Unsung Enablers: A Snapshot of New Zealand’s Army Movements Control in World War II

Given the rich tapestry of New Zealand’s World War II history, the spotlight often shines on the battlefield heroics of the combat units of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Middle East, Italy, and the Pacific. Yet beneath these narratives lies a network of unsung combat enablers whose logistical efforts ensured the execution of military operations. Among them were the men and women of the New Zealand Army Movements Control, whose largely unrecognised efforts were vital to the war effort.

New Zealand military historians often overlook New Zealand’s military logistic functions, it’s as if logistics just happened in the background with no real consequences on the eventful outcome. However, these operations required meticulous planning, coordination, and execution. As part of New Zealand’s broader Military Logistic efforts, Movements Control was pivotal in managing the complex logistics of troop and equipment movements across various theatres of war.

Since its origins during World War II, the role of Army Movements Operators has evolved significantly. Post-war, movement operations became a core trade within the Royal New Zealand Army Service Corps (RNZASC), later passing to the Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport (RNZCT), and now residing within the Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment (RNZALR). Today, RNZALR Movement Operators are crucial in managing military logistics and ensuring the efficient transportation of personnel and equipment.

Their responsibilities are divided into three main areas:

  • Terminal Operations: Movement Operators handle the loading and unloading of cargo from various transport modes, including aircraft, ships, and trucks. They operate vehicles like trucks and forklifts.
  • Movement Control: Movement Control Operators focus on planning and coordinating the transportation of defence personnel and equipment domestically and internationally. They manage travel logistics, including route planning, ticketing, accommodation, and customs clearance.
  • Aerial Delivery: Aerial Delivery Operators specialise in preparing and packing supplies for airdrops, calculating loads and drop zones to ensure safe delivery.
NZ Army modified 20-tonne CAT938K loader with a FAUN trackway dispenser attached to the front. It can roll out a modular aluminium trackway, 40 metres long, from the landing craft, to support trucks driving on a beach.https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/force-for-new-zealand-2023-year-in-review/

Over the years, the role has adapted to meet the changing needs of military logistics and advancements in technology and transportation methods. However, the modern RNZALR Movement Operator trade has its roots in the movement organisations built up during World War II to support New Zealand operations at home and abroad. This article aims to provide a snapshot of this often-overlooked aspect of New Zealand’s military logistics and challenges faced by the New Zealand Army Movements Control during World War Two.

Movements Within New Zealand

During wartime, the Quartermaster-General’s Branch (QMG) was crucial in managing the movement of troops and materials within New Zealand and overseas. Its responsibilities included coordinating transport by road, rail, sea, and air and issuing travel warrants. To manage these extensive tasks, the QMG delegated movement operations to two Assistant Quartermaster Generals: AQMG (2) Movements, who oversaw general troop movements, and AQMG (4) Shipping, who was responsible for sea transport.

A small but essential unit, the Transport Shipping Office, operated under Army Headquarters in Wellington. It was tasked with overseeing the receipt and dispatch of all military stores and equipment at the port and ensuring accurate records. Despite its nominal establishment of 40 personnel, it often worked with reduced numbers, reflecting the resource constraints of the time.

The organisation of overseas deployments was complex, with troops mobilised from camps across New Zealand and transported to ports via special trains and ferries. Before departure, troopships underwent thorough inspections, with adjustments made to ensure adequate accommodations. Early in the war, ships retained peacetime fittings, offering cabins for most troops. However, as shipping space became scarce, ships were reconfigured to maximise capacity with hammocks and tiered bunks.

Between 1939 and 1944, New Zealand dispatched over 64,000 troops overseas in regular reinforcement drafts. For instance, the 1st Echelon, comprising 6,529 soldiers, departed in January 1940, while the 10th Reinforcements, comprising 6,063 troops, embarked in May 1943. Dispatching reinforcement drafts required meticulous planning, especially in arranging final leave for troops and securing timely transport despite occasional delays.

Deployments were not limited to the Middle East and Europe. Forces were also sent to Fiji and New Caledonia, requiring additional logistical arrangements. The deployment of the 3rd Division to New Caledonia in late 1942 involved moving 13,000 personnel in nine stages, highlighting the scale of planning and challenges posed by wartime conditions.

The return of troops from overseas required equally detailed organisation. Movement Control ensured that soldiers disembarked efficiently, underwent medical checks, and received travel documents, ration cards, and leave passes. Large-scale returns, such as the 6,000-strong Ruapehu draft in 1943, involved special trains and ferries transporting men to their homes. In cases of furlough drafts arriving from Australia, disembarkation staff boarded ships at Fremantle to complete administrative tasks during the voyage, ensuring a seamless process upon arrival in New Zealand.

