Too often in military writing, it looks as if logistics “just happens”: an army is raised, equipment appears, stocks refill, and movement unfolds as if by instinct. In truth, nothing “just happens”. Across history—from spear-carriers and baggage trains to War Establishments and to today’s financially risk-averse, resource-restricted ecosystem—the science and art of logistics have quietly driven everything. This study uses history as a working tool: we read past practice to extract durable principles so tomorrow’s logisticians can scale deliberately, not by habit. Scaling is the mechanism that turns intent into counted people, platforms, rations, ammunition, repair parts, and lift so units arrive equipped, stay maintained, and fight at tempo. Without scaling, logistics is only an aspiration.

This guide sets out that mechanism in plain English. Across the force, the same logic applies: decide who gets what, make equipment complete and auditable, package predictably for movement, size, repair, depth to reliability and lead time, and maintain theatre resilience. Peace and war establishments are simply the entitlement “switch”; in-scaling and out-scaling dial the system up and down; and sound master data keeps automation honest. We ground the method in British and Commonwealth doctrine and New Zealand practice, using short case studies to show what works, what doesn’t, and why—so logisticians can make the deliberate, evidence-based choices that turn plans into assured sustainment.

In- and Out-Scaling

Scaling is how the system is dialled up or down. In-scaling builds people, equipment, stocks and permissions to meet a new or larger task. Out-scaling winds the same back down, tidying books and kit so the force is ready for what follows. The levers are the same; they move in opposite directions.

When to scale up

• New equipment or a role change.
• Mounting for deployment/exercises.
• Seasonal/theatre shifts or higher tempo.

When to scale down

• End of operation/rotation.
• Capability withdrawn or mothballed.
• Restructure or budget-driven footprint reduction.

What actually changes

• People & entitlements: switch Peace Entitlement →War Entitlement, or role, issue the correct allowance lists.
• Equipment completeness: make kit complete; rectify shortages; test.
• Consumables & ammunition: set straightforward block issues and first-line loads that match the plan.
• Spares & repair: size unit/depot spares to likely failures and lead times; preserve kit for storage/return.
• Movement & footprint: translate scales into real loads (pallets/containers/ULDs) and book lift.
• Data, compliance & money: update masters, licences and registers; close work orders; reconcile ledgers.

Planned and evidence-based (not guesses)

Scaling is a scientific, planned discipline with explicit service levels. Holdings are set from demand, reliability and lead-time data. Rules of thumb—for example, “carry 10% spares”—are avoided in favour of sizing to the target service level.

Common Pitfalls (and the Scaling Fixes)

Scaling is part science, part art. Some of the traps are timeless:

• Issuing too much– Forgetting to adjust entitlements to actual strength leads to waste.
• Repair underestimates– Peacetime spares won’t cope with wartime tempo; you need to scale for climate, usage, and lead times.
• Lift blindness– A plan that looks neat on paper may be impossible to move unless scales are mapped to pallets, containers, or aircraft loads.
• Footprint risk– Piling too much stock too far forward makes units vulnerable. Balance depth with dispersion.

Deep Historical Context: From Hoplite to Legionary to Tümen

From antiquity to the steppe, Rome and—centuries later—the Mongol Empire show how standardised building blocks, fixed measures and modular kits turned formations into predictable logistics: the Romans through contubernia, rations and marching camps; the Mongols through decimal organisation, remounts and the yam relay.

Greek city-states (c. 6th–4th centuries BCE): The Phalanx as a Scale

• Standard fighting load. The hoplite panoply (shield, spear, helmet, body armour) functioned as a personal equipment scale; city‑states enforced patterns so men fought as interchangeable blocks.
• Rations and measures. Planning by standard measures (e.g., set grain issues per man per day) made food and water predictable, and hence movable.
• Formation → sustainment. Dense heavy infantry implied slower roads and higher baggage/forage demand—an early proof that formation design fixes the sustainment scale (wagons, pack animals, camp followers).

