads (1914–19; 1939–45). Coal soot, cordite fumes, leaded petrol and chlorinated solvents in workshops; asbestos in roofing and lagging; cement and lime dust from rapid rebuilds. Throughput trumped surveys: trains to marshal, ships to turn, vehicles to repair. Hygiene focused on infection and water; industrial toxicology barely featured, so exposure notes were rare.
Korea — Kure and the Commonwealth base (1950–53). A sprawling pre-existing industrial estate re-tasked for logistics: oils, solvents and paints in abundance, metals and asbestos in shipyard fabric. NZ personnel moved through a machine built for output; documentation captured receipts and readiness, not the air and dust they worked in.
Malaya, Borneo and Singapore–Malaysia (1948–66; presence to 1989). Workshops and airstrips required fuels, degreasers, and hydraulic fluids as routine background; insecticides/defoliants were widely used; accommodations and facilities were still in the asbestos era. These were “normal” garrison tasks under tropical conditions, with latency risks unrecognised, and site hazards seldom logged.
Vietnam — Vũng Tàu and beyond (1964–72). Waste burning near lines of communication, pervasive dust, fuels/solvents, and herbicide-affected environments. Integration into Australian support chains normalised the setting; recognition came decades later at the cohort level, while many individual exposure trails remained thin.
Bougainville (1990s). Accommodation and work areas inside a large copper-mine building exposed personnel to silica-rich and metallic dust under hot, enclosed conditions.
Balkans — Bosnia/Kosovo rotations (mid-1990s–2000s). Logistics hubs established inside bomb-scarred industrial zones: transformer yards with PCBs, refineries, vehicle plants; warehouses with demolition dust and solvent films. Early-entry imperatives (“get the flow moving”) routinely outpaced site characterisation.
Timor-Leste (1999–2002). Burnt-out Indonesian-era facilities with asbestos roofing, ad-hoc waste pits, and heavy cement/brick dust from rapid repairs. Logbooks recorded cargo and convoy timings; personal exposure records were typically maintained only in the event of an incident.
Afghanistan (2003–2013). High-altitude fine dusts, continuous diesel exhaust, widespread solvent degreasing, and transits through hubs with burn-adjacent histories. The hazards were familiar yet diffuse, cumulative, not catastrophic, and thus rarely captured in neat exposure sheets.
Iraq — Taji and hub transits (from 2015). Flightline dusts, fuels/solvents, and the legacy of burn pits at specific coalition bases; constant MHE movements on contaminated hard standing. Unit logs were excellent for consignments and training cycles; environmental notes were sporadic and incident-driven.
The common pattern
Occupy damaged or industrialised ground → work at pace → accept “background” contamination as the price of tempo. Ordinary logistic tasks, such as sweeping, cutting, rigging, refuelling, and marshalling MHE, become exposure pathways, and latency hides the bill until long after the paperwork stops.
Why proof is missing — and why that shouldn’t be fatal
Exposures often fail to appear in files because command salience sits with security and throughput; coalitions churn and records fragment; hygiene doctrine long prioritised infection and water over industrial toxicology; and latency outlasts memory. Compounding this, many hazards that are now recognised and routinely mitigated, legacy asbestos, diesel-exhaust particulates and cumulative solvent exposure were, even less than thirty years ago, poorly understood or not considered in planning, PPE issues, or environmental reconnaissance. That is why Parliament enacted the Veterans’ Support Act 2014 (VSA): a benevolent, merits-based scheme that requires decision-makers to act reasonably, apply natural justice, and ensure equal treatment of equal claims.
Two schemes, same principles
The VSA operates
Scheme One (older cohorts/legacy service) and
Scheme Two (modern deployments from 1 April 1974 onwards, with a stronger rehabilitation focus).
Both schemes operate under the Act’s principle of benevolence. New Zealand adopts medical-scientific Statements of Principles (SoPs) from Australia’s Repatriation Medical Authority. Each SoP lists causal factors that, if present, link a condition to service. Two standards of proof apply: Reasonable Hypothesis (RH) for warlike/non-warlike (operational) service, a pro-veteran, lower threshold; and Balance of Probabilities (BoP) for peacetime/routine service, a higher threshold.
How decisions should run in practice.
If a relevant SoP exists, Veterans’ Affairs New Zealand (VANZ) tests the claim against it.
If the RH test is met for qualifying operational service, the claim must be accepted.
If no SoP applies or a SoP cannot neatly capture cumulative exposure, **section 15** applies: VANZ must accept the claim if it is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis based on the facts, unless there are reasonable grounds to believe it is not service‑related. This is the statutory safety‑net for thin or fragmented records.
Where veterans get tripped up when making a claim
Here is where the machinery breaks down: a process that treats missing records as the veteran’s problem and turns a benevolent scheme into an adversarial grind.
Thin records → heavy proof load on the veteran. Requests for exposure logs, sampling data, or site surveys that never existed end up weaponising the gaps the system created.
SoPs treated as gates, not guides. Complex, cumulative or novel exposures (multiple deployments, solvents, PCB yards) don’t map neatly to Statements of Principles, yet section 15 isn’t used early to accept a reasonable hypothesis.
Insurer-style posture. The process can feel adversarial, with repeated demands for “more” evidence, credibility challenges, and narrow readings of medical reports, especially when records are scarce.
Delay as denial. Multi-stage reconsideration/review/appeal stretches months into years; terminally ill veterans can die before resolution, or families inherit the burden mid-grief.
The state holds the data, while the veteran bears the risk. VANZ sits within NZDF, the institution with the records and institutional knowledge; yet, the evidential burden often rests with the ill claimant.
Language and culture mismatch. Claims framed like welfare applications rather than an earned entitlement under a State-fault scheme erode trust and deter engagement (contemporary veteran uptake is reported as extremely low).
If New Zealand truly values those who keep the lines moving, Veterans’ Affairs and the NZDF must do better: shift their efforts from surge-time forms to credible post-tour evidence so that tomorrow’s veteran has a fair shot.
When proof is already thin: build a triangle of proof
Site history: industrial uses, conflict damage, spill/burn areas, foam pads, mining legacies, and why it was dirty.
Medical trajectory: onset windows, peers with similar issues, GP/specialist notes and screening results.
Conclusion
Operationally, the principal danger to military logisticians is often not incoming fire but the estate underfoot, ground that must be made serviceable at pace and under pressure. Somalia serves as a national wake-up call: ordinary logistics in extraordinary environments, mainly undertaken in general-issue kit, with little of the exposure ever documented. Many hazards now recognised and routinely mitigated, such as legacy asbestos, diesel particulates, PCB yards, and cumulative solvent loads, were poorly understood or not considered less than thirty years ago, which only widens today’s evidential gaps.
Even so, that counsel comes too late for many operations up to the early 2000s, when industrial hazards were poorly understood and exposure logs were uncommon. Even if the chaos of early entry cannot be redesigned, commanders and agencies can still complete the process correctly by creating a usable record. A succinct post-tour bundle, filed with personnel records and the unit archive, should include:
a task/location timeline,
sketch maps and photographs of sites worked,
a note of known or likely prior industrial uses,
brief witness statements,
unit diaries and load/consignment lists,
and GP/screening notes (e.g., spirometry where relevant).
Decades later, this modest package can be the difference between a fair hearing and a polite denial. Where no bundle exists for historic tours, assemble the best available reconstruction from diaries, photos, unit logs, site histories, and medical notes.
On the claims side, practice should match principle. Decision-making ought to reflect the benevolent, merits-based intent of the law; use multiple pathways (SoPs and reasonable-hypothesis routes); and adopt a culture that investigates rather than contests. Independent oversight, separate from VANZ and NZDF, would help ensure that the absence of paperwork does not become the absence of justice.
New Zealand’s logistic contribution to the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) during the Second World War is too often glimpsed only in passing—scattered lines in campaign narratives or one-line entries in corps lists. This article assembles, for the first time, a clear, consolidated register of New Zealand logistics units that sustained 2NZEF across its principal theatres of war: North Africa & the Middle East (1940–43), Greece & Crete (1941), and Italy (1943–45). The scope is deliberately bounded, focusing solely on New Zealand formations and excluding the numerous Allied logistics organisations—RASC, RAOC, REME, and those of the Indian, South African, Australian, Canadian, and United States forces—that operated alongside them.
Join up of Tobruk garrison and the 8th Army at Tobruk, Libya, during World War II. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch Ref: DA-01668-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23108170
Context: Establishment and early expansion of 2NZEF logistics
The outbreak of war necessitated the creation of the 2NZEF as a new, expeditionary force, distinct from existing Territorial and regular Army structures. Its logistical backbone had to be built at speed—leveraging what existed at home, but scaling far beyond it. Under Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Crump, the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) began forming for overseas service almost immediately. Within a week of mobilisation, Territorial soldiers and civilian volunteers were concentrated at Papakura, Ngāruawāhia, Trentham, and Burnham for intensive training, laying the foundations for a motorised division sustained by transport, fuel, and supply-chain units.
Ordnance functions for the expeditionary force were organised under a newly established New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC)—separate from the domestically focused NZAOC. Led by Colonel Joseph King as Director of Ordnance Services, the NZOC was raised largely from scratch by drawing on NZAOC depot personnel and civilian staff. A key innovation was the introduction of Light Aid Detachments (LADs) attached to front-line units for rapid repairs, with Captain Sinclair Banks Wallace, the Ordnance Mechanical Engineer, instrumental in recruiting and training these cadres.
Deployment and scaling
The 2NZEF deployed in three major echelons (Advance Party; First Echelon to Egypt, February 1940; Third Echelon to Egypt, September 1940; Second Echelon first to Britain, then joining in Egypt, March 1941). Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg exercised broad administrative autonomy to establish bases, lines of communication, and procurement outside constrained British channels where necessary. On arrival in Egypt, New Zealand logisticians met a Middle East theatre strained by post-Dunkirk shortages. The original logistics structure proved insufficient for a fully motorised division, prompting rapid expansion across supply, transport, maintenance, and repair to meet the demands of desert warfare—an effort that would underpin operations in North Africa & the Middle East (1940–43), Greece & Crete (1941), and Italy (1943–45).
NZASC Divisional supply & transport
Diamond T Tank Transporter of 18 Tank Transporter Company
NZASC Headquarters (Divisional)
NZ Divisional Supply Column → 2 NZ Divisional Supply Company (renamed 1942; disbanded 8 Oct 1945)
2 NZ Divisional Petrol Company (disbanded 8 Oct 1945)
2 NZ Divisional Ammunition Company
Second Ammunition Company formed Nov 1942 (both disbanded 8 Oct 1945)
4 Reserve Mechanical Transport (RMT) Company (disbanded 8 Oct 1945)
6 Reserve Mechanical Transport (RMT) Company (raised 1942; disbanded Nov 1944)
Specialised divisional units
14 NZ Anti-Aircraft Regiment ASC Section
1 NZ Ambulance Transport Unit
18 NZ Tank Transport Company (From 1942)
2 NZ Field Bakery Section (later expanded outputs)
1 NZ Mule Pack Company (1943)
NZ Water Issue Section
NZ Tank Delivery Troop → Forward Delivery Squadron
NZ Jeep Platoon
Base & Lines of Communication (Middle East/Italy)
Headquarters Base ASC
later 6 NZ Division ASC (for deception), then HQ NZASC Maadi Camp → absorbed into NZ Maadi Camp Composite Company (continued to 26 Feb 1946)
NZ Base Training Depot (disbanded 1944) → NZ Advanced Base ASC Training Depot (Italy, to mid-1945)
Base Transport Depot → 17 NZ General Transport Company (LoC transport; integrated into NZ Maadi Camp Composite Company in 1945)
NZ Field Bakery → NZ Catering Depot (disbanded 1944)
NZ Cookery School (assumed catering training functions)
100 Detail Issue Depot (DID)
101 Detail Issue Depot (DID)
NZOC Depots, parks, training & specialist units
A group of NZAOD personnel in Italy, 1944. Front Row: H.D. Bremmer, R.G James, 2nd Lieutenant H.J. Mackridge, N.G. Hogg, G.P. Seymour. Back Row: WO2 Worth, D.S Munroe, G Caroll, Charles Joseph Moulder, Francis William Thomas Barnes, H Rogers, C.W Holmes, W Wallace, N Denery. Photo: Defence Archive Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library.
New Zealand Base Ordnance Depot (NZ BOD) – Middle East hub
1 NZ BOD (Egypt; from 16 Feb 1944)
2 NZ BOD (Italy; from 16 Feb 1944)
New Zealand Advanced Ordnance Depot (NZAOD) – forward mobile depot; later integrated into OFP as an Advanced Ordnance Section (Feb 1944)
NZ Stores Convoy Unit – sub-unit of 2 NZ BOD for long-haul LoC lifts
Ordnance Field Park (OFP) – divisional forward supply/repair park
NZ Divisional Mobile Laundry and Forward Decontamination Unit →NZ Divisional Mobile Laundry from Mar 1942 (Disbanded Sept 1942)
NZ Divisional Bath Unit (Disbanded Sept 1942)
NZ Base Laundry (from Sept 1942) → NZ Mobile Laundry (From 1 Oct 1943) → NZ Mobile Laundry and Bath Unit
Salvage Unit – battlefield recovery and salvage
Armourers’ School of Instruction (NZ BOD) – weapons maintenance training
NZ BODs, NZAOD, OFP and remaining NZOC units – formally disbanded by 26 Feb 1946.
New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NZEME) — formed 1 Dec 1942 (from NZOC repair/maintenance functions).
Members of 10 Light Aid Detachment, NZ Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, attached to 5 NZ Fd Park Coy, changing truck engine, probably at Burbeita. Man in peaked cap identified as Lt G D Pollock, later Col Pollock. Taken circa 1941 by an official photographer. Ref: DA-01035-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22485028
Light Aid Detachments (LADs)
9 NZ LAD (4 Field Regiment) — disbanded 15 Dec 1945
1 NZ Port Detachment — Suez HQ; formalised 20 Dec 1942; disbanded 1 Nov 1945.
2 NZ Port Detachment — Benghazi → Tripoli; disbanded 30 Jan 1946.
3 NZ Port Detachment — Bari (Italy); formed 8 Nov 1943; disbanded 26 Feb 1946.
Medical Supply (NZMC within NZEF)
NZ Medical Stores Depot — established Oct 1940 (Capt Gordon Peek); disbanded 26 Feb 1946.
Corps-level supply nodes
New Zealand Field Maintenance Centre (FMC) – Section “A” → 1 NZ FMC — formed 18 Oct 1941, redesignated 5 Dec 1941; operated to 27 Apr 1942; recalled and disbanded 2 May 1942.
New Zealand Field Maintenance Centre (FMC) – Section “B” → 2 NZ FMC — formed 18 Oct 1941, redesignated 5 Dec 1941; operated to 27 Apr 1942; recalled and disbanded 2 May 1942.
Note: Thereafter, 2NZEF drew from higher-Corps FMCs (numbered series, e.g., “50s” for XIII Corps, “60s” for XXX Corps) manned by British troops.
New Zealand’s Second Front: 2NZEF (Pacific), 1940–44
The 2NZEF raised a distinct Pacific Section to defend Fiji, initially centred on 8 Infantry Brigade which landed on Viti Levu in November 1940. After Japan entered the war, the force expanded to two brigades and was formally designated as the Pacific Section, 2NZEF, under Major General Owen Mead. When the United States 37th Division assumed the Fiji garrison, the New Zealand formation redeployed home. The Pacific Section subsequently became the 3rd New Zealand Division, the 2NZEF’s primary formation in the Pacific. After a period of training in New Zealand, the Division fought as tailored brigade groups in the Solomon Islands campaign of 1943–44—specifically, on Vella Lavella, the Treasury Islands, and the Green Islands—rather than as a whole three-brigade division.
In early 1944, a national manpower crisis—balancing the need for two overseas divisions with the requirement for essential agricultural and industrial output—forced a strategic choice. Following consultation with British and United States authorities, Wellington prioritised the 2nd Division in Italy; the 3rd Division was withdrawn to New Caledonia in June, returned to New Zealand in August, and was formally disbanded on 20 October 1944. Roughly 4,000 veterans were posted to reinforce the 2nd Division; the remainder demobilised to civilian roles.
Against this operational backdrop, the Division built a theatre-specific sustainment system aligned to US logistics. NZASC carried out reception, trunking, rations, POL, and field services; NZOC managed receipt/issue, accounting, repair, and recovery—and unlike the Middle East, first- and second-line repair remained within NZOC (no NZEME split). The model was proven in Fiji (1940–42) and then scaled in New Caledonia (late 1942–44):
Fiji (1940–42)
Fiji was New Zealand’s first defended base in the South Pacific and the springboard for later operations. From late 1940, the NZASC and NZOC established an island-wide sustainment network—port reception, road/rail/coastal lighterage, depots, and first- and second-line repair—that matured into the model carried forward to New Caledonia and the Solomons.
NZASC
Headquarters, Divisional ASC (cadre) — policy/trunking coordination as the garrison approached divisional strength.
4th Composite Company — Suva/Samabula: port clearance, ration issues, local lift to 8 Infantry Brigade Group.
16th Composite Company — Lautoka/Namaka/Nadi (from January 1942): western area support to 14 Infantry Brigade and RNZAF at Nadi.
Reserve Motor Transport (New Zealand & Fiji Sections) — vehicle assembly, convoying, inter‑island interfaces, and surge trunking.
Movement Control detachments — Suva and Lautoka wharf organisation and clearance.
NZOC
DADOS office — technical control and accounting; integration with NZASC issues and returns.
Base Ordnance Depot — Suva/Samabula/Tamavua: receipt/issue/returns; armoury; tailoring/textiles (uniform and tent repair).
Divisional Ordnance Workshops — HQ/Main (east) with B‑section (west): MT and armament repair; roving fitters; instrument work as capacity grew.
Ammunition points — segregation by nature, humidity mitigation, and range supply/accounting.
Fiji Section (from mid‑1942) — residual ordnance/workshop capacity supporting the Fiji Infantry Brigade Group and RNZAF Nausori after divisional redeployment.
Light Aid Detachments
20 Light Aid Detachment — arrived November 1940; first‑line repair/recovery for 8 Brigade; based initially at Suva/Nasese area.
36 Light Aid Detachment — arrived early 1942; supported Fiji Infantry Brigade Group and residual tasks.
37 Light Aid Detachment — arrived early 1942; aligned to 14 Brigade; forward tasks in western area.
Medical Stores
Advanced Depot of Medical Stores (ADMS): Set up at Tamavua Hospital in 1941 (one sergeant, one private, one dispenser).- equipped two hospitals, two light field ambulances, a convalescent depot, an infectious-diseases hospital, and RAPs for two brigade groups.
Norfolk Island (N‑Force), 1942–44
New Zealand agreed with US command to garrison Norfolk Island in late 1942. N‑Force was a weak brigade‑type grouping (~1,483 personnel over its lifetime) with limited vehicles (≈117 total), requiring tight movement schedules, careful road maintenance, and high utilisation of scarce transport.
NZASC
Composite/MT Detachments — local distribution, ration issues, POL, and engineer/AA ammunition lift under island constraints.
Movement Control — wharf/boat‑landing control, surf boat interfaces, and cross‑decking to lighter craft.
Field Bakery Detachment — bread supply for the garrison as required.
NZOC
Ordnance & MT Workshop Section — first‑/second‑line repair retained within NZOC (no NZEME split in the Pacific).
Ordnance Section — receipt/issue/returns, clothing/textiles, and ammunition accounting adjusted to island stockholding levels.
Tonga (T‑Force), 1942–44
T‑Force, based around 16 Infantry Brigade Group, garrisoned Tonga from late 1942. The force totalled ~860 personnel and was issued ≈221 vehicles (as at February 1943), reflecting greater mobility demands across dispersed sites and the need to interface with US movement plans.
NZASC
Composite/MT Detachments — port clearance, ration and water distribution, and inter‑island/airfield runs.
Movement Control — coordination with US shipping/air movements; beach‑landing control where required.
Field Bakery Detachment — bread supply for garrison and detachments.
Ordnance Section — depot functions (receipt/issue/returns), clothing/textiles, and ammunition handling appropriate to garrison scale.
New Caledonia (late 1942–44
After a period of reconstitution and training in New Zealand, in late 1942 the Division re-based to New Caledonia and, under US Services of Supply, consolidated a west-coast logistics corridor—from the Nouméa/Népoui ports through Base Supply Depots at Vallée de Limousin to the Bourail BOD and Moindah Workshops—knitting reception, trunking, and issue via NZASC MT/MC while first- and second-line repair remained within NZOC..
