The close of the Second World War marked a significant evolution in conflict, challenging the established principles of military theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini. While traditional battles between formed armies continued, insurgencies emerged as the predominant form of warfare in the post-1945 world. Early theorists on insurgency included Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, who promoted insurgency, and David Galula, who developed early theories and practices of counterinsurgency based on his observations and experiences in Southeast Asia. This article examines the experiences and work of David Galula and his influence on modern military operations.

David Galula was commissioned into the French Army just before the fall of France in 1940 but was dismissed because of his Jewish heritage. He subsequently joined the Free French Forces in North Africa, serving as a Battalion Intelligence officer under the mentorship of noted sinologist Jacques Guillermaz, who profoundly influenced Galula’s career.[1] Accompanying Guillermaz to China in 1945 as a military attaché, Galula closely observed the Chinese Civil War from both sides and was briefly held captive by Mao’s Communist troops.[2] After observing the Greek Civil War in 1948, Galula replaced Guillermaz as military attaché in Hong Kong from 1952 to 1956. This posting provided Galula with a strategic vantage point to study both successful counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines and Malaya and the failures in Indochina. These experiences would profoundly shape his approach in Algeria.[3]

In the Philippines, Galula witnessed firsthand how a well-conceived civic action program, mobile striking forces, and psychological warfare successfully garnered the support of the population. This strategic shift caused the Hukbalahap Communist guerrilla movement to lose local protection and forced their surrender in 1954.[4].

Similarly, in Malaya, Galula observed the tide turning in favour of the British in their fight against communist insurgency. This success gave Galula valuable insights into the British approach, emphasizing precise political aims, lawful security operations, and improved governance as essential strategies to defeat insurgency by securing popular support.[5] Galula maintained close contact with fellow officers serving in Indochina, allowing him to witness firsthand the failures of French counterinsurgency efforts that ultimately led to their defeat in 1954.[6] The traumatic loss of twenty of his military academy classmates in the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 deeply affected Galula, motivating him to translate his observations on combating insurgency into practical strategies in Algeria.[7]

As a Company Commander in Algeria in 1956, Galula had the opportunity to put his theories into practice. Assigned to the Greater Kabylia district, a National Liberation Front (FLN) activity hotbed. [8] Galula drew on his earlier experiences and observations to implement his counterinsurgency strategies. Within six to eight months, he claimed to have successfully cleared the district of FLN assets and restored government control.[9] His achievements were recognized, leading to a promotion and a transfer to the Headquarters of National Defence in Paris by 1958. However, Galula’s departure from his former command coincided with the unravelling of his proclaimed successes, raising doubts about the validity of his theories amid the broader conflict unfolding in Algeria.[10]

Despite these challenges, Galula continued to lecture on his theories and pursued further education at Staff College in the United States. He gained attention from figures like General Edward Lansdale, who had met Galula in the Philippines and admired his ideas. In 1962, Galula resigned from his military commission and entered the burgeoning counterinsurgency think tank industry in the United States. Supported by General William Westmoreland, he secured a position at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.[11] During this period, Galula published influential works such as “Pacification in Algeria” (1962) and “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice” (1964).

Galula drew upon lessons from French colonisation experiences in Indochina and Africa during the 19th century in these publications. He also integrated his theories on countering communism-inspired insurgency, shaped by his experiences in Asia and Algeria. From these insights, Galula formulated his four “laws” of counterinsurgency:

• The First Law: The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent.
• The Second Law: Support Is gained through an active minority
• The Third Law: Support from the population Is conditional
• The Fourth Law: Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.[12]

In 1961, the French soldier and academic Bernard Fall published his book “Street Without Joy,” an essay on the French war in Indochina. Fall’s work became prominent in US military journals, and he lectured on counterinsurgency warfare at Fort Bragg in Vietnam.[13] As a leading expert on Indochina, Fall endorsed Galula’s work as the premier “how-to” guide to counterinsurgency warfare.[14] Despite the potential for Galula to rise as a prominent counterinsurgency theorist, buoyed by the Kennedy administration’s embrace of counterinsurgency as a military doctrine, he remained overshadowed by Fall and relatively obscure.[15] Any chance for collaboration between Galula and Fall was lost with their deaths in 1967—Galula to cancer and Fall to a landmine in Vietnam, ironically in an area known by the French as the “street without joy.”[16]