Rome (c. 2nd century BCE – 3rd century CE): Scaling by Modular Blocks and Doctrine

• Contubernium as the “unit set.” Eight soldiers shared a mule, tent, tools and cooking gear—a micro‑scale that multiplied cleanly to centuries, cohorts and legions.
• “Marius’ mules.” Standardising the soldier’s carry (a first-line load) reduced trains forward, while heavier impedimenta marched to the rear—an ancestor of today’s 1^st line vs 2^nd line.
• Daily ration and marching camp. Fixed grain allowances, routine camp layouts, ditch/stake quantities, and normalised road days enable staff to convert order of battle into tonnage, tools, time, and space—the essence of scaling.
• State supply. The Annona, roads and depots added a strategic tier of standardised contracts, weights and distances—scaling endurance to seasons, not days.

The Mongol Empire under Chinggis (Genghis) Khan (13th century): Decimal Organisation and Portable Sustainment

• Decimal structure = instant multipliers. Arban (10), zuun (100), mingghan (1,000), tümen (10,000) created a universal grammar of scale: equip and feed an arban, and you can multiply to a tümen without changing the recipe.
• Remounts as a ration of mobility. A scale of remount horses per warrior standardised range and resilience; spare mounts were the mobility equivalent of extra fuel cans.
• Self-contained field kits. Common personal kits (bows in standard bundles, lariats, spare strings, tools, felt gear) and household tents/carts made each decimal block logistically modular.
• The yam relay. A state courier/relay network with post‑stations and passes pre‑scaled communications and light logistics into predictable legs.
• Task‑tailored attachments. Siege/engineering blocks bolted onto the cavalry core when required—early attachments on a standard base.

Throughline: A formation is a logistics equation. Standard measures enable standard issues. Modularity makes mass possible.

The Nineteenth‑Century Step Change — Britain’s Army Equipment System (1861–66)

In the reform decades after Crimea, the War Office published the seven‑part Army Equipment series (Artillery; Cavalry; Infantry; Royal Engineers; Military Train; Commissariat; Hospital).[1] Each volume tied official organisation to authorised equipment lists, weights, measures (often prices), transport tables, and packing/marking rules. Once you knew the unit—infantry battalion, artillery battery, engineer company, or Military Train echelon—you could multiply the lists and convert entitlements into lift and sustainment. Support arms were treated as modular blocks (e.g., Commissariat trades; Hospital sets) scaled to force size and role.

What changed: This turned scaling into a published operating system for logistics—standard nomenclature matched ledgers; weights and measures turned entitlement into tonnage; common patterns let staff scale issues, movement and maintenance simply by multiplying unit counts.

Peace vs War Establishment — The Scaling “Switch”

Establishments are the authorised blueprints for people, vehicles, weapons, tools and key stores—held in two states:

• Peace Establishment (PE): Cadre‑heavy and economical (training scales, minimal transport; many posts unfilled; war‑only items held centrally).
• War Establishment (WE): Fully manned and fully equipped (complete Equipment and first/second‑line holdings; authorised transport and attachments—signals, medical, supply/transport, maintenance—baked in).

Mobilisation tops up PE to WE: fill personnel (Regulars/Reservists/Territorials), issues unit entitlement, builds lift and repair depth, loads first-line holdings, form attachments, and declares readiness. Because WEs link directly to scales, a unit can be multiplied and supported predictably. In service terms, the scaled package is then delivered through various types of support—integral, close, general, and mounting—each tailored to those entitlements and holdings.

• Types of support.
  • Integral — organic, first-line support within the unit. (1st Line)
  • Close — formation troops forward, delivering time-sensitive commodities and quick repair/recovery. (2nd Line)
  • General — force-level support to the whole formation (bulk stocks, distribution, heavy repair). (3rd line; sometimes spans to 4th depending on the army)
  • Mounting — generating/equipping/marshalling the force before deployment. (a pre-deployment phase, not a “line”)

(Illustrative maxim) Alter one allowance, alter the lift: add a blanket per man, and you add wagons to the transport scale. Scaling is a system—inputs ripple into horses, drivers and wagons.