NZASC
HQ Divisional ASC (CRASC & staff) — policy, priorities, and synchronisation with US Services of Supply.
Base Supply Depot (BSD) No. 1 — Vallée de Limousin (Nouméa area) rear buffer; staging at Dumbéa.
Base Supply Depot (BSD) No. 2 — forward stocks up the west coast road system.
Movement Control Detachments — Nouméa & Népoui port/rail interfaces; launch Roa for water transport.
Camp McCrae Port Detachment (≈550 personnel) — three-shift port clearance alongside US units.
10 Reserve Motor Transport Company — HQ Moindah; swing lift and major port-clearance/worked convoys.
Composite Companies (island distribution)
4 Composite (Népoui/Plaine des Gaïacs, 8 Inf Bde);
16 Composite (Ouaco–Koumac/Taom River line, 14 Inf Bde);
29 Composite (Néméara–Bourail–Houaïlou, Div Troops).
4th Motor Ambulance Convoy (4 MAC – deployed to New Caledonia January 1943. Cars were positioned with field ambulances across the island and at 4 NZ General Hospital (Boguen/Dumbéa), Base Camp Reception Hospital (Téné) and Nouméa.
1 Field Bakery Detachments — bread supply at base/forward as required.
1 Field Butchery
Solomons (1943–44):
Guadalcanal
HQ Div ASC (fwd) staged onward movement to assault groupings; ASC elements moved via Efate on US shipping.
4 MAC linked ports, airstrips and hospitals in the evacuation chain.
Vella Lavella (18 Sep 1943
10 Motor Transport Company ran bulk dumps and onward cross-loads (engineer plant, aviation stores, ammunition).
4 MAC maintained casualty mobility under rain, raids and primitive tracks.
Treasury Islands (27 Oct 1943)
4 Motor Transport Company opened the beach-group roadhead and pushed early priorities.
4 MAC Detachment
BSD No. 2 Detachment
Field Bakery Detachment.
Green Islands/Nissan (15 Feb 1944)
16 Motor Transport Company provided the main lift;
10 MT Detachment
4 MAC Detachment.
Field Bakery Detachment.
NZOC
Base depots & workshops — New Caledonia (late 1942–44):
Base Ordnance Depot (BOD), Bourail — central distribution; textiles/tent repair capability recorded.
Divisional Ordnance Workshops, Moindah
HQ/Main Workshop
Armament Section
No 1 Recovery Section
No 2 Recovery Section
Light Aid Detachments (NZOC in Pacific):
20 LAD (Fiji 1940–42; New Caledonia/Solomons 1943–44)
36 LAD (Fiji residual 1942–43)
37 LAD (Fiji 1942; Vella Lavella 1943)
42 LAD (from Jul 1943, with 38 Field Regiment)
64 LAD (Treasury Islands 1943–44)
65 LAD (New Caledonia/Green Islands 1944)
67 LAD (New Caledonia 1943–44)
29 LAA Workshop (section) (Vella Lavella/Green)
Solomons (1943-44)
Guadalcanal (Lunga–Kukum–Matanikau)
Advanced Ordnance Depot (AOD)
Advanced Ordnance Workshops (AOW)
Armament Section
Section of HQ/Main Workshop
Recovery Sections Nos. 1 & 2
Vella Lavella
detachments of 20 & 37 LADNo. 2 Recovery Section Detachment
29 Light AA Workshop (section).
Treasury Islands (Mono & Stirling)
64 LAD as principal mechanical element; ammunition breakdown and refrigeration/distillation plant maintenance; radar support under persistent air threat.
Green Islands/Nissan (Operation SQUAREPEG) — mission-tailored
‘Squarepeg Workshop’ combining vehicle/artillery/instrument trades with radar and a tank workshop section; reduced parties from 20 & 65 LAD; small 29 LAA Workshop team.
Medical Stores
New Caledonia (late 1942–44
ADMS: established a large warehouse at Téné (Racecourse Camp)
Too often in military writing, it looks as if logistics “just happens”: an army is raised, equipment appears, stocks refill, and movement unfolds as if by instinct. In truth, nothing “just happens”. Across history—from spear-carriers and baggage trains to War Establishments and to today’s financially risk-averse, resource-restricted ecosystem—the science and art of logistics have quietly driven everything. This study uses history as a working tool: we read past practice to extract durable principles so tomorrow’s logisticians can scale deliberately, not by habit. Scaling is the mechanism that turns intent into counted people, platforms, rations, ammunition, repair parts, and lift so units arrive equipped, stay maintained, and fight at tempo. Without scaling, logistics is only an aspiration.
This guide sets out that mechanism in plain English. Across the force, the same logic applies: decide who gets what, make equipment complete and auditable, package predictably for movement, size, repair, depth to reliability and lead time, and maintain theatre resilience. Peace and war establishments are simply the entitlement “switch”; in-scaling and out-scaling dial the system up and down; and sound master data keeps automation honest. We ground the method in British and Commonwealth doctrine and New Zealand practice, using short case studies to show what works, what doesn’t, and why—so logisticians can make the deliberate, evidence-based choices that turn plans into assured sustainment.
In- and Out-Scaling
Scaling is how the system is dialled up or down. In-scaling builds people, equipment, stocks and permissions to meet a new or larger task. Out-scaling winds the same back down, tidying books and kit so the force is ready for what follows. The levers are the same; they move in opposite directions.
When to scale up
New equipment or a role change.
Mounting for deployment/exercises.
Seasonal/theatre shifts or higher tempo.
When to scale down
End of operation/rotation.
Capability withdrawn or mothballed.
Restructure or budget-driven footprint reduction.
What actually changes
People & entitlements: switch Peace Entitlement →War Entitlement, or role, issue the correct allowance lists.
Equipment completeness: make kit complete; rectify shortages; test.
Consumables & ammunition: set straightforward block issues and first-line loads that match the plan.
Spares & repair: size unit/depot spares to likely failures and lead times; preserve kit for storage/return.
Movement & footprint: translate scales into real loads (pallets/containers/ULDs) and book lift.
Data, compliance & money: update masters, licences and registers; close work orders; reconcile ledgers.
Planned and evidence-based (not guesses)
Scaling is a scientific, planned discipline with explicit service levels. Holdings are set from demand, reliability and lead-time data. Rules of thumb—for example, “carry 10% spares”—are avoided in favour of sizing to the target service level.
Common Pitfalls (and the Scaling Fixes)
Scaling is part science, part art. Some of the traps are timeless:
Issuing too much– Forgetting to adjust entitlements to actual strength leads to waste.
Repair underestimates– Peacetime spares won’t cope with wartime tempo; you need to scale for climate, usage, and lead times.
Lift blindness– A plan that looks neat on paper may be impossible to move unless scales are mapped to pallets, containers, or aircraft loads.
Footprint risk– Piling too much stock too far forward makes units vulnerable. Balance depth with dispersion.
Deep Historical Context: From Hoplite to Legionary to Tümen
From antiquity to the steppe, Rome and—centuries later—the Mongol Empire show how standardised building blocks, fixed measures and modular kits turned formations into predictable logistics: the Romans through contubernia, rations and marching camps; the Mongols through decimal organisation, remounts and the yam relay.
Greek city-states (c. 6th–4th centuries BCE): The Phalanx as a Scale
Standard fighting load. The hoplite panoply (shield, spear, helmet, body armour) functioned as a personal equipment scale; city‑states enforced patterns so men fought as interchangeable blocks.
Rations and measures. Planning by standard measures (e.g., set grain issues per man per day) made food and water predictable, and hence movable.
Formation → sustainment. Dense heavy infantry implied slower roads and higher baggage/forage demand—an early proof that formation design fixes the sustainment scale (wagons, pack animals, camp followers).
Rome (c. 2nd century BCE – 3rd century CE): Scaling by Modular Blocks and Doctrine
Contubernium as the “unit set.” Eight soldiers shared a mule, tent, tools and cooking gear—a micro‑scale that multiplied cleanly to centuries, cohorts and legions.
“Marius’ mules.” Standardising the soldier’s carry (a first-line load) reduced trains forward, while heavier impedimenta marched to the rear—an ancestor of today’s 1st line vs 2nd line.
Daily ration and marching camp. Fixed grain allowances, routine camp layouts, ditch/stake quantities, and normalised road days enable staff to convert order of battle into tonnage, tools, time, and space—the essence of scaling.
State supply. The Annona, roads and depots added a strategic tier of standardised contracts, weights and distances—scaling endurance to seasons, not days.
The Roman Cohort Illustration by Peter Dennis. Credit: Warlord Games Ltd.
The Mongol Empire under Chinggis (Genghis) Khan (13th century): Decimal Organisation and Portable Sustainment
Decimal structure = instant multipliers. Arban (10), zuun (100), mingghan (1,000), tümen (10,000) created a universal grammar of scale: equip and feed an arban, and you can multiply to a tümen without changing the recipe.
Remounts as a ration of mobility. A scale of remount horses per warrior standardised range and resilience; spare mounts were the mobility equivalent of extra fuel cans.
Self-contained field kits. Common personal kits (bows in standard bundles, lariats, spare strings, tools, felt gear) and household tents/carts made each decimal block logistically modular.
The yam relay. A state courier/relay network with post‑stations and passes pre‑scaled communications and light logistics into predictable legs.
Task‑tailored attachments. Siege/engineering blocks bolted onto the cavalry core when required—early attachments on a standard base.
Genghis Khan’s empire and campaigns. Wikimedia
Throughline: A formation is a logistics equation. Standard measures enable standard issues. Modularity makes mass possible.
The Nineteenth‑Century Step Change — Britain’s Army Equipment System (1861–66)
In the reform decades after Crimea, the War Office published the seven‑part Army Equipment series (Artillery; Cavalry; Infantry; Royal Engineers; Military Train; Commissariat; Hospital).[1] Each volume tied official organisation to authorised equipment lists, weights, measures (often prices), transport tables, and packing/marking rules. Once you knew the unit—infantry battalion, artillery battery, engineer company, or Military Train echelon—you could multiply the lists and convert entitlements into lift and sustainment. Support arms were treated as modular blocks (e.g., Commissariat trades; Hospital sets) scaled to force size and role.
What changed: This turned scaling into a published operating system for logistics—standard nomenclature matched ledgers; weights and measures turned entitlement into tonnage; common patterns let staff scale issues, movement and maintenance simply by multiplying unit counts.
Example of a table from Army Equipment. Part V. Infantry 1865
Peace vs War Establishment — The Scaling “Switch”
Establishments are the authorised blueprints for people, vehicles, weapons, tools and key stores—held in two states:
Peace Establishment (PE): Cadre‑heavy and economical (training scales, minimal transport; many posts unfilled; war‑only items held centrally).
War Establishment (WE): Fully manned and fully equipped (complete Equipment and first/second‑line holdings; authorised transport and attachments—signals, medical, supply/transport, maintenance—baked in).
Mobilisation tops up PE to WE: fill personnel (Regulars/Reservists/Territorials), issues unit entitlement, builds lift and repair depth, loads first-line holdings, form attachments, and declares readiness. Because WEs link directly to scales, a unit can be multiplied and supported predictably. In service terms, the scaled package is then delivered through various types of support—integral, close, general, and mounting—each tailored to those entitlements and holdings.
Types of support.
Integral — organic, first-line support within the unit. (1st Line)
Close — formation troops forward, delivering time-sensitive commodities and quick repair/recovery. (2nd Line)
General — force-level support to the whole formation (bulk stocks, distribution, heavy repair). (3rd line; sometimes spans to 4th depending on the army)
Mounting — generating/equipping/marshalling the force before deployment. (a pre-deployment phase, not a “line”)
(Illustrative maxim) Alter one allowance, alter the lift: add a blanket per man, and you add wagons to the transport scale. Scaling is a system—inputs ripple into horses, drivers and wagons.
Late Victorian to 1914 — Scaling Rehearsed in Peace (NZ)
New Zealand did not drift into World War I. In the years following the war in South Africa and especially under the Territorial Force (from 1910), planners adapted British military establishments to practical peacetime scales and rehearsed them. Camp equipment was centralised and issued according to published scales for the 1913 brigade camps. Districts drew against these scales, and returns/refurbishment were managed according to plan. To ensure the issue/return machine functioned efficiently, temporary Ordnance Depots were established for the 1913 camps (and again for the 1914 divisional camps), staffed with clerks and issuers under regional storekeepers—so requisition, issue, receipt, and repair all followed a single process.[2]
Example of New Zealand Camp Equipment Scale 1913
In parallel, the Defence Stores professionalised: permanent District Storekeepers were appointed, and an intensive store management course produced Quartermaster Sergeants for every infantry and mounted regiment, tightening the link between unit ledgers and district depots. By early 1914, the force had been inspected and judged to be well-armed and well-equipped, and mobilisation regulations—adapted from British directives—were issued in March 1914, aligning establishments, ledgers, and stocks.[3] The result was a pre‑war system that treated scaling as a living routine, not an emergency improvisation.
World Wars & Interwar — Scaling at Industrial Tempo (UK & NZ), 1914–45
First World War (1914–18).
The British Army’s War Establishments and matching scales of equipment underwrote rapid expansion from Regulars to Territorials to Kitchener’s New Armies.[4] New formations could be raised and fitted out by template—weapons, tools, transport, ammunition, clothing, medical stores and repair parts, all mapped from the WE. For a smaller force such as New Zealand, alignment with British establishments and scales enabled swift mobilisation and five years of sustained operations.
Saddlers Toolkit – Handbook of Military Artificers 1915
Interwar (1919–39)
Rather than a pause, this period saw refinement and governance of scaling. G1098 (AFG1098) matured as the unit‑level ledger linking establishment to holdings; mobilisation store tables and Clothing/Equipment Regulations were revised; Dominion practice tightened accounting controls and depot procedures. From 1935, although New Zealand lacked a standing field army, planners tracked British developments closely—each new War Establishment, scale and entitlement as it was published—and adapted them to local conditions (manpower, industry, shipping distances and climate). Thus, when mobilisation began in 1939–40, New Zealand could raise, equip, and structure its forces on modern British templates, rather than through improvisation.
Second World War (1939–45)
Scaling went fully industrial. Theatre-specific clothing scales, bulk demand procedures for ordnance, formal first/second‑line holdings, and push vs pull replenishment methods were used to keep tempo while protecting scarce lift and stocks. Units continued to work to WE/scale templates, with depots, railheads and parks sized to the calculated flows.[5]
Ammunition Loads – Ordnance Manual (War) 1939
Case Study — Greece 1941: mis-scaled ordnance support
Context. In March 1941, the New Zealand Division deployed three Independent New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC) Brigade Workshops and eleven LADs to Greece, with the attached British Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) 1 Ordnance Field Park (1 OFP) providing forward spares and stores.[6] Pre-deployment consultation was thin; scaling assumptions followed British fleet patterns rather than New Zealand holdings.
What went wrong (the scaling error).
Wrong spares mix. 1 OFP was scaled for Internationals and Crossleys; the NZ Division fielded neither in any number (only two Crossleys), so much of the forward lift didn’t match the fleet it had to support.
Assumptive, not analytical. Holdings mirrored generic expectations instead of the Division’s actual G1098s, failure rates, and service-level targets.
Coalition data gap. Equipment data and entitlement tables weren’t reconciled across national lines before movement.
Consequences in theatre.
Readiness lost at the point of need. Lift and time were consumed carrying low-utility spares forward.
Workarounds required. Support hinged on the subset that did match (e.g., Ford, 25-pdr, 2-pdr, spring steel, sheet/rod metals, compressed air, general items) plus local supplementation—enough to keep NZ Workshops going, but with friction and delay.
Campaign outcome. The Greek campaign collapsed into evacuation (and then Crete), compounding the cost of the initial scaling miss.
Fix and regeneration (the recovery).
Rebuild in Egypt. NZOC consolidated with RAOC/Maadi resources and formed the NZ Divisional OFP on 28 July 1941, explicitly scaled to NZ kits.
Deliberate scale-up. Through August–September the OFP built to scale, trained on ordnance accounting, and aligned data to reality.
Right-sized footprint. By late 1941 the OFP held 4 officers, 81 ORs and 27 three-ton lorries configured for OFP stores—turning scaling from assumption into a planned capability.
Practical fixes (what should have been done).
Make scaling scientific. Use master data, reliability/failure rates, demand and lead-time to size spares and blocks; set explicit service-level targets.
Don’t rely on rules of thumb. Ditch “10% spares” heuristics—scale to the actual fleet and mission.
Close coalition gaps early. Reconcile equipment and entitlement tables across partners before you book the lift.
Translate scales to footprint. Convert to pallets/containers/ULDs with correct packaging and documents; protect the lift.
Capture and apply lessons. After action, cleanse data, adjust, and rebuild to standard—exactly what the NZ Div OFP did after Greece/Crete.
Takeaway. Scaling only works when it’s fleet-true, data-driven and coalition-aligned. Get that right pre-deployment, and your forward park becomes a force multiplier rather than a passenger.
Post-War Evolution — From a Single List to an Integrated Entitlement System (NZ Focus)
Example of AFG1098 Accessories and Spares for Bren .303 M.G
Post-1945 fleets—communications, electrics, vehicles, and specialist plant—stretched the old, flat G1098 list. By the late 1950s–60s, practice matured into three coordinated instruments:[7]
Entitlement (Equipment) Tables— the core “who gets what” by unit role and establishment.
Complete Equipment Schedules (CES) — the “what is complete” list for each equipment set (every component, tool, accessory), doubling as the accounting document for that set.
Block Scales — pooled non-CES items and everyday consumables (stationery, training stores, domestic items) expressed as ready-to-issue blocks.
New Zealand’s tailored, Commonwealth-compatible model (1960s)
The New Zealand Entitlement Table (NZET) became the hub, explicitly incorporating New Zealand CES (NZCES) items (and their components), New Zealand Block Scales (NZBS) for non‑CES stores, and first‑line maintenance packs such as FAMTO (First Aid Mechanical Transport Outfit) and FATSO (First Aid Technical Stores Outfit) so operators could keep equipment serviceable between deeper repairs.[8]
By the early 1970s a further pillar emerged: New Zealand Repair Parts Scales (NZRPS). From the late 1960s, these began to replace earlier “spare parts lists,” folding FAMTO and FATSO in as first‑line modules of a wider repair‑chain planning scale—so unit Prescribed Load Lists (PLL) (days‑of‑cover + pipeline), formation Authorised Stockage Lists (ASLs) (service level over replenishment time) and theatre reserves were all sized from the same tempo/lead‑time/reliability factors. In short, repair provisioning became a single, scalable chain from operator kits through to depot depth.
Case Study — Malaysia & Vietnam (1965–1972): combined scaling to autonomy
Context. New Zealand kept a battalion in Malaysia/Singapore with 28 (Commonwealth) Brigade while rotating a rifle company into Vietnam under 1 ATF—three systems at once (British, Australian, NZ) with different entitlements, CES, paperwork and spares. The task was to turn them into one workable load for training in Malaysia and fighting in Phước Tuy.
What worked (the scaling approach).
One combined scale, three sources. Cross-walked UK/AUS entitlements to NZ holdings; set approved equivalents for non-matching items.
Climate-first. Tropical scales for clothing/boots/personal kit; higher replacement factors and wider size ranges.
CES by platform. Normalised vehicle/tool sets so workshops and lift could be planned regardless of source nation.
Local industrial equivalents. Qualified NZ-made clothing, boots, webbing and small stores to UK/AUS specs to cut lead-times and dependency.
Liaison & data discipline. NZ LOs embedded in 1 ATF/FARELF to keep demand, returns and credits clean; part codes aligned early.
People matched to plan. Increased NZ movements, supply and maintenance manning in Malaysia and in-theatre.
Results.
Seamless support in Vietnam. Routine sustainment via Australian pipelines; NZ-specific items flowed via Malaysia/Singapore with minimal friction.
Fewer workarounds, faster repair. Equivalence lists and aligned CES cut “near-miss” parts and sped turnarounds.
Why it mattered later.
As UK/AUS withdrew from Malaysia in the early 1970s, NZ’s habits—combined scales, clean data, boosted manning and a growing local supply base—left the battalion near-logistically independent.
NZ-made equivalents added depth and resilience, enabling New Zealand-led sustainment.
What to copy.
