The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine have starkly revealed the vulnerabilities of global supply chains. As these chains slowed and, at times, ceased to be responsive or even function, it has become alarmingly clear that New Zealand’s approach—dismantling much of its manufacturing capacity and relying on international markets—places it at significant risk, especially in times of crisis. In New Zealand, military logisticians face distinct professional challenges unique to our geographical and resource constraints, relying on training based on lessons learned from foreign militaries and doctrine hinged upon greater resources and fewer constraints with little relevance to New Zealand’s unique position in the world. To address the pressing needs of a minor, geographically isolated force, New Zealand must urgently shift towards developing a logistics doctrine rooted in its military history and experiences.
Traditionally, New Zealand’s military logisticians have relied on international texts like Martin van Creveld’s Supplying War, Kenneth Privratsky’s Logistics in the Falklands War, and William Pagonis’s Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War. While these sources offer invaluable insights into logistics for large, well-resourced armies, their practical relevance for New Zealand’s military, which operates within a distinct set of constraints in staffing, budget, location, and strategic reach, is limited. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower once remarked, “Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.”[1] This often-quoted statement underscores the importance of logistics in every military operation. Yet, New Zealand’s logisticians often base decisions on lessons that, while effective for larger forces, may not apply to a minor, leaner military.
Examples of international practices adopted by the New Zealand Military, such as “just-in-time” (JIT) logistics and the commercialisation of logistics functions, have occasionally proved inefficient or costly when scaled down. JIT, a model inspired by commercial business efficiency, prioritises minimising inventory costs and streamlining supply chains. However, for a small military, the risk of adopting strategies such as JIT can fail, as they do not have the flexibility and redundancy required to support and sustain dynamic and prolonged military operations in challenging and dispersed environments.[2] Meanwhile, commercialising military logistics functions often results in declining critical military skills among service personnel. Outsourcing military logistics to civilian contractors reduces the opportunity for military personnel to gain hands-on experience and develop specialised logistic skills, with a decrease in core logistic skills, reducing the military’s organic capabilities.[3] Additionally, dependency on commercial service providers whose motivation is profit may not fully align with or prioritise military readiness and operational effectiveness. This can have the effect of creating vulnerability and hindering military responsiveness and adaptability. Commercial service providers often are unwilling to invest in training and lack incentive or strategic focus inherent in military logistics operations, and this can compromise the military’s self-sufficiency, limit flexibility, and reduce the military’s ability to maintain a robust logistical foundation internally.[4]
Lessons from New Zealand’s Own Military History
New Zealand’s military history contains logistics lessons that could be the basis for a locally relevant approach. During the South African War, New Zealand’s swift deployment of troops marked the first time the country supported an overseas conflict. Despite limited resources, infrastructure and logistical experience, New Zealand’s military demonstrated skill and adaptability in logistics, efficiently mobilising personnel and sourcing and distributing resources.[5] This agility foreshadowed the logistical challenges of World War I when New Zealand’s contribution to the Allied effort saw the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) become one of the largest, best-equipped, and best-trained contingents to leave its shores.[6] These efforts required substantial logistical coordination to rapidly equip, train, and deploy forces at home and across multiple theatres of war, demonstrating New Zealand’s ability to project and sustain military capability.