Late Victorian to 1914 — Scaling Rehearsed in Peace (NZ)

New Zealand did not drift into World War I. In the years following the war in South Africa and especially under the Territorial Force (from 1910), planners adapted British military establishments to practical peacetime scales and rehearsed them. Camp equipment was centralised and issued according to published scales for the 1913 brigade camps. Districts drew against these scales, and returns/refurbishment were managed according to plan. To ensure the issue/return machine functioned efficiently, temporary Ordnance Depots were established for the 1913 camps (and again for the 1914 divisional camps), staffed with clerks and issuers under regional storekeepers—so requisition, issue, receipt, and repair all followed a single process.[2]

In parallel, the Defence Stores professionalised: permanent District Storekeepers were appointed, and an intensive store management course produced Quartermaster Sergeants for every infantry and mounted regiment, tightening the link between unit ledgers and district depots. By early 1914, the force had been inspected and judged to be well-armed and well-equipped, and mobilisation regulations—adapted from British directives—were issued in March 1914, aligning establishments, ledgers, and stocks.[3] The result was a pre‑war system that treated scaling as a living routine, not an emergency improvisation.

World Wars & Interwar — Scaling at Industrial Tempo (UK & NZ), 1914–45

First World War (1914–18).

The British Army’s War Establishments and matching scales of equipment underwrote rapid expansion from Regulars to Territorials to Kitchener’s New Armies.[4] New formations could be raised and fitted out by template—weapons, tools, transport, ammunition, clothing, medical stores and repair parts, all mapped from the WE. For a smaller force such as New Zealand, alignment with British establishments and scales enabled swift mobilisation and five years of sustained operations.

Interwar (1919–39)

Rather than a pause, this period saw refinement and governance of scaling. G1098 (AFG1098) matured as the unit‑level ledger linking establishment to holdings; mobilisation store tables and Clothing/Equipment Regulations were revised; Dominion practice tightened accounting controls and depot procedures. From 1935, although New Zealand lacked a standing field army, planners tracked British developments closely—each new War Establishment, scale and entitlement as it was published—and adapted them to local conditions (manpower, industry, shipping distances and climate). Thus, when mobilisation began in 1939–40, New Zealand could raise, equip, and structure its forces on modern British templates, rather than through improvisation.

Second World War (1939–45)

Scaling went fully industrial. Theatre-specific clothing scales, bulk demand procedures for ordnance, formal first/second‑line holdings, and push vs pull replenishment methods were used to keep tempo while protecting scarce lift and stocks. Units continued to work to WE/scale templates, with depots, railheads and parks sized to the calculated flows.[5]

Case Study — Greece 1941: mis-scaled ordnance support

Context. In March 1941, the New Zealand Division deployed three Independent New Zealand Ordnance Corps (NZOC) Brigade Workshops and eleven LADs to Greece, with the attached British Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) 1 Ordnance Field Park (1 OFP) providing forward spares and stores.[6]  Pre-deployment consultation was thin; scaling assumptions followed British fleet patterns rather than New Zealand holdings.

What went wrong (the scaling error).

• Wrong spares mix. 1 OFP was scaled for Internationals and Crossleys; the NZ Division fielded neither in any number (only two Crossleys), so much of the forward lift didn’t match the fleet it had to support.
• Assumptive, not analytical. Holdings mirrored generic expectations instead of the Division’s actual G1098s, failure rates, and service-level targets.
• Coalition data gap. Equipment data and entitlement tables weren’t reconciled across national lines before movement.

Consequences in theatre.

• Readiness lost at the point of need. Lift and time were consumed carrying low-utility spares forward.
• Workarounds required. Support hinged on the subset that did match (e.g., Ford, 25-pdr, 2-pdr, spring steel, sheet/rod metals, compressed air, general items) plus local supplementation—enough to keep NZ Workshops going, but with friction and delay.
• Campaign outcome. The Greek campaign collapsed into evacuation (and then Crete), compounding the cost of the initial scaling miss.

Fix and regeneration (the recovery).

• Rebuild in Egypt. NZOC consolidated with RAOC/Maadi resources and formed the NZ Divisional OFP on 28 July 1941, explicitly scaled to NZ kits.
• Deliberate scale-up. Through August–September the OFP built to scale, trained on ordnance accounting, and aligned data to reality.
• Right-sized footprint. By late 1941 the OFP held 4 officers, 81 ORs and 27 three-ton lorries configured for OFP stores—turning scaling from assumption into a planned capability.

Practical fixes (what should have been done).