Build a cross-walk early and lock approved equivalents in SOPs.
Scale for climate and task (clothing, rations, POL, repair parts).
Embed liaison/data stewards with partners.
Man to the plan—grow workshops, supply and movements to match scale.
Qualify local industry to shorten lead-times and strengthen sovereignty.
Takeaway. Combine partner scales with NZ holdings, qualify local equivalents, and resource the logisticians—then a company can fight in Vietnam while a battalion trains in Malaysia, and the force is ready to stand on its own as partners draw down..
From Printed Tables to Digital Systems (1960s–today)
Until the 1980s, scaling was a manual staff drill: planners worked from printed tables, equipment series, mobilisation stores tables and unit instructions, doing the maths by hand—later with basic calculators—and re-checking totals across ledgers and load tables. With computer-based logistics, the arithmetic and cross-checks moved into software: entitlement look-ups, strength-based calculations, days-of-cover policies, lift planning from pack/weight data, and target-setting from demand history. The gains were speed, consistency, auditability and the ability to model scenarios.
Many forces—including New Zealand—progressed from electric accounting machines and mainframes to enterprise ERPs by the late twentieth century, with deployable tools to support entitlement planning. Automation expanded what staff could calculate quickly; it did not replace the need for clear, maintained scales.
Crucially, automation only works with sound data and governance. Organisations change, equipment is updated, and missions evolve; unless master data—organisational structures/establishments, item masters/part numbers, CES versions, block-scale definitions, repair parts scales and links to maintenance task lists—is kept current under change control, systems will produce inconsistent outputs. The principle is simple: keep entitlements, scales and planning factors aligned across supply, maintenance and movement. Contemporary doctrine reinforces this, emphasising information systems for visibility and decision-making, underpinned by disciplined data stewardship.
Case Study — Somalia 1993: when scaling wasn’t applied (and what changed)
Context. New Zealand contingents in Somalia (1992–94) deployed into extreme heat and vehicle-centred tasks, yet much of the kit reflected a temperate, barracks-oriented baseline—signs that entitlements and CES were not re-scaled for climate, role, or threat. To add insult to injury, the advance party deployed into an active conflict zone without weapons. Part of the reason it went wrong was that, at the time, the Army was not configured for rapid expeditionary operations.
What should have been scaled—but wasn’t. Hot-weather clothing and headgear; body armour matched to the threat; vehicle-friendly load carriage; and weapon accessories (e.g., pistol holsters) to match in-service weapons.
Consequences. Under-utilised scale (issued items set aside for improvised workarounds), inconsistent appearance/ID in theatre, and slower adaptation when the threat rose.
After-action learning—Bosnia as the correction. The Army was embarrassed by the Somalia experience and did learn. Subsequent Bosnia deployments were better resourced and equipped: theatre-specific clothing and boots were prioritised; body armour and load-carriage were selected for the task and climate; weapon ancillaries were matched before deployment; and theatre SOPs were clarified. In short, the levers of scaling were applied up-front instead of improvised in theatre.
Takeaway. Treat scaling as deliberate tradecraft before wheels-up: set climate-appropriate clothing scales, match armour and load-carriage to tasks, close ancillary gaps, and codify it all in SOPs. Do that, and the force arrives ready; skip it, and soldiers will improvise uneven fixes in contact.
Why Scaling Matters
Doctrinally, scaling underpins the core logistics principles—Responsiveness, Simplicity, Economy, Flexibility, Balance, Foresight, Sustainability, Survivability and Integration—by turning intent into standard, reusable units of effort.[9]
Budget reality. Scales translate limited resources into repeatable outputs. They allow commanders to make explicit trade-offs between cost, risk, and tempo, and they expose the carrying costs of options (people, stock, space, lift) before money is spent. In fiscally constrained settings, scales are the difference between a force that looks large and a force that lasts. (Then and Now)
Control. Replaces ad‑hoc estimates with standard, repeatable calculations.
Agility. Dial effort up for surge or down for economy without needing to rewrite plans.
Interoperability. Standard blocks and tables let allies plug in seamlessly.
Assurance. Creates an audit trail for readiness claims and expenditure.
Risk management. Ties stock depth and footprint to threat, distance and tempo.
Instruments of Scaling — Quick Guide
When logisticians talk about “scales,” they’re really talking about ways of turning entitlements on paper into real-world stocks, vehicles, or pallets. A few of the main ones are:
Tables of Entitlement – These are the official “allowance lists” for units. They can be adjusted depending on the number of people present, the role the unit is playing, or even the climate. They shape both the unit’s footprint and its initial kit issue.
CES (Complete Equipment Schedules) – Every vehicle or platform comes with a kit list. Multiply that by the number of platforms, add any mission-specific kits, and you get both the accounting baseline and a sense of what workshops and lift have to carry.
Block Scales – Think of these as pre-packed bundles: ammunition, rations, POL (petrol, oil, lubricants), water, consumables, even stationery. They’re designed in mission-length chunks that map directly onto pallets, containers, or sorties.
Ration Scales — Per-person, per-day entitlements (e.g., fresh, composite, MRE/24-hour packs). Sized by headcount and duration, with first-line holdings at unit level and theatre stocks behind them.
Fuel Scales (POL) — Daily fuel requirements derived from platform consumption and tempo (include generators/heaters). Planned as bulk and/or packaged supply with defined reserves.
Clothing & Personal Equipment Scales — Initial issue and replacement factors (boots, uniforms, cold-weather gear). Driven by climate and wear-rates; size ranges require buffer stock. Set climate-specific scales; use approved equivalents across NZ/Allied patterns
Repair Parts Scales – Units carry a few days’ worth of spares on hand, while second-line supply aims to hold enough to cover expected breakdowns over the lead time.
First-Line Ammunition – This is the starter load troops carry into action, balanced against how quickly resupply can arrive.
WMR/DOS (War Maintenance Reserve/Days of Supply) – Larger-theatre stockpiles held to cushion delays or enemy interdiction.
All of this contributes to the classic push versus pull distinction. Push works best when demand is predictable (e.g., food, water, combat supplies), while pull suits variable or diagnostic needs (e.g., spare parts, casualty evacuation). Each commodity sits somewhere on that spectrum, and stock policies need to reflect that.
Scaling in Practice — A Common Framework
The beauty of scaling is that it works at every level. The same levers—entitlements, CES, block scales, repair parts, first-line ammunition, and WMR/DOS—apply whether you’re supporting a corps or a rifle section. The only difference is the number of multiples and echelons involved.
In effect, the same logic sizes a divisional-level park to last a day and a platoon’s first-line to last an opening skirmish. A section’s water is just the smallest expression of the same logic. What matters is anchoring decisions to the wider continuum—tactical, operational, and strategic—so that what a company carries dovetails with what the theatre holds in depth.
Case Study – 3 NZ Div reverse logistics (out-scaling best practice)
Context & scale. When 3 New Zealand Division was withdrawn from the Pacific in 1944, New Zealand executed a full reverse lift and regeneration: over 50,000 line items, 3,274 vehicles (plus 25 tanks) and tonnes of ammunition and supplies were received, cleaned, repaired, repacked and re-issued or disposed of—without forklifts or computers. Mangere Crossing Camp (ex-US “Camp Euart”) became the hub, with 200,000 sq ft of warehousing and a rail siding that ran straight into the storage blocks, allowing trains to off-load directly under cover. Work parties manually handled 250,000 packages averaging 45 kg, and about 10,000 tonnes of mixed stores arrived in the first three months from August 1944; the whole evolution concluded by July 1945.[10]
Method—how it worked.
Pre-exit accounting. Quartermasters across 90 accounting units completed inventories and packing lists in New Caledonia before lift.
Reception & triage. On arrival at Mangere, loads were checked against documents, segregated by condition, and queued for cleaning/repair.
Restore for re-use. Items were cleaned, repaired and repacked to unit standard, then presented for inspection.
Audit & acceptance. Main Ordnance Depot staff and Defence auditors enforced exacting standards; discrepancies were explained and cleared before acceptance.
Disposition. Serviceable materiel moved to Trentham (Main Ordnance Depot) or Hopuhopu (Northern District); many vehicles to Sylvia Park for onward issue; surplus or damaged items were transferred to the War Assets Realisation Board for sale or disposal.
Constraints & workarounds. With no MHE or IT, the system relied on infrastructure (rail-to-warehouse flow), disciplined paperwork, and hard, organised labour. Quartermasters—often not career logisticians—proved adaptable under high audit pressure, demonstrating that well-designed processes can substitute for technology when needed.
Why this is out-scaling done right.
Treated dismantling as deliberately as build-up—planned reverse from theatre to home base.
Aligned supply, maintenance and movement tasks (clean/repair/repack embedded in the flow).
Used fixed infrastructure to compensate for missing tools (rail siding, large covered floors).
Kept data discipline central: inventories, packing lists and audits drove every hand-off.
Produced a regeneration effect—restored force elements, cleared accounts and returned value to the system—on a national scale.
Takeaway. Reverse logistics is not an afterthought. Plan the out-scaling from day one, resource the reception base, couple repair with receipt, and enforce documentation—then even a technology-light force can bring a division home cleanly and quickly.
3 NZ Division Tricks and Tanks parked at Main Ordnance Depot, Mangere Bulk Depot on their Return from the Pacific in 1944 (Colourised). Alexander Turnbull Library
Conclusion
From the hoplite’s panoply and Rome’s contubernium to the Mongol tümen; from the Victorian Army Equipment series to modern War Establishments and today’s Entitlement–CES–Block toolkit (including NZ’s FAMTO/FATSO), the lesson is constant: scaling is the lifeblood of logistics. It turns intent into counted people, platforms, ammunition, spares, and lift—precisely, repeatably, and at the tempo operations demand.
In practice, scaling provides a standard framework: entitlement tables specify who receives what; CES ensures equipment is complete and auditable; block scales package predictable consumables for movement; repair-parts scales establish first- and second-line resilience; and WMR/DOS provides theatre depth. The art is in balancing the push for predictability with the pull for diagnostic, variable demands.
This is not optional tradecraft. Every headquarters and every trade must treat scaling—and the data that underpins it—as core business. Keep establishments current, masters clean, and paper scales translated into real pallets, bookings and stocks so that automation amplifies judgment rather than propagating error. Do this and the force can surge, re-role and wind down cleanly; neglect it and you invite a modern reprise of the Crimean lesson—impressive on paper, unsustainable in contact. Scaling is how intent becomes assured movement and sustainment.
Notes
[1] The Secretary of State for War, “Part 2 – Artillery,” Manual of Army Equipment (1861), https://rnzaoc.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/army-equipment-part-2-artillery-1861.pdf; The Secretary of State for War, “Part 1 – Cavalry,” Manual of Army Equipment (1863); The Secretary of State for War, “Part 5 – Infantry,” Manual of Army Equipment (1865); The Secretary of State for War, “Part 6 – Commissariate Department,” Manual of Army Equipment (1865), https://rnzaoc.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/army-equipment-part-6-commissariat-department-1865-1.pdf; The Secretary of State for War, “Part 4 – Military Train,” Manual of Army Equipment (1865); The Secretary of State for War, “Part 7 – Hospital,” Manual of Army Equipment (1865); The Secretary of State for War, “Part 3 – Royal Engineers,” Manual of Army Equipment (1866).
[10] Francis Arthur Jarrett, “2NZEF – 2 NZ Divisional Ordnance Field Park – Report – F Jarret,” Archives New Zealand Item No R20109405 (1944); “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150 (1944); “HQ Army Tank Brigade Ordnance Units, June 1942 to January 1943,” Archives New Zealand Item No R20112168 (1943).
In the shadowed groves and ordered plots of Wellington’s Karori Cemetery lie men who changed the course of New Zealand military history—not by storming trenches or leading charges, but by ensuring those who did were fed, clothed, armed, and supported. These are not the generals whose names ring in history books, but the logisticians, armourers, storekeepers, and quartermasters—the architects of military sustainment.
Services section at Karori Cemetery
From the mud-soaked marches of the New Zealand Wars to the vast supply chains of the First and Second World Wars, these men represent a unique and vital lineage in New Zealand’s defence story. They operated behind the scenes, yet their influence extended across continents, shaping how the nation fought, survived, and recovered from conflict.
Buried at Karori Cemetery, they now rest together, forming a silent but powerful testimony to the enduring importance of military logistics. This narrative traces how their combined efforts established the logistical backbone that sustained generations of New Zealand soldiers through peace and war.
Lawn section at Karori Cemetery
Edwin Henry Bradford (1829–1901)
Plot: Public/L/28
New Zealand’s first Government Armourer, Edwin Bradford was appointed in 1864 during the New Zealand Wars. Trained at the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, he brought with him technical expertise in weapon maintenance. Serving as Armourer Sergeant during Tītokowaru’s campaign, he ensured arms were fit for purpose in some of New Zealand’s most difficult conflicts. Bradford kept the colony’s armoury functioning for nearly four decades, a quiet sentinel of colonial firepower. His work laid the foundation for the professional military armourer trade in New Zealand. He died in service in 1901, still committed to maintaining the colony’s arsenal, and his grave at Karori is the resting place of a founding figure in New Zealand’s defence support history.
Walter Laurie Christie (1833–1917)
Plot: Ch Eng 2/A/268
Christie joined the Colonial Defence Force in 1863 and served in campaigns including Wereoa and Pātea. He was later posted to the Chatham Islands during Te Kooti’s exile and oversaw prisoner infrastructure there. After transferring to the Defence Stores Department in 1868, as Assistant Armourer, Christie became a central figure in maintaining Volunteer and early Territorial Force weapons. Rising to Foreman of Stores, he worked tirelessly to support the defence force until his retirement in 1908. In 1909, he became the first New Zealander to be awarded the Imperial Service Medal. His grave symbolises the long-serving backbone of New Zealand’s logistics and technical support personnel.
John Henry Jerred (1860–1902)
Plot: Public/N/77
An engineer turned Defence Storekeeper, Jerred joined the Armed Constabulary in 1880 but lost a leg in an accidental shooting. Undeterred, he transitioned to the Defence Stores where he contributed significantly to mobilising New Zealand’s South African War contingents. He became Assistant Defence Storekeeper and was key in outfitting troops during one of the Defence Department’s most intense periods. His death in 1902 during this mobilisation effort was a loss felt deeply by his colleagues, and his grave now stands as a reminder of the pressures borne by support staff during times of national emergency.
James O’Sullivan (1855–1925)
Plot: ROM CATH/Q/12
Beginning his military career as a trooper in the Armed Constabulary, Major James O’Sullivan rose to become Director of Military Stores, spearheading the transformation of New Zealand’s military logistics between the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Joining the Defence Stores Department in 1885, he led it through modernisation, standardising stores, improving accountability, and introducing professional quartermaster training. During the South African War, he ensured the rapid equipping of New Zealand contingents and laid the groundwork for the Territorial Force’s sustainment. O’Sullivan was instrumental in enabling New Zealand’s rapid mobilisation of the NZEF in 1914, making it the first dominion to dispatch a fully equipped expeditionary force. Despite his tireless service, he became the focus of political blame during wartime scrutiny but was later vindicated. Retiring in 1918 after over three decades of service, O’Sullivan’s legacy lives on in the professional systems and structures he helped build.
Major James O’Sullivan, November 1911
Frederick Silver (1849–1925)
Plot: Ch Eng 2/F/335
A Royal Marine Artillery veteran of the Ashanti War, Frederick Silver brought valuable British military experience to New Zealand when he emigrated in the 1870s. Joining the Permanent Militia, he helped mount and manage the colony’s first coastal defence guns, trained personnel, and ensured readiness during rising imperial tensions. In 1902, he transferred to the Defence Stores Department, becoming Assistant Director of Military Stores and later Artillery Stores Accountant. Silver was responsible for managing, accounting for, and issuing artillery supplies to an expanding territorial force. His systematic approach to ordnance helped New Zealand adopt more standardised artillery logistics. He retired in 1913, having played a significant part in the professionalisation of Defence logistics and artillery supply systems.
William Thomas Beck, DSO (1865–1947)
Plot: Soldiers/P/3/11
Captain William Beck was a seasoned Defence Storekeeper who had served as the District Storekeeper in Auckland since 1903. When the First World War began, he was appointed Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services in 1914. He deployed with the NZEF and became the first New Zealander of Godley’s force ashore at Gallipoli. Known for his bravery under fire, Beck maintained the Anzac Cove beach supply point in near-constant danger from Turkish artillery. His leadership and calm demeanour earned him the Distinguished Service Order. After returning to New Zealand, he continued to serve in ordnance capacities until his retirement. Beck’s career exemplifies frontline logistics leadership, resilience, and adaptability under extreme conditions.
John Francis Hunter (1878–1967)
Plot: Ch Eng/C/253
John Hunter joined the Royal New Zealand Artillery in 1898, later transferring to the newly formed Artillery Ordnance Section in 1915. Tasked with managing ammunition manufacturing, testing, and safety, he worked to improve the reliability of New Zealand’s coastal defence munitions during and after the First World War. In 1917, he transferred to the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps and was appointed to run the Dominion’s largest ammunition depot at Mahanga Bay. There, he implemented new ammunition storage and safety procedures that became standard across the force. Retiring in 1931 as Warrant Officer Class Two, Hunter helped usher in a modern and technically competent ammunition logistics framework in New Zealand.
Alfred William Robin, KCMG, CB (1860–1935)
Plot: Public 2/L/282
Major General Alfred Robin was pivotal in New Zealand’s transition from colonial militia to a modern expeditionary force. Commander of the First Contingent to South Africa in 1899, he returned to serve as Chief of the General Staff and later Quartermaster-General during the First World War. In these roles, Robin was responsible for the entire domestic military effort: recruitment, training, equipping, and despatch of reinforcements to the NZEF abroad. A tireless administrator, he worked without leave for the entire war and was a linchpin in ensuring New Zealand’s soldiers received the support they needed. Robin’s influence reached beyond logistics—he was an institutional leader, shaping the New Zealand Military Forces for the interwar years. He retired in 1920 and contributed to youth and veterans’ organisations until his death.
Thomas Joseph King, CBE (1891–1971)
Plot: Soldiers/W/5/19
Brigadier Thomas King began his military service in the Pay Department during the First World War before transferring to the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps. He served as Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services at Gallipoli and later became Director of Ordnance Services between 1924 and 1940. King was responsible for shaping the peacetime logistics systems that would later support wartime mobilisation. During the Second World War, he was deployed as Deputy Director of Ordnance Services for the 2nd NZEF. From 1942, he was the Deputy Director of Ordnance Services for the Ninth Army in the Middle East, managing critical supply operations across several Allied campaigns. In 1944, he led a UNRRA mission to deliver humanitarian aid to Greece. He retired as a brigadier in 1947, having served for over three decades, and was later appointed Colonel Commandant of the RNZAOC.
Henry Esau Avery, CMG, CBE, DSO (1885–1961)
Karori Crematorium and Chapels: Cremated
A Gallipoli and Western Front veteran, Brigadier Henry Avery was the NZ Division Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster-General and remained in the UK post-war, attending the Staff College, Camberley. On return to New Zealand, he was Quartermaster-General until his retirement in 1924. Returned to high office during the Second World War, Avery served as Quartermaster-General and Third Military Member of the Army Board. In these roles, he oversaw the logistical sustainment of New Zealand’s forces at home and abroad. Avery’s command ensured that the rapid expansion of the wartime army was matched with efficient provisioning, infrastructure development, and strategic planning. He also led the post-war drawdown, managing the War Assets Realisation Board and helping repurpose military assets for civilian use. Decorated for gallantry and administration alike, Avery’s career bridged combat experience and senior strategic leadership, making him one of New Zealand’s foremost military logisticians.
Peter McIntyre painting of H E Avery, Public – Wellington museum NZ archives No known copyright restrictions.
Conclusion: A Legacy Forged in Quiet Service
Karori Cemetery holds within its grounds the quiet heartbeat of New Zealand’s military past—a lineage of logisticians whose names may not grace battlefield monuments, but whose deeds ensured those monuments could exist. These men moved the wheels behind the war effort, worked in the shadows to sustain campaigns, train forces, manage depots, and modernise the very systems by which New Zealand’s military functioned.
Their careers span the South African War through two World Wars and mirror the evolution of military logistics in New Zealand: from colonial improvisation to professionalised, global-scale sustainment. Whether maintaining arms in frontier outposts, coordinating supply landings under fire at Gallipoli, or masterminding wartime logistics from General Headquarters, they represent generations of commitment, technical skill, and leadership.