Within New Zealand, troop movements were frequent and extensive. Movement Control coordinated the initial mobilisation of forces, weekend leave, furloughs, and transfers between camps. Given the geography of New Zealand and the distances involved, special trains or ferries were often required, particularly during peak periods such as Christmas and New Year. For example, in late 1942 and early 1943, around 40,000 troops were granted leave, necessitating careful scheduling to avoid disruptions to civilian travel.

The cooperation of the Railways Department was invaluable, with over 22,800 special trains transporting more than 12 million troops between 1939 and 1943. Steamer ferries supplemented rail transport, often allocating large portions of passenger capacity to military movements. In some cases, civilian travel was suspended to prioritise troop transfers.

Ensuring troop welfare during travel was another significant responsibility. Meals were provided in transit, ranging from dining room services to “bag meals” for larger groups. Army catering teams occasionally managed ferry services, particularly on long daytime voyages.

Air transport was an increasingly vital option, especially for urgent travel. It was used for compassionate leave, medical evacuations, and the movement of senior officers. By late 1943, over 500 personnel had been transported by air to destinations such as Fiji, New Caledonia, and Norfolk Island, demonstrating its growing importance in military logistics.

The QMG faced considerable challenges, including resource shortages, fluctuating troop numbers, and the logistical demands of coordinating movements with allied forces. The arrival of American troops in New Zealand required a collaborative approach, with joint efforts between New Zealand and U.S. military authorities ensuring smooth operations. Innovations such as adopting the cafeteria system for shipboard meals and leveraging American transport systems were vital in addressing these challenges.[1]

Movements in 2 New Zealand Expeditionary Force

Within the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF), Shipping and Movements was assigned to the Assistant Quartermaster-General 2NZEF (AQM 2NZEF). This role was further delegated to the ‘Q’ Branch at HQ 2NZEF, which managed general troop movements, shipping operations, and the administration of 2NZEF Port Detachments.[2]

To support the New Zealand Division with reinforcements and supplies, 18 to 30 soldiers were attached to British movement authorities at key ports as New Zealand “missions”. The first Port Detachment was established at Suez on 25 October 1940.[3] The New Zealand Port Detachments were pivotal in facilitating the efficient delivery of cargo and mail to New Zealand units stationed in the Middle East during World War II. As the volume of supplies pouring into the region increased in early 1941, the need for a specialised unit became apparent, and the unit was formalised as 1 NZ Port Detachment on 20 December 1942.[4] Comprising experienced shipping personnel, the NZ Port Detachments established themselves as beacons of efficiency, significantly reducing cargo losses from 15% to less than 1%, well below the peacetime average.

Operating from its headquarters in the Suez area, the detachment meticulously handled all aspects of logistics: examining manifests, overseeing unloading operations, and ensuring that shipments destined for New Zealand forces were promptly dispatched to their final destinations. It also guarded cargoes, managed personnel movements, and handled incoming and outgoing mail—a lifeline for troops far from home.

As the theatre of war shifted, so did the detachment’s responsibilities. Following the movements of the New Zealand Division, the No 2 Port Detachment was established. It was located in Benghazi and later Tripoli, continuing its vital operations despite enemy actions. Tripoli’s duties extended beyond logistics to include the distribution of morale-boosting parcels and tobacco, a gesture appreciated by the troops.

The detachment’s operational equipment mirrored its adaptability and resourcefulness. The launch “Olive Jean,” once a familiar sight in Auckland, was repurposed and renamed “New Zealand,” symbolising its new role under Kiwi command.[5] A second launch, christened “New Zealand II,” was an enemy vessel salvaged, refurbished and equipped with a truck engine after being stranded on a Tripoli beach. It became instrumental in navigating the challenges of a battered port environment.

Following the invasion of Italy and the establishment of Bari as a New Zealand base, the No 3 Port Detachment was formed on 8 November 1943.[6]

By 1943, the No1 Port Detachment had consolidated its operations in Suez, significantly reducing the pilfering of goods from New Zealand shipments. Their resilience and dedication persisted through hazardous conditions, often operating under the cover of darkness during the advances of the 8th Army.[7]

The tasks of the NZ Port Detachments were highly complex. Amid vast quantities of cargo, they faced the daunting challenge of locating individual cases among thousands of tons and retrieving consignments mistakenly diverted to remote ports. Their operations spanned from bustling Haifa to strategic North African and Italian ports, showcasing their dedication to ensuring every shipment reached its intended destination.[8]

The British Army in Sicily 1943 Troops from 5th Division go aboard landing craft at Catania, Sicily, in preparation for the invasion of the Italian mainland, 2-3 September 1943. Loughlin (Sgt), No 2 Army Film & Photographic Unit – http://media.iwm.org.uk/iwm/mediaLib//47/media-47264/large.jpg This photograph NA 6297 comes from the collections of the Imperial War Museums.