1. Make scaling scientific. Use master data, reliability/failure rates, demand and lead-time to size spares and blocks; set explicit service-level targets.
2. Don’t rely on rules of thumb. Ditch “10% spares” heuristics—scale to the actual fleet and mission.
3. Close coalition gaps early. Reconcile equipment and entitlement tables across partners before you book the lift.
4. Translate scales to footprint. Convert to pallets/containers/ULDs with correct packaging and documents; protect the lift.
5. Capture and apply lessons. After action, cleanse data, adjust, and rebuild to standard—exactly what the NZ Div OFP did after Greece/Crete.

Takeaway. Scaling only works when it’s fleet-true, data-driven and coalition-aligned. Get that right pre-deployment, and your forward park becomes a force multiplier rather than a passenger.

Post-War Evolution — From a Single List to an Integrated Entitlement System (NZ Focus)

Post-1945 fleets—communications, electrics, vehicles, and specialist plant—stretched the old, flat G1098 list. By the late 1950s–60s, practice matured into three coordinated instruments:[7]

1. Entitlement (Equipment) Tables— the core “who gets what” by unit role and establishment.
2. Complete Equipment Schedules (CES) — the “what is complete” list for each equipment set (every component, tool, accessory), doubling as the accounting document for that set.
3. Block Scales — pooled non-CES items and everyday consumables (stationery, training stores, domestic items) expressed as ready-to-issue blocks.

New Zealand’s tailored, Commonwealth-compatible model (1960s)

The New Zealand Entitlement Table (NZET) became the hub, explicitly incorporating New Zealand CES (NZCES) items (and their components), New Zealand Block Scales (NZBS) for non‑CES stores, and first‑line maintenance packs such as FAMTO (First Aid Mechanical Transport Outfit) and FATSO (First Aid Technical Stores Outfit) so operators could keep equipment serviceable between deeper repairs.[8]

By the early 1970s a further pillar emerged: New Zealand Repair Parts Scales (NZRPS). From the late 1960s, these began to replace earlier “spare parts lists,” folding FAMTO and FATSO in as first‑line modules of a wider repair‑chain planning scale—so unit Prescribed Load Lists (PLL) (days‑of‑cover + pipeline), formation Authorised Stockage Lists (ASLs) (service level over replenishment time) and theatre reserves were all sized from the same tempo/lead‑time/reliability factors. In short, repair provisioning became a single, scalable chain from operator kits through to depot depth.

Case Study — Malaysia & Vietnam (1965–1972): combined scaling to autonomy

Context. New Zealand kept a battalion in Malaysia/Singapore with 28 (Commonwealth) Brigade while rotating a rifle company into Vietnam under 1 ATF—three systems at once (British, Australian, NZ) with different entitlements, CES, paperwork and spares. The task was to turn them into one workable load for training in Malaysia and fighting in Phước Tuy.

What worked (the scaling approach).

• One combined scale, three sources. Cross-walked UK/AUS entitlements to NZ holdings; set approved equivalents for non-matching items.
• Climate-first. Tropical scales for clothing/boots/personal kit; higher replacement factors and wider size ranges.
• CES by platform. Normalised vehicle/tool sets so workshops and lift could be planned regardless of source nation.
• Local industrial equivalents. Qualified NZ-made clothing, boots, webbing and small stores to UK/AUS specs to cut lead-times and dependency.
• Liaison & data discipline. NZ LOs embedded in 1 ATF/FARELF to keep demand, returns and credits clean; part codes aligned early.
• People matched to plan. Increased NZ movements, supply and maintenance manning in Malaysia and in-theatre.

Results.

• Seamless support in Vietnam. Routine sustainment via Australian pipelines; NZ-specific items flowed via Malaysia/Singapore with minimal friction.
• Fewer workarounds, faster repair. Equivalence lists and aligned CES cut “near-miss” parts and sped turnarounds.

Why it mattered later.

• As UK/AUS withdrew from Malaysia in the early 1970s, NZ’s habits—combined scales, clean data, boosted manning and a growing local supply base—left the battalion near-logistically independent.
• NZ-made equivalents added depth and resilience, enabling New Zealand-led sustainment.

What to copy.

1. Build a cross-walk early and lock approved equivalents in SOPs.
2. Scale for climate and task (clothing, rations, POL, repair parts).
3. Embed liaison/data stewards with partners.
4. Man to the plan—grow workshops, supply and movements to match scale.
5. Qualify local industry to shorten lead-times and strengthen sovereignty.