Their resting places at Karori form more than a collection of headstones—they constitute a collective chapter of military heritage written not in the language of glory but endurance, systems, foresight, and service. In remembering them, we honour the past and reaffirm that victory in war and security in peace depend as much on those who supply and sustain as on those who fight.
They were the architects of readiness. Their legacy remains the scaffold upon which today’s Defence logisticians still stand.
In the popular telling of New Zealand’s military history, the country is often cast as a recipient of overseas innovation, dependent on British or Allied designs to meet its military needs. However, overlooked in the archives is the story of Charles Loomes, a Defence Stores official whose early 20th-century inventions demonstrated both ingenuity and a deep understanding of local operational conditions.
In 1910, as New Zealand established a modest domestic military manufacturing base—primarily focused on converting local wool into standard British-pattern uniforms—Loomes submitted two proposals to the War Office in London: one for a new entrenching tool and another for an improved infantry equipment system. Both designs were intended to enhance the practicality and comfort of New Zealand soldiers in the field.
Although his ideas were ultimately not adopted, Loomes’s efforts exemplify a quiet but essential tradition of military innovation in New Zealand—one that deserves far greater recognition.
A Life of Service and Practical Insight
Charles Loomes was born in 1857 in Whittlesey, England, and emigrated to New Zealand, where he entered public service. By the early 1900s, he was working with the New Zealand Defence Stores Department in Wellington, a precursor to today’s logistical branches of the NZDF. He was not a military commander or weapons engineer, but rather a public servant embedded in the practicalities of supply and equipment. His proximity to returning troops from the South African War (1899–1902) gave him rare insight into the shortcomings of British military kit in colonial conditions. This combination of technical competence and frontline empathy shaped his two major design proposals.
The Entrenching Tool: A Tool for the Dominion, Not the Empire
At a time when British military orthodoxy remained firmly anchored in European conditions, Charles Loomes’ 1910 entrenching tool design stood out as a locally informed innovation. New Zealand troops had just returned from the South African War, bringing lessons hard learned in the scrublands and semi-arid terrain—lessons not adequately reflected in British-issue tools. The shortcomings of the British entrenching tool were increasingly evident: it was heavy, ill-suited for bush work, and cumbersome in combat conditions that demanded speed, versatility, and improvisation.
Loomes, drawing upon feedback from returning veterans and his knowledge, designed a hybrid tool that merged the capabilities of a spade and a tomahawk. His model featured a shorter shaft for easier handling in confined environments and a reinforced blade capable of cutting through vegetation and lifting compact earth. He noted that the tool was designed to remove intact clumps of soil, making it ideal for quickly constructing makeshift sangars, foxholes, or low parapets. This capacity reflected an understanding of the semi-permanent, fast-moving trench systems standard in irregular warfare and mobile operations environments where New Zealand soldiers often found themselves.[1]
According to the 1910 Defence Council report, New Zealand was reforming its defence organisation in anticipation of Lord Kitchener’s review. This included transitioning to a field force more attuned to national conditions. Loomes’ proposal arrived at a critical moment—just as local military leaders and policymakers were beginning to contemplate how New Zealand’s needs might diverge from Britain’s. The fact that the War Office in London reviewed and formally responded to Loomes’ tool submission, thanking him and returning the sample, underscores the event’s rarity. Colonial submissions were often ignored or lost in bureaucracy; Loomes’ treatment was an outlier.
This modest response, while not leading to adoption, highlights the credibility of the proposal and its alignment with growing imperial awareness of environment-specific military needs. The reality, however, was stark: New Zealand had little indigenous arms production capability at the time, and the cost of tooling up to produce such implements locally was seen as prohibitive. The result was that practicality bowed to imperial standardisation.
Nonetheless, Loomes’ design prefigures later developments. As early as the Second World War, entrenching tools would again be reconceptualised for jungle, bush, and close terrain operations, validating Loomes’ insight.
Reimagining Load Carriage: A Soldier-Centred, Modular System
In December 1910, Loomes followed up with a second design submission: improved infantry and mounted infantry equipment to address the long-standing challenge of balancing soldier load, accessibility, and operational effectiveness. This system is compelling because of its technical design and thought, which were born from operational realities and adapted to New Zealand’s hybrid mounted-infantry character.
Loomes proposed a “heads and tails” ammunition pouch system capable of carrying 200 rounds of rifle ammunition—120 in the front, 80 in the rear. Unlike the British webbing designs of the time, which often created imbalance or restricted movement, Loomes’ design allowed soldiers to access ammunition from either end of each pouch. Rounds could be withdrawn in prone and standing positions without awkward adjustments. Once the front pouches were emptied, reserve pouches could be rotated forward, maintaining weight balance and ensuring the soldier remained combat-effective throughout prolonged engagements.[2]
This solution anticipated later 20th-century load-carrying principles—particularly modularity, distributed weight, and quick-access ammunition positioning. Loomes’ notes also specify that his design intentionally left the chest and upper arms unencumbered. This would have improved ventilation and mobility—vital in warm or uneven terrain—and eased firing in prone positions.
Just as important was the equipment’s versatility. Loomes’ harness could be configured for:
Light marching order (with minimal ammunition and essentials)
Full field service (including blanket, water bottle, greatcoat, and rations)
Mounted use (tailored to New Zealand’s mounted rifle units)
Loomes understood that mounted infantry—New Zealand’s dominant expeditionary force model at the time—required unobtrusive, stable, and balanced carriage. This was vital for the rider’s comfort and maintaining combat readiness while mounted. Unlike the clumsy Slade-Wallace or even early Mills webbing gear, which could interfere with movement on horseback, Loomes’ system was designed with the horse in mind.
His proposal was technically sound, cost-conscious, and straightforward to manufacture using leather or woven webbing. Though not accepted, the offer to supply working samples reflected his confidence in the design’s utility.
The Defence Reports of 1911 and 1912 offer valuable context here. The reorganisation of the New Zealand Military Forces was in full swing: the new Territorial system was replacing the old Volunteer model, a permanent instructional staff was being built, and procurement systems were beginning to prioritise local efficiency.[3] Yet, despite a growing awareness of the need for New Zealand-specific solutions, structural constraints—particularly reliance on British-standardised procurement—remained a barrier. The Quartermaster-General’s 1912 report notes that equipment tenders were focused on uniformity and scale, with mills’ pattern marching-order sets being bulk-ordered from the UK.[4]
In short, while Loomes’ system was conceptually ahead of its time, the institutional apparatus to support its adoption did not yet exist.
Innovation Ahead of Infrastructure
Though neither of Loomes’ designs entered service, their rejection reflected institutional inertia rather than any lack of merit. Britain retained tight control over military equipment standardisation, and New Zealand, then a Dominion with no significant defence manufacturing base, had little ability to produce its designs at scale. Loomes was ahead of his time: his submissions anticipated the kind of adaptations that would only become common decades later.
His submissions challenged the notion that innovation flowed from the metropole to the periphery. Loomes proved that original thought could emerge from within New Zealand’s institutions—even if the machinery to adopt it lagged.
A Precursor to Later Innovations: A Quiet Tradition of New Zealand Military Ingenuity
Charles Loomes was not alone in his efforts to design military equipment better suited to New Zealand’s conditions and constraints. While his 1910 submissions may be among the earliest formal proposals from within New Zealand’s defence establishment, they were by no means the last. His spirit of pragmatic, ground-up innovation reappeared throughout the 20th century in a series of unique, often overlooked, and sometimes extraordinary developments—each born of necessity, local ingenuity, and limited resources.
Among the most celebrated examples of New Zealand military innovation was the Roberts Travelling Kitchen, developed on the eve of the First World War by Captain W.G. Roberts of the New Zealand Army Service Corps. Designed in direct response to the challenges of feeding troops in dispersed, mobile operations, the Roberts Kitchen was a self-contained, horse-drawn field kitchen capable of preparing hot meals under austere and constantly shifting field conditions. Constructed with a robust metal chassis and mounted stoves, it could boil water, cook stews, or heat rations while on the move or in static positions without requiring a fixed base of operations. Its compact and modular layout allowed it to be easily deployed by small support teams, providing a dependable solution at a time when maintaining nutrition and morale was often as critical to battlefield effectiveness as ammunition and arms.
What set the Roberts Kitchen apart was not just its portability, but its simplicity, durability, and adaptability—qualities that earned it significant praise both within New Zealand and abroad. It was exported to Australia and trialled by the Australian Army, where it was quickly recognised for its practicality and efficiency. In theatres where standard British Army cookhouses were too bulky or unsuitable for forward areas, the Roberts Kitchen filled a critical gap. It supported mobile columns and supply echelons across difficult terrain and under variable weather, making it ideal for forces operating far from fixed infrastructure. Though mechanised and industrially mass-produced wartime kitchens would later overshadow it, the Roberts Travelling Kitchen stands as a pioneering achievement that anticipated modern mobile field catering and embodied the soldier-centred ethos of New Zealand’s approach to military logistics.[5]
Roberts 2a Oven (Travelling) for 250 Men. Archives New Zealand R22432833 Cookers – Field- Roberts travelling
Then came the New Zealand Battle Ration, one of the most straightforward and most successful examples of locally designed and manufactured military innovation explicitly tailored to the needs of New Zealand troops. Developed during the Second World War, the Battle Ration emerged in response to a growing awareness that the ration packs issued by Britain and the United States were ill-suited to the operational conditions of the Pacific theatre, where New Zealand soldiers were increasingly deployed.
New Zealand forces faced extreme humidity, dense jungle environments, and logistical constraints during campaigns in the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, and other island chains. Standard British rations—often based on tinned meats, hard biscuits, and fatty components—were prone to spoilage, hard to digest in hot climates, and culturally misaligned with New Zealanders’ eating habits. Similarly, early U.S. C-Rations were heavy and included items with unfamiliar or unpalatable flavours. Soldiers frequently discarded parts of these rations, resulting in unnecessary waste and reduced nutritional intake.
In contrast, the New Zealand Battle Ration was designed from the ground up with science, environment, and soldier morale in mind. Drawing on nutritional research and advice from local food technologists and military dieticians, the ration incorporated lightweight, dehydrated components that could be quickly reconstituted with water. This made the ration more portable and shelf-stable and reduced the bulk of what troops had to carry on long patrols or amphibious movements.
Typical components included:
Compressed or dehydrated vegetables, often in powder or cube form;
High-calorie itemssuch as chocolate, sweetened condensed milk powder, and dried fruit;
New Zealand-produced biscuitsformulated to remain edible in heat and humidity;
Beef extract or bouillon tablets, providing both flavour and salts for hydration;
Tea and sugar, consistent with New Zealand soldiers’ dietary and morale preferences.
The result was a compact, nutritionally complete, and culturally familiar ration pack that troops could rely on. Its ease of carriage and reduced spoilage rates made it ideal for small-unit operations, reconnaissance patrols, and units cut off from resupply in remote jungle areas.
The Battle Ration was also locally produced, reducing dependency on vulnerable international supply chains. New Zealand manufacturers, working with the Defence Department and scientific institutions, were able to source, process, and package the components within the country. This had the dual benefit of supporting the national economy during wartime and ensuring higher quality control for frontline provisioning.
The Battle Rations’ success did not go unnoticed. It earned positive recognition from allied observers, particularly American nutritionists and quartermasters who saw in it a viable model for regional adaptation. In some cases, its components were studied as part of broader Allied efforts to improve ration systems in the Pacific, and small-scale adoption of similar food technologies followed.
More than a stopgap solution, the New Zealand Battle Ration represented a fully integrated, homegrown logistical system that placed the soldier’s lived experience at the centre of its design. It remains a landmark example of how a small nation, facing unique environmental and operational challenges, could outpace its larger allies in terms of applied military food science and practical innovation.[6]
But New Zealand’s ingenuity extended beyond food and field comforts.
In 1941, as global supply chains strained and frontline weapons were scarce, Philip Charlton devised the Charlton Automatic Rifle—a fully automatic conversion of obsolete bolt-action Lee–Metford and Lee–Enfield rifles. Intended as a stopgap substitute for the unavailable Bren and Lewis light machine guns, the Charlton was produced primarily for the New Zealand Home Guard. Its rugged construction, semi-automatic default operation, forward pistol grip and bipod (in the New Zealand model) made it an effective emergency solution.[7] Around 1,500 were produced, though tragically, most were destroyed in a postwar fire at the Palmerston North Ordnance Depot. Today, surviving examples are exceedingly rare, but they remain a testament to New Zealand’s wartime adaptation in the face of global resource shortages.
Charlton Automatic Rifle. 1941, New Zealand, by Charlton Motor Workshops. Gift of Mr Philip Charlton, 1965. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Te Papa (DM000451/1-3)
Less successful, but no less revealing, was the Mitchell Machine Carbine, a prototype submachine gun developed by New Zealander Allen Mitchell and submitted for testing in Britain in 1943. Though ultimately rejected due to faults in the trigger mechanism, stock, and excessive barrel heating, the weapon represented an attempt to produce a cost-effective domestic submachine gun using local materials and simple blowback operation. A second, improved prototype was submitted in 1944 but was again declined. Only four Mitchell SMGs were ever built; all remain in New Zealand collections. Despite its flaws, the project underscored the determination to establish a sovereign capacity for weapons development, however limited.[8]
Perhaps the most striking and tragic example of New Zealand’s wartime ingenuity is the story of Colonel John Owen Kelsey and the Kelsey Swivel-Stock Rifle. Drawing from his extensive service as an ordnance and engineering officer during the Second World War, Kelsey developed a novel modification of the Sten submachine gun in the early 1950s. Rather than attempting a curved barrel like the German Krummlauf, Kelsey’s design allowed the weapon to be fired around corners via a swivel-stock and periscopic sight, enabling an operator to shoot while remaining in cover. The concept was tested successfully at Waiouru and forwarded to the War Office in London.[9]
Shooting around a corner from cover with he experimental Mk5 Sten “Swivel Butt Carbiner”. Courtesy MoD Pattern Room Library
Kelsey believed the design could be adapted to other weapons and took out international patents. However, he received no further response, and amid growing personal hardship, he died by suicide in 1954.[10] Though the design never progressed beyond a prototype, it serves as a sobering reminder of the often-overlooked costs of service and the post-war fate of veterans whose talents went underutilised.
Perhaps the most unusual case in New Zealand’s military innovation archive is that of Victor Penny, an Auckland bus mechanic and amateur radio enthusiast who, in the years before the Second World War, persuaded defence authorities that he could build a “death ray” capable of disabling enemy vehicles, aircraft, and electronics. Penny’s device, reportedly a directed electromagnetic energy weapon, earned him state support and near-total secrecy. He was relocated to Somes Island in Wellington Harbour—used during the war as an internment and quarantine facility—where a laboratory was constructed solely for his use. Though the project yielded no proven battlefield capability, it remains an intriguing episode in the country’s history of experimental defence projects and an indicator of how seriously New Zealand’s government once considered homegrown science and technology, even of the most speculative kind.[11]
Radio enthusiast Victor Penny was kept under guard on Matiu Somes Island in Wellington Harbour in 1935 as he worked on his mysterious invention.FILE / Dominion-Post
An Innovation Ethos Born of Need
What binds together the remarkable and diverse stories of Charles Loomes’ entrenching tool and load-carrying equipment, the Roberts Travelling Kitchen, the New Zealand Battle Ration, the Charlton automatic rifle, the Mitchell submachine gun, Victor Penny’s speculative “death ray,” and Colonel Kelsey’s swivel-stock rifle is not institutional power, budgetary scale, or industrial might. Instead, they emerged from a humbler yet uniquely resilient source: necessity—the mother of invention in a small, geographically isolated nation.
These were not the products of a formal military-industrial complex. They came from soldiers, field engineers, ordnance officers, public servants, hobbyists, and workshop innovators. Each worked from within or alongside New Zealand’s military system, often without formal research backing, institutional commissions, or manufacturing infrastructure. They responded to pressing operational needs, adapting or reinventing equipment that didn’t suit the environment or realities faced by New Zealand troops—whether in the South African veldt, the Italian alleys of WWII, the Pacific or the cold training grounds of Waiouru.
Despite the quality and relevance of these designs, many were either dismissed by imperial authorities or faded from memory in the post-war era, overshadowed by the need to adhere to British and later American standardisation. Yet many were contextually brilliant. The Roberts Kitchen and Battle Ration were internationally recognised. The Charlton rifle filled a vital gap in local defence. Kelsey’s adapted Sten gun may not have been adopted, but it represented forward-thinking soldier survivability in urban combat. Even Victor Penny’s electromagnetic weapon, though more speculative, illustrates the willingness of New Zealand’s authorities to explore radical ideas when the stakes were high.
Together, these stories reflect a recurring national pattern: when strategic isolation, global conflict, or supply chain fragility forced New Zealand to look inward, the country proved more than capable of producing its answers. Innovation in New Zealand has historically been less about prestige and more about practicality—a can-do, field-driven ingenuity that quietly delivered effective solutions under adverse conditions.
Charles Loomes, then, should not be seen as a lone innovator ahead of his time, but rather as the first in a long and under-recognised lineage. This lineage stretches from the trenches of South Africa and Gallipoli, through the fields of Italy, and into workshops, depots, and paddocks across the country. These innovators turned limitations into opportunities and ensured New Zealand could solve its military problems independently despite its small population and modest resources.
The legacy of this ethos remains deeply relevant today. New Zealand’s past offers historical insight and a blueprint for future resilience as the global security environment becomes more uncertain and supply chains more contested.
Notes
[1]From: Charles Loomes, Defence Stores Date: 1 August 1910 Subject: Entrenching tool invented by himself, asks that it be forwarded to Imperial, Archives New Zealand Item ID R24759083, (Wellington: New Zealand Archives, 1910).
[2]Charles Loomes, Wellington Date: 24 December 1910 Subject: Improved Equipment for use of Infantry and Mounted Infantry, Archives New Zealand Item ID R24759941, (Wellington: New Zealand Archives, 1910).
[3] “H-19 Defence Forces of New Zealand: Report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces for the period from 7th December 1910 to 27th July 1911,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives (1 January 1911), https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/parliamentary/AJHR1911-I.2.4.2.30.
[4] “Defence Forces of New Zealand: Report of the General Officer Commanding the Forces for the period 28 July 1911 to 27th June 1912,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1912 Session II, H-19 (27 June 1912), https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/parliamentary/AJHR1912-II.2.4.2.37.
[5] “Cookers – Field- Roberts travelling,” Archives New Zealand Item No R22432833 (1915).
[6] “DSIR [Department of Scientific and Industrial Research] World War 2 Narratives. No. 10. Dehydrated Foods and Ration Packs. Copy No. 1,” Archives New Zealand Item No R1768268 (1948).
[11] D. Downs and J. Bridges, No. 8 Re-wired: 202 New Zealand Inventions That Changed the World: 202 New Zealand Inventions That Changed the World (Penguin Random House New Zealand, 2014).
“Actions speak louder than words; let your words teach and your actions speak.” – Anthony of Padua
Across the military world, mottos occupy a special place in a unit’s identity. Far more than decorative phrases, they encapsulate ethos, tradition, pride, and mission. New Zealand’s Army logistic corps have long embraced this tradition, each adopting a motto that speaks to their distinct contributions to sustaining and enabling military operations. Together, these mottos form a vital cultural bridge to the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment (RNZALR) of today.
This article explores the historic mottos of New Zealand’s logistic corps — the Royal New Zealand Army Service Corps (RNZASC), Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport (RNZCT), Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC), and Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RNZEME) — and how their spirit continues in the RNZALR’s regimental motto.
The RNZASC and RNZCT: “Nil Sine Labore” — Nothing Without Labour
The Royal New Zealand Army Service Corps (RNZASC), formed in 1910 and later reorganised into the Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport (RNZCT) in 1979, adopted the Latin motto “Nil Sine Labore”, meaning “Nothing Without Labour.”
Meaning and Significance: “Nil Sine Labore” captured the essential reality of logistics: success in battle is impossible without the unceasing work of those who provide transport, fuel, rations, and supplies.
Wider Context: Like the mottos of other Commonwealth service corps (e.g., British Army Service Corps), it stresses the indispensable nature of effort behind the scenes. While combat might capture glory, labour — the unseen supply chain — sustains the force.
Legacy: The RNZCT’s adoption of the same motto ensured continuity, even as functions evolved from general service to highly mobile modern transport operations.