The No 1 Port Detachment was disbanded on 1 November 1945, the No 2 Port Detachment on 30 January 1946, and the No 3 Port Detachment on 26 February 1946. A Port Detachment was included in the 2NZEF contribution to J Force as part of the Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan.[9] [10]

Movement Control in the Pacific

The Third Division’s Movement Control Unit (MCU) played an overlooked role in the Pacific during World War II. Despite being one of the most minor units, it was integral to the third division’s operations, acting as the “Divisional Shipping Company.” The unit was responsible for coordinating troop movements by sea and air, liaising with American port authorities, and managing the receipt and dispatch of mail and cargo.

Initially formed in Fiji, the unit was redeployed with the division back to New Zealand. After reorganisation and training, it was deployed to New Caledonia in 1943, facing significant challenges. Lacking local harbour facilities and reliant on overworked American resources, the MCU often had to be resourceful, sometimes acquiring essential equipment through unconventional means.

Operating primarily from Nouméa and Népoui, the MCU adapted to differing conditions at each port. In Nouméa, they contended with intense activity amidst heat, mosquitoes, mud, and the bustle of a massive U.S. military presence. Limited dock space meant most ships were worked with wooden barges, leading to delays and occasional cargo losses. The staff had to negotiate with local workers and navigate a complex and evolving logistical environment.

At Népoui, with minimal American presence, the MCU took full responsibility for port operations. However, only one ship could be handled at a time—and only half of it without repositioning—the absence of bureaucratic hurdles allowed for more efficient unloading. The small team worked tirelessly, often around the clock, to manage the steady flow of ships and supplies.

New Zealand soldiers during amphibious training, Pacific area, during World War II. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch :Photographs relating to World War 1914-1918, World War 1939-1945, occupation of Japan, Korean War, and Malayan Emergency. Ref: WH-0724-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22777107

Over time, the MCU expanded its reach, establishing representatives in the New Hebrides and Guadalcanal. During their tenure in New Caledonia, they handled 476 ships— averaging 20 boats per week—with a staff that never exceeded 17 men. Their duties broadened to include boats, wharves, and harbour activities.

When the division advanced to Guadalcanal in August 1943, MCU members established operations in the new combat zone. They faced the unique challenges of unloading ships on open coasts under the threat of Japanese air raids. Lacking proper harbour facilities, they innovated methods to ensure supplies reached the front lines despite frequent interruptions and the complexities of coordinating with American forces.

The remaining MCU staff in New Caledonia continued facilitating reinforcements and equipment shipments to the forward areas. They efficiently managed the division’s return from Guadalcanal, ensuring rapid disembarkation and distribution of troops and equipment. Their expertise allowed thousands of soldiers to be processed in under three hours, with equipment unloaded in record time.

The MCU’s success was mainly due to cooperation with other New Zealand units and American organisations. The Base Supply Depot No. 1 and the Wharf Operating Company supported their operations. American counterparts provided invaluable assistance, offering trucks, harbour transport, and logistical support, greatly enhancing efficiency.

As one of the first units to arrive and the last to depart from New Caledonia, the MCU’s contributions were significant and far-reaching. They ensured the division remained supplied and mobile, directly impacting the success of New Zealand operations in the Pacific theatre.[11]

Post War

As early as 1944, New Zealand’s military leadership began planning for the post-war era, determined to preserve the valuable experiences and lessons learned during the war. Their primary goal was to prevent the Army from reverting to the neglect of the pre-war era, characterised by a minimal regular force. Both the New Zealand Army Service Corps (NZASC) and the New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (NZAOC) developed post-war establishments to align with the projected needs of the Regular and Territorial Forces. However, the responsibility for Movement Control, a critical logistics function, was not assigned to these logistics corps. Instead, it became the responsibility of the Provost Corps.

To qualify as a 4-Star Military Police, members of the Provost Corps, individuals were required to complete basic training in core areas such as Military Law, police procedures, traffic control, map reading, and weapons handling. In addition to this foundational training, members of the Provost Corps also had the option to become fully qualified in the following specialised subjects:

  1. Functions of Movement Control
  2. Embarkation and Disembarkation
  3. Freight Movement
  4. Prevention of Pilfering of Materials[12]

Further research is needed to determine when Movement Control functions were transferred from the Provost Corps to the RNZASC.