Takeaway. Combine partner scales with NZ holdings, qualify local equivalents, and resource the logisticians—then a company can fight in Vietnam while a battalion trains in Malaysia, and the force is ready to stand on its own as partners draw down..

From Printed Tables to Digital Systems (1960s–today)

Until the 1980s, scaling was a manual staff drill: planners worked from printed tables, equipment series, mobilisation stores tables and unit instructions, doing the maths by hand—later with basic calculators—and re-checking totals across ledgers and load tables. With computer-based logistics, the arithmetic and cross-checks moved into software: entitlement look-ups, strength-based calculations, days-of-cover policies, lift planning from pack/weight data, and target-setting from demand history. The gains were speed, consistency, auditability and the ability to model scenarios.

Many forces—including New Zealand—progressed from electric accounting machines and mainframes to enterprise ERPs by the late twentieth century, with deployable tools to support entitlement planning. Automation expanded what staff could calculate quickly; it did not replace the need for clear, maintained scales.

Crucially, automation only works with sound data and governance. Organisations change, equipment is updated, and missions evolve; unless master data—organisational structures/establishments, item masters/part numbers, CES versions, block-scale definitions, repair parts scales and links to maintenance task lists—is kept current under change control, systems will produce inconsistent outputs. The principle is simple: keep entitlements, scales and planning factors aligned across supply, maintenance and movement. Contemporary doctrine reinforces this, emphasising information systems for visibility and decision-making, underpinned by disciplined data stewardship.

Case Study — Somalia 1993: when scaling wasn’t applied (and what changed)

Context. New Zealand contingents in Somalia (1992–94) deployed into extreme heat and vehicle-centred tasks, yet much of the kit reflected a temperate, barracks-oriented baseline—signs that entitlements and CES were not re-scaled for climate, role, or threat. To add insult to injury, the advance party deployed into an active conflict zone without weapons. Part of the reason it went wrong was that, at the time, the Army was not configured for rapid expeditionary operations.

What should have been scaled—but wasn’t. Hot-weather clothing and headgear; body armour matched to the threat; vehicle-friendly load carriage; and weapon accessories (e.g., pistol holsters) to match in-service weapons.

Consequences. Under-utilised scale (issued items set aside for improvised workarounds), inconsistent appearance/ID in theatre, and slower adaptation when the threat rose.

After-action learning—Bosnia as the correction. The Army was embarrassed by the Somalia experience and did learn. Subsequent Bosnia deployments were better resourced and equipped: theatre-specific clothing and boots were prioritised; body armour and load-carriage were selected for the task and climate; weapon ancillaries were matched before deployment; and theatre SOPs were clarified. In short, the levers of scaling were applied up-front instead of improvised in theatre.

Takeaway. Treat scaling as deliberate tradecraft before wheels-up: set climate-appropriate clothing scales, match armour and load-carriage to tasks, close ancillary gaps, and codify it all in SOPs. Do that, and the force arrives ready; skip it, and soldiers will improvise uneven fixes in contact.

Why Scaling Matters

Doctrinally, scaling underpins the core logistics principles—Responsiveness, Simplicity, Economy, Flexibility, Balance, Foresight, Sustainability, Survivability and Integration—by turning intent into standard, reusable units of effort.[9]

Budget reality. Scales translate limited resources into repeatable outputs. They allow commanders to make explicit trade-offs between cost, risk, and tempo, and they expose the carrying costs of options (people, stock, space, lift) before money is spent. In fiscally constrained settings, scales are the difference between a force that looks large and a force that lasts. (Then and Now)

• Control. Replaces ad‑hoc estimates with standard, repeatable calculations.
• Agility. Dial effort up for surge or down for economy without needing to rewrite plans.
• Interoperability. Standard blocks and tables let allies plug in seamlessly.
• Assurance. Creates an audit trail for readiness claims and expenditure.
• Risk management. Ties stock depth and footprint to threat, distance and tempo.