The RNZAOC: “Sua Tela Tonanti” — To the Warrior Their Arms
The Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC) proudly carried the Latin motto “Sua Tela Tonanti”, traditionally translated as “To the Warrior His Arms”, though now often rendered as “To the Warrior Their Arms” for inclusiveness.
Meaning and Significance: This motto embodies the RNZAOC’s role in arming the Army, providing everything from ammunition and weapons to clothing and technical stores. It positions the Corps not as passive administrators, but as an essential enabler of combat power.
Wider Context: Inherited from the historic British Board of Ordnance, the motto ties the RNZAOC directly to a centuries-old tradition of sustaining armies through mastery over materiel — arms to the Thunderer (Jove), or in modern terms, arms to the Warrior.
Legacy: The RNZAOC’s operational support philosophy — rapid, flexible, forward-moving supply and repair — deeply influenced New Zealand’s logistic identity into the RNZALR era.
The RNZEME: “Arte et Marte” — By Skill and Fighting
The Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RNZEME) chose the Latin motto “Arte et Marte”, meaning “By Skill and Fighting” or “By Craft and Combat.”
Meaning and Significance: “Arte et Marte” speaks to the technical excellence demanded of soldiers who kept vehicles, weapons, and equipment operational in all conditions, often under fire. It acknowledges that engineering support is not a civilian function, but a battlefield art practised in war.
Wider Context: Similar mottos appear across the engineer and technical corps throughout the Commonwealth, blending pride in professionalism with recognition of the combat environment they work within.
Legacy: RNZEME’s ethos of skilled technical intervention in the face of adversity feeds directly into the RNZALR’s emphasis on innovation, adaptability, and operational effectiveness today.
The RNZALR: “Mā Ngā Hua Tu Tangata” — By Our Actions We Are Known
When the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment (RNZALR) was formed in 1996 through the amalgamation of the RNZCT, RNZAOC, RNZEME, and the All-Arms Quartermaster functions, it needed a new motto — one that would respect its heritage while uniting its many trades and traditions.
The selected motto, in Te Reo Māori, is “Mā Ngā Hua Tu Tangata”, which translates as “By Our Actions We Are Known.”
Meaning and Significance: This motto synthesises the underlying spirit of the earlier corps mottos. Labour, provision of arms, technical skill, and combat support all manifest through actions — actions that sustain the force and ultimately define success.
Wider Context: By choosing a motto in Te Reo Māori, the RNZALR affirmed its place within a distinctly New Zealand military culture. This reflected the nation’s commitment to multiculturalism and honoured Māori and Western traditions.
Continuity and Evolution: While the words changed, the spirit endures.
“Nil Sine Labore” – Nothing is possible without action.
“Sua Tela Tonanti” – The arms are provided through action.
“Arte et Marte” – Action is both skilled and courageous.
“Mā Ngā Hua Tu Tangata” – Actions define reputation.
Thus, the RNZALR motto is not a break with the past but the culmination of it — a living link between generations of logisticians who have sustained New Zealand’s Army from the earliest days to the present.
Conclusion: Living the Legacy
Military mottos are far more than slogans; they are declarations of identity, values, and purpose. In the case of New Zealand’s Army logistics corps, each motto reflects a vital facet of the broader logistics enterprise — from hard work and skilled maintenance to the critical task of arming and equipping the warfighter.
Through “Mā Ngā Hua Tu Tangata”, the RNZALR carries forward these proud traditions, reminding every Logistic Specialist, Movements Operator, Caterer, Maintainer, and Combat Driver that it is through their actions — perhaps unseen by many, but vital to all — that the Army stands strong.
ANZAC Day is a sacred day of remembrance and gratitude in New Zealand. It is a day when we pause to honour the breadth of military service—those who stormed the beaches and scaled the ridgelines, and those who sustained them from behind the lines. Among these often-unsung heroes are the men and women of the Ordnance Corps. Ordnance soldiers have provided the New Zealand Army with the weapons, ammunition, equipment, and logistical support necessary to fight, survive, and succeed for over a century. Their role has always been vital, even if it has been carried out of the limelight.
But what exactly is an Ordnance soldier?
At their core, Ordnance soldiers are Logistics Specialists and Ammunition Technicians—responsible for ensuring that every frontline soldier has what they need, when they need it. They manage everything from the smallest screw in a field weapon to the vast stocks of food, clothing, and ammunition that sustain entire armies. Their work includes storage, distribution, accounting, repair, salvage, and technical inspection. In short: if it moves, fires, feeds, or protects, it likely passed through the hands of Ordnance personnel.
The roots of military ordnance stretch deep into history. The first recorded Ordnance Officer in the British military was appointed in 1299 to manage siege equipment, such as catapults and battering rams. Over time, these responsibilities evolved into a professional and structured system of military storekeeping and supply, one that reached New Zealand in the 1840s with the arrival of British Imperial forces.
By the 1860s, as the Imperial presence waned, the responsibility for military logistics was gradually handed over to New Zealand personnel. The Defence Stores Department was formally established in 1869 to oversee the nation’s military stores. This marked the beginning of New Zealand’s independent ordnance tradition. In 1917, during the First World War, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) was officially formed, taking over duties from the Defence Stores Department. The Corps provided critical support throughout the war and maintained the Army through the interwar years.
With the Second World War outbreak, the Ordnance Corps expanded dramatically. To support 2NZEF, the New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC) was raised for overseas service, while a separate NZOC served as the NZAOCs Territorial element. In 1942, the engineering and maintenance functions of the NZOC operating in the Middle East were separated to form the New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NZEME). This change was mirrored in New Zealand in 1946, when workshops were transferred from the NZAOC to the newly created NZEME.
In recognition of its wartime service, King George VI granted the “Royal” prefix to the Corps on 12 July 1947, making it the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC). That same year, the territorial and regular elements were merged into a single corps that would serve with distinction for the next half-century.
Every ANZAC Day, we reflect on the legacy of the Ordnance soldier—from the dusty cliffs of Gallipoli and the battlefields of North Africa to the supply depots of World War II, the jungles of Southeast Asia, and the humanitarian missions of the late 20th century. Their story did not end with the close of the Cold War. In 1996, the RNZAOC was amalgamated with the Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport (RNZCT) and the Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RNZEME) to form the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment (RNZALR)—a unified, modern logistics formation designed to meet the evolving demands of military operations in the 21st century.
The legacy of the Ordnance soldier lives on today in every RNZALR Logistic Specialist and Ammunition Technician. Their story is not just a historical record—it is the very foundation of the RNZALR. Their values of resilience, quiet courage, and professional excellence continue to shape the New Zealand Army’s ability to sustain and succeed at home and abroad.
Gallipoli and the First World War: The Storekeeper on Anzac Beach
The story of the New Zealand ordnance soldier begins amid the brutal landing at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. Captain William Beck, a New Zealand Staff Corps officer, was appointed Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services (DADOS) for the New Zealand and Australian Division. According to several accounts, Beck was the first New Zealander ashore at ANZAC Cove, leading the landing of Godley’s divisional headquarters under intense fire.
His task was immense. Amid the beachhead’s chaos, confusion, and carnage, Beck quickly set about establishing a makeshift ordnance dump right on the shoreline—improvising with salvaged crates, scattered supplies, and a growing stream of urgently needed materiel. As soldiers surged inland and casualties mounted, Beck and his small team organised the distribution of ammunition, rations, clothing, and basic field stores to units already under fire in the hills above. Without shelter, maps, or proper infrastructure, this operation became a lifeline to the forward troops.
Supplies on the beach at ANZAC Cove 1915. Athol Williams Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library
Beck worked under relentless fire, including from a remarkably accurate Turkish artillery piece that pounded the beachhead daily. Nicknamed “Beachy Bill” by the troops, the gun became infamous for zeroing in on the supply areas, and Beck’s improvised depot was one of its most frequent targets. The name, according to some accounts, was given in ironic tribute to Captain Beck himself, whose unwavering presence under fire seemed to draw the enemy’s attention as reliably as the tides. Despite the danger, Beck remained calm and courteous, continuing to perform his duties in conditions that would have driven many to cover. His efforts earned him the enduring moniker “the brave storekeeper on Anzac Beach.” He became a quiet legend among his peers. General Sir William Birdwood, commanding the ANZAC forces, was said to personally check on Beck during his rounds, out of admiration and concern. Beck’s courage and composure under fire became emblematic of the Ordnance Corps’ ethos: professionalism in adversity, and mission before self.
Though he was later evacuated due to illness caused by the stress of battle in August 1915, Captain Beck’s role at Gallipoli demonstrated how critical logistics were to the survival and sustainment of fighting troops—and that the Ordnance soldier was not a rear-echelon presence, but a frontline enabler in every sense.
Following the Gallipoli campaign, the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) was reorganised and redeployed to the Western Front in France and Belgium, as well as to the Sinai and Palestine campaigns in the Middle East. What began in 1914 as a two-man effort—Beck and Sergeant Norman Levien—expanded rapidly into a structured logistics organisation. In 1917, the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) was formally established as a dedicated branch of service, recognising its work’s increasingly specialised and essential nature.
On the Western Front, Ordnance personnel established and managed supply dumps and armourers’ workshops across the scarred landscapes of the Somme, Messines, and Passchendaele. They worked in trenches, mud, and snow—often within range of enemy artillery—ensuring that troops had the bullets, boots, tools, and trench stores required to sustain a static war of attrition.
Their responsibilities went well beyond basic supply. Ordnance units also operated salvage sections to recover, repair, and repurpose battlefield equipment—a critical function in conserving resources and maintaining operational tempo. They ran mobile repair facilities and oversaw essential services like bath and laundry units, which not only preserved hygiene in the harsh conditions of trench warfare but also boosted morale and prevented disease. These services reflected the Ordnance Corps’ holistic approach to sustaining soldiers, not just with materiel, but with cleanliness, comfort, and care in brutal circumstances.
In the Middle East, NZAOC detachments supported mounted operations across the harsh deserts of Sinai and Palestine. Operating in support of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, Ordnance soldiers adapted their methods to suit long, exposed supply lines and the mobile nature of desert warfare. They managed camel trains, improvised field depots, and operated forward repair points—often little more than canvas shelters in the sand—to keep men and animals in the fight. Salvage and maintenance tasks were equally essential here, where resupply could be days away and every item had to be made to last.
By the end of the First World War, the NZAOC had grown into a compact, disciplined, and highly respected corps. From the mud of Flanders to the sands of Beersheba, their work underpinned New Zealand’s military effort. Though rarely seen in official war photographs or commemorated in mainstream histories, their contributions were vital. They demonstrated that logistics was not a sideline to combat—it was its backbone. They also laid the foundation for a professional military logistics tradition in the RNZALR today.
The Second World War and Beyond: Backbone of the Battlefield
During the Second World War, the NZAOC matured into a seasoned and indispensable pillar of military capability. Whether supporting the fight abroad or maintaining the war effort at home, Ordnance personnel were the engine behind the Army’s ability to project and sustain force across multiple theatres of war.
North Africa and Italy: Desert Sands and Mountain Passes
In the North African campaigns of 1941–42, Ordnance units operated across Egypt and Libya’s vast, unforgiving deserts, supplying the 2nd New Zealand Division during pivotal battles such as Operation Crusader and El Alamein. Supply depots were often under canvas, exposed to enemy air raids and desert winds. Light Aid Detachments worked tirelessly in the blistering heat to keep tanks, trucks, and artillery in the fight, repairing on the move and recovering damaged equipment under fire.
A dedicated Ordnance Convoy Section was raised to support the increasing volume and complexity of operations. Its task was to move stores and equipment from rear areas to forward supply points, filling a critical gap when the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) could not meet demand. These convoys ensured a continuous flow of tools, spare parts, and personal equipment to the front, often through contested or poorly marked desert tracks.
The NZ Divisional Salvage Company also operated until late 1941, recovering and repurposing valuable battlefield materials—everything from damaged vehicles to discarded equipment. This function saved resources and contributed to operational sustainability by rapidly recycling assets back into the supply chain.
Ordnance support also extended to troop welfare. Mobile Bath and Laundry Sections accompanied the Division to provide frontline hygiene services, which were essential in preventing disease, exchanging clothing, maintaining morale, and improving the force’s overall combat effectiveness. Their presence in forward areas helped ensure that troops remained as healthy and combat-ready as conditions allowed.
Fred Kreegher, New Zealand Ordnance Field Park, sorting out stores in the rear of his Bin Truck. The Noel Kreegher collection
When the Division redeployed to Italy in late 1943, the harsh desert gave way to snow-covered mountains and treacherous river valleys. But the demands on Ordnance personnel did not ease. During gruelling campaigns at Monte Cassino and through the Po Valley, the NZOC once again delivered. Ordnance Field Parks and dumps were established within range of enemy guns, and equipment was recovered, repaired, and reissued under complex and often perilous conditions.
These layered capabilities—convoy operations, salvage and recovery, technical maintenance, and personal support—ensured the Division could manoeuvre and fight confidently, knowing its logistical tail was secure. The Ordnance Corps wasn’t simply supporting the fight—it was integral to sustaining it.
The Pacific Theatre: Islands of Sustained Effort
While New Zealand’s main expeditionary force focused on Europe and the Mediterranean, many New Zealand troops were also deployed to the Pacific. Here, the NZAOC supported the 3rd New Zealand Division across island bases in New Caledonia, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Fiji. These were remote and logistically challenging environments—characterised by tropical diseases, heavy rain, mud, and dense jungle.
Ordnance detachments established supply points, maintained stores, repaired equipment, and ensured operational readiness across scattered islands. These locations often lacked established infrastructure, requiring personnel to be resourceful and adaptable. Camp maintenance, local procurement, and even salvaging enemy materiel became part of the day-to-day tasks.
Although the 3rd Division never saw major set-piece battles like those in North Africa or Italy, it did undertake several opposed amphibious operations and complex island-clearing operations, most notably in the Solomon Islands campaigns at Vella Lavella, Treasury Islands, and Green Island. These landings were tactically complex and logistically demanding, requiring close coordination between combat troops and supporting elements. The Division’s presence helped safeguard New Zealand’s Pacific interests and contributed meaningfully to the broader Allied campaign in the South-West Pacific Area. The Ordnance Corps was instrumental in keeping this contribution viable—its soldiers operated under arduous conditions, far from public view but never from operational necessity.
The Home Front: Sustaining the War Machine
Back in New Zealand, the Ordnance Corps played an equally vital—if often overlooked—role in sustaining the nation’s war effort. Depots at Trentham, Hopuhopu, Burnham, Palmerston North and Waiouru became crucial hubs for receiving, inspecting, storing, and distributing supplies to deployed units. The scale of this effort was immense: weapons, uniforms, vehicle parts, ammunition, and medical supplies flowed in and out of these depots on a daily basis.
Ordnance staff oversaw procurement, stock accounting, and quality control, ensuring that New Zealand’s contribution to the global conflict was met efficiently and precisely. In addition to servicing the expeditionary forces, these depots supported the Home Guard, Territorial units, and mobilisation centres. When new battalions were raised or re-equipped, Ordnance issued the kit and ensured everything was fit for purpose. This included the units of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force deployed overseas, as well as the three Divisions and supporting arms raised for home defence. These domestic formations—charged with protecting New Zealand from possible invasion—required full logistical support, from uniforms and webbing to weapons, ammunition and transport. Ordnance Corps personnel were central to ensuring these forces were ready to respond, maintaining a continuous flow of supplies while adapting to changing wartime demands.
“Repairing despatch riders’ motor-cycles. Photo of mechanics and motorcyclists repairing motorcycles at a field workshop during military manoeuvres in Northland.” Auckland Weekly News, 23 December 1942, p.14
Auckland Libraries Heritage Collections AWNS-19421223-14-03
The wartime workforce also included women, with members of the New Zealand Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (NZWAAC) taking on duties in Ordnance depots, handling clerical tasks, managing stores, and supporting logistics operations nationwide. Their involvement further highlights the adaptability and inclusivity of the Ordnance mission in meeting the demands of total war.
Post-war Transition
Post-war deployments saw Ordnance personnel serve in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, and beyond—often integrated within British, Australian, or Commonwealth logistics formations. Though New Zealand’s contribution to these conflicts was modest in size, the professionalism and impact of its Ordnance soldiers were significant. In the Korean War (1950–53), New Zealand’s primary combat force—16th Field Regiment—was supported by a small but capable number of logistics specialists. Ordnance staff embedded within allied supply chains, managing stores, issuing ammunition, and repairing equipment under the demanding conditions of the Korean Peninsula’s harsh winters and mountainous terrain.
During the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) and the subsequent Indonesian Confrontation (1962–1966), New Zealand troops operated in dense jungle environments that tested their combat and logistics capabilities. Ordnance soldiers were seconded as individuals to the New Zealand Battalion or British units, where they maintained supply lines through monsoon rains, oppressive humidity, and remote jungle bases. Their tasks ranged from maintaining small arms and issuing jungle kit to managing the complex movement of stores between staging areas and patrol bases—a vital function in an environment where regular resupply was challenging and sometimes depended on airdrops or riverine transport.
Although New Zealand did not deploy a complete Ordnance unit in Vietnam, RNZAOC personnel were seconded individually to Australian and United States forces. These included roles such as supply officers, ammunition controllers, and non-commissioned officers (NCOS) stationed at key logistics hubs like Nui Dat and Vung Tau. Working in a high-tempo combat zone, they handled everything from weapons and clothing to fuel, spare parts, and ammunition—often under the threat of enemy attack. The complexity of the Vietnam conflict demanded rapid response times, adaptability, and technical proficiency, all of which the Ordnance soldiers delivered in spades.
Beyond direct deployments, Ordnance personnel were also deeply involved in supporting the considerable effort required to sustain a deployable division maintained under New Zealand’s national service and conscription scheme during the Cold War. This mobilisation model meant that the RNZAOC was responsible for equipping, maintaining, and provisioning a standing force-in-being that could be rapidly expanded in times of crisis. Warehouses and mobilisation stores across the country were stocked with weapons, webbing, clothing, communications equipment, and general supplies—ready to be issued to citizen-soldiers if called upon. The planning, accounting, and logistical foresight required to maintain this latent capability were immense, and it stood as a testament to the professionalism of the Corps.
Across these theatres and responsibilities, Ordnance personnel served in austere and unpredictable environments. Whether embedded with an allied supply unit in the jungle or managing stockpiles for national mobilisation, they maintained the flow of materiel that kept New Zealand’s military effort credible and ready. Though they rarely received public recognition, their contribution was the vital connective tissue that made readiness a reality.
Peacekeeping and Modern Missions: From Mogadishu to the Pacific
In the late 20th century, as New Zealand’s defence priorities shifted toward peacekeeping and international humanitarian support, Ordnance soldiers once again rose to meet the challenge—this time under the flag of the United Nations. The 1992 deployment to Somalia marked a pivotal moment in New Zealand’s operational history and the modern evolution of the RNZAOC. In response to a deteriorating humanitarian crisis fuelled by civil war and famine, the UN launched a multinational intervention to secure aid routes and stabilise the region. New Zealand’s initial contribution to this effort—the New Zealand Supply Detachment—consisted primarily of 28 RNZAOC personnel, marking the first time in decades that an Ordnance-led contingent was deployed operationally in its own right.
Arriving in Mogadishu in December 1992 as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the detachment was tasked with establishing a functioning logistics capability in a highly hostile and volatile environment. Somalia’s capital had no functioning government, no stable infrastructure, and was riddled with armed factions. Despite the risks, the RNZAOC personnel immediately began establishing supply chains, securing local procurement channels, and distributing food, water, and stores to support the broader UN mission. They set up New Zealand’s main camp at the now well-known base called “Taniwha Hill,” which would symbolise Kiwi resilience amid chaos.
New Zealand soldiers leave their camp to conduct a patrol. NZDF Offical
Working out of hastily converted shipping containers and tents in the sweltering heat, the team operated under constant threat of gunfire, looting, and militia activity. Despite the mission’s peacekeeping label, it quickly became apparent that they were operating in a conflict zone. Convoys were escorted, personal weapons were always carried, and supply runs often meant travelling at high speed through hostile streets to avoid ambush. One RNZAOC NCO recalled travelling with a rifle propped between his knees, ready to return fire if necessary—a stark contrast to the logistics roles typically performed at home.