Conclusion

This account of New Zealand’s Army Movements Control during World War II offers a glimpse into New Zealand logistics units’ critical role during this conflict. This snapshot is not intended to be an in-depth history but rather a starting point—an invitation for further research and study into the contributions of these essential yet often overlooked enablers.

Amid the chaos of global conflict, the planning, coordination, and execution carried out by New Zealand’s Army Movements Control ensured the seamless transit of troops and supplies. These units exemplified resilience and adaptability from managing complex embarkation and disembarkation processes and orchestrating domestic and international transport routes to innovating under resource constraints in the Pacific theatre. Their efforts were vital in minimising logistical inefficiencies, delivering supplies to their intended destinations, and sustaining the morale of New Zealand’s Forcers during one of the most challenging periods in history.

This legacy continues in the modern RNZALR, where Movement Operators uphold the tradition of excellence in military logistics. Their work underscores the enduring significance of logistics in operational success while honouring the dedication and ingenuity of those who laid the groundwork during World War II.

By recognising these contributions, we fully appreciate the intricate machinery behind New Zealand’s war effort and the unsung logisticians who ensured its smooth operation. This story deserves further exploration and study, shining a light on the individuals whose quiet competence underpinned the feats of those on the front lines.


Notes

[1] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150  (1944): 73-86.

[2] W. G. Stevens, Problems of 2 NZEF, Official history of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45, (Wellington, N.Z. : War History Branch, Dept of Internal Affairs, 1958, 1958), Non-fiction, 139. http://ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00245a&AN=massey.b1793365&site=eds-live&scope=site

http://nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Prob.html.

[3] “Formation and Disbandment of Units – Middle East – October,” Archives New Zealand Item No R26020907  (1940), https://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE55765754.

[4] “Formation and Disbandment of Units – Middle East – December,” Archives New Zealand Item No R26020933  (1942), https://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE55766664.

[5] “Sent Overseas,” New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24192, 6 February 1942, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19420206.2.55.

[6] “Formation and Disbandment of Units – Middle East – November,” Archives New Zealand Item No R26020944  (1943), https://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE55765610.

[7] “Cargo and Mail,” Evening Star, Issue 24974, 20 September 1943, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19430920.2.46.

[8] “Mentioned in Dispatches,” Southland Times, Issue 25336, 12 April 1944, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ST19440412.2.26.

[9] “Formation and Disbandment of Units – Japan – October,” Archives New Zealand Item No R26020973  (1945), https://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE55763893.

[10] “Areas NZ is Taking over in Japan,” Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 90, Issue 68, 23 March 1946, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WC19460323.2.52.

[11] E.V Sale, Base Wallahs: Story of the units of the Nase Organisation, NZEF IP (A.H. and A.W. Reed for the Third Division Histories Committee, 1947), Non-fiction, 243-50.

[12] “The Star Classification and Promotion of Other Ranks of the Regular Force,” New Zealand Army Order 60/1947, 9 August 1947.


The NZDF’s Evolution of Inventory Management from DSSR to SAP, 1984-1998

SAP, an acronym for Systems, Applications, and Products in Data Processing, is a global leader in enterprise resource planning (ERP) software. Founded in 1972 in Germany, SAP SE has developed comprehensive ERP solutions that integrate various organisational functions into a unified system, including finance, logistics, human resources, and supply chain management. This integration enables real-time data access and streamlines workflows, enhancing operational efficiency and decision-making processes.[1]

For the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), implementing SAP through the Defence Supply Redevelopment Project (DSRP) and Project Fusion marked a shift toward a modern, data-driven approach with the potential to strengthen the NZDFs’ ability to meet the evolving demands of military logistics.

Between 1984 and 1994, the Royal New Zealand Army Ordnance Corps (RNZAOC) led the NZ Army effort as part of the significant NZDF initiative to reform supply and inventory management via the DSRP and Project Fusion. Building on earlier projects like the Defence Supply Systems Retail (DSSR) and Defence Supply System Development (DSSD) initiatives, the DSRP set a new standard and laid the foundation for ongoing modernisation, leading to SAP’s adoption as the Defence Inventory Management platform in 1998.