For nearly forty years, Galula’s works remained overlooked mainly outside of historical circles until the United States became involved in Iraq. While the US easily won the conventional war in 2003, it was caught unprepared for the insurgency that ensued. Recognizing the inadequacy of existing resources like the Small Wars Handbook, COIN doctrine, and Special Forces doctrine in addressing the insurgency in Iraq, US forces embarked on a significant initiative. They produced FM 3-24, The US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual. This manual emphasized that political rather than purely military solutions were essential to defeating insurgencies.[17] FM 3-24’s development was significantly influenced by adopting Galula’s theories as its foundation by the American military. The success of the 2007 counterinsurgency “surge” was directly attributed to Galula’s teachings,[18] which were applied contemporarily with limited consideration of historical discrepancies between Galula’s theoretical framework and his practical experiences in counterinsurgency.[19]

Due to the implementation of FM 3-24, the United States counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq achieved some success, giving American forces the upper hand over the insurgents. This mirrored Galula’s findings in Algeria from 1956 to 1959, marking a reversal of the situation observed just a few years earlier.[20] As stability gradually returned to Iraq, American forces were able to complete their withdrawal by 2011. However, similar to Galula’s experience in Algeria, the security and political situation deteriorated once the stabilising influence of US forces diminished. The emergence of Daesh as a regional power exacerbated the insurgency faced by the Iraqi government, highlighting the lack of a sustained plan to maintain the stability achieved through successful counterinsurgency efforts.[21]

Galula was an astute observer in pivotal places at critical times, allowing him to study insurgencies in China, Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, and French Indochina closely. These experiences profoundly shaped his theories on counterinsurgency. In Algeria, Galula had the opportunity to put these theories into practice at both company and battalion levels. However, there was a discrepancy between his theoretical framework and the complexities on the ground, a disparity that became evident after his transfer to Paris.

Endorsed by Bernard Fall as the foremost guide to counterinsurgency warfare, Galula’s theories gained significant traction, particularly within the United States Military, influencing the development of FM 3-24. Successfully employed during the 2007 surge in Iraq, Galula’s concepts garnered praise and seemed adequate in the short term. Yet, following the withdrawal of American forces in 2011, Iraq quickly descended into insurgency, facilitating the emergence of Daesh as a regional power. This outcome underscored the limitations of Galula’s theories when applied without robust field testing by their author or independent authorities.

Galula’s impact on modern military operations remains substantial. However, while his theories are beneficial in achieving immediate objectives, some view them as a transient trend rather than a comprehensive long-term strategy against insurgencies.

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Notes

[1] A.A. Cohen, Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency (Praeger, 2012).

[2] Ann Marlowe, David Galula: His Life and Intellectual Context (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010. 2010).

[3] David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, Mg (Rand Corporation) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), Book.

[4] Ryan Nebres Severo, “Philippine Counterinsurgency During the Presidencies of Magsaysay, Marcos, and Ramos: Challenges and Opportunities,” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 2016).

[5] Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958.

[6] Bernard B. Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” (2015).

[7] Marlowe, David Galula: His Life and Intellectual Context.

[8] P.J Banyard, “FLN: The Fight for Algeria’s Independence,” War in Peace1983.

[9] Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958.

[10] G. Mathias, Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice Versus Theory (ABC-CLIO, 2011).

[11] Marlowe, David Galula: His Life and Intellectual Context.

[12] David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Praeger, 2006), Article.

[13] Frances Fitzgerald, “”Lost on the Street without Joy” (Re “the Reporter Who Warned Us Not to Invade Vietnam 10 Years before the Gulf of Tonkin”),” The Nation, 2015 2015.

[14] Robert Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” US Army War College: Parameters, no. Spring 2004 (2004).

[15] Marlowe, David Galula: His Life and Intellectual Context.

[16] Fitzgerald, “”Lost on the Street without Joy” (Re “the Reporter Who Warned Us Not to Invade Vietnam 10 Years before the Gulf of Tonkin”).”

[17] Travers McLeod, Rule of Law in War: International Law and United States Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 2014).

[18] Michael Evans, “The Shirt of Nessus: The Rise and Fall of Western Counterinsurgency,”  https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2015/01-02/shirt-nessus-rise-fall-western-counterinsurgency/.

[19] Mathias, Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice Versus Theory.

[20] David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), Book.

[21] Mathias, Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice Versus Theory.

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———. Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958. [in English] Mg (Rand Corporation). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. Book.
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