As the situation deteriorated, a second and larger contingent of 43 logistics personnel (including reinforcements from the RNZAOC and other corps) deployed in 1993 as the New Zealand Supply Platoon. This platoon was accompanied by an infantry protection element from 1 RNZIR, marking New Zealand’s first combat deployment of infantry since the Vietnam War. This reinforced the seriousness of the mission and highlighted the increasing danger and the blurred lines between combat and combat service support. Operating as an integrated platoon, the team performed with professionalism and efficiency, earning the respect of allied forces for their adaptability, calm under pressure, and ability to keep essential supplies flowing under fire.
The New Zealanders remained through some of the mission’s most violent episodes, including the events surrounding the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident in October 1993. Positioned nearby, the RNZAOC soldiers bore witness to the heavy fighting yet carried on their duties with unwavering determination. When many international contingents began withdrawing, the New Zealand logistics team continued to operate until mid-1994, one of the last Western elements to depart the theatre.
The Somalia deployment reaffirmed the modern Ordnance soldier’s place at the heart of New Zealand’s deployable military capability. It demonstrated that RNZAOC personnel were not only logisticians, but also frontline enablers—capable of operating in fluid, high-risk environments and delivering under extreme pressure. “Taniwha Hill,” New Zealand’s base in Mogadishu, was regularly subjected to gunfire and mortar attacks, and Kiwis operated in volatile zones with little margin for error. Yet the RNZAOC platoon carried out their duties with quiet professionalism and resolve, ensuring UN and coalition forces remained supplied and mission capable.
This ongoing legacy of service continues under a new banner. In 1996, the RNZAOC was formally disestablished as part of an Army logistics reorganisation. Its personnel, functions, and traditions were integrated into the newly formed RNZALR, uniting the RNZAOC, RNZCT, RNZEME, and Quartermaster staff into a single, cohesive regimental structure. This transformation ensured that the enduring values and capabilities of the Ordnance Corps would carry forward into a modern, agile logistics force aligned with contemporary operational requirements.
Since then, RNZALR Logistic Specialists and Ammunition Technicians have continued to support peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in theatres such as Bosnia, the Sinai, East Timor, and Afghanistan. During the East Timor operation (1999–2002), logistics units played a crucial role in sustaining one of New Zealand’s largest overseas deployments since the Korean War. Their work—whether managing supply convoys, setting up field depots, or coordinating humanitarian assistance—underscored the critical importance of logistics as an enabler and a key factor in mission success.
Domestically, RNZALR Logistics personnel have remained indispensable. From supporting civil defence during the Canterbury earthquakes to managing logistics and providing personnel to support Managed Isolation and Quarantine (MIQ) facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, and maintaining daily sustainment across Defence camps and bases, they remain central to New Zealand’s readiness and resilience. In every setting, whether at home or abroad, the legacy of the Ordnance soldier lives on through the actions and professionalism of the RNZALR.
Roll of Honour: Service Remembered, Sacrifice Recognised
The story of the Ordnance Corps is also one of loss. The New Zealand Ordnance Roll of Honour lists 63 names of those who died while serving in our logistics and stores organisations—from the Defence Stores Department of 1862 to the RNZAOC’s integration into the RNZALR in 1996. Among them:
Captain Sam Anderson (1899), Defence Storekeeper
Captain Arthur Duvall (1919), New Zealand Army Ordnance Department
Temporary Major William Knox (1941), Divisional Ordnance Field Park, North Africa
Private Russell John Casey (1994), 1 Logistic Regiment, RNZAOC
Each of these individuals—and the many others on the Roll—represents a life dedicated to service, often given in conditions far from home and with little fanfare.
Remembrance and Honour
Each ANZAC Day, we renew our vow: “We will remember them.” In remembering, we broaden our gaze to include those who served without seeking recognition—those who issued the boots, drove the convoys, repaired the radios, and ensured that the warriors had their arms.
The Ordnance Corps soldiers were not mere auxiliaries but the enablers of victory, the sustainers of peace, and the standard-bearers of discipline and duty. Their legacy is not just one of historical interest, but a living ethos that endures in the RNZALR.
As the Last Post echoes and the nation falls silent, let us remember the battles won and the thousands of acts behind the lines that made those victories possible. The story of the Ordnance soldier is one of dedication, innovation, and unheralded bravery.
At the going down of the sun, and in the morning— We will remember them. Lest we forget.
Effective military logistics are essential to operational success, particularly in challenging environments such as the tropical conditions faced by Allied forces in the Pacific during the Second World War. New Zealand’s experience during this period highlighted significant logistical and nutritional challenges, prompting innovative approaches to ensure its soldiers’ health and combat effectiveness. Among the most notable developments was the creation of the New Zealand Battle Ration—a specialised field ration explicitly designed to sustain troops operating in harsh tropical climates. This article explores the rapid development, innovative design features, practical testing, international recognition, and lasting legacy of the New Zealand Battle Ration. It underscores its wartime significance and the missed opportunities in the post-war period.
Soldiers eating a meal outdoors, Egypt. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch: Ref: DA-00816-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/23083314
Development of the New Zealand Battle Ration
During the Second World War, New Zealand maintained generous and robust ration scales for troops stationed in camps. However, the army initially lacked a dedicated field ration tailored to tropical environments. Early deployments to remote Pacific garrisons, including Fanning Island and Fiji, revealed significant deficiencies in existing rations. This highlights an urgent requirement for a nutritionally balanced, durable field ration for prolonged use under tropical conditions.
The urgency to address this shortfall became critical following Japan’s entry into the war in December 1941. Colonel Salmon, Deputy Quartermaster-General, promptly sought assistance from New Zealand’s Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) to develop specialised emergency rations. The DSIR rapidly prioritised this task, leading to the swift development of the New Zealand Battle Ration starting in late 1941. By early 1943, after rigorous scientific research and testing, practical field trials demonstrated the effectiveness of this innovative ration in sustaining troops operating under challenging tropical conditions.[1]
Before this development, troops deployed in the field relied predominantly on standard camp-scale rations composed mainly of canned goods and easily portable items requiring minimal preparation. Recognising the inadequacy of these provisions for tropical operations, substantial scientific and developmental efforts were initiated to create a specialised and practical solution, culminating in the New Zealand Battle Ration.
Vitamin Content in Service Diets
To ensure that the New Zealand Battle Ration met stringent nutritional requirements, a dedicated team comprising Mr L.W. Tiller, Dr J.C. Andrews, and Dr B.W. Doak conducted extensive research into vitamin fortification. In October 1942, Tiller and Andrews travelled to Australia to study advancements in vitamin fortification techniques, particularly the extraction and application of vitamin C from lucerne (alfalfa). This international collaboration provided critical insights into effectively incorporating vitamins into field rations.
Meanwhile, Dr Doak carried out comprehensive analyses of the vitamin content in potential ration ingredients, explicitly targeting key nutrients such as ascorbic acid (Vitamin C), thiamine (Vitamin B1), and carotene (Vitamin A precursor). He meticulously evaluated these vitamins in various ratios before and after exposure to tropical storage conditions. His work extended to examining army rations’ mineral composition and moisture levels, crucial in determining their durability and nutritional viability in hot, humid climates. The outcome of this rigorous research directly informed the formulation of the New Zealand Battle Ration, ensuring it could maintain nutritional integrity under demanding tropical conditions.
Composition and Features of the New Zealand Battle Ration
The resultant ration was meticulously designed for emergency use during assaults rather than for continuous consumption. Each daily ration was divided into three meals—breakfast, lunch, and tea—offering a well-balanced combination of calories, minerals, and vitamins in a compact and appetising form. The key principle underpinning the ration was to provide sufficient nutrition and energy, maintain troop morale, and ensure practicality under challenging field conditions.
Key features of the New Zealand Battle Ration included:
Minimal weight and bulk, specifically designed to fit comfortably into standard-issue haversacks without causing excessive fatigue or restricting mobility.
Meals packaged individually, with each meal fully self-contained, eliminating the need for additional utensils beyond mess tins and spoons.
Comprehensive inclusion of necessary items such as fuel blocks, waterproof matches, cigarette tobacco, and water sterilisation tablets to ensure self-sufficiency.
Robust packaging impervious to water and gases, ensuring durability in tropical environments.
Clear instructions printed on toilet paper included in each meal, ensuring ease of preparation under challenging conditions.
Detailed Meal Breakdown:
Breakfast:
Meat and gravy (3 dehydrated blocks)
Curry powder (2 tablets for added flavour)
Milk and sugar block (1)
Salt tablets (2)
Tea tablets (2)
Sweet biscuits (1 packet)
Mixed fruit block (1)
Chewing gum fortified with Vitamins B1 and C (1 packet)
Cigarette tobacco and papers (1 packet)
Waterproof matches (1 packet)
Smokeless fuel blocks for cooking (3)
Water sterilising tablets (1 packet)
Toilet paper printed with cooking instructions (2 sheets)
Lunch:
Savoury biscuits (1 packet)
Sweet biscuits (1 packet)
Cheese block (1)
Fruit block (apricots, 1)
Barley sugar sweets (1 packet for energy boost)
Chewing gum (1 packet)
Tea tablets (3)
Milk and sugar block (1)
Cigarette tobacco and papers (1 packet)
Waterproof matches (1 packet)
Water sterilising tablets (1 packet)
Toilet paper printed with instructions (2 sheets)
Tea:
Meat and gravy (3 dehydrated blocks)
Vegetable block (1, providing essential dietary fibre and nutrients)
Sweet biscuits (1 packet)
Mixed fruit block (1)
Milk and sugar block (1)
Salt tablets (2)
Tea tablets (3)
Chewing gum (1 packet)
Cigarette tobacco and papers (1 packet)
Waterproof matches (1 packet)
Smokeless fuel blocks (3)
Water sterilising tablets (1 packet)
Toilet paper printed with cooking instructions (2 sheets)
Including cooking items, specifically meat-and-gravy blocks, vegetable blocks, curry powder, and smokeless fuel, was informed by detailed operational feedback stressing hot meals’ positive psychological and physical impact during strenuous operations. In contrast, American forces primarily relied on cold rations like the K-ration at this time, highlighting New Zealand’s unique approach and emphasis on troop welfare.
Packaging Innovations
Given the tropical environment’s challenges—humidity, torrential rains, heat, and rough handling—advanced packaging solutions were essential to preserving the integrity of the New Zealand Battle Ration. Metal containers, traditionally robust, were impractical due to their excessive weight, scarcity during wartime, and difficulty of transport in challenging conditions. Consequently, an innovative approach to packaging materials was crucial, requiring solutions that provided robust protection while maintaining minimal weight and bulk.
A significant breakthrough came with adopting Pliofilm, a flexible and moisture-vapour-proof material suited to wrapping individual food items. This advanced material prevented moisture ingress, significantly extending the shelf life and maintaining the nutritional quality of dehydrated ration components. Wellington-based stationery and publishing firm Coulls Somerville Wilkie Ltd. was commissioned to implement this cutting-edge packaging approach. The company employed a comprehensive, multi-layered packaging strategy:
First layer: Individual food items were carefully heat-sealed within Pliofilm wrappers, shielding them from moisture and humidity.
Second layer: Each meal was packed into wax-dipped cartons, providing an additional protective barrier against environmental factors such as water and vapour penetration.
Third layer: These individually wrapped meals were consolidated into a robust outer wax-dipped carton containing a full day’s ration (breakfast, lunch, and tea). This outer packaging ensured the ration packs remained intact and dry, even under the harshest tropical conditions.
Extensive and rigorous testing validated the effectiveness of this packaging system. Notably, ration packs successfully passed stringent immersion tests, including one severe test involving a 56-hour water submersion after being transported to and from New Caledonia. The exceptional durability and resilience of the packaging conclusively demonstrated its suitability and practicality for tropical military operations, significantly enhancing troop morale and operational effectiveness.
Field Trials and Reception
Initial trials of the New Zealand Battle Ration commenced in early 1943 under the oversight of Major Yerex, Director of Bush Warfare Training. Conducted in New Zealand’s dense bush terrain, these early trials involved experienced troops familiar with operational challenges, providing critical feedback on the ration’s nutritional adequacy, ease of preparation, and practicality under field conditions. The rapid initiation of these trials, within approximately a year after the ration’s development began, highlighted the efficiency and effectiveness of DSIR and military personnel collaboration.
Extensive trials were conducted in New Caledonia, where 200 Battle Ration packs were tested under realistic and demanding conditions, simulating prolonged jungle warfare. Troops participating in these exercises consistently reported high satisfaction with the ration. They highlighted the significant morale boost and physiological benefits of including hot meals. Soldiers appreciated the straightforward preparation process, noting that hot, nutritious meals substantially improved energy levels, reduced fatigue, and positively influenced performance during rigorous physical exertion.
New Zealand soldiers opening boxes of supplies. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch: Ref: 1/2-041657-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22388214
Detailed feedback from troops indicated that the ration’s composition, including dehydrated meats, gravy, vegetables, and flavour-enhancing items such as curry powder, significantly contributed to their operational effectiveness. Moreover, troops valued the thoughtful inclusion of supplementary items like fortified chewing gum, waterproof matches, smokeless fuel blocks, and water sterilisation tablets, recognising these as vital components that enhanced self-sufficiency and operational readiness.
Administrative evaluations were more mixed, with some senior officers expressing reservations about the practicality of rations requiring cooking. These critics favoured simpler, non-cookable rations such as the American K-ration, which was readily available through U.S. supply channels and did not require cooking, thus simplifying logistics. Despite these critiques, the consensus from troops who directly utilised the New Zealand Battle Rations in operational settings was predominantly positive, emphasising the ration’s practical advantages and clear operational benefits. This direct troop feedback ultimately reinforced the ration’s effectiveness and underscored its suitability for field deployment in challenging tropical environments.
Soldiers loading rations into small landing craft, Vella Lavella Island, Solomon Islands. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch. Ref: 1/2-044802-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22493249
International Recognition and Legacy
The innovative New Zealand Battle Ration attracted considerable international acclaim from Allied nations during and immediately after the Second World War. The U.S. Quartermaster Corps Subsistence Laboratory in Chicago conducted extensive comparative analyses of emergency rations from various countries. Their findings praised the New Zealand Battle Ration for its superior compact design, lightweight characteristics, nutritional variety, and effectiveness in tropical climates, positioning it as an exemplar among contemporary Allied rations.
British military authorities were equally impressed, showing substantial interest in adopting New Zealand’s advancements in ration technology. The British War Office requested detailed documentation and insights into the ration’s design, packaging, and nutritional composition, reflecting a clear recognition of its innovative attributes and potential for broader military applications.[2]
Despite the enthusiastic international response, the widespread operational deployment of the New Zealand Battle Ration was ultimately restricted by logistical constraints, predominantly due to the dominance of the American supply chain in the Pacific Theatre. The ready availability of the American K-ration and other U.S.-supplied rations made it challenging for the New Zealand Battle Ration to gain broader traction and regular use.
Regrettably, despite its early wartime innovation, the New Zealand Army did not capitalise upon these significant advancements in packaged nutrition in the immediate post-war years. Instead, they reverted to the pre-war practice of issuing soldiers portable rations equivalent to the in-camp ration scales, overlooking the potential benefits demonstrated during the war.
It was not until 1958 that the New Zealand Army revisited the idea of specialised ration packs, developing a new four-person, 24-hour ration pack specifically designed to streamline food supplies for armoured units. This pack was assembled using readily available commercial products and successfully trialled by the 1 and 4 Armoured Regiments during their 1959 annual camps.[3]
The operational experiences of the New Zealand Special Air Service (NZ SAS) and regular regiments during jungle operations in Malaya further emphasised the necessity for a lightweight, convenient, and nutritionally balanced 24-hour ration pack. Recognising this evolving operational requirement, the New Zealand Army undertook fresh efforts to develop such a pack, incorporating lessons learned from the field and responding to the practical needs of soldiers operating in challenging environments.[4] This renewed approach eventually laid the groundwork for modern ration packs, leaving a lasting legacy that underscores New Zealand’s contributions to innovation and adaptability in military logistics and field nutrition.
Conclusion
The New Zealand Battle Ration represented a remarkable wartime innovation, effectively addressing the’ critical logistical and nutritional challenges of tropical conditions. Its development showcased rapid scientific advancement, practical ingenuity in packaging, and a focus on troop welfare. Although its immediate post-war potential was not fully realised due to logistical constraints, its pioneering legacy eventually informed later ration developments within the New Zealand Army and internationally, cementing its status as a significant contribution to military logistics and field nutrition. Nevertheless, the decision by the New Zealand Army to revert to pre-war rationing practices in the immediate post-war years represented a missed opportunity to stay at the forefront of ration pack innovation. It was not until the late 1950s, influenced by operational experiences overseas, that the New Zealand Army resumed developing modern, specialised ration packs, highlighting the delayed recognition of the long-term value of their wartime innovations.
[2] “DSIR [Department of Scientific and Industrial Research] World War 2 Narratives. No. 10. Dehydrated Foods and Ration Packs. Copy No. 1,” Archives New Zealand Item No R1768268 (1948).
[3] “H-19 Military Forces of New Zealand Annual Report of the General Officer Commanding, for period 1 April 1958 to 31 March 1959,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives (22 June 1959 1959).
[4] “Supplies: General- Ration Packs: Development and Production,” Archives New Zealand Item No R17189341 (1958 -1967).
The evolution of New Zealand Army stores accounting from 1845 to 1963 reflects the broader transformation of the nation’s military logistics from its colonial origins to a modern, structured system. This study is not a deep dive into the intricate details and complexities of New Zealand military stores accounting but rather an introductory overview of a system that has incrementally evolved over 180 years.
Initially modelled on British military accounting principles, New Zealand’s unique defence requirements—shaped by its geographical isolation, force structure, and operational demands—necessitated continuous refinement. Accounting practices have continuously evolved since the first musket was issued to the militia in 1845. However, it wasn’t until The Public Stores Act of 1867 that structured inventory control and accountability measures were formally introduced. This legislation laid the foundation for military store accounting, marking a significant step towards the professionalisation of the Defence Stores Department. These measures ensured crucial oversight and efficiency in military logistics, particularly highlighted by the demands of the South African War and the two World Wars, underscoring the need for a robust and adaptable system capable of sustaining large-scale military operations.
By the mid-20th century, New Zealand had developed a sophisticated store accounting framework. The introduction of NZP1: Volume I—Stores Accounting in 1951 marked a milestone, formalising the policy regulating the army’s store management. The subsequent 1962 revision further streamlined procedures, ensuring the system remained relevant amid evolving logistical complexities.
New Zealand’s innovations in stores accounting did not go unnoticed. In 1963, the Australian Army sought guidance from New Zealand to modernise its system, acknowledging the effectiveness of the NZ Army’s approach. This recognition underscored New Zealand’s competence in military logistics, demonstrating that despite its smaller size, its expertise had broader strategic significance.
Structure of this Study
Part One will examine the period from 1845 to 1918, tracing the evolution of New Zealand’s military stores accounting system from its British colonial origins to a structured, modern framework comparable to those of New Zealand’s allies by 1914. The demands of the First World War tested the system’s efficiency and resilience, exposing strengths and weaknesses that would shape post-war reforms.
Part Two will cover the period from 1918 to 1945, during which the lessons learned from the First World War were applied to improve inventory control, procurement efficiency, and financial oversight. Economic constraints of the interwar years prompted refinements to stores accounting, leading to the introduction of cost accounting in 1921 and the formalisation of logistical procedures in 1927. The rapid mobilisation for the Second World War tested these systems on an unprecedented scale, accelerating the adoption of modernised inventory tracking and decentralised supply chain management. By 1945, these wartime adaptations had laid the foundation for a more sophisticated and accountable military logistics system.
Part Three will examine the period from 1946 to 1963, focusing on the transition from wartime supply chains to a peacetime military logistics infrastructure. The post-war period saw efforts to streamline surplus disposal, re-establish long-term procurement strategies, and integrate emerging technologies into stores accounting. By 1963, the system had matured into a mature manual store accounting framework, ensuring greater efficiency, accountability, and interoperability.
Military Stores Accounting and Its Distinctions from Commercial Stores Accounting
The primary goal of military stores accounting is to ensure that soldiers on the frontlines, tradesmen in workshops, and medical staff in field hospitals have the necessary tools and equipment to carry out their duties effectively. This involves managing administrative burdens through the command and supply chains and ensuring all required controls are in place for the long-term sustainment and capability maintenance.