Defence Supply Redevelopment Project (DSRP) – 1984

The DSRP sought to transition from manual processes to computerised supply and inventory management. Initially, the focus was on upgrading NCR accounting machines to mainframe-connected terminals, digitising records with minimal functional enhancements. Although limitations persisted, this shift offered benefits like eliminating manual ledger cards, real-time record updates, and enhanced data availability. Notably, the coexistence of three Item Management Records across various levels (the Defence Codification Agency, retail, and depot) led to duplication, inefficiency, and repeated updates of NSNs (National Stock Numbers).

The DSRP’s objectives were ambitious:

  1. Automating supply functions cost-effectively.
  2. Improving the management of high-value repairable items.
  3. Reducing inventory value while maintaining service levels.
  4. Centralising item management.
  5. Enabling multi-level data access.
  6. Supporting national asset management.
  7. Providing analytical and performance measurement tools.
  8. Relating inventory levels to demand rates.
  9. Enhancing warehousing efficiency.
  10. Standardising core functions with adaptable subsystems across services.
  11. Providing forecasting and cost assessment capabilities.

Using the SPECTRUM project management system, the DSRP team conducted research and simulations based on NZ Defence Inventory statistics, testing supply and inventory management theories. Recognising the value of learning from allied practices, the team also conducted international reviews with UK, US, and Australian defence forces to avoid redundant explorations and ensure an informed approach.[2]

Defence Inventory Structure and Challenges – 1985

In 1985, the Defence Inventory comprised approximately 600,000 stock lines valued at NZ$155 million ($560,306,361 in 2024), making it one of the country’s largest inventories. Notably, 90% of depot-level items cost less than NZ$100 ($361.49 in 2024) and 69% less than NZ$10 ($36.15 in 2024), enabling prioritised management of high-cost items. The inventory’s Demand Rate analysis highlighted varying item turnover rates, with the majority (71%) categorised as “Too Slow.” Fast-moving, high-cost items required close stock control to prevent stockouts, optimising budget utilisation and customer service.[3]

The mainframe batch-processing system of the time, linked to data capture machines at supply units, relied on manual data transfer via paper tape. The lag between transaction and data integration often rendered central records outdated, limiting operational efficiency.

Implementation of DSSR

Initially rolled out in 1984, the NZDF implemented DSSR as an intermediate solution. DSSR replaced manual ledger cards with electronic records and simplified stock management at retail units. RNZAF Base Auckland led this transition, with 1 Supply Company, RNZAOC in Ngāruawāhia, the first Army unit to transition.[4] By 1985, DSSR allowed units to conduct transactions, generate automated reports, and maintain up-to-date stock files, reducing dependency on higher Headquarters for stock information. The meticulous planning and testing of DSSR implementation instilled confidence in its effectiveness.

Sergeant Gerry Rolfe and DSSR Terminal, FMG Annual Camp 1988. RNZAOC Collection

Defence Supply System Development (DSSD)

DSSD, the second phase of supply reform, addressed the limitations of NCR accounting machines. Initially established as an expansion of DSSR, DSSD aimed to develop a stable, online supply and replenishment system. Although interim in scope, DSSD laid the foundation for broader supply management enhancements. Developed through a structured project lifecycle, the system addressed fundamental data integrity and management issues within existing supply structures.

DSSD introduced a three-tiered record structure to streamline data handling:

  1. Item Identification Record (IIR): Standardised item information across Defence.
  2. Item Management Record (IMR): Service-specific data, ensuring consistency.
  3. Item Account Record (IAR): Unit-level records linked to IIR and IMR, improving data accuracy and reducing redundancy.

System Enhancements: Provisioning, Receipts, and Stocktaking

DSSD incorporated key supply functions, enabling more accurate provisioning, automated stock level monitoring, and faster transaction processing. Notable improvements included:

  • Automated provisioning using a refined Provision Management Code (PMC) for faster processing and workload reduction.
  • Receipt processing through warehouse-located Visual Display Units (VDUs), enabling immediate stock updates and more efficient stocktaking.
  • Bin Management: Enhanced warehousing efficiency by managing stock by location and expiry, supporting FIFO (first-in, first-out) principles.[5]

Consumer Unit Accounting – 1993

In 1993, the NZ Army implemented Consumer Unit Accounting within its Quartermaster Stores, preparing for an eventual transition to Project Fusion. By trialling this system at 2nd Field Hospital, the NZ Army established a streamlined Q Store management model within DSSD, with full implementation planned for mid-1993.[6]

Transition to SAP

By 1996, with the dust barely settled on the DSSD and Consumer Unit Accounting implementations, the NZDF inventory and supply system continued to evolve significantly. The SAP finance module went live that year, followed by SAP Inventory Management in 1998 and SAP Plant Maintenance in 1999.