The 1941-42 mobilisation is one of the most prominent examples of New Zealand’s logistical achievement. Following Japan’s entry into World War II, New Zealand continued to support the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) abroad while also bolstering its Home and Pacific defences in response to the threat of Japanese invasion. Within months, New Zealand’s Territorial Force was entirely mobilised, Pacific Island garrisons strengthened, existing units expanded, and new units were established to support this increased defence commitment. By mid-1942, New Zealand had mobilised approximately 200,000 troops for home defence and in the Pacific Garrisons, including the raising of the 3rd Division for service in the Pacific, providing them with essential equipment, including a dramatic expansion of the Army’s vehicle fleet from just 62 in 1939 to 30,236 by 1944. All this was achieved with limited infrastructure and resources while also establishing additional logistics functions related to movements, quartering, and sustenance, demonstrating remarkable logistical skill and adaptability and proving that an inexperienced force can conduct effective logistics in times of crisis.[7]
A Missed Opportunity to Teach Applicable Lessons
Despite these considerable historic achievements, New Zealand’s military logisticians are rarely, if ever, exposed to their history as a foundation for their logistics training. Instead, case studies of large-scale operations, such as German Logistic planning in 1940, the Burma Campaign or the Gulf War, are often favoured, overlooking relevant examples highlighting logistics’ importance in smaller-scale and austere operations that New Zealand forces are likely to encounter.[8] General Omar Bradley’s words, “Supreme excellence in logistics consists of breaking the enemy’s will to fight without fighting,” resonate with New Zealand’s experience during the 1941-42 mobilisation.[9] This massive effort in logistics management stands as a masterclass in resourceful logistics that has been forgotten and not included in military professional development training programs.
The absence of knowledge of these logistics successes is a missed opportunity to develop logisticians who can adapt to New Zealand’s unique military demands. Former U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis once said, “The most important six inches on the battlefield is between your ears. But the muscles that bring the supply lines are just as essential and often go unappreciated.”[10] Mattis’ sentiment reinforces the importance of logistics as the backbone of military capability, especially for a small nation whose experience during WWII demonstrates the benefits of efficient logistical planning and execution.
Integrating Local Lessons for Future Resilience
By recognising and using examples from New Zealand’s logistical history, New Zealand’s military can create a training framework that places logistics on an equal footing with combat operations. New Zealand’s military history illustrates that logistical resourcefulness, agility, and adaptability are essential and achievable, even with limited resources. Lieutenant Colonel Scott Fowler’s observation that “Logistics lacks the glamour of combat operations, but history has repeatedly shown that without it, the sharp end of the spear would quickly dull” aptly captures logistics’ crucial role in military readiness.[11] Therefore, establishing logistics as a value-adding competency anchored on relevant lessons should become a priority to foster a resilient, responsive and capable defence logistical organisation.
In conclusion, while international case studies provide valuable insights and lessons, they often lack relevance to New Zealand’s unique military logistic challenges. By studying New Zealand’s logistical achievements, such as the 1941-42 mobilisation, more robust preparation can be enabled to prepare its logisticians better to operate effectively within the constraints of a smaller force. Through this approach, New Zealand’s military logisticians would better understand the principles required to meet the relevant and unique operational demands facing New Zealand in a challenging and unpredictable world.
Notes
[1] Dwight D Eisenhower quoted in Robert A. Doughty; Ira D. Gruber and Roy K. Flint, Warfare and Logistics Along the Mississippi: A Case Study of the Civil War. (Boston: Boston University Press, 1998), 145.
[2] David Taylor and John Kingman., “Just-In-Time and the Military: An Examination of a Flawed Strategy,” Journal of Military Logistics 13, no. 2 (2005): 77-89.
[3] Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. 3rd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
[4] John R Martin and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (Routledge, 2015).
[5] Robert McKie, “Unappreciated duty: the forgotten contribution of New Zealand’s Defence Stores Department in mobilising the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in 1914: a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand” (Massey University, 2022), 44-54.
[6] Colin Richardson, “General Sir Alexander Godley, The last Imperial Commander,” in Born to lead? Portraits of New Zealand commanders, ed. Joel Hayward Glyn Harper (Exisle, 2003), 46.
[7] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944,” Archives New Zealand Item No R25541150 (1944).
[8] Defence Logistics NZDDP-4.0 (Second Edition), New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication: NZDDP, (New Zealand Defence Force, 2020), Non-fiction, Government documents. https://fyi.org.nz/request/18385/response/73807/attach/5/NZDDP%204.0.pdf.
[9] “QMG (Quartermaster-Generals) Branch – September 1939 to March 1944.”
[10] James Mattis quoted in Peter J. Munson, War, Welfare & Democracy: Rethinking America’s Quest for the End of History (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2014), 45.
[11] Scott Fowler, The Fundamentals of Marine Corps Logistics ( Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2013)), 34.