Instruments of Scaling — Quick Guide

When logisticians talk about “scales,” they’re really talking about ways of turning entitlements on paper into real-world stocks, vehicles, or pallets. A few of the main ones are:

• Tables of Entitlement – These are the official “allowance lists” for units. They can be adjusted depending on the number of people present, the role the unit is playing, or even the climate. They shape both the unit’s footprint and its initial kit issue.
• CES (Complete Equipment Schedules) – Every vehicle or platform comes with a kit list. Multiply that by the number of platforms, add any mission-specific kits, and you get both the accounting baseline and a sense of what workshops and lift have to carry.
• Block Scales – Think of these as pre-packed bundles: ammunition, rations, POL (petrol, oil, lubricants), water, consumables, even stationery. They’re designed in mission-length chunks that map directly onto pallets, containers, or sorties.
• Ration Scales — Per-person, per-day entitlements (e.g., fresh, composite, MRE/24-hour packs). Sized by headcount and duration, with first-line holdings at unit level and theatre stocks behind them.
• Fuel Scales (POL) — Daily fuel requirements derived from platform consumption and tempo (include generators/heaters). Planned as bulk and/or packaged supply with defined reserves.
• Clothing & Personal Equipment Scales — Initial issue and replacement factors (boots, uniforms, cold-weather gear). Driven by climate and wear-rates; size ranges require buffer stock. Set climate-specific scales; use approved equivalents across NZ/Allied patterns
• Repair Parts Scales – Units carry a few days’ worth of spares on hand, while second-line supply aims to hold enough to cover expected breakdowns over the lead time.
• First-Line Ammunition – This is the starter load troops carry into action, balanced against how quickly resupply can arrive.
• WMR/DOS (War Maintenance Reserve/Days of Supply) – Larger-theatre stockpiles held to cushion delays or enemy interdiction.

All of this contributes to the classic push versus pull distinction. Push works best when demand is predictable (e.g., food, water, combat supplies), while pull suits variable or diagnostic needs (e.g., spare parts, casualty evacuation). Each commodity sits somewhere on that spectrum, and stock policies need to reflect that.

Scaling in Practice — A Common Framework

The beauty of scaling is that it works at every level. The same levers—entitlements, CES, block scales, repair parts, first-line ammunition, and WMR/DOS—apply whether you’re supporting a corps or a rifle section. The only difference is the number of multiples and echelons involved.

In effect, the same logic sizes a divisional-level park to last a day and a platoon’s first-line to last an opening skirmish. A section’s water is just the smallest expression of the same logic. What matters is anchoring decisions to the wider continuum—tactical, operational, and strategic—so that what a company carries dovetails with what the theatre holds in depth.

Case Study – 3 NZ Div reverse logistics (out-scaling best practice)

Context & scale. When 3 New Zealand Division was withdrawn from the Pacific in 1944, New Zealand executed a full reverse lift and regeneration: over 50,000 line items, 3,274 vehicles (plus 25 tanks) and tonnes of ammunition and supplies were received, cleaned, repaired, repacked and re-issued or disposed of—without forklifts or computers. Mangere Crossing Camp (ex-US “Camp Euart”) became the hub, with 200,000 sq ft of warehousing and a rail siding that ran straight into the storage blocks, allowing trains to off-load directly under cover. Work parties manually handled 250,000 packages averaging 45 kg, and about 10,000 tonnes of mixed stores arrived in the first three months from August 1944; the whole evolution concluded by July 1945.[10]

Method—how it worked.

1. Pre-exit accounting. Quartermasters across 90 accounting units completed inventories and packing lists in New Caledonia before lift.
2. Reception & triage. On arrival at Mangere, loads were checked against documents, segregated by condition, and queued for cleaning/repair.
3. Restore for re-use. Items were cleaned, repaired and repacked to unit standard, then presented for inspection.
4. Audit & acceptance. Main Ordnance Depot staff and Defence auditors enforced exacting standards; discrepancies were explained and cleared before acceptance.
5. Disposition. Serviceable materiel moved to Trentham (Main Ordnance Depot) or Hopuhopu (Northern District); many vehicles to Sylvia Park for onward issue; surplus or damaged items were transferred to the War Assets Realisation Board for sale or disposal.

Constraints & workarounds. With no MHE or IT, the system relied on infrastructure (rail-to-warehouse flow), disciplined paperwork, and hard, organised labour. Quartermasters—often not career logisticians—proved adaptable under high audit pressure, demonstrating that well-designed processes can substitute for technology when needed.

Why this is out-scaling done right.