SAP’s implementation was intended to be transformative by providing an integrated platform encompassing inventory, finance, and maintenance management. It promised enhanced transparency, accountability, and streamlined workflows across the NZDF. SAP’s ERP structure enabled a comprehensive view of the NZDF’s resources, potentially allowing for more efficient stock control, cost management, and operational readiness. However, SAP’s rollout in the NZDF was not seamless. The broader organisational restructuring—such as the merging of Army logistics corps and trades, commercialisation pressures, service-specific variances and the East Timor Deployment—created friction in the system’s adoption and efficacy. Initial teething issues with SAP exposed gaps between its ambitious capabilities and the practical realities of NZDF’s operational needs, including cultural resistance, institutional disobedience and adjustment issues across the NZDF.

SAP marked a significant leap in data integration and accessibility but has also introduced complexities that did not exist in the manual and earlier computerised systems. While these older systems were labour-intensive, they were simple and provided a level of clarity that more complex ERP systems can obscure. For example, SAP’s reliance on data accuracy and interlinked functions can be both a strength and a weakness; if data entry processes or interservice coordination falter, SAP can lead to cascading errors or inefficient resource allocation. This contrasts with the older systems, where more direct oversight allowed immediate corrective actions, albeit with higher personnel involvement.

The NZDF’s historical reliance on incremental upgrades also indicates a pattern of preferring stability over rapid technological shifts, which may have contributed to SAP’s challenges in achieving full operational potential. Further, legacy systems’ straightforward data architecture may have been more adaptable to ad-hoc military requirements. At the same time, SAP’s complex structure requires rigorous adherence to standard operating procedures, which can be challenging in dynamic military environments.

In summary, the NZDF’s journey from DSSR to SAP encapsulates the challenges of modernising logistics within a traditional military framework. While SAP has undeniably centralised and automated NZDF’s inventory management, unlocking its full potential requires addressing its limitations, particularly regarding adaptability, deployability in operational environments, data integrity, and interservice coordination. A balanced approach incorporating lessons from legacy systems while leveraging SAP’s advanced capabilities could provide the NZDF with a practical, adaptable logistics system tailored to its unique operational demands.


Notes

[1] “What is SAP ERP?,” 2024, accessed 11 November, 2024, https://www.sap.com/products/erp/what-is-sap-erp.html.

[2] Lou Gardiner, “Defence Supply Redevelopment Project,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine  (8 March 1984): 14.

[3] Lou Gardiner, “The Current Defence Inventory,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine  (8 March 1984): 15-18.

[4] Frank Ryan, “DSSR  Implementation Update,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine  (8 March 1984): 19.

[5] Grahame Loveday, “Defence Supply System Development,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine 1/87  (April 1987): 49-53.

[6] Kevin Riesterer, “Consumer Unit Accounting,” RNZAOC Pataka Magazine 1993  (July 1993): 9.


New Zealand Army Stores Accounting (1939-1944): Overcoming Wartime Supply Challenges

Between 1939 and 1944, the New Zealand Army’s home-front logistics functions undertook a monumental task. They faced significant obstacles in maintaining accurate record-keeping and inventory control, dealing with challenges such as limited storage capacity, a shortage of experienced personnel, and high turnover rates.  At the peak of this period, nearly 200,000 regular, Territorial, and Home Guard troops were mobilised and dispersed in numerous units across New Zealand and the Pacific, all in need of weapons, ammunition, clothing, and equipment. The scale of their operation was immense, and their efforts were crucial to the war effort. Supplying and maintaining this force, especially as they were dispersed and many required specialised and technical resources, was a testament to the dedication and resourcefulness of the personnel tasked with stores accounting.

With allied forces unable to stem the Japanese offensive in Asia and the Pacific and invasion likely, the situation’s urgency demanded swift and efficient mobilisation. However, the constant reshuffling of personnel and frequent transfers of equipment and ammunition between units added further complexity. Organisational changes and equipment shortfalls were frequent, compounding the difficulty of building up and sustaining military readiness at home while supporting New Zealand’s deployed forces overseas. Despite these hurdles, the New Zealand Army’s logistics efforts achieved significant milestones. Their resilience and adaptability in the face of immense national and global pressure are a source of admiration.

The Accounting System

Like the armies of Canada and Australia, the New Zealand Army was organised and equipped in line with British doctrine, with the New Zealand Army General Staff determining the Army’s organisation with local modifications to fit New Zealand’s unique requirements. These organisational structures were formalised through three main types of documents:

The Order of Battle (ORBAT): This outlined the number and composition of formations, detailing the units they commanded following the General Staff’s policy decisions.