Military stores accounting is a specialised system designed to manage and track the acquisition, storage, distribution, and disposal of military supplies. Unlike commercial stores accounting, which primarily focuses on cost control and financial profitability, military stores accounting prioritises accountability, operational readiness, and the efficient utilisation of resources to meet operational outputs.[1]
Differences Between Military and Commercial Stores Accounting
Feature
Military Stores Accounting
Commercial Stores Accounting
Objective
Ensuring operational readiness and accountability
Maximising profit and minimising costs
Nature of Inventory
Includes depreciable assets, expendable, consumable, repairable, and non-expendable items
Primarily consumable and depreciable assets
Accounting System
Uses strict regulatory frameworks and controlled issue systems
Focuses on balance sheets and profit margins
Lifespan of Items
Items can remain in service for decades with periodic refurbishment
Items are typically depreciated and replaced
Valuation
Based on operational utility rather than market price
Based on market valuation and depreciation
Security and Control
Strict control due to security concerns
Less stringent control mechanisms
Classification of Military Stores
Military stores are classified into several categories based on their usage, longevity, and maintenance requirements:
Expendable Stores – Items that are used once and cannot be reused (e.g., ammunition, medical supplies, fuel). These are issued as required and accounted for under strict consumption controls.
Consumable Stores – Items that are used over time and require replenishment (e.g., rations, lubricants, batteries). While they are used up gradually, they still require accountability and stock rotation.
Repairable Stores – High-value equipment that, when damaged or worn, can be repaired and reissued rather than disposed of (e.g., weapons, radios, vehicles). These items are often tracked using maintenance logs and servicing records to maximise their lifespan.
Non-Expendable Stores – Permanent assets that remain in service for extended periods (e.g., buildings, infrastructure, large-calibre weapons). These items require detailed asset management and condition assessments.
The Long-Term Use of Military Equipment
Unlike commercial organisations, where items are often replaced once they end their economic life, military assets— from clothing to high-value or technologically complex equipment—are maintained, refurbished, and upgraded to extend their service life. For example:
Small Arms: Some rifles and sidearms remain in service for decades through regular maintenance and upgrades.
Vehicles: Military transport vehicles, such as trucks and armoured vehicles, can be refurbished multiple times before decommissioning.
Aircraft and Naval Assets: Large defence assets, including ships and aircraft, are often modernised with new technology and systems rather than being replaced outright.
Uniforms and Gear: Certain clothing items and equipment are subject to phased replacement cycles, where only components are updated as needed.
The Importance of Accountability in Military Stores Accounting
Military regulations are always subservient to Government legislation and regulations, especially Treasury rules regarding the expenditure of public monies. Military stores accounting is not a single system, but a collection of specialised accounting frameworks developed to manage different commodities such as ammunition, rations, fuel, vehicles, and technical spares. As military technology has advanced, these systems have evolved parallel to meet modern armed forces’ complex logistical demands.
Accountability is central to military stores accounting, ensuring that every piece of issued equipment is tracked to guarantee:
Proper usage and maintenance,
Prevention of loss or theft,
Compliance with operational requirements,
Efficient resource allocation during deployments.
Military store personnel are responsible for maintaining detailed records, conducting audits, and ensuring strict adherence to regulations. These rigorous accounting and inventory control measures ensure that military resources remain available and serviceable when required. Beyond merely tracking financial transactions, military stores accounting is a critical function that underpins military operations’ effectiveness, security, and sustainability.
Early Developments in Stores Accounting
From 1845, Quartermaster staff managing militia stores and then Volunteer stores from 1858 followed British military procedures. The Defence Stores were formally established in 1862, predating Lieutenant Colonel Edward Gorton’s appointment as Inspector of Defence Stores in 1869. Although Gorton assumed leadership in 1869, the Defence Stores had already been functioning, supporting the colonial military effort.[2]
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Gorton
The 1867 Public Stores Act, implemented under Gorton’s administration, introduced structured accounting procedures.[3] The Defence Stores Department issued circulars and administrative guidelines to ensure proper accountability and management of military supplies. Gorton’s rigorous approach laid the foundation for the 1871 Public Stores Act, which regulated government-wide stores management and standardised accounting practices.[4]
1870-ammunition-stocktake
Despite Gorton’s achievements in strengthening accountability, his strict enforcement and meticulous oversight drew criticism, leading to the abolition of the Stores Inspection Department in 1877.[5] However, his Defence Stores procedures remained robust, and a culture od accountability was established within Defence Stores. Thirty years later, Colonel George Macaulay Kirkpatrick of General Kitchener’s staff validated them in 1910, finding them comparable to British military standards.
Stores records were maintained by a system of indents and vouchers, with balances maintained in ledger books. The Defence Stores were required to provide annual reports of stocks on an annual basis, ensuring accountability and transparency in military logistics. These practices laid the foundation for the modern systematic inventory control and efficient stores management.
Example of a Ledger book
Development of the Artillery Stores (1880s Onwards)
As New Zealand expanded its Garrison Artillery and introduced new guns, equipment, and ammunition, additional accounting and management procedures became necessary. This was beyond the scope of the existing Defence Stores Department, requiring the expertise of military professionals.
In conjunction with Defence Storekeeper Captain Sam Anderson, Sergeant Major Robert George Vinning Parker, formerly of the Royal Garrison Artillery, developed a system of Artillery Stores Accounting. Parker was in charge of artillery ledgers and stores at Auckland, Wellington, and Lyttelton, ensuring the proper tracking and maintenance of artillery supplies. He continued in this role until 1889 when he was reassigned to Dunedin.[6]
Replacing Parker as the Artillery Ledger Keeper was Regimental Sergeant Major and Instructor in Gunnery Frederick Silver. Silver’s expertise in artillery logistics positioned him as a key figure in the continued refinement of artillery accounting systems. Following the death of Captain Sam Anderson in December 1899, Silver applied for the role of Ledger Keeper in the Defence Stores. Given his extensive experience and close working relationship with Anderson, Silver believed he was the ideal candidate.[7] However, due to his seniority, James O’Sullivan, the Chief Clerk of the Defence Stores, was awarded the role of Defence Storekeeper.[8]
Despite this, Silver was appointed as a temporary clerk in the Defence Stores, transitioning from the Permanent Militia on 25 June 1900. While his new role introduced additional responsibilities, Silver managed Artillery Ledgers seamlessly within the Defence Stores framework.[9]
The relationship between the Defence Stores and the Artillery was cooperative, with both functions operating as a single organisation. The Defence Stores was crucial in supporting the artillery’s logistical needs, ensuring that munitions, equipment, and essential supplies were readily available. The interconnected nature of these two functions allowed for a streamlined approach to military logistics, where artillery-specific requirements were integrated within the broader supply framework managed by the Defence Stores.
This integration led to an efficient system that balanced military necessity with stringent logistical oversight.
Organisational Reforms and the Defence Council (1906)
With the passage of the Defence Act Amendment Act 1906 on 28 October 1906, the Defence Council was established, providing the New Zealand Military Forces with a structured headquarters for the first time. The Act introduced specific staff functions, including:
Director of Artillery Services (Ordnance): Responsible for artillery armament, fixed coastal defences, and ordnance supplies.
Director of Stores: Responsible for clothing, personal equipment, accoutrements, saddlery, harnesses, small arms, ammunition, machine guns, transport, vehicles, camp equipment, and all stores required for the Defence Forces.[10]
As part of this reform, James O’Sullivan was confirmed as Director of Stores for New Zealand and appointed Quartermaster and Honorary Captain in the New Zealand Militia. Silver was designated as Assistant Defence Storekeeper, continuing to oversee Artillery Ledgers, which—despite falling under the purview of the Director of Artillery Services (Ordnance)—remained under Defence Stores control.
Despite these improvements, officers and Quartermaster staff in volunteer units were still elected annually, leading to inconsistency in stores management. Many units functioned more like social clubs than military organisations, resulting in disorganised stores accounts. This led to frequent discrepancies between supplies provided by the Crown and actual inventory.
The continued reliance on part-time and volunteer Quartermasters highlighted the need for further professionalisation of the quartermaster within the New Zealand Military, a challenge that would persist as the New Zealand Military transitioned into the modern era.
The Defence Act 1909 and the Transition to a Citizen Army
The Defence Act 1909 marked a significant transformation in New Zealand’s military organisation, laying the groundwork for a citizen-based Territorial Army and ending the Volunteer System.[11] This fundamental shift required extensive adjustments within the Defence Stores Department to support the expanding force structure.
For O’Sullivan, Silver, and the Defence Stores Department, the challenge was to continue modernising stores and logistics to meet the demands of a rapidly growing army. As the Territorial Force expanded, so did the logistical requirements, necessitating a more structured and professional approach to store management.
On 1 June 1910, Silver’s position was redesignated as Assistant Director of Military Stores, and he was appointed a Quartermaster with the rank of Honorary Lieutenant in the New Zealand Militia. His expertise and leadership played a crucial role in ensuring the Defence Stores Department could support the evolving needs of the New Zealand Military.
Guidance on the duties related to the management of stores
In 1910, Lord Kitchener, renowned as “The Empire’s foremost soldier,” visited New Zealand and thoroughly reviewed its military forces.[12] His assessment led to significant reforms within the NZ Military, including establishing the New Zealand Staff Corps (NZSC) and the New Zealand Permanent Staff (NZPS) in 1911. These changes aimed to create a professional cadre of officers (NZSC) and enlisted personnel (NZPS) capable of providing expert guidance and efficient administration to the Territorial Force units.
Lord Kitchener’s visit critically evaluated the military’s capabilities, revealing deficiencies in equipment care, maintenance, and overall responsibility. The existing Regimental Quartermaster Sergeants (RQMS) lacked the necessary skills, underscoring the need for a professional RQMS cadre.
The Regulations (Provisional) for the Military Forces of New Zealand, which came into effect on 5 May 1911, established the command and administrative structure of the Forces.
The overall responsibility for military stores and equipment was placed under the Commandant of the Forces, with specific duties delegated to key officers and commanders at various levels.
Senior Officers Responsible for Stores and Equipment
Quartermaster General
Managed mobilisation stores, including policies on reserves of clothing, equipment, and general stores.
Determined scales of clothing, equipment, and stores needed for troops.
Oversaw mobilisation arrangements for food, forage, clothing, stores, and equipment.
Director of Supplies and Transport
Managed the supply of food, forage, fuel, and lighting.
Responsible for Army Service Corps technical equipment.
Director of Equipment and Stores
Oversaw clothing, equipment, and general stores.
Managed supplies of stationery, forms, and books.
Provided vehicles and technical equipment, except those for Artillery and Engineers.
Supervised the storage and distribution of small arms and ammunition.
Director of Ordnance and Artillery
Established reserve scales for arms, ammunition, and technical equipment for Artillery and Engineer units.
Managed the provision and inspection of guns, small arms, and ammunition.
Oversaw machine guns, Artillery and Engineer vehicles, and technical stores.
Director of Medical Services
Provided advice on and inspected all medical equipment to ensure it met operational standards.
Director of Veterinary Services
Provided expert advice on veterinary stores and equipment.
District and Unit Responsibilities
At a regional level, Commanders of Districts were responsible for maintaining the efficiency of forts and armaments, including all associated buildings, works, stores, and equipment. They also played a key role in ensuring financial prudence by overseeing officers responsible for spending and stores management.
At the unit level, the Commanding Officer had a broad set of responsibilities, including:
Maintaining discipline, efficiency, and proper administrative systems within the unit.
Ensuring accountability for public equipment, clothing, and stores.
Overseeing the maintenance and cleanliness of all issued arms.
Managing the proper receipt and distribution of rations and fuel.
Ensuring daily ration inspections were conducted in the presence of an officer.
Other Regimental Officers, such as Company Commanders, even those in temporary appointments, were also responsible for:
The equipment, ammunition, clothing, and stores assigned to their company.
Ensuring soldiers maintained personal cleanliness and proper care of their uniforms, arms, and accoutrements.
Supervising the quality and adequacy of rations provided to troops.
Finally, the 1911 Regulations clearly stated that any officer or individual responsible for public stores was strictly forbidden from lending any article under their charge unless expressly sanctioned by their Commanding Officer (CO). This regulation reinforced strict accountability and control over military stores, ensuring that all equipment, clothing, and supplies were used solely for authorised military purposes. [13]
To maintain proper accountability and management of military stores, Defence Stores personnel and unit Quartermasters followed detailed policies and procedures outlined in official publications, including:
Regulations (Provisional) for the Military Forces of New Zealand
Financial Instructions and Allowances Regulations for NZ Military Forces
Regulations for Clothing and Equipment of NZ Military Forces
NZ Dress Regulations
Prices Vocabulary of Stores
NZ Mobilisation Regulations
Additional guidance was also found in operational reference materials, such as:
Field Service Regulations
Training Manuals
Field Service Pocket Books
The responsibilities established in 1911 laid the foundation for the structured management of military stores, setting a precedent for all future stores accounting procedures. These early frameworks ensured accountability, efficiency, and operational readiness, embedding core logistical principles underpinning military supply chain management today. While titles and organisational structures have evolved, the fundamental tenets of logistical oversight, resource management, and financial accountability have remained steadfast. Successive iterations of Defence Orders, regulations, and policies have refined and expanded these responsibilities, ensuring their continued relevance and adaptability to the evolving operational and strategic needs of the New Zealand Defence Force in the modern era.
Standardising Stores Management and Training
In November 1911, thirty young men from military districts attended an intensive three-week training course at the Defence Stores Department in Wellington to address this. This comprehensive training, overseen by O’Sullivan, included:
Weapon storage, inspection, maintenance, and accounting
Storage, inspection, and maintenance of leather items (e.g., saddlery and harnesses)
Storage and upkeep of canvas and fabric equipment
Packing procedures for stores
Maintenance of records and documentation
The candidates successfully passed the examinations and were appointed as RQMS under General Order 112/10. Notably, this was the first military trade-related stores course conducted in New Zealand.
“Staff of the Quarter-master General—men who passed as Quarter-master instructors and are being drafted to the various districts, Colourised by Rairty Colour
To ensure consistency across districts, a conference of District Storekeepers was held in Wellington in August 1913. O’Sullivan noted their dedication to maintaining accountability for government property, highlighting their investment in their work.
Historically, annual military camps were managed ad hoc with inconsistent equipment scales. With the establishment of the Territorial Army, the Defence Stores Department introduced standardised camp equipment requirements in 1913.
To streamline supply chain management, temporary Ordnance Depots were established at brigade camps in 1913. Personnel received training under the Director of Equipment and Stores, and roles were assigned as follows:
Ordnance Officer: District Storekeeper Auckland (Lieutenant Beck)
Two clerks
Four issuers
Following the success of the 1913 camps, the system was expanded in 1914, with each regional storekeeper acting as an Ordnance Officer and staff numbers increasing to six clerks and twelve issuers.
Takapau Divisional Camp, 1914. Te Papa (1362454)
Strategic Assessment, Preparedness and Mobilisation
In early 1914, General Sir Ian Hamilton inspected New Zealand’s forces, assessing approximately 70% of personnel. He noted that the Territorial Force was “well-equipped and well-armed” but recommended looking to Australian models for future Ordnance development. O’Sullivan’s annual report for 1914 confirmed that the Defence Stores Department was in a strong position, with ample stocks of small arms, ammunition, clothing, and web equipment.
The 1914 mobilisation was the first test of the reorganised and reequipped New Zealand military forces since the South African War. The challenge was immense: raising, equipping, and dispatching an expeditionary force while maintaining the coastal defence garrisons and the Territorial Army for homeland security. O’Sullivan’s Defence Stores supported this effort, which, under his leadership, played a crucial role in successfully mobilising the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF).
The groundwork for the NZEF was laid in March 1914 when General Alexander Godley issued mobilisation regulations, adapted from British Army directives, to guide the formation of an expeditionary force. New Zealand’s commitment to supporting Britain in the event of war had been reinforced at the 1907 and 1911 Imperial Conferences, yet it was only in 1912 that Godley, confident in the growth of the Territorial Army, shifted focus to preparing for an overseas force.
As part of this preparation, Godley identified three likely tasks for the NZEF:
Seizure of German Pacific possessions.
Deployment to protect Egypt from a Turkish attack.
Fighting in Europe alongside British forces.
By mid-1914, New Zealand’s military reorganisation was three years into an estimated seven-year process.
Although at full operational strength, confidence in the military’s preparedness was high. Annual training camps had been completed, and unit stores had been restocked. A major stocktake was planned for August 1914—marking the first such effort in two years, as the 1913 stocktake had been postponed due to industrial strikes.
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 set off a chain of events leading to war. On 30 July, Defence Headquarters instructed District Headquarters to begin precautionary war preparations. By 1 August, partial mobilisation schemes were underway, and further instructions on the composition of the NZEF followed on 2 August.
Each military district contributed a fully equipped infantry battalion, a mounted rifle regiment, artillery, engineers, and medical subunits. These units were to be drawn from the permanent forces, Territorial Force, and reserves. District Storekeepers supported by unit Quartermasters were critical in equipping these units with stores drawn from existing regiments and regional mobilisation depots.
On 3 August, Quartermaster General (QMG) Colonel Alfred William Robin issued detailed instructions regarding individual equipment. Territorial soldiers were to report with their complete kit, while reservists would collect theirs from their regiments. Quartermaster staff were given guidance on recording the transfer of equipment in regimental ledgers.
With war declared, New Zealand’s government announced on 7 August that an Expeditionary Force of 7,000–8,000 men would be mobilised. The response was overwhelming, with thousands of volunteers rushing to enlist. Having had several days’ notice, District Headquarters swiftly implemented mobilisation plans.
Godley’s assumption that the NZEF’s first task would be the seizure of German Pacific territories was proven correct. By 11 August, the New Zealand force for German Samoa—comprising 1,413 personnel—was fully equipped by the Defence Stores and ready for deployment. Additional stores were assembled at Wellington’s wharf for embarkation. The force landed on 29 August, securing Samoa without resistance.
Meanwhile, mobilisation camps were established across New Zealand:
Auckland (Alexandra Park) – District Storekeeper Captain William Thomas Beck set up a mobilisation store, assisted by Sergeant Norman Joseph Levien.
Christchurch (Addington Park) – Captain Arthur Rumbold Carter White managed the Canterbury District mobilisation store.
Dunedin (Tahuna Park) – Captain Owen Paul McGuigan handled equipping recruits, many of whom had no prior military training.
Wellington (Awapuni Racecourse) – The Defence Stores in Wellington directly supported the mobilisation effort.
As the central hub for Defence Stores, Wellington managed the receipt and distribution of equipment nationwide. Public appeals were made for short-supply items like binoculars and compasses. On 14 August, approval was granted for each soldier to receive a second pair of boots—typically, the second pair had to be purchased at a reduced rate.
Mobilisation was not simply a matter of sending troops overseas; it also involved ensuring the ongoing reinforcement of the NZEF and maintaining the Territorial Army at home. Planning for NZEF reinforcements commenced alongside the main mobilisation effort to sustain the force in the field. It was determined that 20% reinforcements would be provided six weeks after the NZEF’s departure, with a further 5% arriving monthly thereafter.
Trentham Camp was selected as the primary training and equipping centre for reinforcement drafts, where the Camp Quartermaster Stores, under Lieutenant (Temporary Captain) Thomas McCristell, played a critical role in ensuring personnel were properly outfitted before deployment. The scale of this task was immense, with store personnel working late into the night to issue uniforms and equipment to the steady stream of reinforcements. While the focus remained on sustaining the NZEF, efforts were also required to maintain the Territorial Army at home, ensuring a trained force remained available for local defence and future deployments. Mobilisation was not a single event but a continuous process that demanded careful logistical planning and execution to sustain the war effort.
Beyond issuing equipment, the Camp Quartermaster Stores also served as a training ground for new Quartermasters destined for overseas service. Selected candidates underwent instruction in key logistical functions, including clothing and equipping troops, managing camp equipment, organising ammunition supplies, and overseeing water distribution and field kitchen setup. This training ensured that reinforcements were well-equipped and supported by skilled personnel capable of sustaining operations in the field.
By September 1914, the Defence Stores had successfully equipped the NZEF. On 24 September, General Godley thanked the Defence Stores staff for their efforts, acknowledging their crucial role in the mobilisation process. However, controversy soon followed.
On 26 October, after ten days at sea, Godley sent a note to Minister of Defence Colonel James Allen, alleging irregularities in Defence Stores operations and implying that O’Sullivan and his staff might be engaging in misappropriation. Despite recognising O’Sullivan’s significant contributions, Godley recommended auditing the Defence Stores’ accounting systems. This unfounded allegation ultimately led to O’Sullivan’s resignation, overshadowing the department’s achievements in successfully mobilising and equipping both the Samoa Expeditionary Force and the NZEF.