• Treated dismantling as deliberately as build-up—planned reverse from theatre to home base.
• Aligned supply, maintenance and movement tasks (clean/repair/repack embedded in the flow).
• Used fixed infrastructure to compensate for missing tools (rail siding, large covered floors).
• Kept data discipline central: inventories, packing lists and audits drove every hand-off.
• Produced a regeneration effect—restored force elements, cleared accounts and returned value to the system—on a national scale.

Takeaway. Reverse logistics is not an afterthought. Plan the out-scaling from day one, resource the reception base, couple repair with receipt, and enforce documentation—then even a technology-light force can bring a division home cleanly and quickly.

Conclusion

From the hoplite’s panoply and Rome’s contubernium to the Mongol tümen; from the Victorian Army Equipment series to modern War Establishments and today’s Entitlement–CES–Block toolkit (including NZ’s FAMTO/FATSO), the lesson is constant: scaling is the lifeblood of logistics. It turns intent into counted people, platforms, ammunition, spares, and lift—precisely, repeatably, and at the tempo operations demand.

In practice, scaling provides a standard framework: entitlement tables specify who receives what; CES ensures equipment is complete and auditable; block scales package predictable consumables for movement; repair-parts scales establish first- and second-line resilience; and WMR/DOS provides theatre depth. The art is in balancing the push for predictability with the pull for diagnostic, variable demands.

This is not optional tradecraft. Every headquarters and every trade must treat scaling—and the data that underpins it—as core business. Keep establishments current, masters clean, and paper scales translated into real pallets, bookings and stocks so that automation amplifies judgment rather than propagating error. Do this and the force can surge, re-role and wind down cleanly; neglect it and you invite a modern reprise of the Crimean lesson—impressive on paper, unsustainable in contact. Scaling is how intent becomes assured movement and sustainment.

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Notes

[1] The Secretary of State for War, “Part 2 – Artillery,” Manual of Army Equipment  (1861), https://rnzaoc.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/army-equipment-part-2-artillery-1861.pdf; The Secretary of State for War, “Part 1 – Cavalry,” Manual of Army Equipment  (1863); The Secretary of State for War, “Part 5 – Infantry,” Manual of Army Equipment (1865); The Secretary of State for War, “Part 6 –  Commissariate Department,” Manual of Army Equipment  (1865), https://rnzaoc.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/army-equipment-part-6-commissariat-department-1865-1.pdf; The Secretary of State for War, “Part 4 – Military Train,” Manual of Army Equipment  (1865); The Secretary of State for War, “Part 7 – Hospital,” Manual of Army Equipment  (1865); The Secretary of State for War, “Part 3 – Royal Engineers,” Manual of Army Equipment  (1866).

[2] “H-19 Report on the Defence Forces of New Zealand for the period 28 June 1912 to 20 June 1913,” Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives  (1 January 1913), https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/parliamentary/AJHR1913-I.2.5.2.34.

[3] “Regulations – Mobilisation of New Zealand Military Forces,” Archives New Zealand Item No R22432979  (27 April 1914).

[4] Ordnance Manual (War), War Office, (London: His Majesties Printing Office, 1914). https://rnzaoc.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/ordnance-war-manual-1914.pdf.

[5] Ordnance Manual (War), ed. The War Office (London: His Majestys Stationery Office, 1939).

[6] Brigadier A.H Fernyhough C.B.E. M.C, History of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps 1920-1945 (London: Royal Army Ordnance Corps, 1965), 141.

[7] “Publications – Military: Army Form G1098: War Equipment Tables,” Archives New Zealand Item No R17189361  (1951-1963).

[8] “Publications – Military: Army Form G1098: War Equipment Tables,” Archives New Zealand Item No R17189362  (1963-1968).

[9] Defence Logistics NZDDP-4.0 (Second Edition), New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication: NZDDP, (New Zealand Defence Force, 2020), Non-fiction, Government documents. https://fyi.org.nz/request/18385/response/73807/attach/5/NZDDP%204.0.pdf.

[10] Francis Arthur Jarrett, “2NZEF – 2 NZ Divisional Ordnance Field Park – Report – F Jarret,” Archives New Zealand Item No R20109405  (1944); “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150  (1944); “HQ Army Tank Brigade Ordnance Units, June 1942 to January 1943,” Archives New Zealand Item No R20112168  (1943).