The War Establishment (WE): This document specified each unit’s authorised staffing and structure, which were, in most cases, identical to the British Army war establishments.

The Unit Equipment Table (Form NZ 483): These defined each unit’s authorised stores and equipment. Examples of Equipment Tables approved from July 1939 were:[1] [2]

  • Form NZ 483-2: – HQ of a Mounted Rifle Brigade
  • Form NZ 483-3: – HQ of Infantry Brigade
  • Form NZ 483-5: – HQ of Infantry Brigade and Attached Troops
  • Form NZ 483-6: – HQ of a Medium Regiment, NZ
  • Form NZ 483-21: – A Mounted Rifle Regiment (Horse)
  • Form NZ 483-22: – A Mounted Rifle Squadron (Motorised)
  • Form NZ 483-23: – An Independent Mounted Rifle Squadron
  • Form NZ 483-24: – A Motor Regiment
  • Form NZ 483-32: – A Medium Battery
  • Form NZ 483-52: – A Field Company, RNZE
  • Form NZ 483-61: (a) – HQ of a District Signals Company
  • Form NZ 483-61: (b) – No 1 Sect, A District Signals Company
  • Form NZ 483-61: (c) – No 2 (M.R Brigaded Section) A District Sigs Coy
  • Form NZ 483-61: (d) – No 3 (Fd Arty Bde Sect) A District Sigs Coy
  • Form NZ 483-61: (e) – No 4 (Med Arty Bde Sect) A District Sig Coy
  • Form NZ 483-61: (f) – No 5 (Inf Bde Sect) A District Sig Coy
  • Form NZ 483-71: – An Infantry (Mixed) Battalion
  • Form NZ 483-72: – An Infantry (Mixed) Battalion (Fortress)
  • Form NZ 483-73: – No 2a (LMG) Platoon, for a Fortress Bn
  • Form NZ 483-76: – A Detached Rifle Company, National Military Reserve
  • Form NZ 483-81: – A Composite Company, ASC
  • Form NZ 483-82: – A Reserve MT Company, ASC
  • Form NZ 483-83: – A Composite Company, AHQ Reserve Group
  • Form NZ 483-91: – A Field Ambulance (Mechanised)
  • Form NZ 483-101: – A Light Aid Detachment, NZAOC

Changes to the unit organisation often stemmed from General Staff policy decisions regarding equipment scales—such as weapons, vehicles, and wirelesses—resulting in corresponding amendments to the War Establishments and Unit Equipment Table Form NZ 483 tables.

Each unit maintained both ‘peace’ and ‘war’ establishments. While the peace establishment included reduced personnel and resources for peacetime training, the war establishment detailed the full complement of men and equipment needed for active service. From 1939, regular and territorial units in New Zealand began mobilising to war strength with reservists, integrating the Territorial Force and recruits through the New Zealand Temporary Staff (NZTS), marking the shift to a wartime footing.

With an established table of what stores they should hold, A unit or sub-unit knew exactly what equipment they were responsible for, including spades, shovels, axes, etc. They would also have items of controlled stores usually identified with a serial number – the controlled stores would include compasses, binoculars, wristwatches, etc., which, when issued, would be signed for. When losing a controlled item, a Board of Inquiry was conducted to establish the circumstances of loss and determine who (usually the soldier) should pay for it.

The Company Quartermaster Sergeant (CQMS), whose rank could be Sergeant, Staff Sergeant of Warrant Officer Class Two, or, of course, the Company Commander, was responsible for the accountability of the unit or sub-unit stores. Standards of accountability for unit stores varied, with some units conducting regular kit checks and publishing lists of soldiers with deficiencies and the amount they owed in unit routine orders.

Manual Systems and Administrative Burden

The Army stores accounting system applied to all units of the New Zealand Army. It was based on a unit ledger, supported by inventories, vouchers, schedules, and scales of issue, which recorded all store items and transactions in the unit. All entries in ledgers were to be supported by a voucher, and all vouchers were cleared by posting to the ledger or annotated with a reference to another voucher or to the point of issue. Stores could only be struck off charge by one of the following:

  • An Issue Voucher, signed by the recipient of the stores
  • A Certificate Issue Voucher, where the recipient was not required to sign for the stores
  • A Board of Survey or Certificate of Condemnation
  • By an application to write of Army Stores

Units such as NZAOC depots, MT Branch depots, mobilisation units and Camp Quartermaster Stores were classed as accounting units. They managed their stocks with a ledger card system using the NZ161 Ledger card.[3]

Field Force units maintained their NZ Equipment Table as the main ledger, recording all items issued to the unit and their distribution.