New Zealand’s largest military deployment to date placed immense logistical demands on the Defence Stores. The department leveraged pre-war procurement contracts while employing competitive tendering to secure uniforms, equipment, and supplies. This approach facilitated rapid expansion, with Buckle Street in Wellington emerging as a key logistical hub. However, the sheer volume of supplies soon exceeded capacity, necessitating the leasing of commercial storage facilities beyond the department’s central depots in Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin.
As military activity intensified, the establishment of the Palmerston North District Store in early 1915 significantly enhanced logistical capabilities, particularly for units stationed in the lower North Island. This expansion underscored the growing need for decentralised supply operations, improving the efficiency of equipment distribution.
The rapid wartime expansion placed immense strain on both personnel and logistics. Despite increasing responsibilities, the department received only minimal increases in permanent staff, forcing heavy reliance on temporary workers to meet operational demands.
As the war progressed, concerns over procurement methods and accounting procedures led to mounting external scrutiny. In 1915, a Commission of Inquiry was launched to examine the Defence Stores’ business practices, financial controls, and purchasing procedures. While the Commission found no evidence of misconduct, it recommended procedural improvements to enhance transparency and efficiency. In response, the government established the Ministry of Munitions, which took over procurement and supply chain management, streamlining logistical operations..
Supporting the NZEF (1915–1921)
The New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) formed its own New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) in 1915, recognising the need for a more structured military logistics system. This corps provided dedicated logistical support for the NZEF and residual units until 1921. This development was critical as the demands of modern warfare required a more organised and professional approach to supply chain management, equipment maintenance, and ordnance distribution.
Initially, the NZEF relied heavily on British supply lines and logistical structures, with Quartermasters embedded within units managing day-to-day supply requirements. However, as operations expanded and the need for self-sufficiency grew, the establishment of the NZAOC provided a more formal system of procurement, storage, distribution, and maintenance of military stores. The Centre of mass for the NZAOC within the New Zealand Division was the Assistant Director of Ordnance Stores (DADOS) and his staff, who operated in concert with regimental quartermasters, who remained responsible for issuing and maintaining personal and unit equipment at the frontline.
Quartermasters played a pivotal role in ensuring that troops were properly equipped, fed, and clothed and worked closely with the NZAOC to ensure seamless logistical support across different theatres of war, from Gallipoli to the Western Front and the Middle East.
By 1918, the NZAOC had become a critical component of the NZEF’s supply chain, with depots in the UK and the DADOS operating dumps in key operational areas. As the war concluded, the Corps played a crucial role in the demobilisation process, managing the return of surplus equipment, disposal of unserviceable stores, and redistributing serviceable assets to remaining military units and government departments.
The NZAOC continued to support New Zealand’s post-war military commitments until 1921. The lessons learned during the Great War laid the foundation for future developments in ordnance and supply management, shaping the logistics framework of the post-war army.
The role of Quartermasters and the NZAOC in supporting the NZEF between 1915 and 1921 was instrumental in ensuring that New Zealand troops remained equipped and operationally effective throughout the war. Their contributions sustained the force in combat and established enduring logistical principles that continued influencing military store management in the following decades.
Home Service Stores Accounting
On the home front, military authorities pushed for the complete militarisation of stores accounting, aiming to align New Zealand’s system with British Army Ordnance practices. This led to a significant leadership change in 1916, with Major Thomas McCristell replacing James O’Sullivan as Director of Equipment and Stores. Under McCristell’s leadership, the department underwent a comprehensive reorganisation, transitioning into a formal military structure.
By 1 February 1917, the home service New Zealand Army Ordnance Department (NZAOD) and NZAOC were officially established, replacing the Defence Stores Department. This milestone ended 48 years of civilian-led military logistics, marking a shift towards a fully integrated, military-controlled Ordnance service.
Concurrent with the establishment of the Home Service NZAOC, formal Ordnance Procedures were published, and the Regulations for the Equipment of the New Zealand Military were updated. These replaced all previous instructions and formed the foundation for New Zealand’s modern military logistics system.
Conclusion: Towards a Modern Military Stores Accounting System
The period from 1845 to 1918 laid the foundational principles of New Zealand Army stores accounting, evolving from ad hoc militia supply practices to a structured, professional system aligned with British military standards. Early efforts, such as the 1867 Public Stores Act and the establishment of the Defence Stores Department, introduced much-needed oversight and accountability, ensuring military forces were adequately equipped for colonial conflicts and later global engagements.
The early 20th century saw increasing refinement in stores management, with greater formalisation under the Defence Act 1909, the creation of a structured supply organisation, and the introduction of rigorous accounting and inventory control measures. The mobilisation for World War I tested these systems on an unprecedented scale, demonstrating their strengths and the need for further development. The establishment of the NZEF NZAOC in 1915 and the home service New Zealand Army Ordnance Department and Corps in 1917 signified a pivotal transformation, shifting military logistics from civilian oversight to a dedicated military-run system. The experiences of World War I reinforced the importance of accurate, efficient, and adaptable stores accounting systems, setting the stage for continued evolution in the interwar and post-World War II periods. The next part of this study, New Zealand Army Stores Accounting: 1919–1945, will examine how the lessons learned from wartime operations influenced peacetime logistics, the modernisation of accounting frameworks, and the growing role of technology and centralised control in military supply chain management.
Notes
[1] Australian Defence Force, “Logistics Series – Supply,” Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.3 (2004): 1.1-1.16.
[4]“The Public Stores Act 1871,” ed. General Assembly of New Zealand (Wellington, 1871).;”Lieut-Colonel Edward Gorton,” New Zealand Gazette, Issue 1, 26 January 1872, 619.
[11] Peter Cooke and John Crawford, The Territorials (Wellington: Random House New Zealand Ltd, 2011), 153.
[12] Paul William Gladstone Ian McGibbon, The Oxford companion to New Zealand Military History (Auckland; Melbourne; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 2000), 369.
[13] “Regulations (Provisional) for the Military Forces of New Zealand “, New Zealand Gazette 5 May 1911.;
Given the rich tapestry of New Zealand’s World War II history, the spotlight often shines on the battlefield heroics of the combat units of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Middle East, Italy, and the Pacific. Yet beneath these narratives lies a network of unsung combat enablers whose logistical efforts ensured the execution of military operations. Among them were the men and women of the New Zealand Army Movements Control, whose largely unrecognised efforts were vital to the war effort.
New Zealand military historians often overlook New Zealand’s military logistic functions, it’s as if logistics just happened in the background with no real consequences on the eventful outcome. However, these operations required meticulous planning, coordination, and execution. As part of New Zealand’s broader Military Logistic efforts, Movements Control was pivotal in managing the complex logistics of troop and equipment movements across various theatres of war.
Since its origins during World War II, the role of Army Movements Operators has evolved significantly. Post-war, movement operations became a core trade within the Royal New Zealand Army Service Corps (RNZASC), later passing to the Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport (RNZCT), and now residing within the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment (RNZALR). Today, RNZALR Movement Operators are crucial in managing military logistics and ensuring the efficient transportation of personnel and equipment.
Their responsibilities are divided into three main areas:
Terminal Operations: Movement Operators handle the loading and unloading of cargo from various transport modes, including aircraft, ships, and trucks. They operate vehicles like trucks and forklifts.
Movement Control: Movement Control Operators focus on planning and coordinating the transportation of defence personnel and equipment domestically and internationally. They manage travel logistics, including route planning, ticketing, accommodation, and customs clearance.
Aerial Delivery: Aerial Delivery Operators specialise in preparing and packing supplies for airdrops, calculating loads and drop zones to ensure safe delivery.
Over the years, the role has adapted to meet the changing needs of military logistics and advancements in technology and transportation methods. However, the modern RNZALR Movement Operator trade has its roots in the movement organisations built up during World War II to support New Zealand operations at home and abroad. This article aims to provide a snapshot of this often-overlooked aspect of New Zealand’s military logistics and challenges faced by the New Zealand Army Movements Control during World War Two.
Movements Within New Zealand
During wartime, the Quartermaster-General’s Branch (QMG) was crucial in managing the movement of troops and materials within New Zealand and overseas. Its responsibilities included coordinating transport by road, rail, sea, and air and issuing travel warrants. To manage these extensive tasks, the QMG delegated movement operations to two Assistant Quartermaster Generals: AQMG (2) Movements, who oversaw general troop movements, and AQMG (4) Shipping, who was responsible for sea transport.
A small but essential unit, the Transport Shipping Office, operated under Army Headquarters in Wellington. It was tasked with overseeing the receipt and dispatch of all military stores and equipment at the port and ensuring accurate records. Despite its nominal establishment of 40 personnel, it often worked with reduced numbers, reflecting the resource constraints of the time.
The organisation of overseas deployments was complex, with troops mobilised from camps across New Zealand and transported to ports via special trains and ferries. Before departure, troopships underwent thorough inspections, with adjustments made to ensure adequate accommodations. Early in the war, ships retained peacetime fittings, offering cabins for most troops. However, as shipping space became scarce, ships were reconfigured to maximise capacity with hammocks and tiered bunks.
Between 1939 and 1944, New Zealand dispatched over 64,000 troops overseas in regular reinforcement drafts. For instance, the 1st Echelon, comprising 6,529 soldiers, departed in January 1940, while the 10th Reinforcements, comprising 6,063 troops, embarked in May 1943. Dispatching reinforcement drafts required meticulous planning, especially in arranging final leave for troops and securing timely transport despite occasional delays.
Deployments were not limited to the Middle East and Europe. Forces were also sent to Fiji and New Caledonia, requiring additional logistical arrangements. The deployment of the 3rd Division to New Caledonia in late 1942 involved moving 13,000 personnel in nine stages, highlighting the scale of planning and challenges posed by wartime conditions.
The return of troops from overseas required equally detailed organisation. Movement Control ensured that soldiers disembarked efficiently, underwent medical checks, and received travel documents, ration cards, and leave passes. Large-scale returns, such as the 6,000-strong Ruapehu draft in 1943, involved special trains and ferries transporting men to their homes. In cases of furlough drafts arriving from Australia, disembarkation staff boarded ships at Fremantle to complete administrative tasks during the voyage, ensuring a seamless process upon arrival in New Zealand.
Within New Zealand, troop movements were frequent and extensive. Movement Control coordinated the initial mobilisation of forces, weekend leave, furloughs, and transfers between camps. Given the geography of New Zealand and the distances involved, special trains or ferries were often required, particularly during peak periods such as Christmas and New Year. For example, in late 1942 and early 1943, around 40,000 troops were granted leave, necessitating careful scheduling to avoid disruptions to civilian travel.
The cooperation of the Railways Department was invaluable, with over 22,800 special trains transporting more than 12 million troops between 1939 and 1943. Steamer ferries supplemented rail transport, often allocating large portions of passenger capacity to military movements. In some cases, civilian travel was suspended to prioritise troop transfers.
Ensuring troop welfare during travel was another significant responsibility. Meals were provided in transit, ranging from dining room services to “bag meals” for larger groups. Army catering teams occasionally managed ferry services, particularly on long daytime voyages.
Air transport was an increasingly vital option, especially for urgent travel. It was used for compassionate leave, medical evacuations, and the movement of senior officers. By late 1943, over 500 personnel had been transported by air to destinations such as Fiji, New Caledonia, and Norfolk Island, demonstrating its growing importance in military logistics.
The QMG faced considerable challenges, including resource shortages, fluctuating troop numbers, and the logistical demands of coordinating movements with allied forces. The arrival of American troops in New Zealand required a collaborative approach, with joint efforts between New Zealand and U.S. military authorities ensuring smooth operations. Innovations such as adopting the cafeteria system for shipboard meals and leveraging American transport systems were vital in addressing these challenges.[1]
Movements in 2 New Zealand Expeditionary Force
Within the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF), Shipping and Movements was assigned to the Assistant Quartermaster-General 2NZEF (AQM 2NZEF). This role was further delegated to the ‘Q’ Branch at HQ 2NZEF, which managed general troop movements, shipping operations, and the administration of 2NZEF Port Detachments.[2]
To support the New Zealand Division with reinforcements and supplies, 18 to 30 soldiers were attached to British movement authorities at key ports as New Zealand “missions”. The first Port Detachment was established at Suez on 25 October 1940.[3] The New Zealand Port Detachments were pivotal in facilitating the efficient delivery of cargo and mail to New Zealand units stationed in the Middle East during World War II. As the volume of supplies pouring into the region increased in early 1941, the need for a specialised unit became apparent, and the unit was formalised as 1 NZ Port Detachment on 20 December 1942.[4] Comprising experienced shipping personnel, the NZ Port Detachments established themselves as beacons of efficiency, significantly reducing cargo losses from 15% to less than 1%, well below the peacetime average.
Operating from its headquarters in the Suez area, the detachment meticulously handled all aspects of logistics: examining manifests, overseeing unloading operations, and ensuring that shipments destined for New Zealand forces were promptly dispatched to their final destinations. It also guarded cargoes, managed personnel movements, and handled incoming and outgoing mail—a lifeline for troops far from home.
As the theatre of war shifted, so did the detachment’s responsibilities. Following the movements of the New Zealand Division, the No 2 Port Detachment was established. It was located in Benghazi and later Tripoli, continuing its vital operations despite enemy actions. Tripoli’s duties extended beyond logistics to include the distribution of morale-boosting parcels and tobacco, a gesture appreciated by the troops.
The detachment’s operational equipment mirrored its adaptability and resourcefulness. The launch “Olive Jean,” once a familiar sight in Auckland, was repurposed and renamed “New Zealand,” symbolising its new role under Kiwi command.[5] A second launch, christened “New Zealand II,” was an enemy vessel salvaged, refurbished and equipped with a truck engine after being stranded on a Tripoli beach. It became instrumental in navigating the challenges of a battered port environment.
Following the invasion of Italy and the establishment of Bari as a New Zealand base, the No 3 Port Detachment was formed on 8 November 1943.[6]
By 1943, the No1 Port Detachment had consolidated its operations in Suez, significantly reducing the pilfering of goods from New Zealand shipments. Their resilience and dedication persisted through hazardous conditions, often operating under the cover of darkness during the advances of the 8th Army.[7]
The tasks of the NZ Port Detachments were highly complex. Amid vast quantities of cargo, they faced the daunting challenge of locating individual cases among thousands of tons and retrieving consignments mistakenly diverted to remote ports. Their operations spanned from bustling Haifa to strategic North African and Italian ports, showcasing their dedication to ensuring every shipment reached its intended destination.[8]
The British Army in Sicily 1943 Troops from 5th Division go aboard landing craft at Catania, Sicily, in preparation for the invasion of the Italian mainland, 2-3 September 1943. Loughlin (Sgt), No 2 Army Film & Photographic Unit – http://media.iwm.org.uk/iwm/mediaLib//47/media-47264/large.jpgThis photograph NA 6297 comes from the collections of the Imperial War Museums.
The No 1 Port Detachment was disbanded on 1 November 1945, the No 2 Port Detachment on 30 January 1946, and the No 3 Port Detachment on 26 February 1946. A Port Detachment was included in the 2NZEF contribution to J Force as part of the Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan.[9][10]
Movement Control in the Pacific
The Third Division’s Movement Control Unit (MCU) played an overlooked role in the Pacific during World War II. Despite being one of the most minor units, it was integral to the third division’s operations, acting as the “Divisional Shipping Company.” The unit was responsible for coordinating troop movements by sea and air, liaising with American port authorities, and managing the receipt and dispatch of mail and cargo.
Initially formed in Fiji, the unit was redeployed with the division back to New Zealand. After reorganisation and training, it was deployed to New Caledonia in 1943, facing significant challenges. Lacking local harbour facilities and reliant on overworked American resources, the MCU often had to be resourceful, sometimes acquiring essential equipment through unconventional means.
Operating primarily from Nouméa and Népoui, the MCU adapted to differing conditions at each port. In Nouméa, they contended with intense activity amidst heat, mosquitoes, mud, and the bustle of a massive U.S. military presence. Limited dock space meant most ships were worked with wooden barges, leading to delays and occasional cargo losses. The staff had to negotiate with local workers and navigate a complex and evolving logistical environment.
At Népoui, with minimal American presence, the MCU took full responsibility for port operations. However, only one ship could be handled at a time—and only half of it without repositioning—the absence of bureaucratic hurdles allowed for more efficient unloading. The small team worked tirelessly, often around the clock, to manage the steady flow of ships and supplies.
New Zealand soldiers during amphibious training, Pacific area, during World War II. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch :Photographs relating to World War 1914-1918, World War 1939-1945, occupation of Japan, Korean War, and Malayan Emergency. Ref: WH-0724-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22777107
Over time, the MCU expanded its reach, establishing representatives in the New Hebrides and Guadalcanal. During their tenure in New Caledonia, they handled 476 ships— averaging 20 boats per week—with a staff that never exceeded 17 men. Their duties broadened to include boats, wharves, and harbour activities.
When the division advanced to Guadalcanal in August 1943, MCU members established operations in the new combat zone. They faced the unique challenges of unloading ships on open coasts under the threat of Japanese air raids. Lacking proper harbour facilities, they innovated methods to ensure supplies reached the front lines despite frequent interruptions and the complexities of coordinating with American forces.
The remaining MCU staff in New Caledonia continued facilitating reinforcements and equipment shipments to the forward areas. They efficiently managed the division’s return from Guadalcanal, ensuring rapid disembarkation and distribution of troops and equipment. Their expertise allowed thousands of soldiers to be processed in under three hours, with equipment unloaded in record time.
The MCU’s success was mainly due to cooperation with other New Zealand units and American organisations. The Base Supply Depot No. 1 and the Wharf Operating Company supported their operations. American counterparts provided invaluable assistance, offering trucks, harbour transport, and logistical support, greatly enhancing efficiency.
As one of the first units to arrive and the last to depart from New Caledonia, the MCU’s contributions were significant and far-reaching. They ensured the division remained supplied and mobile, directly impacting the success of New Zealand operations in the Pacific theatre.[11]
Post War
As early as 1944, New Zealand’s military leadership began planning for the post-war era, determined to preserve the valuable experiences and lessons learned during the war. Their primary goal was to prevent the Army from reverting to the neglect of the pre-war era, characterised by a minimal regular force. Both the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) and the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) developed post-war establishments to align with the projected needs of the Regular and Territorial Forces. However, the responsibility for Movement Control, a critical logistics function, was not assigned to these logistics corps. Instead, it became the responsibility of the Provost Corps.
To qualify as a 4-Star Military Police, members of the Provost Corps, individuals were required to complete basic training in core areas such as Military Law, police procedures, traffic control, map reading, and weapons handling. In addition to this foundational training, members of the Provost Corps also had the option to become fully qualified in the following specialised subjects:
Further research is needed to determine when Movement Control functions were transferred from the Provost Corps to the RNZASC.
Conclusion
This account of New Zealand’s Army Movements Control during World War II offers a glimpse into New Zealand logistics units’ critical role during this conflict. This snapshot is not intended to be an in-depth history but rather a starting point—an invitation for further research and study into the contributions of these essential yet often overlooked enablers.
Amid the chaos of global conflict, the planning, coordination, and execution carried out by New Zealand’s Army Movements Control ensured the seamless transit of troops and supplies. These units exemplified resilience and adaptability from managing complex embarkation and disembarkation processes and orchestrating domestic and international transport routes to innovating under resource constraints in the Pacific theatre. Their efforts were vital in minimising logistical inefficiencies, delivering supplies to their intended destinations, and sustaining the morale of New Zealand’s Forcers during one of the most challenging periods in history.
This legacy continues in the modern RNZALR, where Movement Operators uphold the tradition of excellence in military logistics. Their work underscores the enduring significance of logistics in operational success while honouring the dedication and ingenuity of those who laid the groundwork during World War II.
By recognising these contributions, we fully appreciate the intricate machinery behind New Zealand’s war effort and the unsung logisticians who ensured its smooth operation. This story deserves further exploration and study, shining a light on the individuals whose quiet competence underpinned the feats of those on the front lines.
Notes
[1] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150 (1944): 73-86.
[11] E.V Sale, Base Wallahs: Story of the units of the Nase Organisation, NZEF IP (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 243-50.
[12] “The Star Classification and Promotion of Other Ranks of the Regular Force,” New Zealand Army Order 60/1947, 9 August 1947.