Photograph of World War II servicewomen unloading pillows. Ref: PAColl-8846. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22327559

 While effective, the system was inflexible compared to today’s digital Inventory Management systems. Under the pressures of wartime, maintaining rigorous documentation proved challenging, and adherence to procedural norms was sometimes relaxed to expedite supply to forces in the Pacific and Home Defence.

Mobilisation and Training Impact

In 1941, brigade and district manoeuvres escalated the army’s activity tempo, and early in 1942, the entire Territorial Force was mobilised, and tactical responsibilities with the Home Guard were formalised. Many units operated in active service conditions, with newly trained Quartermasters and staff often lacking prior military store management experience. The potential threat of invasion by Japanese forces added a sense of urgency and pressure, making training and equipping all available troops the top priority, even if it meant sacrificing strict clerical accuracy.[4]

Members of the New Zealand Home Guard receiving equipment. New Zealand. Department of Internal Affairs. War History Branch:Photographs relating to World War 1939-1945. Ref: DA-00477. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. /records/22871820

Before total mobilisation, many of the Regular and Territorial Force personnel and civilian staff skilled in stores accounting had deployed overseas with the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) in the Middle East or with the Brigade Group in Fiji. This left domestic units staffed by officers and NCOs with limited military stores experience, often stationed in field locations without adequate storage facilities. Despite these challenges, the dedication and commitment of these officers and NCOs were unwavering, even as ongoing personnel rotation severely hindered inventory management.

Progress in Accounting Practices

By late 1943, the strategic situation had stabilised, and the threat of invasion was removed, with the demobilisation of the Home Guard and Territorial Force underway by early 1944. As part of this process, comprehensive audits of unit accounts were conducted. Despite some losses due to unrecorded stores, the overall value of missing inventory remained relatively low compared to the total volume managed. The following table presents the total amount written off from April 1939 to March 1944, which was £259,200 (equivalent to $28,119,860 in 2024).

Note that “Deficiencies” – representing faulty accounting – contributed £84,710 ($9,165,191.67 in 2024). Including estimates for undetailed years, this figure suggests that deficiencies represented less than 40% of the total write-offs.[5]

Reflecting on Wartime Logistics and Accountability

During the peak demand period of 1942 and early 1943, stores accounting took a secondary role to the urgent need to supply the mobilised units efficiently. The New Zealand Army was not only receiving large shipments of war material from the United Kingdom and North America but also managing the distribution of substantial volumes of the same equipment for both Pacific deployments and Home Defence, prioritising speed over strict procedural adherence. While this approach led to some irregularities, major scandals were avoided, and only minor cases of misappropriation occurred. This flexibility demonstrates the staff’s pragmatic approach to balancing efficiency and accountability under extreme conditions, ensuring operational needs were met without compromising integrity.

Lessons for Contemporary Military Stores Accounting

This analysis provides a perspective for modern logistics professionals, especially when using contemporary data management systems. Despite the sophisticated features of these platforms—like precise tracking and real-time reporting—the effectiveness of these tools is often linked to the skills and judgment of the personnel who operate them. The lessons from the New Zealand Army’s wartime experiences demonstrate that the strategic use and flexibility in stores accounting can be crucial in emergencies. However, suppose the benefits of the modern systems are not being fully realised. The root cause likely lies in the organisation’s skill sets for managing and leveraging these resources.

Rigidly following procedures can sometimes hinder progress, just as it did in the past when wartime conditions demanded quick and adaptable responses. For today’s logistics leaders, the real challenge is recognising when to exploit the flexibility offered by modern data systems and when to relax procedural controls. Balancing this requires training and experience, especially in crises where the pressure to deliver supplies efficiently can tempt managers to bypass standard processes. While this may be necessary temporarily, the quick restoration of standard procedures is essential to maintaining accountability and data quality.

The key is adaptability, but only to the extent that it does not lead to long-term compromises in record-keeping and operational integrity. If modern data management tools are underperforming, investing in staff training and developing the necessary expertise could ensure these advanced systems are used to their full potential.

Notes

[1] “New Zealand Equipment Tables -Provisional,” New Zealand Army Order 164  (1 July 1939).

[2] “New Zealand Equipment Tables -Provisional,” New Zealand Army Order 216  (1 October 1941).

[3] “FORMS AND BOOKS: Forms adopted,” New Zealand Army Order 266  (1 October 1939).

[4] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150  (1944).

[5] “Appendices to Report on QMG (Quartermaster-General’s) Branch,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541151  (30 June 1944).